Power asymmetry between the European Union and Africa? A case study of the EU's relations with Ghana and Senegal. by Van Criekinge, Tine
The London School of Economics and Political Science
Power Asymmetry between the European Union and Africa? 
A case study o f the EU’s relations with Ghana and Senegal
Tine Van Criekinge
A thesis submitted to the Department o f International Relations o f  the 
London School o f  Economics for the degree o f  Doctor o f  Philosophy, 
London, June 2009.
UMI Number: U615495
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615495
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
British Library of Political 
anct Economic Science
Declaration
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London 
School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have 
clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried 
out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided 
that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior 
written consent of the author.
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any 
third party.
2
Abstract
The EU’s relationship with Africa is defined by power asymmetry, commonly 
characterised by a distribution of resources and capabilities across issue areas that almost 
always favour those at the top. Although asymmetry constrains weaker parties in 
identifying their preferences and the resources they can draw upon, in practise even in a 
situation of power asymmetry weaker actors can be successful in achieving their 
preferences. This thesis questions why some African countries have been able to exercise 
leverage and control vis-a-vis the EU despite power asymmetry. This question is answered 
through case studies of the EU’s relations with Ghana and Senegal in three policy areas: 
aid, trade, and migration. The thesis adopts an empirical approach firstly to identify both 
parties’ capacities and constraints in conducting relations, and secondly to establish the 
conditions under which African countries are able to fulfil their goals.
As a foreign policy actor the EU faces institutional and political constraints which 
lead to gaps between policy rhetoric and practise, and between expectations and actual 
capabilities. This affects the EU’s position vis-a-vis third parties and creates a disjunction 
between the EU’s structural power and its actual bargaining power. Structurally weaker 
countries are able to influence the EU, firstly, because of how the perceptions they hold of 
the EU’s constraints and capacities shape their own strategies, and secondly, because of the 
presence of certain contextual factors which favour or constrain the exercise of leverage 
and control.
Senegal and Ghana are employed as case studies for the EU’s relations with Africa. 
Although the socio-economic and political environment, the structural differences in 
power, and the EU’s strategies are similar in both countries, Senegal has been more 
effective in promoting its interests than Ghana in relations with the EU. Senegal’s 
perceptions of the EU’s capabilities and constraints, the prevalence of ‘ownership’ and 
government ‘control’, and a strategic position have led to success in attaining its 
preferences and goals. Ghana’s perceptions of apparent differences in structural power and 
mostly externally-driven policy processes have led it to adopt a more cooperative and 
consensual approach, weakening Ghana’s ability to influence processes and outcomes vis- 
a-vis the EU. Leverage and control are therefore found in an actor’s perception of its own 
power and that of others and in an environment where certain conditions favour weaker 
country influence, indicating that power is both relational and contextual.
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Introduction
Power asymmetry between the European Union and Africa?
The European Union’s relationship with Africa is defined by power asymmetry, commonly 
characterised by a distribution of resources and capabilities across issue-areas that almost 
always favour the stronger actor. Although asymmetry constrains weaker actors in 
identifying their preferences and the resources they can draw upon, in practise even in a 
situation of power asymmetry weaker actors can be successful in achieving their 
preferences. This thesis questions why some African countries have been able to achieve 
their preferences vis-a-vis the EU despite power asymmetry. This is answered through case 
studies of the EU’s relations with Ghana and Senegal in three policy areas: aid, trade, and 
migration. The thesis adopts an empirical approach to identifying both parties’ capacities 
and constraints in conducting relations, and to establish the conditions under which African 
countries are able to fulfil their goals in relations with the EU.
1 The research agenda
Traditional analyses of relations between so-called weak and the strong countries, and in 
particular between developing and developed countries, contend that relations are centred 
around an unequal distribution of power, making for an asymmetric (or unequal) 
relationship. This relationship is commonly characterised by “a hierarchical distribution of 
resources and abilities simultaneously across many issue areas that almost always result in 
outcomes favorable to those at the top of the hierarchy” (Singh 2000: 451). Clearly, a 
situation of power asymmetry exists between the EU and Africa, not solely because of the 
obvious economic disparities that exist between the parties, but also due to gaps in 
institutional capacity. EU-Africa relations are supposed to undermine asymmetry as they 
are institutionalised, and are based, at least rhetorically, on the notion of ‘partnership’.1 
Despite this, the outcome of recent EU-Africa negotiations and actual implementation of 
the EU’s policy towards Africa demonstrate that asymmetry persists. Elgstrom and 
Stromvik have argued, for example, that the EU’s negotiations with the African, Caribbean,
1 According to Farrell, “the partnership concept... suggests free will, equal weight in terms of influence and 
ability to shape negotiations and outcomes, and the expectation o f favourable results for each partner” (2005: 
265).
and Pacific Group of States (ACP)2 offer a good example of asymmetric power relations in 
which “the chance for the European Union to have its way ... is greatly enhanced” (2005: 
121). This power asymmetry has been coupled with an increased marginalisation of Africa 
on the EU’s foreign policy agenda largely due to increasing EU interest elsewhere and 
more pressing domestic and foreign policy concerns.3 At the turn of the millennium, 
Cosgrove-Sacks aptly noted that, “there seems little doubt that the ACP and Africa in 
particular have slipped down the EU agenda ... Contentious issues are likely to be sidelined 
and the special sensitivities of the least developed countries are unlikely to command 
significant attention. In short, the marginalization of developing countries’ interests has 
become part of the status quo” (1999: 357). Indeed contextual developments, such as EU 
enlargements which consequentially shifted the EU’s focus towards other developing 
countries, and more important, the end of the Cold War, which further shifted the EU’s 
focus to more closely consider its Central and Eastern European neighbours, “served to 
undermine the relative power of the ACP countries” (Elgstrom 2005: 186). As Africa’s 
power diminished, the EU’s was seen as expanding. The end of the Cold War created 
expectations for the EU to become a more global actor, in that it had acquired more room to 
manoeuvre on the international stage. The EU began distributing aid to more parts of the 
world, there was an increase in cooperation and association agreements with non-ACP 
countries and other regional groups, and the EU’s foreign policy began taking shape and 
expanding (Smith 2004: 61-63).
Marginalisation and power asymmetry thus characterise relations between the EU 
and Africa. Indeed, taken as a whole, the ACP group and Africa in particular have been 
largely unsuccessful in having their demands met by the EU. In 2000, the negotiations on 
the Cotonou Agreement, the current framework governing EU-ACP relations, clearly 
showed the extent to which power asymmetry and marginalisation contributed to an 
outcome that was much more favourable towards the EU’s preferences than those of the 
ACP. Cotonou broke dramatically with past orientations of the EU’s policy towards the 
ACP and Africa, by eliminating preferential trade, basing aid allocations on countries’ 
merits and needs, introducing more stringent political and economic conditionalities, and
2 Throughout the thesis, reference is often made to the ACP group as a whole, because it has been under the 
EU-ACP framework that relations with African countries have mainly operated. Therefore, many o f the 
policies the EU implements in Africa are similar to those for the entire ACP group. This also implies that the 
African focus namely refers to sub-Saharan Africa, as relations with Northern African countries largely fall 
under a separate framework. Furthermore, references made to ‘Africa’ implies African countries, and does not 
mean that Africa is a unitary actor.
3 EU foreign policy is a set o f actions and objectives which seek to pursue and promote the interests, values, 
and goals o f the EU in its relations with other international actors. For other definitions, see especially Smith 
2008: 2; Smith 2002: 7; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 19.
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expanding the scope of relations beyond the development and trade framework to include
political and security issues. As Farrell notes:
The negotiations over the Cotonou Agreement showed just how asymmetrical this 
partnership really was ... The outcom e appears to reflect less o f  the consensual tone 
one might expect from partnership ... The European Union was able to impose 
certain conditions upon its erstwhile partner that the latter w as unable to refuse due 
to asymmetric bargaining strengths (2005: 271-272).
Elgstrom’s (2005) interpretation of the ACP’s role in the Cotonou negotiations also offers a 
telling account of just how the EU imposed its preferences on the countries, leaving little 
room for negotiation or compromise.
Although power asymmetry permeates relations between the weak and the strong, it 
does not necessarily determine that the outcome of these interactions will always favour the 
strong. Recent scholarship has begun to note changes to traditional approaches 
characterising relations between the strong and the weak as a zero-sum game. In fact, the 
role of the weak in the framework of international trade negotiations has seemingly 
strengthened, with an increasing number of developing countries refusing to submit to the 
‘take it or leave it’ offers made by stronger developed countries (Drahos 2003; Habeeb 
1988; Hess 2001; Page 2003; Odell 2006; Singh 2003; Solignac Lecomte 2003). Can the 
same be said for the EU’s relations with Africa? In a context where EU interests clearly 
dominate the agenda, some anomalies exist. In fact, by shifting the focus of analysis to the 
individual country level, rather than on Africa or the ACP group as a whole, it is apparent 
that some countries have demonstrated not only a capacity to negotiate with the EU, but 
more importantly, on occasion have had success in having their demands met. This 
suggests that power relations between the EU and Africa are not as straightforward as they 
may seem given the situation of power asymmetry. Indeed, careful consideration of the 
context in which such relations take place is essential in establishing both parties’ 
limitations and capacities vis-a-vis one another. Senegal and Ghana are taken as case 
studies for examining this larger relationship between the EU and Africa. Although power 
asymmetry and marginalisation characterise their relations with the EU, they have had 
varying degrees of success and failure in attempting to fulfil their preferences in 
negotiations and relations with the EU. Given that power asymmetry defines EU-Africa 
relations, how is it that some African countries have been able to make demands and have 
these met in their relations with the EU? Is this success country-driven or EU-driven? Why 
have some African countries been more successful than others in exercising leverage and 
maintaining control vis-a-vis the EU?
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2 The argument and the analytical approach
The main argument of this thesis is that despite the fact that power asymmetry is an 
overarching characteristic of relations between the EU and African countries, relational and 
contextual factors can explain why some countries have been successful in reaching their 
goals and preferences vis-a-vis the EU. This is because the EU faces institutional and 
political constraints that lead to gaps between policy rhetoric and practise, and between 
expectations and actual capabilities. This affects the EU’s position vis-a-vis third parties 
and creates a disjunction between the EU’s structural power and its actual bargaining 
power. Structurally weaker countries are able to achieve their preferences and goals 
successfully vis-a-vis the EU, firstly, because of how perceptions of the EU’s constraints 
and capacities shape their strategies vis-a-vis the EU, and secondly, because relational and 
contextual factors can create conditions in which weaker countries can be successful in 
reaching their goals and preferences vis-a-vis stronger actors. In other words, the ability of 
an actor to be successful can be constrained or facilitated according to certain factors that 
intervene in power asymmetry and shape countries’ strategies, demands, and ability to 
exercise leverage and maintain control. Leverage refers to the ability of an actor to reach its 
preferences and interests vis-a-vis another actor by placing its interests and preferences on 
the political agenda; by getting the other actor to take its demands and concerns seriously 
(i.e. opinions, criticisms, and demands are seen as legitimate and valid); and modifying or 
shifting others’ behaviour, choices, decisions, or preferences. Control, or ownership, refers 
to the freedom, or relative freedom, a weaker actor has to formulate and pursue strategies 
and policy preferences and implement policy outcomes without interference from outsiders, 
without necessarily pleasing external actors, or without having to compromise or 
accommodate the interests of others in order to reach its preferences and goals (see Chapter 
1 for a more detailed discussion on leverage and control).
By relational factors it is meant that power is understood as operating between two 
or more actors in a specific context or issue-area. Acknowledging that power is relational is 
essential for understanding asymmetry. Thus the exercise of power is dependent on the 
relationship that exists between two or more actors. Furthermore, the issue-areas and 
context in which the parties operate matter greatly in determining how power asymmetry 
shapes both the process and the outcomes of these relations. As such, in establishing how 
and why a weaker actor has or has not been able to reach its preferences vis-a-vis a stronger 
actor these two all-important factors must be taken into account. Conceptualising power as 
contextual recognizes that resources or capabilities relevant in a particular context may
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prove irrelevant or useless in another. Furthermore, the contextual nature of power denotes 
that certain historical, socio-economic, political, and cultural factors can also intervene in a 
power asymmetric environment. Power can thus be characterised as operating through an 
interactive, dynamic, and intersubjective process in which contextual factors intervene in 
shaping the extent to which actors can exercise leverage vis-a-vis another and maintain 
control (see Chapter 1). Therefore, an actor’s preferences, interests and demands shape both 
the process and outcome of power relations, and the structural environment, or contextual 
factors constrain or facilitate the exercise of leverage and control. Both the agent and the 
structure affect and shape the process and outcome of power relations. Power asymmetry 
therefore is not a static situation, in which one actor is fatalistically bound to concede to the 
demands of the stronger actor. Instead, power is exercised through an interplay of actor 
preferences, demands and interests, and a dynamically-evolving context in which such 
relations occur.
If power is conceptualised as relational it can help explain why in situations of 
power asymmetry sometimes the weaker actor can continue to maintain control, make 
demands and even exercise leverage vis-a-vis a stronger actor. Because of the relational 
nature of power, the way in which the actors formulate preferences, strategies, and 
demands vis-a-vis one another is a crucial element to take account of in analysing successes 
and failures in a power asymmetric environment. In this sense, success is intrinsically 
linked to how an actor perceives its own power as opposed to that of others, as well as how 
it perceives the other actor’s power as opposed to its own. Power is thus influenced and 
shaped by actors’ perceptions of themselves, of others, and vis-a-vis one another. Thus 
although an actor may possess power in the traditional sense, if it is not perceived by the 
weaker actor to be able to convert this power into bargaining power, this necessarily 
hampers its ability ‘get what it wants’. In analysing power relations between weak and 
strong parties, it is therefore crucial to identify both parties’ capacities and constraints in 
conducting relations with one another, for it is the perception of these capacities and 
constraints which shape actors perceptions and their consequent strategies vis-a-vis one 
another. It is argued that in its relations with Africa, the EU is constrained on three levels: 
in terms of terms of its capability to employ the resources and expertise necessary to 
effectively implement its policies in African countries; in terms of coherence and 
coordination between the different actors and institutions comprising the EU; and in terms 
of consistency and coherence between the various policies constituting the EU’s foreign 
policy actions. These constraints are seen as affecting other actors’ perception of the EU,
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which in turn contribute to shaping the weaker actor’s own strategy, approach, and 
demands (see Chapter 1).
Yet perceptions alone cannot entirely explain weaker actor leverage and control. 
Although perceptions shape the actors’ approach and strategy vis-a-vis one another, they do 
not necessarily determine success in exercising leverage and maintaining control. Indeed, 
this is where the contextual and structural nature of power relations becomes fundamental 
in explaining weaker actor successes and failures in a situation of power asymmetry. For it 
is the contextual environment in which relations between weaker and stronger actors 
operate which determines firstly how the countries perceive one another and secondly how 
the preferences and strategies adopted translate into successfully reaching preferences in 
policy processes and outcomes. The thesis thus considers five main categories of contextual 
factors which are seen as creating the conditions under which weaker countries are either 
constrained or able to exercise leverage and control: these are namely historical, 
institutional, economic, strategic, and political/ideological factors (see Chapter 1).
The thesis focuses on three different fields or issue-areas in which the EU and 
Africa have been or are seeking cooperation, namely aid/development, trade, and 
migration. Aside from migration, the thematic areas are the main policy fields in which 
EU-Africa relations operate. Examining relations in the specific context of these three 
thematic areas can offer insight into how different issue-areas and contextual environments 
influence strategies and approaches, as well as recognising that power asymmetry can differ 
from one issue-area to the next, and is therefore not a determinant for policy processes and 
outcomes between weak and strong actors. The areas were chosen for the following 
reasons.
Aid and development cooperation through the funding of projects and programmes, 
is the most traditional and established form of cooperation between the EU and Africa. Aid 
relations between the EU and Africa have a long tradition, which although having evolved 
over time, have led to significant familiarity between the parties. Yet the aid framework is 
one in which differences in power between the EU and Africa are expected to be the most 
pronounced, in that the politics of aid are concretely based on an asymmetry of resources 
between donors and recipients. From a neorealist point of view therefore, this implies that 
recipient countries are generally reliant on the preferences of donors, as it is namely the 
donor exerting control over the resources the recipient aims to acquire.
As in aid, the EU’s trade relations with Africa also point to a similar power 
asymmetry. The sheer size of the EU’s market, its vast experience conducting trade 
negotiations, and its position as a primary donor in Africa, compared to the extreme trade
18
marginalisation of most African economies and the significant capacity constraints in terms 
of human resources and technical trade expertise illustrate this asymmetry. Furthermore, 
the EU does not have particular strategic economic interests in most of Africa and so 
countries’ structural bargaining strength is expected to be significantly weaker than that of 
the EU. The evident structural asymmetries that exist between the EU and African 
countries in the aid and trade fields make these areas particularly relevant for further 
investigation for weaker actor leverage and control. Aid and trade therefore were chosen on 
the basis that these are, and have been since the beginning, the main pillars of EU-Africa 
relations. As such, they are the main areas in which the parties negotiate and interact with 
one another, and therefore merit due consideration in examining power relations.
Migration is a slightly different issue-area compared to aid and trade. The need to 
engage migrant-sending countries to cooperate in stemming migratory flows challenges the 
traditional asymmetric relationship between the weak and the strong. The necessity for 
cooperation on the EU side is expected to create a more balanced relationship in which both 
parties can make demands and concessions. The increased priority of migration issues on 
the EU agenda as well as the realisation that migration can only be effectively managed in 
joint cooperation, have possibly given some African governments a new scope for 
influence in putting forward their agendas and in making demands on the EU. As such, this 
field potentially offers important insight into the changing and evolving context in which 
relations between the EU and Africa take place, and how this may affect the actors’ 
positions towards one another. Migration was chosen over other new policy fields in which 
cooperation is now unfolding, namely because of the increasing importance this issue-area 
is starting to acquire in EU-Africa relations, and especially in the EU’s relations with West 
Africa. Indeed, as the migration phenomenon grows, it is likely that this area will continue 
to remain high on the EU-Africa political agenda.
3 Methodology
The thesis adopts an empirical approach to analysing power asymmetry between the EU 
and African countries. As such, the analysis relies mainly on detailed descriptions of how 
Senegal and Ghana’s perceptions and contextual factors have shaped the countries’ 
strategies since the coming into force of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000. The empirically- 
oriented investigation proceeds in four steps: First, the capacities and the constraints the EU 
has in formulating and implementing its policy preferences with Africa are considered, in 
order to establish its limitations and how these may affect the perception of the countries 
under investigation. Second, the EU’s policy orientations, actions, and implementation
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record are examined, to contextualise the relationship between the parties and establish the 
extent to which the EU has been coherent and consistent in its policies towards Senegal and 
Ghana. Third, the countries’ policy preferences and the strategies they have adopted to 
reach those preferences are analysed. Finally, the reasons behind the countries’ success or 
failure are assessed, by examining how perceptions and contextual factors contributed to 
the exercise of leverage and control.
The conclusions are largely context-bound and sweeping generalisations about 
power relations between the weak and the strong are necessarily limited. Nevertheless, this 
empirically-focused approach does have its strengths. Firstly, such an approach recognises 
that EU-Africa relations are complex and context-bound, and relying merely on 
assumptions that power asymmetry determines how the actors will interact with one 
another presents a rather simplistic view of this relationship. In challenging the notion that 
power asymmetry determines processes and outcomes, it is crucial to investigate these 
relations at the individual country level. Looking at Africa or the ACP as a whole overlooks 
the complexities of these relations and fails to provide insight into perceptions held of the 
EU, how and why certain policy preferences and negotiating strategies are adopted, and 
how these strategies translate into a capacity to exercise leverage and maintain control in 
relations with the EU. Secondly, the detailed descriptive approach taken in the country 
chapters allows for informed comparisons of the different strategies that the countries have 
employed in their relations with the EU. Although the findings are indeed country-specific, 
the framework developed in the thesis can be applied to similar situations in which 
developing countries might be able to exercise leverage and control vis-a-vis stronger 
external actors. This then, can be used to formulate wider generalisations about the way in 
which these countries are able to negotiate successfully despite evident power asymmetries 
between actors. In sum, the thesis uses detailed empirical analysis to demonstrate that the 
traditional conceptualisation about power asymmetry in EU-Africa relations is too one­
dimensional. It shows that there is more to these relations than meets the eye. Although it 
by no means negates that power asymmetry exists, it aims to demonstrate that in taking into 
closer consideration the context in which relations between the EU and African countries 
operate, this asymmetry can be seen as decidedly less deterministic.
Gathering information for the empirical work involved extensive field research 
based largely on in-depth interviews with relevant EU and African policy-makers and 
technical experts. Between March and September 2008, 47 interviews were conducted
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mainly in Brussels, Accra, and Dakar.4 These followed a semi-structured format, in that 
participants were provided with a set of questions, but with the discussion generally 
consisting in a flexible approach to allow respondents to talk about their views, 
experiences, and perceptions. Information gathered from the interviews was corroborated 
with primary and secondary materials. EU and individual country documents, publications, 
and reports as well as press releases and media coverage on negotiation positions, the 
process and results of negotiations, and the implementation of demands were thoroughly 
examined to substantiate claims made in the interviews.
3.1 Timeframe: post-Cotonou
The thesis will examine EU-Africa relations in a relatively short time period, 
namely since the signing of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 and the decade following the 
implementation of the Agreement. As mentioned above, the negotiations surrounding the 
Cotonou Agreement, and the signing and implementation of the Agreement signalled a 
definite shift in the way in which relations between the two country blocs would be 
conducted. How did Cotonou change EU-Africa relations? And why does it merit a detailed 
study of how this affected the ability of African countries to reach their preferences vis-a- 
vis the EU?
Cotonou signalled a decisive shift in relations between the EU, Africa, and the ACP 
in general. On the one hand, relations between the country blocs became less unique, 
through the ending of preferential trade access, the onset of political and economic 
conditionalities, and the use of more subjective judgements on the merits of countries being 
able to receive financial assistance. Indeed, as Smith wrote, “What is [or was] happening, is 
not a shift away from the ACP, or at least African states, but a normalization of relations 
with them, in that those relations are becoming more like the EU’s relations with other 
regions: more political and encompassing a wider range of concerns” (2004:70-71; see also 
Orbie 2004: 18-19). Africa, and the ACP, became one amongst the many regions or set of 
countries with which the EU conducted its external relations, and the instruments used to 
project the EU’s objectives and implement its policies came to resemble more closely those
4 15 interviews were conducted with officials in the relevant directorate-generals in the European 
Commission, namely DG Development, DG Trade, and EuropeAid; 5 interviews were conducted with 
Commission officials from the EC Delegations in Accra and Dakar; in Dakar 9 interviews and in Accra 11 
interviews were conducted with senior officials and technical experts/advisors from the Senegalese and 
Ghanaian governments with relevant experience negotiating with EU. 3 interviews were conducted with 
practitioners in international organisations based in Accra and Dakar; 2 interviews were conducted in London 
with officials working for the UK government; and 2 interviews were conducted in Berlin and Brussels with 
African diplomats with relevant experience with the EU both in European and African contexts. Follow-up 
information was also gathered through electronic and telephone correspondence with some participants.
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used to deal with other geographical areas. In addition to this normalisation, the continent 
also became increasingly marginalised in terms of its importance on the EU’s foreign 
policy agenda. Other regions and other foreign policy concerns aside from Africa and 
development became priorities for the EU. On the other hand, relations also became more 
politicised, with conditionality becoming a more prominent instrument with which the EU 
could essentially make more subjective judgements on countries’ performance. 
Furthermore, political and security elements, such as the onset of official and regular 
‘political dialogue’ between the parties and support for policies on and actions in areas 
ranging from migration, peace-keeping, drug trafficking, terrorism, and arms proliferation 
were also integrated into the EU-Africa framework. In sum, Cotonou significantly changed 
the relationship between the EU and Africa, and in so doing, created both new challenges 
and new opportunities between the two parties. It is on the contemporary context of this 
changing relationship where the thesis will place its focus.
While the early part of the decade following Cotonou clearly confirmed the 
marginalisation of Africa, as the continent slipped further down the list of EU priorities in 
terms of trade, development, and foreign policy in general, in recent years scholars and 
practitioners alike have come to note a definite resurgence of Africa on the EU agenda 
(Carbone 2008: 218; Michel 2007; Kotsopoulos 2007; Kotsopoulos and Sidiropoulos 
2007). Indeed, this has been confirmed, at least in theory, by the coming into force of the 
EU-Africa Strategic Partnership in the latter part o f2007. In implementing the partnership, 
the EU recognised the regained strategic and economic importance of the continent, and 
confirmed its intention to remain a crucial actor in the developments that are now re­
shaping Africa’s relations with external actors. It has thus become far too simplistic to 
dismiss these relations as marginalised or asymmetric provided the increased opportunities 
African countries are now anticipated to have.
Certainly, this very recent and brief timeframe on which the thesis focuses implies 
that many of the processes and issues under examination are currently ongoing and 
continually evolving, therefore some conclusions will be somewhat preliminary. However, 
nearly 10 years have passed since the signing of Cotonou, and given the changes in the 
relationship stemmed by this Agreement, in addition to the regained importance of Africa 
in international affairs, the time is ripe to re-examine EU-Africa relations within this new 
and evolving context, and to account for the way in which this changing context has either 
permitted or constrained African countries’ opportunities for reaching their preferences vis- 
a-vis external actors.
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3.2 Case studies: Why West Africa? Why Senegal and Ghana?
In analysing how and why some African countries have been successful in reaching 
their demands vis-a-vis a structurally stronger EU, the thesis places the focus exclusively 
on the West African region. There are three reasons for this choice. Firstly, because of the 
region’s close proximity to Europe and the long-standing historical ties between the parties, 
there has been considerable involvement and interaction between the EU and West Africa, 
thus offering a rich basis upon which to conduct detailed empirical research. Secondly, the 
proximity and close ties have also led West Africa to become a particularly relevant region 
in which the EU is now negotiating and implementing many of its newer policies and 
actions on migration, peacekeeping, arms proliferation, and drug trafficking. This makes 
West Africa a particularly interesting region to investigate more closely, because of the 
increased significance that these policies and actions are gaining in the context of the EU’s 
relations with the continent. Thirdly, West Africa is the poorest region in the world, which 
makes conclusions on West African countries’ ability or inability to exercise leverage and 
control vis-a-vis one of the wealthiest regions in the world particularly interesting and 
important. In demonstrating that some countries, despite their extreme poverty and the 
significant structural constraints they face, are able to formulate strategies, project these 
onto structurally stronger external actors, and have on occasion been successful in getting 
their demands met, it can be shown that firstly, contextual and nuanced analyses are 
absolutely fundamental in understanding relations between weak and strong actors, and 
secondly, that the way in which the capacities and preferences of developing countries have 
been conceptualised in the past, are perhaps in need of rethinking.
Within the West African region^Senegal and Ghana have been chosen as the two 
case studies for examining the possibility of weaker country leverage and ownership in EU- 
Africa relations. The countries have been selected based on a most similar methodology, 
which implies that as ‘weaker’ countries they share many of the same characteristics yet 
they have differing degrees of success vis-a-vis the EU. The thesis aims to explain why two 
countries which on the surface seem quite similar in terms of their history with the EU, face 
similar structural constraints in negotiating with the EU, and are comparable with regards 
to their political and strategic position, have adopted such differing strategies towards the 
EU and have had differing degrees of success in having their preferences met.
Both Senegal and Ghana have a long history of relations with the EU and its 
Member States. Senegal gained independence from France in 1960, but retained close ties 
with Europe through its ‘special relationship’ with France, maintaining close political,
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military, and cultural links, and through association to the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1957, and later to the EC/EU as a signatory to the Yaounde (1963), Lome (1975) 
and Cotonou (2000) agreements, governing EU-ACP relations. Ghana was the first country 
in Africa to gain independence from Britain in 1957. After Britain joined the EEC in 1973, 
Ghana became a signatory to the Lome Convention, and has continued to cooperate with 
the EU through the framework of the Cotonou Agreement. Upon becoming part of the ACP 
group, both countries have received development assistance from the EU under the 
European Development Fund (EDF); until 2008, their exports had preferential access to the 
EU market; and since 2000 the countries have engaged in considerable political dialogue 
with the EU through the auspices of the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership, EU-ECOWAS 
(Economic Community of West African States, a regional organisation of which both 
countries are members) ministerial troika meetings, and through bilateral dialogue on issues 
such as migration, fisheries, and the environment. The long-standing history of cooperation 
between Senegal and Ghana and the EU have allowed for significant familiarity and 
experience between the parties.
Despite these established relations, structural power asymmetry between Senegal 
and Ghana and the EU is prevalent, and it is precisely for this reason that they make for 
interesting cases for studying weaker country leverage and ownership vis-a-vis the EU. 
Given their structural weaknesses, it is relatively unexpected that either of these countries 
might be able to exercise leverage and maintain control in relations with a structurally 
stronger EU. Both Senegal and Ghana are amongst the most aid-dependent countries in 
Africa, with poverty, income inequality, and significant developmental challenges featuring 
prominently as structural constraints to the countries’ economic and financial position (see 
Table 3.1 in Chapter 3). In terms of world trade, both countries are heavily marginalised. 
They have small export markets, mainly concentrated in a limited number of agricultural 
and service sectors, while they are required to import heavily to meet basic needs due to 
limited industrialisation and low production capacity (see Chapter 5). Furthermore, as low 
income countries, they both face significant constraints in their institutional capacity to 
formulate strategies, administer relations with external actors, and negotiate at the 
international level. This compared to the EU’s financial, economic, and institutional 
strengths clearly shows the significant power asymmetry typical of relations between the 
EU and many African countries.
Notwithstanding these evident constraints that characterise the countries as the 
‘weaker’ party, they also have some notable assets that could strengthen their strategic 
positions vis-a-vis the EU. Indeed, political stability in a tumultuous region, a
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commendable record of good governance, democracy, and adherence to human rights, and 
a willingness to implement structural economic reforms, have positioned Senegal and 
Ghana as relative success stories on the African continent. Furthermore, both countries 
have also been politically active at the regional and continental levels in promoting peace, 
development and integration, and are considered to have an important role in 
contemporary African diplomacy and politics. The countries’ track record in political and 
economic reform, and their position of leadership at the continental level have also made 
them attractive aid recipients and partners in political cooperation for the EU, as their 
success can be used to point out developmental and political successes to an often sceptical 
public. Indeed, the countries have both been preferred aid recipients of EU aid, faring well 
amongst ACP countries in terms of the aid they have been allocated relative to their need 
and good performance records (see Table 3.5 in Chapter 3).
Although the countries are seemingly quite similar, interestingly, their strategies 
towards the EU have been rather divergent. The countries’ hold very different perceptions 
of their own capacity to exercise leverage and maintain ownership vis-a-vis the EU and of 
the EU’s capacity to transform its structural strengths into bargaining strengths. While 
Senegal has sometimes adopted a conflictual approach and exerted a strong sense of 
ownership in relations with the EU, Ghana has instead demonstrated a much more 
consensual stance, preferring compromise over confrontation. It is argued that these 
differing perceptions and approaches have led to differing levels of success in convincing 
the EU to consider more closely their preferences and in maintaining control over their 
policy agendas despite the constraints they face as weak countries. The reasons behind the 
varying degrees of success can only be explored by delving deeper into the context of each 
country’s relations with the EU.
In choosing two West African countries as case studies to explore the wider context 
of EU-Africa relations, the conclusions will be specific to the country and regional context. 
At the same time, the two case studies can also be considered representative of those 
African, and indeed, developing countries that are increasingly demonstrating political will 
and capacity to negotiate at the bilateral and multilateral levels, despite marginalisation and 
capacity constraints. As such, the case studies can be considered a first step in identifying 
common trends between different African, ACP, and even developing countries in their 
relations with the EU, but also with other international actors.
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4 Outline of the thesis
The thesis consists in seven substantive chapters. Chapter 1 provides the conceptual 
framework for the thesis. The chapter provides a brief overview of the literature on EU- 
Africa relations and identifies some of its shortcomings. It then summarises the different 
approaches to the concept of power in International Relations literature and how these have 
conceptualised weak and strong actor power relations. Based on these two fields of 
literature, the chapter proposes several theoretically-informed hypotheses on power 
asymmetry in EU-Africa relations. The thesis then proceeds with the empirical analysis of 
relations between the EU and Senegal and Ghana in the three thematic areas. Chapter 2 lays 
out the changes that have occurred in the EC’s development policy and how these have 
impacted on EU-Africa relations. It focuses particularly on the European Commission as a 
donor and the EC as a development actor in Africa and looks at the constraints faced by the 
EC and how these affect its position in Africa. These constraints challenge the idea that 
structurally stronger actors necessarily hold all the cards when negotiating aid with 
structurally weaker countries. Chapter 3 analyses the extent to which Senegal and Ghana 
have or have not been able to reach their preferences within the framework of the EC’s 
development cooperation policy, and more specifically questions whether the countries 
have or have not been able to maintain control over negotiations and implementation of 
financial assistance. Although power asymmetry between the donor and the recipient is 
clearly a reality, this does not necessarily determine that negotiated outcomes are in favour 
of the donor rather than the recipient, nor does it necessarily determine whether an aid 
relationship is successful or not. Chapter 4 explores the changes that have ensued in the 
EU’s trade policy towards Africa and analyses how these changes have impacted on the 
EU’s relations with the continent, and it establishes the EU’s constraints and capacities in 
exercising power as a trade negotiator in Africa. Regardless of the EU’s experience in trade 
negotiations and its economic size, the constraints faced by the EU create a disjunction 
between the EU’s structural power and its actual bargaining power or ability to influence 
and negotiate a preferred outcome with weaker actors in trade negotiations. Chapter 5 
examines how Senegal and Ghana have or have not been able to achieve their preferences 
in regional trade negotiations between the EU and West Africa. Due to favourable 
contextual conditions and the countries’ perceptions of the EU as a trade negotiator, at the 
individual country level there has been some scope for influencing negotiating processes 
and outcomes. Chapter 6 explores how the EU’s external migration policy has influenced 
its relations with African migrant-sending countries and examines the EU’s capacities and
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constraints in implementing an effective and coherent approach to cooperation in migration 
matters with Africa. The EU is constrained in fully engaging in migration dialogue and 
policy with Africa and this has affected the EU’s position vis-a-vis Africa in a context in 
which interests in migration diverge. Chapter 7 discusses how the EU’s migration policy 
has affected the scope of influence of migrant-sending countries, Senegal and Ghana, 
noting that the increased strategic importance migration has afforded to some African 
countries, as well as the necessity for joint cooperation, has created a more balanced 
relationship in which both parties can make demands and concessions. Finally, the 
conclusion reviews the main findings and places these in the larger context of power 
asymmetry in EU-Africa relations. It discusses the implications of the research on the wider 
international role of the EU in the world and identifies some future avenues of research to 
advance the field.
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Chapter 1
Power and asymmetry in EU-Africa relations: 
A conceptual framework
The concept of power has been, and continues to be, one of the most highly contested areas 
of debate in the field of International Relations (IR) and beyond (Barnett and Duvall 2005; 
Schmidt 2005). The debate has generated various definitions and understandings of how 
power operates in general and between actors. Although this thesis adopts an empirical 
approach to studying power asymmetry, it is nonetheless necessary to lay out a framework 
for the concept of power. The chapter firstly explores how power asymmetry has been 
conceptualised in the context of EU-Africa relations, indicating that an EU-centric 
approach to these relations has tended to place power exclusively in the hands of the EU, 
obscuring African opportunities to exercise leverage and maintain control. This is followed 
by an outline of five different theoretical approaches to understanding power. It summarises 
how each approach conceptualises power; the main scholars to whom these understandings 
can be attributed; and lastly whether these understandings contribute to a better 
understanding of power relations between weak and strong actors. The chapter then defines 
the concepts of power, leverage and control as they will be used throughout the thesis, 
while the last section provides several theoretically and empirically-derived hypotheses of 
how weaker actors might exercise leverage in relations where power asymmetry is a 
defining characteristic.
1 Power Asymmetry in EU-Africa relations: moving beyond the current debate
Theoretical and empirical analyses of EU-Africa relations have tended to place overarching 
power on the side of the EU. The EU, the Commission, and/or the Member States, are the 
focal points of these analyses, and are considered to have the ultimate decision-making 
power when it comes to relations with African countries. Indeed, relations between Africa 
and the EU have long been conceptualised as driven mainly by the EU’s interests and 
preferences. Ravenhill (1985) contended that a mixture of psychological, political, 
bureaucratic and economic factors explained the EU’s relations with Africa. The EU-Africa 
relationship operated along clientelistic lines, in which the EU and the Member States 
behaved as collective patrons towards the ‘clients of the Community.’ Holland (2002) 
found that integration theory could best explain the EU’s actions abroad, in which
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development policy was seen as a core activity in order to further the EU’s integration 
efforts. Olsen (2002, 2005) instead argued that the EU’s role in development could be 
understood through a combination of ‘European’ and elite bureaucratic interests, rather 
than altruistic considerations. He suggested that because general EU interest in the ACP, 
and Africa in particular, became marginal in the face of ever-expanding and competing 
foreign policy interests elsewhere, the policy serves the EU’s self-interests to the extent that 
it establishes the EU as a significant international actor and enhances European integration 
efforts (Olsen 2002: 145). Farrell (2005) suggested that the EU’s policy actions and its 
behaviour in the Cotonou and trade negotiations with Africa have been beset by realist 
tendencies. In this sense, the EU’s policies towards Africa operate along interest-based 
lines rather than according to a normative framework in support of core values such as 
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.
Others have focused on internal policy formulation and the EU’s negotiating 
approach towards Africa and the ACP, and in so doing, indicate that it is essentially the EU 
which holds ultimate decision-making power in relations with weaker actors. Elgstrom 
(2000,2005) considered how the internal decision-making processes of the EU are a vital 
factor in determining how the EU negotiates with the ACP countries in asymmetrical 
negotiations. Rather than looking at the EU’s material bargaining power, Elgstrom 
emphasised the role of norms as explanatory factors for the EU’s position towards the ACP. 
The EU is argued to be on the stronger side of an asymmetric bargaining game, because its 
norms and identity play a central role in determining its preferences and outcomes. Carbone 
(2007) focused on the role of the European Commission as a development actor, and 
formulated a set of conditions under which the Commission is able to exert a leadership 
role in EU development efforts towards Africa and other developing countries. He argued 
that this leadership role is conditional upon the presence of a strong institutional 
entrepreneur which pushes policies through, internal cohesiveness, and the use of a 
repertoire of tactics.
Others still have focused on the effectiveness and impact of the EU’s actions in 
Africa, and how this affects the EU’s foreign policy identity. Although these studies do not 
necessarily comment on the EU’s power over African countries in terms of decision­
making or its power to shape preferences and policy-orientations, they do illustrate the 
asymmetries that exist between the parties. Dickson and Arts (2004) demonstrate how what 
could once be considered a genuine commitment to creating a unique development policy 
towards the ACP, now finds itself in a state of atrophy, where policy efforts have become a 
mere symbolic gesture. Smith (2004) argues that the EU’s increased focus away from the
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ACP and towards other regions in the world can be explained by three factors: external 
demands (demands for compensation by other actors due to the creation of the internal EU 
market); member state interests (making a global impact as a unitary actor); European 
interests (a sense of EU responsibility to former colonies and Eastern Europe, security 
concerns, countering US hegemony, developing an international identity concerned with 
respect for human rights, democratic principles, market economy and regional integration 
efforts). Olsen (2004) demonstrates how the EU’s efforts in Africa have shifted from 
development towards conflict and crises management. This shift in policy towards Africa 
serves two important purposes, the first being the pursuit of the EU’s global interests, and 
the second being the strengthening of European integration efforts.
Certainly these studies have contributed to furthering understandings not only of the 
EU’s relations with Africa, but also how its actions on the continent have shaped its 
international identity. Past literature on EU-Africa relations therefore forms a vital basis 
upon which this thesis aims to build. Yet what all contributions on EU-Africa relations 
have in common is that they essentially adopt an EU-centric approach to understanding, 
conceptualising, and analysing this relationship. In this sense, the EU is not only the focal 
actor in these studies, it is also the actor that initiates, formulates and implements policy 
actions, and its interests and preferences fundamentally shape the processes and outcomes 
of these relations. Africa is conceptualised as a mere beneficiary or to use the aid 
terminology, recipient, with little capacity for preference formulation or input. In focusing 
on the EU, power asymmetry between the EU and African countries has tended to be 
presented as a rather deterministic or even fatalistic condition of these relations, as the EU’s 
preferences determine outcomes because it is the stronger actor. As previously noted in the 
Introduction, analysis on the African side of these relations has been lacking and this has 
resulted in a rather skewed picture of how relations between the partners have actually 
progressed. In adopting a more holistic approach to studying EU-Africa relations, this 
thesis contends that it is misleading to conceptualise developing countries merely as a set of 
actors positioned at the receiving end of the policy spectrum, with no capacity for input or 
articulation of preferences. It is crucial to take the literature on EU-Africa relations beyond 
the current framework focusing almost exclusively on the EU side of the spectrum. It is 
certainly important to consider the EU’s strengths and weaknesses in relations with African 
countries, and to understand what drives the EU’s policy preferences and actions towards 
these countries. At the same time, it is essential to examine just how African countries have 
perceived the EU’s efforts, how they have articulated their own strategies towards the EU, 
and whether they have indeed been able to reach their preferences regardless of evident
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power asymmetry. Indeed, although power asymmetry defines these relations it does not 
necessarily determine the process and outcome of these relations.
The lack of an African perspective evidences another gap in the literature 
conceptualising the EU as a foreign policy actor. Until recently, little effort had been made 
to integrate other actors’ perceptions, views, understandings, and images of the EU, into the 
context of analysing the EU’s effectiveness and impact as a foreign policy actor and how 
that contributes to shaping its international identity. Considering the ever-expanding 
foreign policy role of the EU, this analytical gap is in crucial need of being filled by 
empirical studies that more closely consider ‘outsiders’ views of the EU. Indeed, it is in the 
EU’s relations with the wider world that the significance of its policy actions can be 
understood and that more complete assertions can be made about the EU’s ‘actomess’.1 In 
this sense, it is not enough merely to consider the way in which the EU perceives its own 
power or the understandings it has about its expected or appropriate role in the world; the 
expectations that other actors’ have of the EU, and how the EU is perceived to be meeting 
these expectations are equally crucial to understanding the full extent of the EU’s power 
vis-a-vis others. Scholars of EU foreign policy studies are increasingly recognising the need 
to consider the way in which other actors perceive the EU (see Lucarelli 2007, 2007a; 
Elgstrom 2007), and some notable attempts to capture such perceptions of the EU have 
started to appear in recent scholarship (see Lucarelli 2009; Chaban and Holland 2008; 
Chaban et al 2006; Holland et a l 2007; Elgstrom 2007; Ortega 2004; Tsuruoka 2004, 
2008).
Although commendable in their efforts, these studies have focused exclusively on 
‘influential’ or ‘important’ external actors, such as Russia, China, Brazil, South Africa, the 
World Bank, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the United Nations. In these 
attempts to capture outsiders’ perceptions of the EU, there exists a manifest under­
representation of ‘weaker’ countries. In fact, these studies have only captured how the 
perceptions of others affect the EU’s international identity in a contextual environment in 
which power asymmetry is decidedly less manifest. It is nonetheless important to take into 
consideration the views of the EU by less-prominent, or weaker actors for two reasons. 
Firstly, as noted by Elgstrom (2007), an actor’s perception of the EU can contribute and 
obstruct the EU’s ability to exercise power and take on a leadership position in
1 EU ‘actomess’ here refers to Bretherton and Vogler’s idea that as a sui generis foreign policy actor, the EU 
has started exhibiting qualities o f a foreign policy actor. According to them, actomess is “constructed through 
the interplay o f many factors, both internal to the Union and in the external environment of ideas and events 
that permit or constrain EU action ... Actomess comprises three elements -  opportunity, which denotes the 
external context; presence, which captures the ability o f the EU, by virtue o f its existence, to exert influence 
beyond its borders; and capability, which signifies the ability to exploit opportunity and capitalize on 
presence” (2006: 2).
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international fora. While it may reasonably be expected that the views and the consequent 
actions of influential international actors such as Brazil, China, the WTO, etc. will impact 
the EU’s power and leadership, given current understandings of the power asymmetry that 
exists between the EU and Africa, it is much more unexpected that economically and 
politically marginalised actors have the capacity to influence the EU’s position in the 
world. If it can be demonstrated that the perceptions, strategies and actions of such actors 
have indeed been effective in challenging notions of the EU’s power or leadership, this 
would imply that it is necessary to re-examine common notions of both the EU’s 
international identity and of power asymmetry between the EU and weaker actors. A 
second reason why it is important to take into consideration African perceptions is because 
of the historical significance of the EU’s relations with the continent. In looking at how 
African countries have perceived the EU and how they have shaped their own strategies 
vis-&-vis the EU, one can more closely consider the extent to which the EU is beginning or 
not to be seen as an international actor with an identity separate from Member States’ 
bilateral long-standing relations with these countries. In other words, Africa offers a 
context in which it can be examined whether the EU as such, has or has not been able to 
establish itself as a power and a leader in its own right, or whether Member States’ foreign 
policies continue to overshadow its multilateral efforts.
Although many studies on EU-Africa relations have pointed at the power 
asymmetry which exists between the two sides, as outlined above, these studies have 
tended to rely on a rather one-sided view of these relations. In order to understand this 
relationship better and to offer a more complete framework for analysing relations between 
the EU and Africa, we need to establish more nuanced understandings of power, and how 
these can affect the way in which the actors interact with one another. The following 
sections examine the concept of power in the IR literature and then propose a definition of 
power to be applied throughout the thesis.
2 The concept of power in the International Relations literature
2.1 Power as force/possession
Realist and neo-realist schools have understood power as a tangible possession. 
Morgenthau understood power to be “anything that establishes and maintains the control of 
man over man” (1960: 9). Thus, Morgenthau contended that the pursuit of power could be 
explained by basic human nature, which was based on the drive to dominate others. Thus,
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man was considered to be “bom to seek power” (Morgenthau 1946: 1988). The ultimate 
expression of power is found in the capability to use force, and therefore to force others 
into accepting one’s preference and choices. Thus in the pursuit of power, resorting to force 
is the only normal (or ‘natural’) way to go about securing one’s interests. Power was 
therefore conceptualised as necessarily a conflictual condition, in which opposition became 
the defining factor. Thus it is the use of force that ultimately determine who ‘wins’ and who 
‘loses’ in a situation of conflict.
Like realism, neo-realism also assumes power as a central factor in relations 
between states, but instead of attributing the pursuit of power as an intrinsic feature of 
human nature, it is instead the anarchical nature of the international system that drives 
states to secure more power (e.g. military capabilities) in order to survive. In a situation of 
international anarchy states find themselves in a race for survival in which the acquisition 
of more power is essential. Power is reduced to a possession, or the measure of “the 
military, economic, and technological capabilities of states” (Gilpin 1981:13). Neo-realists 
have thus equated power with capabilities and resources. This is clearly demonstrated not 
only in how power is defined, but even more so in their insistence that ‘measuring’ power 
and ‘order-ranking’ states by their level of power is useful. Waltz proposed such a ranking 
according to a state’s “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic 
capability, military strength, political stability and competence” (1979: 113). Similarly, 
Cline (1975) and Knorr (1975) asserted that power is merely a matter of measuring states’ 
possessions. Cline took the idea of power as possession even further, providing a 
systematic “calculus of national power.” Through his formula, which combined numbers on 
“critical mass (population and territory), economic capability, military capability, strategic 
purpose, and the will to pursue national strategy,” Cline believed he could accurately 
measure and rank the power of a particular state (1975: 11).2
Neorealist understandings of power as possession have led power to be 
conceptualised in an abstract and general form, or what Guzzini has called a “lump concept 
of power” (2000: 55; see also Schmidt 2005: 529-530, 537), in that it greatly 
underestimates the full range of power. Importantly, by simply reducing power to tangible 
elements, realist and neo-realist understandings of power cannot adequately explain why 
actors who lack such possessions have at times demonstrated success in having their 
demands met. If indeed power consisted solely in the ability to use force or in its possession 
of resources, there would be little need to analyse relations between the weak and strong, in 
that outcomes favouring the strong would be a given (Habeeb 1988: 2-3, 11, 14; Zartman
2 For other attempts to measure power see Stoll and Ward (1989).
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and Rubin 2000: 10). As such, relations between states become a zero-sum game. When a 
stronger party proves unsuccessful in negotiating its preferences, the response of neorealist 
and realists has been to refuse the weaker party any potential contribution towards this 
success, but simply attributing the stronger actor’s lack of will as the explanatory factor. 
Yet Baldwin argued that this led to a “paradox of unrealized power” (1979: 163), which 
realist and neo-realists schools have tried to explain through the failure of stronger states to 
use resources effectively, or what he calls a “malfunctioning conversion process,”3 or has 
failed to be explained due to lack of consideration of the “policy-contingency framework” 
that surrounds the actors concerned (see below). It is clear that realist and neorealist 
understandings of power as force and/or resource possession offer only limited insight into 
relations between weak and strong actors. Although resources, capabilities, and force may 
play a part in determining the success or failures in weak states’ power relations with the 
strong, these cannot be considered the ultimate determining factors of power.
2.2 Power as relational and contextual
Highly influential works by Habeeb, Keohane and Nye, and Baldwin have 
conceptualised power in relational and contextual terms, and in so doing, have posed as a 
challenge to realist and neo-realist understandings. Habeeb (1988) stressed that realist/neo- 
realist and pluralist conceptions of power failed to interpret power as a process which can 
produce change in an actor’s behaviour and lead to a negotiated outcome. He defined 
power as “the way in which actor A uses its resources in a process with actor B so as to 
bring about changes that cause preferred outcomes in its relationship with B” (Habeeb 
1988: 15). Power in negotiation is therefore not as simplistic as mere possession, but 
equally so as a strategy to bring about change. Habeeb divided power into, what he termed, 
‘aggregate structural power’, referring to an actor’s capabilities and resources {Ibid.: 17- 
18); ‘issue-specific structural power’, referring to resources and capabilities within a 
specific context (Ibid.: 19-23), and finally ‘behavioural power’, referring to the tactical 
approach adopted by an actor in reaching a preferred outcome (Ibid.: 23-25). In dividing 
power into distinctive types, Habeeb allows for power to be understood not solely from the 
stronger parties perspective, but equally so from that of the weaker side. Therefore, 
conceptualising power relations between the weak and strong, involves acknowledging not
3 As Habeeb has illustrated: “some analysts have preferred to try to force asymmetrical negotiations to ‘fit’ 
into the classical framework. Thus some analysts regard Panama’s successful negotiation for sovereignty over 
the Panama Canal as ‘Jimmy Carter gave away the Panama Canal,’ and explain America’s defeat in Vietnam 
as lack of will to take advantage o f the tremendous power disparity between the United States and North 
Vietnam” (1988: 3).
34
only that there exists a balance of power between the participant parties (Habeeb 2000: 83), 
but equally so, that power cannot be fully attributed to mere structural advantages 
possessed by one party over another (Zartman 2002: 6-7). Thus the outcome of any 
particular negotiation, whether asymmetrical or symmetrical, can only be understood as 
resulting from each side’s power (Habeeb 1988: 1). Therefore an important factor in better 
conceptualising power in negotiation is to break it down into several elements, of which 
force, capabilities, and influence are merely three.
Neoliberal institutionalists’ Keohane and Nye explicitly rejected the idea of an 
“overall power structure” (2001: 36-42), that is, the idea that “within a system, the structure 
(that is, the distribution of power among states in it) determines the nature of its 
international regime. And the most important power resources are military” (Keohane and 
Nye 2001: 37). In their efforts to break away from traditional thought, Keohane and Nye 
suggested that an overall structure model makes faulty predictions regarding patterns of 
behaviour. Instead they proposed that power be analysed according to “issue structure” 
{Ibid.: 43-45), positing that “power resources in one issue area lose some or all of their 
effectiveness when applied to others ... Issue structuralism does not predict congruence of 
power across issues. On the whole, then, analysis of politics will have to be conducted by 
issue area” {Ibid. : 44). Clearly, they advocate the importance of conducting contextual 
analysis when looking at power; it is only through such analysis that the relevance of a 
particular power resource in a specific context will become clear and the concept of power 
will be meaningful.
Furthermore, Keohane and Nye (2001) also made an important contribution to the 
concept of power as an analytical tool for understanding relations between weak and strong 
actors through their concept of complex interdependence. The authors argued that 
economic interdependence between states made realists understandings of power as based 
on military force unconvincing, as the use of such power is useless in situations where 
economic issues are more important, such as free trade negotiations between allied states, 
for example (again, power is contextual). In a situation where states have become 
interdependent, power relationships are based on mutual asymmetrical dependencies. The 
level of this asymmetry, according to Keohane and Nye, is determined by “sensitivity” and 
“vulnerability”, where the former refers to the extent to which changes in one actor’s 
situation affect other actors, while the latter refers to the costs faced by an actor should it 
choose to terminate a relationship. When there is a high level of asymmetry in sensitivity 
and vulnerability between actors, then the relationship can be characterised as dependent, 
rather than interdependent (again, power is relational). Thus levels of relative dependencies
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exist between actors and these can predict the distribution of potential power amongst 
them.
Baldwin too emphasised the importance of context, or what he calls the ‘policy- 
contingency framework,’ when analysing power. Baldwin criticised traditional power 
analyses’ exclusive focus on “property concepts” (1985: 22-23), or rather measures of 
objective elements such as economic resources and military force. Baldwin argued that 
“relational concepts” are much more relevant to fully understanding how power actually 
operates.4 Thus while it is important to understand actors’ capabilities, it is equally 
important to identify their “value system” (Baldwin 1985:22). Indeed, for Baldwin, power 
“refers to a relationship between two or more people, not to a property of any one of them” 
(1985: 20). In conceiving of power as a relation between actors, Baldwin clearly rejected 
the idea of power as a possession. By making power a relational concept, he allowed for 
explanations of how power is exercised between parties, without coming to the simplistic 
conclusion that the stronger actor won because it simply possessed more resources or lost 
because it was unwilling to use those resources. Furthermore, if power is indeed relational, 
then it must also be contextual. As Baldwin wrote: “In order to make a meaningful 
statement about an (actual or potential) influence relationship, one must (explicitly or 
implicitly) specify who is influencing (or has the capacity to influence) whom (domain) 
with respect to what (scope)” (Ibid : 20). Thus, like Keohane and Nye, Baldwin noted that 
what may be considered a useful resource for exercising power in one context may prove 
irrelevant in another. Similarly, this brought him to reject the overall power structure idea, 
in that “the notion of a single overall international power structure unrelated to any 
particular issue-area is based on a concept of power that is virtually meaningless.” 
(Baldwin 1979: 193). For Baldwin, power is meaningful because of “the multiple 
distributional patterns of a wide variety of resources related to a number of significant 
issue-areas” (Ibid.).
The authors’ interpretations of power add valuable insights, crucially underlining 
the importance of contextual analysis or issue-areas, and rejecting the idea of power as a 
possession. This thesis thus empirically engages with their interpretations of the concept of 
power, as the context in which relations between the EU and African countries take place is 
assumed to be an important factor in determining a weak actor’s leverage and control. At
4 Baldwin was highly influenced by Dahl’s definition of power, namely that “A has power over B to the 
extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (1957). Dahl’s definition saw power 
as a relational concept. As such, power was not found only in quantifiable possessions or military force, but 
rather in how it was expressed between actors. Although Dahl’s definition has been heavily criticised for 
being too intuitive, tautological, and broad, it nonetheless prompted a debate on the need for a re­
interpretation o f the concept (Bachrach and Baratz 1963: 163; Baldwin 1979: 165; Habeeb 1988: 14; Lukes 
2005: 16-19, 27, 39; Lukes 1986: 3-4; Nagel 1975: 12).
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an aggregate level, the EU is clearly the stronger actor, but reality demonstrates that 
Baldwin’s ‘paradox of unrealized power’ operates in relations between the EU and Africa. 
Certainly, one cannot simply rely on the explanation that it is the EU’s unwillingness to use 
its potential power towards African countries that has allowed certain countries to have 
their demands met. Indeed, contextual analyses which take account of both actors’ 
positions vis-a-vis one another can demonstrate the opportunities in which a certain context 
or a particular issue-area can favour the weak.
Nevertheless, although these scholars shed new light on understandings of power, 
aside from Habeeb (2000), they do not undertake in depth empirical analysis of power 
relations between the weak and strong. While Baldwin stated that “so-called ‘weak powers’ 
influence so-called ‘strong powers’ because of the power analyst’s failure to account for the 
possibility that a country may be weak in one situation but strong in another” (1979: 164), 
he did not endeavour to expand into in-depth analysis of how a weak actor might indeed 
reach success in exercising leverage. In fact, both Baldwin, and Keohane and Nye were 
more concerned with explaining how power resources differ from one context to the next, 
but not so much with how actors may behave in relation to one another and how differences 
in power asymmetry may affect behaviour and/or the ability to make demands (Zartman 
and Rubin 2000: 5). Holzscheiter, for example, argues that the authors in fact relied on 
realist/neorealist notions of power. She writes, “the extended realist notions of power 
introduced by Keohane, Nye and Baldwin are of limited help as soon as it comes to 
accounting for situations in which actors that lack material bargaining capabilities can be 
successful. They remain fundamentally state-centred and faithful to the primacy of realist 
states’ interests: the maximisation of material profit and security” (Holzscheiter 2005:729). 
This is not due to analytical failure by the scholars however, but rather due to the scope of 
their argument, which is purely theoretical. In other words, the re-conceptualisations of 
power by Baldwin and Keohane and Nye simply did not aim to address empirical 
questions, but rather aimed at partially breaking from traditional thought in order to present 
an improved understanding of power relations.
2.3 Power as a perception
Where Baldwin and Keohane and Nye essentially stop short, rational-choice 
negotiation theorists’ Zartman and Rubin pick up the discussion. Although there have been 
noteworthy attempts to analyse weak actor success in asymmetric relations with the strong 
(see Zartman 1971; Aggarwal and Allan 1983; Habeeb 1988; Singh 2000), Zartman and
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Rubin not only present numerous detailed empirical accounts of such successes, but on a
theoretical level the scholars also aim at re-conceptualising the notion of power to better
understand the position of the weak. Zartman and Rubin understand power to be a
“perceived relation” capable of intervening in objective reality (2000:13; see also Zartman
2008: 107). They define power as “the perceived capacity of one side to produce an
intended effect on another through a move that may involve the use of resources” (Zartman
and Rubin 2000: 14). Although perceptions may indeed be partially based on reality, such
as resource possession, it is not the only determining factor constituting power. Indeed,
Perception mediates objective reality, although of course reality imposes certain limits 
on the implication of perception ... The perceived symmetry or asymmetry of a 
relationship is related to elements such as force and resources, as well as to reputation 
and prospects of a party to produce past and future movements on the part of its 
targets. As such, it becomes the basis of an action that constitutes power (Ibid.: 13).
Conceiving of power as a perception, rather than an absolute objective reality, maintains 
the relational and contextual aspects of power, yet also adds a further dimension to 
analysing relations between the weak and the strong. Power as a perception posits that the 
successful use of power is intrinsically linked to how it perceives both its own power as 
opposed to that of others, as well as how an actor perceives the other actor’s power as 
opposed to its own. As such, power as a perceived relation tends to offer particularly 
relevant insight into overcoming Baldwin’s ‘paradox of unrealized power’, or what 
Zartman and Rubin similarly refer to as the ‘structuralists’ paradox’ {Ibid.: 3-4, 14; 
Zartman 2008: 101).
At first glance Zartman and Rubin’s conceptualisation of power may seem to
exhibit constructivist undertones. Indeed similarities can be drawn between their
understanding of power as a perception, and Wendt’s explanation of a power relationship
as based on “intersubjective understandings and expectations” (1992: 396), constituting an
actor’s conception of self and other. Zartman and Rubin note that perceived power is able
to convey how an actor’s behaviour is shaped through the, “perception of their own power,
the other’s power, and the relative standing of self and other” (2000: 13-14). Wendt, on a
similar note, writes:
A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward 
objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for 
them. States act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because 
enemies are threatening and friends are not. Anarchy and the distribution of power are 
insufficient to tell us which is which. US military power has a different significance 
for Canada than for Cuba, despite their similar “structural” position, just as British 
missiles have a different significance for the US than do Soviet missiles. The 
distribution of power may always affect states’ calculations, but how it does so 
depends on the intersubjective understandings and expectations, on the “distribution 
of knowledge,” that constitute their conceptions of self and other (1992: 396).
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A closer look at Zartman and Rubin’s definition of power however, reveals that the 
scholars instead continue to follow a more rationalist line of thinking. This is particularly 
evident in their definition of power that highlights the action of one actor producing 
“intended effects” on another actor. Their understanding of power relies on initially 
identifying a set of fixed preferences (or demands) and then through causal analysis, 
deducing how and which of the intended preferences were either altered or conceded to. As 
will be shown in the following section, constructivist thought takes a slightly different 
approach to the analysis of power. While placing importance on the role of perception, and 
how this may influence preferences and behaviour, constructivists also stress the role of 
‘structural’ elements comprised in the notion of power; of particular importance are 
considerations of ‘unintended effects’ and how formation of ideals, values, norms, and 
preferences may affect behaviour.
2.4 Power as agenda-setting
By moving away from grand theories of power as proposed by realists and neo­
realists, the rationalist approach presented above has been able to more accurately capture 
situations in which weaker actors have shown leverage over the strong. Nonetheless, the 
literature thus far presented is essentially lacking in a conceptualisation of power as an 
implicit and informal exercise. The focus, in fact, has been placed largely on outcomes, and 
as such, power is understood to be exercised through an observable process of formal 
decision-making. The actor which makes the decisions therefore is ultimately more 
powerful. Power as decision-making is what Lukes has referred to as a “one-dimensional” 
view of power (2005: 16-19), in which “to exercise power is to prevail over the contrary 
preferences of others” (Lukes 1986: 9), while Bachrach and Baratz (1962) insisted it 
constitutes just one ‘face’ of power. In an influential attempt at expanding this limited 
conception of power, Bachrach and Baratz posited that power could also be understood in a 
more subtle manner. They contend that:
Power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social 
and political values and institutional practises that limit the scope of the political 
process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively 
innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all 
practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution 
be seriously detrimental to A’s set of preferences (Bachrach and Baratz 1962: 948).
The scholars argue that power is not just exercised by who actually wins in decision­
making in a formal setting, but can also be attributed to those who set the agenda, or rather 
those that set the rules of the game, both in a formal and informal setting. According to
39
Bachrach and Baratz, “the dominant values and the political myths, rituals, and institutional
practices which tend to favor the vested interests of one or more groups, relative to others”
(1970:11), is a crucial element in power relations. Analysts should not merely analyse the
decision that has been made (e.g. the outcome), but equally important is an examination of
“nondecision-making”, or rather:
A decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to 
the values or interests of the decision-maker ... A means by which demands for 
change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be 
suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain 
access to the relevant decision-making arena; or failing, all these things, maimed or 
destroyed in the decision-implementing stage of the policy process (Bachrach and 
Baratz 1940: 44).
The argument made by Bachrach and Baratz generated a new group of scholars to 
take-up the notion of power, and re-interpret its meaning in a more constructivist manner. 
Lukes’ contributions to the concept of power have been of key importance to expanding the 
concept even further. Lukes argues that Bachrach and Baratz’s understanding of power as a 
more covert process of both decision- and nondecision-making is actually power’s “second- 
dimension” (Lukes 2005:21 -25). Lukes remains unsatisfied however by this interpretation, 
proposing instead a “three-dimensional view” (2005:25-29) of power, which, “incorporates 
power of the first two kinds, but also allows that power may operate to shape and modify 
desires and beliefs in a manner contrary to people’s interests” (Lukes 1986: 10). Thus 
power is exercised not only when one actor wins, or in success in preventing certain issues 
from being placed on the decision-making agenda, but power also consists in the capacity, 
to shape, or determine others preferences.
2.5 Constructivist notions of power
The important contribution that constructivist thought has made to the concept of 
power is found in their concern with preference-shaping and the ‘nonintentionality’. This 
constituted a true shift in thinking about power, often referred to as ‘structural power’ 
(Barnett and Duvall 2005; Guzzini 1993). Barnett and Duvall (2005), Morriss, (2002), 
Strange (1988) and Lukes (1986; 2005), have all argued that power should not always 
imply intentional outcomes. Lukes notes that, “what actors intentionally do always 
generates chains of unintended consequences and it is implausible to deny that some of 
these manifest their power” (2005: 76). Thus power is present even when one actor doesn’t 
have the direct intention to change the other’s preferences. B’s perception of A as a 
potentially powerful actor can in fact influence behaviour; Zartman and Rubin have alerted
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us to the significance of perceptions before. Yet power does not necessarily require A’s
overt will and intention to directly control or influence the behaviour of B. If B concedes to
A, could it not have been Bachrach and Baratz’s idea of non-decision that caused B to
concede? Or was it instead A’s ability to manipulate B’s preferences so that an actual
conflict of interests never even arises? Or as Lukes has put it,
To put the matter sharply, A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he 
does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or 
determining his very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get 
another or others to have the desires you want them to have -  that is, to secure their 
compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? (2005: 76).
Therefore, power is not always the direct result of A’s intended actions towards B, thus
contesting the causality implied in understandings of power as a relational concept. As
Guzzini notes in his thorough analysis of constructivist responses to Baldwin’s and
Keohane and Nye’s rational choice approaches to power:
Power as the production of unintended effects is not captured because it falls outside 
the causal link between A’s intention and B’s changed behaviour ... By reducing the 
analysis of power to the establishment of a causal chain from A’s intention to the 
outcome, a choice-theoretical approach cannot theoretically incorporate the idea of 
power as unintended effects into the concept of power (1993: 459).
Guzzini criticises the rational-choice approach even further, when he warns that its inability 
to incorporate unintended effects neglects more implicit elements of power. He contends 
that, “exclusion of nonintentionality privileges the manipulative actor’s (or power holder’s) 
view and leaves the analysis of power with a specific blind spot, namely, the tacit power of 
the strong” {Ibid. : 461). Incorporating an element o f ‘nonintentionality’ into the concept of 
power allows for an account of how the formation of ideals, values, norms, and preferences 
may affect an actor’s behaviour, thus recognising in addition to intended action, both 
potential and latent actions (Lukes 2005: 25-29).
Preference-shaping is therefore a fundamental part of the constructivist approach to 
power. The rationalist framework also conceded the need for an expansion of the power 
concept in preference-shaping terms, albeit in a much more overt and observable manner. 
Nye’s notion of soft power is one such example. He argues that power exists both in a hard 
and soft form, the former comprising military and economic power resting on “coercion 
and inducement,” (Nye 2004: 7) and the latter, defined as “getting others to want the 
outcomes that you want,” based instead “on the ability to shape the preferences of others” 
(Nye: 5). While Nye’s focus on preference-shaping offers a welcome shift from the realist 
and neorealist focus on more tangible (economic and military) resources associated with 
power, it nevertheless does not fully fit into constructivist thought. His discussion on soft 
power is agent-centred, that is, power is understood as an action exercised by an actor, as
41
opposed to focusing on unintended effects or how structural processes shape an actor’s
preferences and understandings of self. As Nye’s definition of power is “the ability to
influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants” {Ibid.: 2), the focus
remains on an understanding of ‘power over’ as opposed to a more constructivist
understanding of ‘power to.’5 Unlike ‘power over,’ which implies an element of control
over behaviour (whether coercive or cooperative), ‘power to’ is instead concentrated on
identifying the “locus of power” (Lukes 1986: 5). ‘Power over’ is an exercise, whereas
‘power to’ is a capacity (Haugaard 2002: 277; Lukes 1986: 1; Morriss 2002: 297-300).
Barnett and Duvall clarify further:
Concepts of power rooted in behavior and interaction point to actors’ exercise of 
control over others; they are, then, “power over” concepts. Concepts of power tied to 
social relations of constitution, in contrast, consider how social relations define who 
the actors are and what capacities and practices they are socially empowered to 
undertake; these concepts are, then, focused on the social production of actors’
“power to” (2005: 46).
Yet ‘power to’ concepts, and in particular Lukes’s third dimension of power are also 
slightly problematic. Lukes’s third dimension of power is heavily influenced by the 
Gramscian idea of hegemony, which sustains that the power of a ruling class in essence is 
not a product of coercion, but rather of manipulation, or the intellectual and moral ability of 
authority to gain compliance from the masses (Gramsci 1971). Although Lukes’s extension 
of the concept of power considers “the socially structured and culturally patterned 
behaviour of groups and practices of institutions” (2005:22), like the concept of hegemony, 
this view leans towards elitist tendencies. In a similar vein of realist/neo-realist 
understandings of power, Lukes’s view places ultimate power exclusively in the hands of 
the dominant actor, and severely minimises if not wholly excludes the possibility of 
reciprocal behaviour from a weaker and or ‘dominated’ actor.
Such notions of power should not be discarded altogether however. Certainly, it is 
important to consider that structural limitations are in place when actors interact with one 
another. Structural power is in fact not necessarily inconsistent with other notions of power; 
it merely presents an alternative approach to the concept. What is particularly interesting in 
constructivist discussions on power is their emphasis on the need for broadening the 
concept to include both rationalist and constructivist interpretations. Lukes’ three- 
dimensions of power illustrate such an attempt at a more comprehensive concept,6 so too
5 For a game theoretic discussion on ‘power to’ versus ‘power over’ see Dowding (1996: 1-18).
6 See also Gill and Law (1988), who distinguish between three dimensions o f power: overt, covert, and 
structural.
42
does Barnet and Duvall’s (2005) distribution of power into four categories.7 They 
essentially argue that power comes in multiple forms, yet not enough has been done to 
integrate these forms into a more complete framework. In advocating the building of 
bridges between different theoretical approaches, they discourage discarding one 
framework in favour of another, in that each offers valuable insight into the concept of 
power (Barnet and Duvall 2005: 43-45; 67-69).
3 Definitions and indicators
Power is much more complex than the capability to use force effectively or the possession 
of resources. As shown by the occasional negotiating successes of the weak vis-a-vis the 
strong, power is inherently a multifaceted concept. It is therefore vital to ask, in any 
empirical research considering relations between the weak and the strong, not just whether 
asymmetry exists, but also what kinds of asymmetries exist between the parties and to what 
extent these determine how power is employed vis-a-vis one another. Certainly if power is 
indeed bound to the context and relations in which it is exercised and to each actor’s 
perception of objective reality and of one another, asymmetry becomes a much more 
intricate process requiring more in-depth analyses. Nevertheless, the structural constraints 
operating in relations between traditionally weak and strong actors should by no means be 
obscured either (e.g. structural power, or the Lukes’s ‘third dimension of power’). It is 
therefore vital to recognise that power may be exercised in a more implicit manner through 
nondecision and agenda-setting, and furthermore that the entire structure of international 
relations may indeed partially operate according to structural understandings of power 
based on both tangible and intangible structural factors. While this study offers a more 
empirical investigation on power relations, it nonetheless theoretically engages with the 
concepts of power cited above by emphasising the contextual, relational, and perceptive 
nature of power and how this shapes an actor’s ability to exercise leverage and control.
3.1 Power
In this thesis, power is characterised as operating through an interactive, dynamic, 
and intersubjective process in which contextual factors help to determine the process and
7 “The first type is power as relations of interaction or direct control by one actor over another— Compulsory 
Power; the second is the control actors exercise indirectly over others through diffuse relations of  
interaction— Institutional Power; the third is the constitution of subjects' capacities in direct structural relation 
to one another—  Structural Power; and the fourth is the socially diffuse production o f subjectivity in systems 
o f meaning and signification— Productive Power” (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 43).
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outcome of relations between weak and strong actors. It is interactive because power works 
as a relation between two or more actors, in which reciprocal rather than unilateral 
behaviour and learning occurs. This does not imply that relations between two or more 
actors necessarily exhibit power symmetry, but it does assert that each actor benefits from 
some sort of power, even if that merely entails the power to leave a relationship (Habeeb 
1988: 16). Power is a dynamic, not a static, concept. The process in which it is employed 
constitutes “changes in the actor’s positions, values, attitudes, objectives and expectations” 
{Ibid.: 14), eventually leading to a particular outcome. Power cannot be understood as a 
given, but as a factor of the context in which relations take place. Lastly, power is 
intersubjective in that an actor’s perceptions of its own power and that of others determine 
how it shapes its interests and demands (Wendt 1992: 396; Zartman and Rubin 2000: 13- 
14). This takes account of how an actor’s preferences are formed within the relationship, as 
well as determined through the larger structural environment (Hopf 1998: 175). Thus an 
actor’s preferences, interests and demands shape both the process and outcome of power 
relations, while the contextual environment may constrain or facilitate power. Both the 
agent and the structure affect and shape the process and outcome of relations.
Power, when it is employed, can be equated with leverage through pressure and 
persuasion (Zartman 2008: 101), but also through coercion and non-compliance. The other 
dimensions of power which is also important to consider in relations between weak and 
strong actors, is the power to maintain autonomy or exert control or ownership. These 
terms are further discussed below.
3.2 Leverage and influence
As has been demonstrated above, understanding power in material terms limits 
explanations for situations in which weakness can actually be turned into strength when 
there is asymmetry in structural power between actors. It is therefore more practical to 
consider not just an actor’s power in se, but rather how effectively power can be turned into 
instances of leverage and influence. Leverage refers to the ability of an actor to reach its 
preferences and interests vis-a-vis another actor by placing its interests and preferences on 
the political agenda; by getting the other actor to take its demands and concerns seriously 
(i.e. opinions, criticisms, and demands are seen as legitimate and valid); and modifying or 
shifting others’ behaviour, choices, decisions, or preferences. The exercise of leverage can 
be seen as successful when items of interest are placed on the EU’s agenda or incorporated 
in the EU’s strategy towards the country, where it did not previously do so and when the
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EU begins to seriously consider the other actor’s preferences because it cannot afford to 
ignore these (e.g. the country is considered a ‘voice to be reckoned with’). An actor can be 
seen as successful in exercising leverage when it can use its power, whether real and/or 
perceived, to reach its preferred outcome. This can be considered synonymous with 
influence, which refers to the ability to induce changes in behaviour or preferences without 
necessarily possessing the relevant authority to do so and without the use of force or 
coercion (Berenskoetter 2007: 5). In the context of negotiations, leverage and influence are 
often equated with terms such as bargaining power, bargaining strength, or negotiating 
capital,9 and indeed these terms can be used interchangeably to express a situation in which 
one party has the capacity to produce a shift or change in another actor’s position or 
preferences, is successful in shaping the agenda, or influences behaviour.
Leverage and influence are exercised through the use of tactics and instruments such 
as persuasion, pressure, coercion, and behaviour which affect actors’ perceptions of one 
another, and which in turn, shape and define (and re-shape and re-define) actors’ strategies, 
positions, and preferences vis-a-vis one another. In the absence of structural resources with 
which to coerce, persuasion can be used as a means to induce a voluntary change or shift 
through social interaction or through offering incentives and/or side payments for 
compliance. Thus persuasion is both “a process of convincing someone through argument 
and principled debate” (Checkel 2002:1), and an offer of structural resources or support in 
exchange for a change in position or preferences. Pressure and coercion instead involve the 
use of conditionalities, restrictive measures and even punitive action in order to ensure an 
induced change or shift in position. In this case, leverage is exercised because one party has 
the means and ability to impose and/or force another actor to consider and accept its 
preferences because of the high costs associated with not doing so. Thus, when a situation 
arises in which a party is unwilling to comply, the use of a threat by an opponent will 
increase the cost of non-compliance, potentially leading to failed agreement. In sum, both 
persuasion and coercion are meant to alter the gains or losses the other party is able to 
conjure from a negotiated outcome (Hopmann 1998).
8 For example, Mokken and Stokman define influence as “the capacity o f actors to determine (partly) the 
actions or choices o f other actors within the set o f action or choice alternatives available to those actors,” 
(1976: 37; see also Morriss 2002). Power, on the other hand, is defined as “the capacity o f actors to fix or 
change (completely or partially) a set o f action alternatives or choice alternatives for other actors” (Ibid), thus 
encompassing notions o f power both as a possession and as agenda-setting.
9 For example, Meunier defines bargaining power as “the ability of a negotiating actor to obtain the best 
possible deal in the negotiation, that is, to obtain the most from its opponent while conceding the least, other 
things being equal” (2000: 104). Whitfield and Fraser define negotiating capital as “the leverage that a 
negotiator is able to derive from [certain] structural conditions” (2008a: 39).
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Leverage can also be exercised through certain types of behaviour. In the case of 
interactions between weak and strong actors, an actor’s decision to act compliantly or non- 
compliantly affects its negotiating position and the perceptions held of that actor. This in 
turn, will affect the leverage it can exercise in attempting to reach its preferences vis-a-vis 
the other actor. Compliance is found in the willingness to concede to the preferences and 
demands made by another actor. Thus compliance necessarily entails that the other actor 
has been more successful in exercising leverage, because it has convincingly ensured either 
a change in position or secured the status quo from the other party. This is not to say that 
compliance is necessarily undesired, it merely indicates that compliance is an indicator of 
bargaining strength of one actor over another.10 Leverage, however, can be exercised 
through non-compliant behaviour, when this produces a change or shift in the other actor’s 
position or even creates stalemate in negotiations between weak and strong parties. Non- 
compliance entails expressing dissatisfaction with the terms and conditions of the 
relationship; resisting intimidation or coercion by a structurally stronger actor, and its 
potential capability to employ threats or punishments; refusal to comply with the other 
actor’s demands which could potentially lead to the disintegration of the relationship. Non- 
compliance may also be manifested through public voice or criticism, terminating a 
relationship or refusing to negotiate as a form of protest, or seeking alternative partnerships 
or agreements.
3.3 Control and ownership
A second dimension of power is found in an actor’s ability to maintain control, 
autonomy, or exert ownership over policy processes and outcomes. An actor can be 
considered to have control if it is able to maintain independence in determining its own 
policies and strategies in relations with other actors. This means that an actor is free, or at 
least relatively free, and perceives itself as such, to formulate and pursue strategies and 
policy preferences and implement policy outcomes without interference from outsiders, 
without necessarily pleasing external actors, or without having to compromise or 
accommodate the interests of others in order to reach its preferences and goals. In this 
sense, power does not mean the ability to influence others to accept your preferences, or the 
ability to produce a shift or change, but rather it refers to the ability to circumvent outside 
influence in the formulation of strategies and preferences, and the implementation of
10 Consider for example, that according to Whitfield, recipient countries which adopt a strategy of compliance 
in aid negotiations with donors, “start by recognizing the chronic subordination of the recipient state, and by 
doing so, they undermine the country’s own negotiating strength, perpetuating weakness” (2008: 21).
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outcomes, in the first place. Furthermore, in the context of relations between weak and 
strong actors, power as control or autonomy is often synonymous with ownership, and in 
fact, also in this thesis, these terms are used interchangeably.11
Control involves the ability to identify an actor’s own priorities and interests in 
relations with external actors, establishing and relying on a country’s own systems and 
frameworks for cooperation with external actors, a willingness to negotiate and cooperate 
according to the weaker country’s terms and preferences and to forego cooperation should 
this not be the case, and lastly, the ability and willingness to initiate and implement policy 
processes formulated with the country’s own interests and preferences in mind. In 
establishing the extent to which weaker countries have or have not been able to maintain 
control or ownership in evident situations of structural power asymmetry, it is thus 
necessary to distinguish between the objectives and goals of the actors concerned in order 
to be able recognise when a weak country can control policy processes and outcomes. 
Furthermore, in assessing whether weaker actors have or have not been able to maintain 
control in relations with stronger actors, it must be established whether processes and 
outcomes have been decided by the weaker actor without considering the stronger actor’s 
preferences; whether processes and outcomes are the result of a compromise or consensus 
between the actors; or if processes and outcomes are imposed by outsiders and accepted 
reluctantly by weaker actors despite differing preferences, but as a necessary price to pay to 
reach a certain outcome (see Whitfield and Fraser 2008: 4).
This section has provided a more nuanced definition of power and explained how this 
is linked to the exercise of leverage and the maintenance of control vis-a-vis stronger 
actors. So how then, does this more nuanced understanding of power and the exercise of it 
actually apply to relations between stronger and weaker actors? In other words, what are 
some of the possible explanations for weaker actor leverage and ownership? The following 
section provides some theoretically and empirically driven hypotheses of how these notions 
might play out in the EU’s relations with African countries.
4 Hypotheses
Based upon the conceptualisation of power as operating through an interactive, dynamic, 
and intersubjective process in which contextual factors create conditions under which 
actors can exercise leverage and control, and given the gaps in the literature on EU-Africa
11 For example, in their analysis o f the strategies African government’s have adopted in aid negotiations, 
Whitfield and Fraser define ownership as, “the degree o f control recipient governments are able to exercise 
over policy design and implementation” (2008: 4).
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relations and conceptualising EU ‘actomess’ in foreign policy, it is now possible to 
formulate some theoretically and empirically-informed hypotheses regarding the conditions 
under which weaker actors, in this case African countries, are able to exercise leverage vis- 
a-vis stronger actors, in this case the EU.
4.1 Perceptions
Following the conceptualisation of power as a perceived relation, and based upon 
the need to consider more closely outsiders perceptions of the EU as a foreign policy actor, 
it is assumed that the way in which an actor perceives its own power as opposed to that of 
others, as well as how it perceives the other actor’s power as opposed to its own, will affect 
the exercise of leverage, and to a lesser extent, control (Tables 1.1. and 1.2 at the end of this 
chapter summarise the assumptions and hypotheses regarding perceptions). Whose 
perceptions are important in shaping strategies? This thesis will mainly concentrate on the 
perceptions that African policy-makers and negotiators hold of the EU and of their own 
capabilities, as well as the perceptions held by high-level political actors, such as Heads of 
State and relevant Ministers. While the perceptions of this first set of actors will be 
, determined by in-depth interviews, as described in the introduction, the perceptions of the 
second set of actors is determined mostly by the type of responses and discourse they have 
expressed regarding relations with the EU. While it is recognised that this may not 
accurately reflect these actors’ true perception of the EU, their public statements and views 
can be seen as representing the countries’ overall approaches and strategies in dealing with 
the EU.
Perceptions affect leverage to the extent that they significantly influence the 
strategies and policy preferences that actors will adopt vis-a-vis one another. To a lesser 
extent, they also affect control in terms of whether a weaker actor sees the stronger actor’s 
influence as necessarily contributing in a positive or negative manner to the formulation of 
strategies and policies, and in terms of whether the actor is willing or not to forego 
cooperation with the stronger party. Therefore, although the EU may possess power, if it is 
seen as unable to convert this power into bargaining strength or influence, this affects the 
other actor’s perception of the EU’s ability to reach its preferences in relations with other 
actors. Conversely, it is also important to consider how the weaker actor perceives of its 
own power vis-a-vis the EU. If the weaker actor perceives its own capabilities and abilities 
as a source of bargaining strength or if it is ideologically inclined to maintain ownership,
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for example, it is likely to affect the intensity or the confidence with which it will pursue its 
strategies and demands. Perceptions are shaped in three ways:
Firstly, they are shaped by objective reality, or the possession of structural 
resources an actor has. Indeed, as Zartman and Rubin (2000) have noted, perceived power 
is partially based on the realities of what each actor concretely possesses. In relations with 
Africa, this would imply that perceptions of the EU’s power are shaped by its financial and 
economic strength in development and trade. At the very basic level, economic and 
financial differences between the EU and Africa define the structural power asymmetry 
between the parties, in that the EU is wealthier than African countries, and therefore the 
power of the purse means the EU is the ultimate decision-maker with regards to how much 
aid it is willing to allocate or how many trade preferences it is willing to concede. 
Furthermore, perceptions of the EU’s economic and even political strengths influence the 
weaker actor’s behaviour and strategies, because it raises expectations of what the stronger 
actor is capable of and how it should behave (Hill 1993; Tsuruoka 2008,2004). Differences 
in wealth therefore shape the basic structural environment and affect weak countries’ 
perceptions of the EU’s potential to use power or influence. In this sense, African countries 
are likely to perceive the EU as a more powerful actor and one with which cooperation is 
necessary given their marginal and weak position.
Secondly, perceptions are shaped by external actions and the effectiveness and 
impact of these actions. Therefore, what the EU actually does in Africa, the way it does it, 
and how much impact this actually has is important in shaping other actors’ perceptions of 
the EU’s capability to translate its rhetoric into action or its structural resources into 
bargaining power. If the EU is perceived to be inconsistent or even incapable of negotiating 
or implementing policies according to its claims this is likely to affect actors’ perceptions 
of the EU’s ability to exercise power. In this sense, while the EU may raise external actors’ 
expectations in terms of what it is structurally capable of, the inability to meet those 
expectations due to constraints or even unwillingness can considerably affect perceptions 
(Hill 1993; Tsuruoka 2008,2004). In analysing power relations between weak and strong 
parties, it is therefore crucial to identify both parties’ capacities and constraints in 
conducting relations with one another, for it is the perception of these capacities and 
constraints which shapes their consequent strategies vis-a-vis one another.
There are four ways in which the EU’s actions are posited to affect countries’ 
perceptions of it. First, in terms of the employment of the resources and expertise necessary 
to implement its policies in other countries: if the EU is unable to convert its rhetoric into 
practise because it lacks, or is unwilling to employ, the resources necessary, this is likely to
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weaken its effectiveness abroad and will consequently lower countries’ expectations and 
affect their perceptions of the EU negatively. This may lead to less willingness to cooperate 
(non-compliance) and/or more conflictual strategies for reaching preferences. Conversely, 
if the EU is seen as capable, experienced, and ‘putting its money where its mouth is’, thus 
meeting and perhaps increasing countries’ expectations, this will positively affect their 
perceptions. This may lead to more likelihood to cooperate (compliance) with the EU 
and/or a more consensual strategy for reaching preferences.
Second, in terms of its image as a united or divided actor or in terms of coherence 
between the Commission and the Council/Member States in employing policies abroad: 
when there is inconsistency or incoherency in the position or actions of the Member 
States/Council and those of the Commission, it negatively affects the EU’s position as a 
single unitary actor. When the EU is perceived as divided, other actors may attempt to seek 
out either interlocutors or actors within the EU that are more sympathetic to their position 
thus facilitating leverage. Yet Elgstrom (2005) and Forwood (2001) have argued that in its 
relations with weaker actors (especially the ACP), the EU tends to present itself as a strong 
and unitary actor, which makes challenging the EU’s position difficult for such actors 
(Elgstrom 2005:184,187). In addition to the above proposition, it is also posited therefore 
that if the EU is perceived as united in its position, or as ‘speaking with one voice’, it 
positively affects other actors’ perceptions of the EU’s ability to act consistently, 
coherently, and united. This strengthens the EU’s position and will make other actor’s less 
likely to successfully exercise leverage or control. Thus, “EU unity contributes to the 
perceived power of the Union” (Elgstrom 2007: 950).
Third, divergence or incoherence between various EU policies, and coordination 
amongst the different areas of competence also affects other actors’ perceptions of the EU’s 
capacity to engage with them. Thus, “if one negotiating party does not accept the 
proclaimed self-image of its opponent, or sees it as inconsistent with the actual behaviour 
of that actor, it will doubt the sincerity and credibility of the actor and hesitate to agree to 
its proposal” (Elgstrom 2008: 12). If the EU is perceived as being inconsistent and/or 
incoherent in translating policy rhetoric into meaningful and impactful actions, than 
countries will be more likely to lower their expectations of the EU, and in turn adopt 
strategies that more closely assert their own preferences, which might be conflictual with 
the EU’s policy preferences, or they may just be less willing to cooperate with the EU. If a 
country views the EU as necessarily powerful or influential, it is more likely to devise a 
strategy that might be consensual with the EU’s strategy or policy preferences.
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Fourth, and related to the above point, the EU’s actions in Africa are often said to 
serve a wider purpose of establishing the EU as a relevant foreign policy actor. In this 
sense, the EU uses its policies and actions in Africa not merely as instruments for securing 
cooperation in development, trade and migration (see Chapter 2, 4, and 6), but also, in 
order reach wider political and strategic objectives such as establishing itself as a relevant 
power in the world and confirming and strengthening its ‘actomess’ (Crawford 2007; Olsen 
2002, 2004, 2005; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 12; Arts and Dickson 2004; 
Holland 2002). The fact that the EU often uses its policies and actions in Africa to achieve 
broader goals such as legitimising its role as a foreign policy actor, affects the way in which 
it conducts its relations with others, because if a certain policy, negotiation, or country, is 
seen as particularly beneficial to strengthening the EU’s role, the costs of failure to find 
agreement or to establish good relations can be high for the EU. In this sense, it is posited 
that perceptions of the EU’s willingness, urgency, and/or need to find agreement with the 
weaker party, the extent to which it is dependent on a negotiated solution, and/or has 
interests in establishing good relations with a weaker actor, can be used as a source of 
bargaining strength for the weaker party, provided they are aware of these constraints.12 
The EU’s use of its relations, actions, and policies vis-a-vis weaker countries to achieve 
wider political and strategic objectives can raise the costs of failure, non-compliance, or 
non-implementation for the EU. In this sense, the EU is, to some extent, constrained by its 
wider policy interests and goals to project itself and to be seen as a relevant and powerful 
political actor. If the EU is perceived as not constrained by its interests, or if the weaker 
actor is unaware of these constraints, it will be less likely to formulate a non-compliant 
strategy and exercise leverage vis-a-vis the EU. If the EU is perceived as constrained by its 
interests, the weaker actor will be more likely to devise a strategy in which it can expose 
these constraints and exercise leverage in finding agreement or influencing the agenda.
Finally, perceptions are shaped by the larger international and domestic context in 
which relations take place. This point is particularly crucial, because it brings the 
discussion back to the importance of accounting for the contextual nature of power. In this 
sense, historical, socio-economic, political and cultural factors contribute to the way in 
which actors perceive one another and consequently the power they are able to exert vis-a-
12 For example, in bilateral negotiations on aid conditionality between Indonesia and the US, structurally 
much weaker Indonesia was able to exercise leverage vis-a-vis a structurally stronger US partially because of 
its awareness o f what consequences failed agreement would have for securing the U S’s position as a 
hegemon. According to Kivimaki, “because of its dependence on abstract strategic concerns and on the 
legitimacy o f its position, the United States had to abandon many o f its self-interests” (2000: 75). The U S’s 
need to find a compromised solution to aid negotiations, provided Indonesia with bargaining strength when it 
threatened to shift relations towards the Communist camp, unless a negotiated agreement to the conditionality 
surrounding much-needed U S’s aid allocations could be found (see also Kivimaki 2003).
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vis one another. Importantly, these factors are not necessarily under the direct control or 
influence of the actors, but instead are elements of the larger contextual environment in 
which relations between the EU and Africa operate. Contextual factors help to determine 
firstly how the countries perceive the EU and secondly how they perceive their own 
capabilities to exercise leverage and maintaining control vis-a-vis the EU, and how these 
will in turn translate in to the confidence and willingness to pursue strategies and demands 
vis-a-vis a stronger actor. Importantly, a weak actor’s ability to exercise leverage or 
maintain control vis-a-vis the EU, is determined by the extent to which its perceptions of 
the EU’s and of its own power and the context in which these relations operate, provide the 
country with the confidence to translate its strategies into an asset it can deploy in meeting 
its preferences and demands.
Although this thesis examines relations between the EU and African countries in a 
relatively short time period, namely since the Cotonou Agreement of 2000, the historical 
legacy between the EU and these countries affects not only the way in which the parties are 
likely to perceive one another, but furthermore, also contributes to the formulation of 
strategies, approaches and preferences in negotiating with one another. The way in which 
African countries choose to negotiate and formulate their strategies vis-a-vis the EU is 
influenced by their historical experience in dealing with the EU as a development actor, as 
a trading partner and more recently as a foreign policy actor. In addition to the countries’ 
historical experiences in dealing with the EU, the historical legacy of the countries’ 
relationship to EU Member States, by way of their colonial past as well as the presence of 
Member States as bilateral development and foreign policy actors in the countries also 
contributes to shaping perceptions of the EU. Before advancing the discussion, some words 
must first be said about these historical factors in the specific case of Senegal and Ghana’s 
relations with the EU. Although the historical relations between the countries and the EU or 
the Member States are not explored in detail in the following chapters, it is nevertheless 
important to outline how history might contribute to shaping the actors perceptions of the 
EU.
Senegal is historically closely tied to France, with links between the two countries 
dating back more than three centuries. Senegal was France’s oldest colony in sub-Saharan 
Africa, and the two countries have up until very recently maintained the close ties 
developed during the colonial period since political independence in 1960. This has led to a 
“special relationship” in which France has been intimately involved in Senegalese affairs, 
while Senegal used its status as a strategic francophone country to solidify its important 
status in the region and in francophone Africa (Chafer 2007). In recent years however,
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unsatisfied with the level of developmental and economic progress that its relationship with 
France has brought the country, Senegal has begun to diversify its relations away from its 
traditional partner towards other international partners such as the US and the UK, but also 
Arab states, China, and India. On the one hand, therefore, Senegal has based its 
expectations and interactions with the EU on its previous experiences in dealing with 
France. On the other hand however, Senegal’s increasing interest in expanding its relations 
with alternative actors also has important implications for the extent to which it is willing to 
assert ownership and control in relations with external partners.
In Ghana, the historical ties to its former colonial power, the UK, are not nearly as 
strong as Senegal’s ties to France. In fact, it has been mostly other actors such as the World 
Bank and the IMF that have influenced and shaped Ghana’s understanding and perceptions 
of other foreign policy actors. Upon independence, Ghana began to face almost immediate 
economic decline, which eventually led it to pursue reform arrangements with international 
financial institutions (IFIs). Although the IMF was politically unpopular in the 1960s and 
1970s, in the 1980s the government of Jerry Rawlings actively pursued its relations with 
the IMF and the World Bank through the Economic Recovery Programme. As argued by 
Whitfield and Jones (2008), it is mainly Ghana’s intimate relations with these financial 
institutions, and not so much its former colonial master, that have shaped the government’s 
understandings and expectations in conducting relations with foreign actors. Indeed, “the 
IMF and World Bank became the most important architects of Ghana’s economic strategy 
and policies” (Whitfield and Jones 2008: 190). In this regard, other external actors, and 
especially, other donors such as the EU, the UK, and other Member States are merely 
considered one amongst the many international actors present in Ghana. Ghana’s intimate 
relations with financial institutions and its relatively ‘normal’ relations with other bilateral 
and multilateral actors have created a different historical setting in Ghana than in Senegal, 
which as will be demonstrated in the following chapters has influenced the strategies it 
adopts towards the EU, which have been mostly in line with the overall approach the 
country adopts towards external actors in general.
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Table 1.1: Summary of assumptions on perceptions
Assumption 1
The way in which an actor perceives its own power as opposed to that of others, as 
well as how it perceives the other actor’s power as opposed to its own, will affect 
the exercise of leverage and control.
Assumption 2
Perceptions are shaped by:
1. objective reality, or the possession of structural resources an actor has;
2. external actions and the effectiveness and impact of these actions;
3. the larger international and domestic context in which relations take place.
Table 1.2: Summary of hypotheses on perceptions
Hypothesis 1
Based on perceptions of structural power, weaker actors are likely to perceive the 
EU as a more powerful actor and one with which cooperation is necessary given 
their marginal and weak position.
Hypotheses 2a
If the EU is unable to convert its rhetoric into practise because it lacks, or is 
unwilling to employ, the resources necessary, this is likely to weaken its 
effectiveness abroad and will consequently lower countries’ expectations and affect 
their perceptions of the EU negatively. This may lead to less willingness to 
cooperate (non-compliance) and/or more conflictual strategies for reaching 
preferences.
If the EU is seen as capable, experienced, and ‘putting its money where its mouth 
is’, thus meeting and increasing countries’ expectations, this will positively affect 
their perceptions. This may lead to more likelihood to cooperate (compliance) with 
the EU and/or adopt a more consensual strategy for reaching preferences.
Hypotheses 2b
If the EU is inconsistent or incoherent in the position or actions (between the 
Member States/Council and the Commission), it negatively affects other actors 
perceptions of the EU as a single unitary actor and its capacity to act accordingly. 
Divisions within the EU may allow weaker actors to seek out interlocutors or 
actors with which to exercise leverage or control.
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Hypotheses 2b continued
If the EU is united in its position, or ‘speaks with one voice’, it positively affects 
other actors perceptions of the EU as a single unitary actor and its capacity to act 
accordingly. Unity amongst the EU will make weaker actors less likely and able to 
exercise leverage and control.
Hypotheses 2c
Divergence or incoherence between EU policies, and lack of coordination amongst 
the different areas of competence, is likely to negatively affect weaker actors’ 
perceptions of the EU’s capacity to engage with them. This may lead to less 
willingness to cooperate (non-compliance) and/or more conflictual strategies for 
reaching preferences.
If a weaker actor views the EU as powerful, capable, or influential, it is more likely 
to cooperate (compliance) with the EU and/or adopt a more consensual strategy for 
reaching preferences.
Hypotheses 2d
The EU’s use of its relations, actions, and policies vis-a-vis weaker countries to 
achieve wider political and strategic objectives can raise the costs of failure, non- 
compliance, or non-implementation. If the EU is perceived as not constrained by its 
wider interests, or if the weaker actor is unaware of these constraints, it will be less 
likely to formulate a non-compliant strategy and exercise leverage and control.
If the EU is perceived as constrained by its wider interests, the weaker actor will be 
more likely to devise a strategy in which it can expose these constraints and 
exercise leverage and control in finding agreement or influencing the agenda.
4.2 Contextual factors constraining and favouring leverage and control
Perceptions alone cannot entirely explain weaker actor leverage, however. 
Perceptions are important, but they cannot on their own determine success or failure in 
exercising leverage and control. Indeed, this is where the contextual factors in power 
become fundamental to consider in explaining weaker actor leverage and control in a 
situation of power asymmetry. For it is the contextual environment of relations between 
weaker and stronger actors which creates the conditions under which preferences and 
strategies adopted can translate into successful outcomes vis-a-vis stronger actors. In this 
regard, in analysing leverage in relations between weaker and stronger actors, it is 
important to take account of “the ever-changing global and national economic, political, 
ideological, and institutional context within which donor and recipient define their 
preferences and select their strategies” (Whitfield and Fraser 2008: 39). On the one hand,
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although the structural differences between actors cannot “determine the outcome of any 
negotiation in a mechanistic sense”, they create both constraints and opportunities for the 
actors “in deciding what they think can be achieved ... and which resources to draw on to 
make their case in a way that compels the other to consider their preferences seriously” 
(Whitfield and Fraser: 39). On the other hand, the context in which the weak and strong 
conduct relations has a determining effect on the process and outcomes of their 
interactions. To this extent, preferences are shaped and strategies are chosen “in the context 
of given structural conditions and how it [the actor] decides those conditions can be 
deployed in negotiations to meet its objectives” {Ibid. : 39). Based upon previous literature 
on negotiations between the weak and the strong, and on contextual and structural 
understandings of power, four main categories of factors affecting the conditions under 
which weaker countries are either constrained or able to effectively reach their preferences 
and shape outcomes in relations with stronger actors can be identified: institutional, 
economic, strategic, and political/ideological (Tables 1.3. and 1.4 at the end of this chapter 
summarise the factors constraining and favouring leverage). The way in which these factors 
are expected to facilitate or constrain weaker actor leverage and control is here further 
explored.
4.2.1 Institutional factors
The actual institutional capacity of African countries to negotiate with the EU is an 
important element in determining the extent of their success in exercising leverage and 
control. Institutional factors are particularly relevant, because in addition to the economic 
disparities that create power asymmetry between African countries and the EU, a country’s 
institutional capabilities to develop strategies, to negotiate with external actors, and to 
actually implement policies contributes significantly to structural weaknesses or strengths 
which constrain or favour an actor’s ability to exercise leverage and control. Institutional 
factors which constrain leverage and control include: a lack of or limitations in the capacity 
to formulate and implement strategies (strategies are formulated exclusively by external 
actors or mainly in accordance with the preferences of external actors; government input 
and the incorporation of their own preferences is limited); a lack of or limitations in 
expertise (officials have not received the training necessary to carry out their tasks; are 
unaware or misunderstand how the external actor functions; have little or no experience in 
a particular policy field), a lack of or limitations in human and technical resources, 
(officials are overburdened and overwhelmed by complex and excessive administrative
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procedures; lack the necessary assistance to carry out their tasks; have inadequate access to 
equipment or research to formulate and implement strategies); a lack of or limitations in 
negotiating experience or the presence of weak institutional memory (little, no, or 
unsuccessful negotiating experience in a particular policy field; little or no training in 
negotiation skills; a high turnover rate of officials); and weak government administrative 
and management systems and frameworks (the implementation of external actors’ policies 
bypasses government administrative and management structures). Therefore, although 
African governments may have the political will to determine their own policies and 
preferences, they may be significantly constrained by several institutional factors that 
weaken their position vis-a-vis stronger actors.13
At the same time, there are other institutional factors which favour a country’s 
ability to exercise leverage and control in relations with external actors. Factors which can 
strengthen the ability to exercise leverage and control include: a capacity for strategy 
formulation based on prior negotiating experience or based on the presence of strong 
technical expertise (officials have participated, often successfully, in similar negotiations; 
have received the necessary training in negotiation skills); the presence of capable human 
and technical resources (officials are provided with the necessary assistance in fulfilling 
their tasks and goals; have received necessary and proper training; are not overburdened by 
the amount and complexity of administrative procedures required to manage external 
actors); and strong country management systems and frameworks exist (country systems 
and frameworks are initiated and implemented by the government; the government insists 
on the use of country-owned frameworks; external actors rely on country frameworks and 
do not bypass the government in negotiating and implementing their strategies and 
policies). Therefore, although weaker countries might be severely constrained in 
implementing their policy preferences, they nevertheless may demonstrate a willingness 
and capacity to at least formulate strategies and maintain ownership over their policy 
preferences.
13 For example, in aid negotiations, BrSutigam and Botchwey (1999; see also Moss et al. 2006) have 
demonstrated that although for a few select countries high levels o f aid have actually assisted in establishing a 
strong local capacity to manage aid and donors, for most countries aid dependence tends to impose high 
transaction costs on the government, leading to donors by-passing the government in the execution of projects 
and programmes, weakening capacity and ownership on the part o f the government, creating revenue 
instability and fragmented budgets, lowering the incentive to rely on alternative resources for financing 
development, and undermining transparency, accountability and democratic decision-making. Chisala (2006) 
has also identified the main institutional features o f aid dependency as constituting an excessive number o f  
projects and programmes relative to the country’s capacity to absorb incoming aid, thus weighing down 
institutions which are already weakened by a lack o f financing or trained expertise.
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4.2.2 Economic factors
The economic conditions facing African countries also impact on the extent to 
which they can exercise leverage and control. At the very basic level, economic conditions 
largely define power asymmetry, in that the stronger actor is usually wealthier than the 
weaker actor, and therefore it decides, for example, how much financial assistance it is 
willing to allocate in aid negotiations, how much market access it is willing to grant in trade 
negotiations, or how much labour access or financial assistance it will allow in migration 
negotiations. Differences in wealth shape the basic structural environment in which the 
parties formulate their preferences and strategies, yet these do not necessarily determine 
outcomes. Indeed, other economic factors also condition the exercise of leverage and 
control in EU-Africa relations.
A country’s financial and trade dependence on the EU plays an important part in 
determining the extent to which it can exercise leverage and control. A country which does 
not depend entirely on EU aid to finance its developmental objectives or is not entirely 
dependent on preferential access to the EU market, and can draw upon other sources of 
financing such as foreign or domestic investments, migrant remittances, resource capital, 
etc. or alternative trading partners, and therefore has more room for manoeuvre.14 Instead, a 
highly aid- and trade-dependent country is more constrained by its continual need to 
finance and meet its development goals through EU aid and trade, and is therefore less 
likely to refuse aid and trade preferences altogether or even to put forward its own 
preferences, in order not to risk foregoing aid and trade offers.15 At the same time, financial 
or economic dependence does not necessarily imply that weaker governments have no 
room for manoeuvre vis-a-vis stronger external actors. For one, recipient countries which 
receive aid from many donors, may be able to play external actors against each other and 
are therefore more likely to be able to secure their own preferences. At the same time, 
where donor coordination efforts are extensive and effective, this may also imply that “in 
so far as donors take common policy positions or push funds through one common pool, 
this can reduce recipient-govemment bargaining power” (Whitfield and Fraser: 40).
14 For example, in Botswana revenue from diamond mining and sound macroeconomic policies which 
generated sustained economic growth have allowed the government to become less dependent on foreign aid 
and gave it additional leverage in aid negotiations, by being able to refuse aid which did not meet the 
government’s own terms (Maipose 2008; Land 2002).
15 Indeed, the main findings to come out o f a comprehensive comparative case studies of African strategies 
used in aid negotiations suggests that the key factor distinguishing more or less successful negotiating 
strategies (success being the extent of government control over negotiation outcomes) is a government’s 
confidence that its strategies will not lead to the loss o f aid (Whitfield 2008).
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Another important economic factor to consider is the presence or the pursuit of 
alternative trading partners. In increasing trade and economic links with non-traditional aid 
and trade partners such as China, for example, governments may be provided not only with 
an alternative source of funding, but also with an element of leverage in negotiating the 
terms and conditions of aid and trade agreements with established donors such as the EU 
(Alden 2007; Whitfield and Fraser: 40; Whitfield 2008: 347-348; Whitfield 2008a: 364- 
365). Therefore, the ability or willingness of a country to forego cooperation, or risk the 
consequences of non- or limited cooperation is an important element in determining the 
success of leverage and control. In this sense, it is posited that the presence of alternatives 
(resources, trading partners, or cooperation frameworks) can give the country the 
confidence either to bypass relations with the EU, or to project stronger control by putting 
forward its preferences on its own terms.
4.2.3 Strategic factors
Strategic factors too create increased opportunities for African countries to exercise 
leverage and control vis-a-vis the EU.16 The strategic importance of a given country is 
determined firstly by its economic position, in terms of economic or commercial interests it 
provides for the EU (including the presence of highly-demanded or lucrative natural 
resources; investment opportunities; an influential player in international trade fora; 
openness to and facilitation to international trade; good infrastructure). Secondly, it is 
determined by its geographic position vis-a-vis the EU, in terms of its importance for 
example, as a migrant-sending country (the physical access its location provides for 
migrants coming to the EU), or in terms of trading opportunities (a country’s vicinity to the 
EU and the access it provides to other countries or regions). Lastly, strategic importance is 
found in a country’s ability to define itself and convince the EU of its status as a ‘success 
story’, by, for instance, undertaking macroeconomic reforms, generating economic growth, 
promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law, or acting as a regional leader in 
the promotion of regional integration, conflict resolution, or crisis management.17 For
16 For example, the strategic importance of a country like Ethiopia, positioned as a Western ally in the Horn of 
Africa, has given the government additional negotiating room especially vis-d-vis a donor such as the U.S., 
which has particular interests in maintaining stability in a fragile region (Furtado and James Smith 2008; The 
Economist 2007).
17 For example, according to Rocha Menocal and Mulley (2006) good economic management and sound 
macroeconomic policies, as well as a willingness to undertake reforms tend to favour the creation and 
maintenance o f good donor-recipient relations. During aid negotiations therefore, recipients may refer to a 
sound economic performance track-record in order to convince donors to meet their preferences. Indeed, for 
many donors, strong macroeconomic policies and the undertaking o f reforms are often a condition for aid 
allocations and disbursements, and where a recipient does indeed demonstrate success or at least a willingness
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example, in the aid field, strategic considerations may lead to some countries becoming ‘aid 
darlings’, namely countries with a high proliferation of donors and high aid allocations 
because of favourable conditions or efforts undertaken by the government in the eyes of the 
donors (Whitfield and Fraser: 41; Whitfield 2008: 341; Harrison et al. 2008; Rocha 
Menocal and Mulley 2006). In other words, a country’s strategic importance as a ‘success 
story’ is determined by the extent to which its politics and policy actions ‘fit’ with the EU’s 
stated norms and preferences for conducting relations with such countries. Indicators for a 
country constructing itself as a ‘success story’ include the presence of many donors or 
external actors; reference by external actors to the country’s success in order to showcase 
successful examples of their interventions; and the extent to which its actions are seen as 
effective and relevant by other regional and international actors.
An important caveat needs to be pointed out here. Countries are considered ‘success 
stories’ for ‘policy’ and ‘political’ reasons, and this affects the extent to which they are able 
to exercise leverage and control vis-a-vis external actors. A country which is considered a 
success story for ‘policy reasons’, because of, for example, its willingness and success in 
enacting donor-imposed reforms or a good record of democracy and rule of law, is less 
likely to successfully exercise leverage as opposed to a country which is considered a 
success story for ‘political reasons’, based on, for example, its influential or critical 
position and role on the international, continental, and regional scene (Whitfield 2008:341; 
Whitfield and Fraser 2008a: 41). Thus while ‘aid darlings’ may receive high aid allocations 
and have numerous donors contributing to their development goals, at the same time, 
because of extreme donor interventions, they may have developed a significant stake in the 
success of the country’s development framework and will therefore likely be reluctant to 
allow for exclusive government control.18 In this sense, compliant behaviour on the part of 
the weaker actor, may allow for cordial relations between actors, but it does not necessarily 
confer it with increased leverage or control. Instead, the politically-strategic importance of 
some countries (through, for example, the successful mediation of regional conflicts; being 
seen by others as promoting regional integration; having an important voice on regional and 
international scenes), with regards to the EU’s interests in establishing itself as a relevant
to meet conditions in these areas, donors have been more inclined to provide higher and more predictable aid 
allocations, disbursements and performance assessments.
18 The case o f Tanzania versus Rwanda, for example, demonstrates that while an aid darling like Tanzania has 
often played the ‘darling’ or ‘good reformer’ card in negotiations with donors and has indeed obtained high 
aid allocations, at the same time the considerable resources donors have invested in the country have given 
them a strong stake in the country’s development agenda consequentially diminishing government control 
over development policies (Harrison et al. 2008). In Rwanda, on the other hand, the government’s awareness 
that for geo-strategic or political reasons donors are unable to withdraw aid, has led it to circumvent aid 
conditionalities and excessive donor interventions (Hayman 2008).
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and important development and foreign policy actor on the international stage, can assist 
the exercise of leverage and control (Crawford 2007; Olsen 2002, 2005).
This last point merits further expansion. The use of these policies to achieve wider 
political and strategic objectives can create opportunities for weaker country leverage. 
Where capacity permits, countries with a political environment where the EU’s policies can 
be used as a tool for promoting its foreign policy objectives, through, for example, conflict 
or crisis management, or countries which are politically influential at the regional or 
continental level, are expected to be in a more favourable position to exercise leverage and 
control vis-a-vis the EU. This is because their strategic position can give them increased 
bargaining strength, because the EU will be more likely to cooperate with such countries 
given their potential for contributing to securing wider strategic objectives. A weak actor 
can transform its weakness into strength by playing on these wider strategic needs and 
interests.
4.2.4 Political and ideological factors
Finally, international and domestic political factors also shape the environment in 
which African countries are enabled or constrained in exercising leverage and control. 
Whitfield and Fraser have suggested that on the one hand, a high degree of domestic 
political legitimacy and a strong electoral mandate tend to favour recipient country leverage 
in that it confers upon the government a strong negotiating mandate and the confidence to 
project this mandate in relations with foreign actors (2008a: 41). Furthermore, a high 
degree of unity within the government can also assist the countries’ position vis-a-vis 
external actors, as this will make it more difficult for external actors to seek possible 
interlocutors within the government which support their preferences and persuade key 
officials within the government to shift or support a certain position {Ibid. : 42). On the 
other hand, other political factors at the domestic level, such as interventions and pressure 
by powerful interest groups, a weak electoral mandate, or instability amongst coalition 
groups can either constrain the government in the eyes of external actors and therefore 
provide them with a stronger position to impose their own preferences, or can create 
leverage for the government when the external actors prefer the government over the 
political opposition {Ibid: 41).
Further to this, aside from dependence at the economic level, the degree of 
dependence on external actors at the political level is also an important element in shaping 
countries’ ability, and willingness to exercise leverage and control. Chisala has argued that
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in addition to the effects of institutional aid dependence on recipient countries, political aid 
dependence can lead to ‘dependency behaviour’, such as a lack of initiative on the part of 
the government in formulating and defending its strategies and policies in relations to 
external actors, as well as the presence and intrusion of external actors in preference 
formulation of the government, and more generally, a reactive, rather than proactive 
government (2006: 27; see also Moss et al 2006). Political dependence therefore tends to 
stifle the adoption of a leadership role in negotiations by distorting incentives to take on 
such a position due to supplements and allowances coming from external actors.
Lastly, resonance between governments’ and the EU’s political or ideological 
orientations can assist in creating an environment which favours good relations and 
facilitates dialogue, but this does not necessarily confer leverage or control on the weaker 
actor. Although Elgstrom (2005; 1992; 1990) has highlighted the importance of cultural 
similarities and differences between the parties, and shared norms about what policies 
should and should not accomplish, in facilitating relations between weaker and stronger 
actors, leverage and control can be successfully exercised if the country’s domestic political 
environment so permits.
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Table 1.3: Factors constraining and favouring weaker actor leverage and control 
Factors constraining leverage and control Factors favouring  leverage and control
Institutional
• Lack of or limited capacity
• Lack of or limited expertise
• Lack of or limited human and 
technical resources
• Lack of or limited negotiating 
experience/weak institutional 
memory
• Weak government administrative 
and management systems and 
frameworks
Economic
• High financial/trade dependence on 
EU
• Lack of (and/or lack of confidence 
in) alternative sources of finance or 
trade
• High number of coordinated 
donors/external actors
Strategic
• Lack of or limited economic and 
commercial interest for EU
• Geographic location vis-a-vis EU
• Lack of or limited political and 
ideological interest for EU
• Lack of awareness of stronger 
party’s strategic constraints
Political/Ideological
• Pressure and intervention by 
interest groups
• Weak electoral mandate
• Government disunity and 
instability
• Political aid dependence on 
external actor(s)/dependency 
behaviour
• Weak government 
initiative/political will
Institutional
• Capacity for strategy formulation
• Technical expertise
• Presence of capable human and 
technical resources
• Prior negotiating experience/strong 
institutional memory
• Strong country management 
systems and frameworks
Economic
• Low financial/trade dependence on 
EU
• Presence of (and confidence in) 
alternative sources of finance or 
trade
• High number of uncoordinated 
donors/external actors
Strategic
• Economic and commercial interest 
for EU
• Geographic location vis-a-vis EU
• Political and ideological interest 
for EU
• Awareness of stronger party’s 
strategic constraints
Political/Ideological
• Domestic political legitimacy
• Strong electoral mandate
• Government unity and stability
• Strong government 
initiative/political will
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5 Conclusion
Although structural power asymmetry characterises relations between weak and 
strong actors, it is here suggested that certain constraints and conditions faced by both the 
strong and weak intervene significantly in shaping the environment in which the parties 
conduct their relations and negotiate with one another, and more importantly, can account 
for occurrences in which a negotiated outcome is not necessarily always in favour of the 
structurally stronger party. Because relations are influenced by both contextual and 
relational factors, the analysis of relations between the EU, on the one hand, and African 
countries, on the other, is based on the premise that the process and outcome of interactions 
between the two sides is a result of an encounter between the preferences of both the weak 
and the strong actor. In addition, “the ability of each actor to successfully achieve their 
preferred outcomes is heavily constrained by the conditions under which each faces the 
other (the negotiating capital they can draw on) and the negotiating strategies they adopt to 
pursue their preferences” (Whitfield and Fraser 2008a: 38). Importantly therefore, the 
constraints and strengths faced by both actors should be explored in order to better 
understand why or why not some countries have been successful in reaching their 
preferences regardless of the evident power asymmetry that constitutes this relationship. By 
looking at power from a contextual, relational, perceptive and structural point of view, this 
study aims to shed new light on relations between weak and strong actors. As an empirical 
work, it offers a more in depth look at how African countries have attempted to promote 
their interests and preferences by exercising leverage and control in relations with the EU, 
regardless of power asymmetry.
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Chapter 2
Aid and development cooperation:
EU constraints and African opportunities
The purpose of this chapter is to lay out the changes that have occurred in the EC’s 
development policy and how these have impacted on EU-Africa relations. It focuses on the 
European Commission as a donor and the European Community (EC) as a development 
policy actor. Although the aid relationship between the EC and African countries is 
fundamentally based on asymmetry in power, typical of donor-recipient relations, it is too 
simplistic to assume that the stronger actor, in this case the Commission, necessarily holds 
all the cards in the negotiation and implementation of aid with weaker countries. Although 
recipient countries face several constraints in effectively projecting their preferences onto 
donors, it is also important to consider the constraints faced by the donor. This chapter 
explores some of the major developments and policy orientations shaping EC development 
policy since administrative and political reforms undertaken in 2000. Secondly, it provides 
a brief overview of the EC aid cycle and examines the opportunities available to African 
countries for participating in aid negotiations, showing the evolution of negotiating roles 
and the increased possibilities countries have to determine their preferences. The third 
section looks at the constraints faced by the Commission as the institution implementing 
the EC’s aid policy and how these affect the EC’s position as a development actor in 
Africa.
In comparison to the other two areas of EU-Africa relations explored in this thesis 
(trade and migration) aid, or the funding of development projects and programmes, is the 
most traditional and established form of cooperation between the two parties. EC assistance 
to Africa dates back to the start of European integration. The 1957 Treaty of Rome 
designated a system of association between former African colonies and the six founding 
Member States of the then-EEC, and included the provision of development assistance for 
the associated countries through the European Development Fund (EDF).1 Eventually this 
developed into the Lome Conventions in 1975, where association between the EC and the 
ACP came to be based on two instruments for cooperation, trade and aid. The trade element
1 The founding o f  a European development policy was largely driven by French (and in part by Belgian and 
Italian) insistence, as it was eager to share the costs o f maintaining current and former colonies, while 
continuing to uphold preferential trade (Claeys 2004: 113).
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provided a system of generalised preferences towards the ACP,2 while the EDF provided 
the ACP with financial assistance for development. Aid relations between the EU and the 
Africa have thus existed for a long time, and have resulted in significant familiarity 
between the parties.
More importantly, the aid framework is one in which differences in power between 
the parties are most pronounced. This is because “development policy is one of the few 
policy domains where the Union can draw on the power of the purse” (Orbie and Versluys 
2008: 75). The Commission and the Member States together provide a little over half of all 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the world, with 50% of this destined for sub- 
Saharan Africa (EU Donor Atlas 2008). The EC as single donor provides about 10% of all 
ODA in the world and surpassed the World Bank in 2004 to become the primary 
multilateral donor in Africa (OECD 2008). Importantly, “the fact that the EC has at its 
disposal a substantial budget for development policy -  larger than that of any individual EU 
Member State -  is exceptional” (Orbie and Versluys 2008: 75). Unlike newer thematic 
cooperation instruments and policy spheres (political dialogue, security, environment, and 
migration), in which cooperation is seen as essential (by the EU) for achieving policy 
objectives and goals, the politics of aid are concretely based on a power asymmetry. From a 
realist/neorealist point of view, this implies that recipient countries are generally reliant on 
the preferences of donors, as it exerts control over the resources the recipient aims to 
acquire. It is assumed that the recipient has little room for manoeuvre, with the balance of 
power clearly in favour of the donor (Elgstrom 1990: 147). Yet differences in resources do 
not necessarily determine an actor’s success in exercising leverage or asserting ownership, 
because the relational and contextual nature of power can create conditions under which 
weaker actors can reach an outcome in their favour. The following sections examine how 
the aid relationship between the EC and Africa is characterised by power asymmetry, but 
will also argue that this by no means implies that the EC has necessarily had the upper hand 
in determining the process and outcomes of aid relations.
2 It granted preferential access to ACP exports entering the EC, offered financial support to compensate for 
losses in export earnings, and provided guaranteed and fixed prices at which countries could purchase EU 
goods.
1 Major developments and orientations in EU development policy
The EC has become a significant aid donor and development actor in its own right, as its 
development policy has increased in importance and relevance (Dearden 2008a: 2; Orbie 
and Versluys 2008: 68). The Commission plays an important role in implementing the EC’s 
development policy and acts as the main coordinating body amongst Member States. It 
manages several development programmes, with cooperation with the ACP, financed 
through the EDF, constituting the cornerstone of the EC’s development policy.3 Since the 
late 1990s, the EC’s development policy has undergone some important changes. The 
evolution of the policy is further explored here to provide a framework for the current state 
of the policy and its implications for the EC as a donor, and secondly, its implications for 
relations with African countries, as recipients.
• By the end of 1990s the EC’s development policy was renowned for long delays in 
aid disbursements, complicated procedures, and a generally inefficient management of the 
aid project cycle. Overall, the policy lacked a clear vision and rationalisation for the EC’s 
interventions. Furthermore, an increasing build-up of dormant or unutilised funds, known 
as the ‘reste a liquider’ (RAL)4 severely plagued the EC’s aid distribution record.5 Internal 
administration of the policy was fragmented, overstretched, and “excessively bureaucratic, 
with a concentration upon administrative procedures and disbursement rather than 
evaluation of the results” (Dearden 2008:188). Lastly, aid programmes were considered ill- 
suited for the local conditions of recipients, with programming and the preparation of 
project proposals carried out entirely by the Commission and its consultants rather than 
with the participation of national stakeholders and local administrations (Dearden 2008a: 
4). Recipient governments had little room to influence the EC’s contributions to their 
development goals and objectives.
In light of international criticism, and internal acknowledgement of flaws, in 2000, 
the Commission committed to a major overhaul of its external assistance programme (CEC 
2000a).6 The reforms aimed at significant improvements in both the quality and timely
3 Aside from the EDF, the EU budget also provides assistance for the ACP through thematic budget lines in 
wide-ranging areas such as the environment, NGO co-financing, migration, the European Initiative for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), food security and disaster prevention.
4 The RAL is used as an indicator for speed between financial commitments and payments.
5 For example, under the 8th EDF, 77% o f aid commitments failed to be disbursed within the timeframe of the 
fund. Unspent balances were carried over into the subsequent 9th EDF, increasing it by 50%, from €13.8 to 
€27.3 billion.
6 In 1998 an OECD/DAC peer review o f the EC’s aid policy outlined some o f the major inefficiencies 
plaguing development cooperation (OECD 1998). In addition, in the Communication on the Reform o f  the 
Management o f  External Assistance, the Commission acknowledged: “Management performance has 
deteriorated over time to the point of undermining the credibility of its external policies and the international 
image o f the European Union. EC external assistance programmes have a reputation for slow and
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delivery of aid, while ensuring robust financial management and increased impact of 
assistance. This included a radical overhaul of programming and management of aid 
projects by setting out clearer budgets, strategies and timeframes for implementation; 
reforming financial and administrative control mechanisms through the creation of the 
EuropeAid Cooperation Office (also known as AIDCO), responsible solely for 
implementation, (making DG Development and DG RELEX responsible for policy 
formulation and programming of aid); and ensuring a stronger impact on the ground 
through ‘deconcentration’, as termed by the Commission, which devolved the 
responsibility for aid management to delegations located in recipient countries. That same 
year, a ‘landmark’ Statement on the European Community’s Development Policy was 
released, placing poverty reduction as the central objective of the EC’s policy and 
highlighting areas in which it was considered to have a comparative advantage.7 The 
Statement also insisted on the EU’s commitment to coherence, coordination, and 
complementarity amongst policies (especially trade, agriculture, fisheries, and security), 
between the EC’s development programme and those of the Member States, with 
international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the IMF and the World Bank, and lastly, 
with the domestic policies of recipients (Dearden 2008a: 5). It furthermore committed the 
EC to allocating aid on the basis of country needs and performance, increasing country 
ownership over development strategies, and involving government and civil society in the 
programming, allocation, implementation and evaluation of aid (Grim et a l 2005: 2). 
Where the recipient country had sufficient administrative capacity, co-management 
between the delegation and the government was solicited; where this was not the case, the 
option of co-financing with other donors, especially EU Member States, was preferred 
(Dearden 2008a: 6). Importantly, the reforms sought to place increased responsibility and 
participation on recipients while increasing coordination with Member States’ own 
development policies. In sum, the EC’s development policy had gained a new strategic 
direction and strengthened the objectives and means to achieve this (Grim et a l 2005: 2).
In 2004, a qualitative assessment noted some considerable improvements in the 
EC’s aid policy (CEC 2005f). EDF disbursement rates had increased by 37% since 2001 
and the RAL stabilised for the first time at €20 billion. Furthermore, devolution to 61 
delegations was considered completed, with 70% of funds managed at the local level and 
with additional staff transferred and acquired (Dearden 2008a: 9-10). At the same time, a
unresponsive delivery, poor quality and excessively centralised and rigid procedures. The balance of external 
aid spending is also heavily influenced by the political priorities of the European Parliament, Member States 
and events in the world that are beyond the Commission’s control” (CEC 2005c: 5).
7 The areas are: the link between trade and development, regional integration, macroeconomic support, 
transport, rural development, health and education, and institutional capacity building (CEC 2000).
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number of outstanding political and administrative issues remained. Most notably, between 
2001 and 2004 aid projects in the ACP countries had deteriorated in ‘sustainability’, 
‘effectiveness’, and ‘impact’ (CEC 2006d: 73). Furthermore, improvements in 
disbursement rates were not consistent. While in 2001, 2002, and 2004 the Commission 
disbursed more than 90% of committed aid, in 2003, 2005, and 2006 significant gaps 
remained with only 60-80% disbursed (see Figure 2.1). Although the Commission over­
committed much less than prior to the reforms, the EDF continued to suffer from delays 
and discrepancies between aid commitments and payments.
Figure 2.1: EDF aid commitments and payments to the ACP, (2000-2007)
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Sources: CEC 2007f: 8; CEC 2008: 76
Administrative procedures remained lengthy and complex, impeding implementation, and 
management continued to be excessively focused on improving disbursement rates rather 
than on the impact of aid (Dearden 2008a: 8-9). In addition, the EC’s programmes were not 
being successfully coordinated with Member States’ and other donors’, while the 
comparative advantage in certain sectors and the Commission’s position as a focal point for 
collective action had not been exploited (Santiso 2002: 404; Dearden 2008a: 9; ECDPM 
2005: 8-9). The creation of EuropeAid and the division between the operational and the 
policy sides of the aid process were also cause for concern as respective roles between 
EuropeAid and DG Development (DEV) and the DG for external relations (RELEX) were
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considered vague (Dearden 2008a: 7; Santiso 2002:414; Hewitt and Whiteman 2004:146). 
Lastly, despite the increased role solicited for recipient governments in identifying their 
priorities for development, the EC had failed to “develop deeper and more enduring 
partnerships with the beneficiaries of its aid programmes” (Dearden 2008: 189).
By the end of 2004, the international development environment was moving 
towards a new consensus in development thinking and practise. The adoption of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 just months after the launch of the new 
EC development policy, established a specific set of developmental goals to which the 
donor community and developing countries reoriented their efforts. At the UN Conference 
in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002, the international donor community committed to increasing 
ODA to 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI). Furthermore, the Rome High-Level Forum 
on Aid Harmonization in 2003 and the Paris High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness- in 
2005 (whose outcome was the Paris Declaration), committed donors and recipients to aid 
harmonisation, alignment and management. In view of the continuing problems faced by 
the EC’s development policy, the changes in the international development environment, 
and a new incoming Commission, by 2005 the EC’s development policy was outdated, and 
a restatement of the policy was necessary (Dearden 2008a: 11; Dearden 2008:189; Grimm 
et a l 2005: 2; ECDPM 2005: 7-8).
In 2005, the Commission, the Member States, and the European Parliament (EP) 
agreed to The European Consensus on Development. It set out a framework for common 
principles amongst the EC and the Member States, solicited the implementation of 
development policies according to a complementary approach, and recognised the 
comparative advantage of the Commission as a coordinating body for EU’s development
o m
efforts. In line with the Paris Declaration, the Consensus acknowledged that aid 
effectiveness could only be achieved through increased country ownership of the 
development process and the alignment of the EC’s strategies with those of recipients. In 
assigning a coordinating role to the Commission, it also reiterated the commitment to aid 
harmonisation by undertaking joint programming exercises, shared analysis, joint missions 
and co-financing with other donors. Lastly, it highlighted the EU’s intention to move away 
from project-based aid to budget support, to facilitate the alignment of countries’ policies 
with the EC’s, increase country ownership over the development process, and decrease 
transaction costs for both the EC and the recipient country (CEU 2005a).
8 The Commission was said to have a “global presence,” could ensure “policy coherence for development,” 
promote “development best practices,” had a crucial role in facilitating “coordination and harmonisation,” its 
aid programmes are notable in “size and critical mass,” it possesses particular experience in promoting 
“democracy, human rights, good governance and respect for international law,” and lastly, can put “into effect 
the principle o f participation o f civil society” (CEU 2005a: 17-18).
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As a follow-up to the Consensus, in 2007, the Council adopted the EU Code o f  
Conduct on Complementarity and Division o f Labour in Development Policy, significantly 
stepping up EU efforts towards increased aid coordination between Member States and the 
Commission (CEC 2007g). The Code limits the number of donors active in a country and 
in a certain sector, ensures that development cooperation is evenly distributed across 
countries (i.e. aid darling versus aid orphans), and allows donors with a comparative 
advantage to act as the lead donor in a particular sector. Importantly, the Code promotes 
primary leadership and ownership of donor coordination by the recipient country, 
especially where capacities permit. Implementation of the Code is seen as depending on 
cooperation between delegations and Member State agencies, and between the delegations 
and relevant actors in the recipient government (Dearden 2008a: 14).
In sum, the EC’s development policy has undergone some important changes since 
its inception, with the reforms in 2000 sparking a new era for the policy. The evolving 
nature of the policy has afforded a greater role to the Commission as a coordinating body 
amongst the Member States and as a development actor in its own right, as well as 
increasing the opportunities for recipients to determine how aid contributes to their 
development goals. These change indicate that at the level of policy orientation, the EU’s 
relations with developing countries have aimed to move away from a traditional donor- 
recipient relationship in which recipients are positioned at the receiving end, with no 
capacity for input or articulation of preferences. Yet, while these efforts are certainly 
commendable, most observers remain critical on whether recipients have truly been 
afforded a more participatory role in determining their own preferences in relations to 
donors. The next section considers this in more detail.
2 The EC aid cycle and opportunities for recipient participation
The Cotonou Agreement, provides for development assistance to the ACP until 2020, with 
the EDF as the main instrument for this aid. The EDF is external to the EU budget and is 
intergovernmental, in that it is decided upon entirely by its own committee, consisting of 
Member State representatives. The amount of the fund is decided by the Council of 
Ministers approximately every five years and later ratified by national parliaments, and is 
financed by voluntary ad hoc contributions from Member States. The EDF committee 
approves general country strategies and large aid projects based on qualified majority 
voting, with the voting weights determined by the level of Member States’ contributions to 
the Fund. Although Member States provide the funding and decide the total aid package of 
the fund, the Commission is responsible for managing and distributing the aid.
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Coinciding with the 2000 reforms, Cotonou afforded some important changes to the 
aid relationship between the EC and the ACP. The number of aid allocation instruments 
available were reduced to two separate envelopes, where Envelope A allocated aid for 
long-term development goals, and Envelope B for emergencies and unforeseen 
circumstances.9 Cotonou also marked the end of automatic aid entitlements. Aid allocation 
decisions would be based on criteria concerning not just a country’s need for aid, but also 
its performance in implementing and administering aid according to a country strategy.10 
Furthermore, the EDF was transformed into a multi-annual ‘rolling programme,’ in which 
aid disbursements would be based on regular performance reviews which could lead to 
adjustments in allocations according to results achieved. A ‘sunset clause’ was also 
introduced, requiring funds committed in a given year to be spent within a three-year 
timeframe, while unspent funds would be de-committed and either returned to a general 
reserve or simply repatriated to the Member States.11 These changes significantly impacted 
on EC-ACP aid relations (Carbone 2008), but more importantly, changes provided by 
Cotonou, the 2000 reforms, and follow-up initiatives such as the EU Development 
Consensus and the Code of Conduct, have also aimed to strengthen the scope for recipient 
country participation and involvement in determining outcomes in the aid cycle, 
particularly in the programming and evaluation phases.
The EDF aid cycle is organised into six stages: programming, identification of 
projects, appraisal, financial allocation, implementation, and evaluation. It is in the 
programming phase, when aid allocations and strategies are negotiated, and the evaluation 
phase, when allocations and strategies are revised according to performance evaluations, 
where recipients are most likely able to influence development strategies and policies 
(Whitfield and Fraser 2008a: 39-40). Since the 2000 reforms, recipients are required to 
draw-up individual Country Strategy Papers (CSP), specifying their political and socio­
economic situation, development priorities and projects, and the envisioned value-added of
9 The Lom6 Conventions allocated programmable aid towards long-term development projects and non­
programmable aid on an issue-specific basis, such as SYSMIN (support for mineral dependent countries faced 
with unforeseen circumstances and export losses), STAB EX (support for agriculture dependent countries 
faced with unforeseen circumstances and export losses), SAPs (Structural Adjustment Programmes), 
emergency aid, and refugee and returnee aid.
10 Needs assessments are based on: “per capita income; population size; social indicators; level o f  
indebtedness; concentration o f dependence on export earnings; export earnings losses and dependence on 
export earnings.” Performance based allocations, to be assessed in “an objective and transparent manner,” 
consider: “progress in implementing institutional reforms, the use of resources, effective implementation of 
current operations, poverty alleviation or reduction, sustainable development measures and macroeconomic 
and sectoral policy performance” (Annex IV, Cotonou Agreement).
11 Under the Lom6 Conventions, once aid had been committed it could not be de-committed and remained 
available until the funds had been fully utilised. In the most problematic of cases, the full utilisation o f funds 
took up to 17 years: the last o f the unspent funds from the 6th EDF, implemented in 1985, were paid as late as 
2002 (Grimm 2004: 2).
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EC contributions to development goals and priorities. The CSP is accompanied by a 
National Indicative Programme (NIP), setting out a plan of action and timetable for 
implementation. In preparing these, recipient governments are expected to collaborate 
closely with the EC delegation, various non-state actors, EU Member States and other 
active donors. CSP/NIPs, and individual aid projects and programmes, are then carefully 
scrutinised by the inter-service Quality Support Group (iQSG), which ensures quality 
control and promotes the adoption of best practices (Dearden 2008a: 6).12 As a last stage in 
the programming phase, the CSP/NIP is approved by the entire Commission. The 
programming process is intended to provide recipients with an element of ‘ownership’ of 
the development process. Emphasis is placed on the developmental needs established by 
the country, and on the strategies deemed appropriate for development. The CSP should 
therefore be aligned with the country’s national development strategies, which mainly 
implies alignment with countries’ Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP).13
In the evaluation phase too, countries are expected to participate. Aid programmes 
and country strategies are subject to annual, mid-term, and end-of-term reviews, which may 
lead to adjustments in aid allocations according to a “result-orientated framework” (CEC 
2002: 13). An assessment review can modify a country’s strategy or aid allocation 
according to financial, sectoral and macroeconomic criteria, special circumstances, and a 
judgement on a country’s capacity to implement the aid. Thus the reviews evaluate a 
country’s progress not only in meeting development goals, but more importantly, serve as a 
means to verify countries’ performance and adjust, reward, or penalise accordingly.14 
Reviews are ideally a joint exercise, and as such the country’s National Authorising Officer 
(NAO) and the EC Head of Delegation are involved in reviewing needs and performance 
and altering the CSP/NIP as needed.
The onset of increased budget support contributions as opposed to project aid is also 
expected to give recipients increased opportunities for influence. As the project-based 
approach became increasingly criticised for failing to align aid contributions with 
recipients’ national development strategies and reform programmes, budget support
12 Although the iQSG is located in DG Dev, it reports to Relex and Member State representatives in the EDF 
Committee.
13 The PRSP process began through Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative, led by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). It aimed at reducing the debt burden o f aid recipient countries provided that these 
governments drew up medium term national development strategies. PRSPs are prepared by governments, 
involving domestic stakeholders and external development partners, and describe the macroeconomic, 
structural and social policies and programmes that will promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as 
financing needs and the sources financing.
14 In 2004 the Commission undertook the first set o f systematic reviews know as the mid-term review (MTR), 
adjusting aid allocation for 45 countries (see CEC 2005e).
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gradually became a more popular aid instrument (Schmidt 2006: 2).15 EC budget support 
consists of a direct transfer of funds into the recipient government’s treasury. To receive 
budget support countries must first demonstrate that they have met basic eligibility criteria, 
which consists in a well-defined national or sector policy and strategy, in most cases this is 
encompassed in a country’s PRSP; a stable macro-economic framework, usually pre­
approved and supported by a major international financial institution such as the IMF; and 
a credible commitment to reform and improve domestic public financial management 
(PFM) systems.16 The implementation, harmonisation, and alignment of budget support is 
negotiated in groups of donors contributing to such support, and in negotiations between 
donors and the recipient government. It is intended not only to provide the recipient 
government with more discretion as to how and where aid is spent, but to increase the
| n
importance of dialogue between the government and the donors.
This increased focus, at least rhetorically, on country participation and ownership, 
and the move toward more results-oriented aid, have changed the negotiating roles between 
the Commission and aid recipients. Countries’ negotiating roles have become much more 
solicited and relevant in utilising the programming phase to determine the type of aid they 
are allocated and where and how aid is spent. They can also ensure that aid will actually be 
disbursed by using the review phase as an opportunity to bargain for a better aid package, 
provided they are successful in convincing the Commission of their good performance and 
aid implementation capacities. At the same time, the new aid procedures have also afforded 
the Commission with “far more discretionary power in allocating resources to individual 
ACP country programmes” (TRADES 2000: 29), in that the loss of automatic aid 
entitlements allows it to allocate and disburse funds according to subjective judgements and 
reviews of country needs and performance.18 Yet while the Commission’s decisions should 
ideally be based on a mutual acknowledgement of the assessment given, in fact it retains 
ultimate decision-making power when it comes to financial allocations. Furthermore,
15 Since 2005, EC budget support allocations to the ACP have increased nearly two-fold. The 10th EDF 
allocated 44% of programmable aid (€13.5 billion) in the form o f budget support, compared with 25% under 
the 9th EDF.
16 Budget support contributions are disbursed according to fixed and variable ‘tranches’, with the former 
consisting in an all-or-nothing payment based upon the country upholding the basic eligibility conditions for 
receiving such support, and the latter disbursed depending upon the achievement o f targets for performance 
indicators agreed with the recipient government (CEC 2005h: 4).
17 Interview EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC 13); Interview EC Delegation, Accra: September 2008 (EC 19).
18 At the onset o f the MTR, the ACP expressed reservations about the decision-making process of the reviews, 
warning that “the EU should not be both the judge and jury and the application o f performance criteria in a 
discretionary manner should be avoided” (ACP Secretariat 2004a: 5). Concerns arose with regards to 
Commission objectivity in the review process, not only due to a lack of clear-cut criteria for judging 
countries’ performance, but also due to failure to address shortcomings in the Commission’s own role in aid 
allocation and implementation. Secondly, concerns arose regarding transparency, ACP ownership, and 
participation in the review process; for some countries participation was limited at best, for others, the NAO 
and civil society did not participate in the review (Mackie 2006: 3; Africa Peace Forum et al. 2005: 13-15).
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although reviews should be conducted with the participation of both the Commission and 
the relevant country authorities, it can be reasonably expected that when the Commission 
sees fit to reduce funds, it will do so without the consent of these authorities.
Has this new approach offered increased opportunities for aid recipients to negotiate 
their preferences vis-a-vis the Commission? How have recipients utilised these 
opportunities to meet their preferences? Or has traditional power asymmetry between 
donors and recipients continued to dictate aid relations in favour of the more powerful 
actor? To understand the opportunities available to aid recipients to influence the aid 
process, it is first necessary to investigate the conditions that either constrain or encourage 
aid recipients in exercising leverage and control vis-a-vis the donor. One of these 
conditions may be found in the Commission’s own constraints as a donor, as explored in 
the next section.
3 Constraints on the EC as a donor
While asymmetry in power is certainly the overriding characteristic of EU-Africa aid 
relations, careful consideration of the context in which such relations take place is essential 
in establishing both parties’ limitations, capacities, and opportunities for negotiating and 
administering aid according to their preferences. On the one hand, the EC holds a strong 
position in its aid relations. Indeed, as previously noted, it possesses significant financial 
strength as a donor, and these contributions are considered by recipients as important and at 
times crucial in furthering development prospects.19 In analysing the Cotonou negotiations, 
Elgstrom argued that the EU often presents a “take it or leave it” approach in negotiations 
with weaker parties, making it a “tough actor to deal with” and creating considerable 
difficulties in challenging the EU’s position (2005: 184, 187; Forwood 2001). However, 
although the EC certainly has the ‘power of the purse’ and may even present a strong and 
united front when faced with weaker negotiating partners, its aid administration continues 
to face several significant problems. These problems are firstly found in the Commission’s 
relationship with the Member States, secondly in the administrative and political concerns 
remaining after the 2000 reforms, and thirdly in the lack of policy coherence between 
development and other external policies. These constrain the Commission’s position as a 
donor and the EC as a development actor, which in turn affect the recipients’ perception of 
the EC and shapes their strategies in dealing with the Commission.
19 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: May 2008 (SI; S2); June 2008 (S3; S4; S6; S7); Interviews 
Ghanaian government, Accra: 17 September 2008 (G3; G4; G5; G8).
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3.1 The Commission’s relationship with the Member States
Despite development policy being a shared competence between the EC and the 
Member States, the Commission’s mandate vis-a-vis the ACP is strong (Elgstrom 2005: 
187). Indeed, once funds and strategies are approved by the intergovernmental EDF 
committee, the Commission has the sole responsibility to negotiate and administer the 
Fund. This implies that the Commission has substantial responsibility to, firstly, deliver an 
effective aid policy, and secondly, in comparison to the other two policy areas examined in 
this thesis, migration and trade, to negotiate directly with the ACP and therefore act and be 
seen as a development actor in its own right (Dearden 2008a: 2; Orbie and Versluys 2008: 
68). However, the Commission remains both indirectly and directly constrained by its 
relationship with the Member States in the realm of development cooperation with Africa. 
Indirectly, the Commission is constrained by its relationship with Member States, not 
because of a narrow mandate bestowed upon it, but because Member States remain “not 
fully convinced of the capability of the European Commission to deliver aid ‘better and 
faster’, in spite of its remarkable achievements in the restructuring of the EU external 
assistance programme” (Carbone 2008: 219). The EC is also constrained directly by its 
relationship with the Member States because it is confined to using their resources under 
the EDF, which have not increased significantly since the reforms.
The Commission’s relationship with the Member States indirectly constrains its 
room for manoeuvre in its aid relations with Africa due to the intense pressure to deliver 
from the Member States, and to a lesser extent from the Court of Auditors. Past failures 
placed considerable pressure on the Commission to deliver an effective and efficient policy. 
Thus, “in its relations with the ACP countries, the European Commission has its hands tied 
not by a mandate of the Member States, but by its past management failures” (Carbone 
2008: 227; see also Frederiksen and Baser 2004: 4).20 With the transformation of the EDF 
into a rolling fund, the Commission now faces pressure to assure that funds are committed 
and disbursed quickly and according to a predicted timeframe, or risk their repatriation. 
Furthermore, although calls by some Member States, such as the United Kingdom, to 
renationalise or repatriate EC development policy entirely have largely ceased, many 
Member States remain critical of increasing contributions to the fund until significant
20 Frederiksen and Baser identify two sources o f political pressure exerted on the Commission to improve on 
past management failures: externally, the EC finds itself under pressure from the Member States, the 
European Parliament, and the Court of Auditors. Internally, Relex commissioners have been keen to advance 
on the reform process which they initiated and to demonstrate that improvements in aid management have 
indeed taken hold (2004: 4).
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improvements are substantiated (see below).21 The Commission also faces pressure from 
the Court of Auditors, which has continually criticised the speed of EDF disbursements and 
the tendency to formulate unrealistic disbursements and implementation forecasts (Mackie 
et al. 2004: 118). Paradoxically, the increased pressure constrains the Commission’s 
capacity to deliver an effective and flexible aid policy. Indeed, as Santiso has commented 
in his critical account of the reforms, “the Commission has come under increased pressure 
to improve accountability and enhance transparency in the management of foreign aid. 
However, as distrust breeds bureaucracy, demands for increased transparency and 
accountability have tended to reduce flexibility and effectiveness, illustrating the trade-offs 
that exist between accountability and efficiency” (2002: 411; see also Frederiksen and 
Baser 2004: 5).
This increased pressure to deliver has an adverse effect on the Commission’s 
position in negotiating aid packages with African countries. In reviewing the EC
tVinegotiations with Botswana and Malawi under the 10 EDF, Carbone found that “the 
excessive preoccupation of the European Commission with improving the quality of EU aid 
has fatally resulted in reduced ownership of development by African countries” (2008: 
218). In addition, although EDF consultations with African governments experienced initial 
delays in 2006, the Commission later pushed governments to speedily sign programming 
documents by the end of 2007, to begin implementing the Fund by 2008. This notably
99reduced the opportunities for African governments to participate (ECDPM 2006). Lastly, 
the pressure to deliver, which led to the EDF becoming a ‘rolling programme’ subject to 
progress reviews, has placed an increasing burden on African governments, and most 
notably the NAOs, in that this requires governments to put the funds to use in the times 
specified, or risk losing the aid.
Pressure has also had the adverse effect of creating stringent rules and regulations 
on the delivery of aid. This has led to persisting complexity of the EC’s aid management 
systems and continued untimely aid disbursements. In interviews with EC officials 
responsible for the approval and implementation of projects and programmes, this 
excessive complexity was continually noted, with many respondents charging the increased
9Tpressure in recent years to deliver quality aid as a major obstacle to efficient aid delivery.
21 Indeed, a 2004 UK House of Lords report on the added value o f Commission’s aid programmes concluded 
that, “the benefits o f EU aid outweigh the possible advantages o f ‘repatriating’ it to national aid budgets ... 
Today, in view o f the improving quality o f the EU programme, the much larger United Kingdom bilateral aid 
budget... the existence o f a substantial EU aid programme is in Britain’s interest.” The same report also 
warned, however, that, “Until EU Development Aid’s quality and speed o f delivery further improves, the 
Government and other Member States should be wary o f any large increases.”
22 Interviews EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC6; EC7); Interview Namibian diplomat, Berlin: March 2008 (N l).
23 Interviews EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC6; EC7; EC8; EC12; EC13; EC15)
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Indeed, since 2005, the Commission’s efforts to improve the quality of aid requires funding 
proposals to pass through a review mechanism, the iQSG, making project approval and 
implementation even more rigorous and lengthy. EuropeAid officials note that they often 
approach funding approval requests with caution, to minimise the risk of a project or 
programme eventually failing to meet the predicted implementation times or exceeding the 
initial funding allocation. It is not unusual for a proposal to be sent back to the delegation 
and the recipient government several times before it is approved in Brussels.24 Despite 
shifting to a more participative and results-oriented approach for aid negotiations and 
management, the EC’s policy practises continue to exhibit an excessive emphasis upon 
disbursement rates and preventing mismanagement, rather than improving the actual impact 
of aid (Dearden 2008a: 9; ECPDM 2006; Frederiksen and Baser 2004: 5).
The Commission is also directly constrained by its relationship with the Member 
States, because it is they who provide the resources for the EDF. This not only sets the 
Commission apart from bilateral donors, but it is also problematic for the strength of its 
negotiating position vis-a-vis recipient countries. Member States have been cautious to 
increase their contributions due to past failures and mismanagement, and continue to prefer 
their own bilateral programmes over the EC’s. This is shown, firstly, by the refusal of some 
Member States, namely the United Kingdom, Spain and Ireland, to incorporate the EDF 
into the Community budget, which would make Member States’ contributions mandatory 
and open the Fund to EP scrutiny. Despite strong support for this by the EP, the 
Commission, the Nordic and Benelux countries, Poland and Hungary, and most recently 
France (Mackie et a l 2004:17), budgetisation of the EDF has been subject to heavy debate 
each time the EC’s budget is due to be decided.25 Furthermore, Member States have failed
tH thto meet the Commission’s expectations for increased funding under both the 9 and 10 
EDF cycles, despite their commitments at the international level to increase aid 
contributions, with total EDF funding reduced over the last two EDF cycles, “due (in part) 
to disagreements among EU Member States on the amount of their contribution” (ECDPM 
2006: 1). Although the Commission monitors Member State progress in maintaining 
commitments made at Monterrey in 2002, Barcelona in 2005, and Gleneagles in 2006, most 
Member States continue to prefer their own bilateral development programmes over the 
EDF.
24 Ibid. (EC2; EC7; EC8).
25 Arguments against budgetisation include a fear o f increasing contributions to the Fund; a diversion of 
funding away from the ACP towards other geographical areas or foreign policy objectives; distortion o f the 
privileged relationship with the ACP (Mackie et al. 2004: 18; European Voice 2008; ACP-EU JPA 2005).
78
Thus reliance on Member State funding constrains the Commission because it is 
unable to maintain its initial offers for funding, reducing its credibility in negotiations with
♦ ththe ACP group as a whole and with individual countries. During the negotiations on the 9 
EDF the Commission initially indicated a likely total sum of €14.3 billion to the ACP, but 
Member States decreased this to €13.8 billion. This was largely to the dismay of the ACP 
who had anticipated an increase as promised during the Cotonou negotiations (Carbone 
2008: 220; Elgstrom 2005: 197). Similarly, during the 10th EDF negotiations, Member 
States committed €2 million less than what was promised during the 2005 revision of the 
Cotonou Agreement (CEU-ACP 2006).
Despite findings by Elgstrom (2005) and Forwood (2001) that the EU presents itself 
as a strong and unitary actor when faced with weaker negotiating partners, in reality, 
African aid officials and negotiators are well aware of the extent to which the EDF is a 
product of intense internal negotiations. Although all interviewees were keen to note the 
value of EC funding in attaining development goals, the Commission’s reliance on 
voluntary Member State contributions and its excessive bureaucratic procedures were seen 
as placing it in a subordinate position vis-a-vis other major international donors.27 
Accordingly, although the EC’s contributions are seen as necessary by most countries, 
government officials prefer donors that offer more predictable aid flows, give larger 
contributions, and whose practises are less complex. Thus, perceptions of the EC as less 
capable than other international donors have affected its position as a development actor. 
This highlights how Hypotheses 2 on perceptions posited in the previous chapter play out 
in the EU’s aid relations with African countries. Indeed, if the EU is perceived as being 
incapable, inconsistent, and/or incoherent in translating policy rhetoric into meaningful and 
impactful actions, then countries will be more likely to lower their expectations of the EU, 
and perhaps circumvent cooperation when faced with alternative and better options.
The Commission’s position as a development actor was significantly strengthened 
when it was mandated a central coordinating role of the EU’s development policies, 
including the Member States’. Both Orbie and Verslyus (2008) and Carbone (2007) argue 
that since being delegated this task the Commission has adopted a leadership role in 
coordination efforts, with signs of an ‘integrationist shift’ in the EU’s development policy 
emerging. A lack of coordination with Member State policies significantly impacted the 
value-added of the EC’s interventions, with Member States and the Commission pursuing
26 Interview Namibian diplomat, Berlin: March 2008 (N l); Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: May 
2008 (SI); Interview Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G3).
27 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: May 2008 (SI); June 2008 (S3; S4; S7); Interviews Ghanaian 
government, Accra: September 2008 (G3; G4; G5; G8).
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different or competing objectives or unnecessarily duplicating efforts, while over­
burdening recipient governments with excessive administration (Orbie and Versluys 2008: 
73). Both the Consensus on Development and the Code o f Conduct made significant strides 
in ensuring increased coherence and complementarity amongst the different EU 
development policies. This is one area of the EU’s development policy where the 
Commission is starting to face fewer constraints and has instead gained increased capacity 
to pursue its role and objectives (see especially Carbone 2007). Interviews with African 
officials confirm that the Commission is increasingly perceived as a leader in coordination 
efforts amongst international donors, which in intensifying interactions between the 
Commission, other donors, and the recipient government, has also increased the importance
ORof the EC in general amongst other donors. The Commission’s capability to act as an 
effective coordinator has thus been important in shaping and indeed even shifting African 
perceptions of the EC as a development actor. At the same time, the emphasis on increased 
coordination and complementarity with the Member States may also have resulted in “a 
reduced space for negotiations with recipient countries” (Carbone 2008: 227), in that 
countries are less able to have donors compete against one another in terms of offering the 
best proposal which most closely fits with the recipient’s preferences (Whitfield and Fraser 
2008:40; Woll 2008). The increasingly important role of the Commission in more closely 
integrating EC and Member State development policies and practises is thus an important 
element to take into consideration in analysing how the constraints and capacities faced by 
the EC affect its relations with recipient countries.
3.2 Remaining administrative/institutional concerns
Remaining administrative/institutional concerns within the Commission have also 
affected the EC’s position as a donor. These are found in the role of the delegations in 
administering the EC’s aid policy and providing opportunities for recipient participation 
and in the policy split in Brussels between development policy formulation and 
implementation. Hypothesis 2a posited in Chapter 1 is thus highlighted here: if the EU is 
seen as incapable of employing resources and expertise effectively in other countries, or is 
unable to convert its rhetoric into practise because it lacks or is unwilling to employ 
necessary resources, this is likely to weaken its effectiveness abroad and will consequently 
affect other countries’ expectations and perceptions of the EU negatively. The way in
28 Interviews with African officials also confirm that they perceive the EC as having taken the lead in 
coordination efforts amongst international donors (Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S3); 
Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G3; G4; G5; G8)).
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which this plays out in the specific context of the EU’s relations with Africa will become
clearer in the following chapter.
The role of the delegations in creating an effective EC aid policy towards Africa is
fundamental. Indeed:
Continued attention to implement, adjust and consolidate the different reform 
components will be key in the struggle to increase the quality and effectiveness of 
external assistance. Implementation and consolidation of the extensive devolution of 
management responsibilities from EC headquarters in Brussels to the EC delegations 
abroad will probably be the most critical component in this endeavour (Frederiksen 
and Baser 2004: 1).
More than strengthening the EC’s donor performance-record, devolution is also a means to 
provide increased ownership of aid programming to recipient governments by providing 
“influence, decision-making power and some control over finances” {Ibid.: 2). Prior to the 
2000 reforms, the EC’s delegations had poorly defined responsibilities, limited decision­
making power, persistent staff shortages and limited training opportunities {Ibid.: 1; 
Dearden 2008a: 4-5). The reforms sought to address this by delegating more decision­
making power to the delegations. They were charged with presenting, explaining and 
implementing the policy, analysing and reporting on the developments of the recipient 
countries, and conducting negotiations in accordance with their given mandate. They are 
expected to manage all phases of the project cycle, previously under the responsibility of 
EuropeAid, and participate closely in the drafting of programming documents, such as the 
CSP. Importantly, delegations should play a key role in the implementation of the EC’s aid 
programmes, by leading the programming process in consultation with national 
governments, managing the aid implementation, launching and managing local calls for 
proposals, and coordinating with other international donors, civil society, and NGOs. 
Furthermore, the role of the delegations is expected to become even more crucial with the 
increase in budget support, as “a greater understanding of the local context becomes of 
prime importance and therefore the role of the Delegations is central to ensuring the 
realisation of effective aid programmes” (Dearden 2008: 190).
Although the role of the delegations is a crucial one in both creating a more 
effective policy and providing African countries with an increased role in negotiations, 
devolution has not been entirely successful and this has constrained the EC’s aid relations 
with Africa. As Dearden has pointed out, two fundamental problems remain regarding the 
devolution process, firstly “adequate resourcing of the Delegations to undertake their new 
analytical and policy-driving role,” and secondly, “the relationship of the Delegations to 
Brussels,” (2008a: 19). For one, administrative funding to run and manage aid relations 
with Africa and the ACP has not increased significantly (Carbone 2008: 227), and this
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constrains the Commission’s capacity to cope with increased responsibilities. Although 
staff numbers have increased, delegations continue to lack the staff necessary to undertake 
their new activities, while current staff often lack the expertise, skills and training necessary 
for these new roles. Furthermore, staff is either contractual or rotates every two to three 
years, impeding the building of effective and trust-based relationships with the recipient 
government and contributing to the loss of ‘organisational memory’ (Frederiksen and 
Baser: 4-8; ACP Secretariat 2004). There is also a wide consensus amongst recipient 
governments that despite devolution, major decisions continue to pass through Brussels 
first, with misinformation between the delegations and headquarters a continuous problem. 
Accordingly, this affects project implementation, stalls the timely aid disbursements, and
*3 A
limits recipient ownership {Ibid.). Therefore, deficiencies in financial and human 
resourcing capacities and opportunities hamper the relationship between the recipient 
government and the Commission, while the inability or the unwillingness for Commission 
headquarters to support the role of the delegations undermines the attainment of policy 
goals and further affects the relationship with recipients.
Another administrative/institutional constraint is found in the lack of clarity about 
respective roles and responsibilities between DG RELEX, DEV and EuropeAid. The split 
between aid programming and implementation is a significant problem in the 
Commission’s position as an effective international donor. One of the main administrative 
changes to come out of the reform process was the creation of EuropeAid, separating the 
operational side of the EC’s aid policy from the formulation and programming side, as it 
became the central agency responsible for the implementation of aid policies for all of the 
EC’s partner countries, and not just the ACP. Although this was meant to increase 
geographic coherence, observers note that the split has “damaged internal morale and 
further eroded Development’s position in the EC hierarchy” (Hewitt and Whiteman 2004: 
146). Indeed, former DG DEV Commissioner Poul Nielson was quoted as saying that it had 
been “a real error in terms of management and policy responsibility that we have a tension 
between the upstream policy part and the ‘do it’ part” (House of Commons 2002). Others 
see this split as “possibly disrupting the project-cycle management” (Orbie and Versluys: 
70; see also DAC 2002: 73; Santiso 2002: 414; House of Commons 2002; Hewitt and 
Whiteman 2004; Dearden 2008a: 23), while the process is also said to have “dismayed its 
clients -  especially those of longest standing, the ACP” (Hewitt and Whiteman: 146;
29 Interviews EC: Brussels, April 2008 (EC6; EC 15); Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: May 2008 
(S 1), June 2008 (S3; S4; S6); Interviews EC Delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC17), Accra/London: October 
2008 (EC 20); Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G3; G4; G5; G8).
30 Interviews EC officials, Brussels: April 2008 (EC6; EC15); Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: 
May 2008 (SI), June 2008 (S3; S4); Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G3; G4; G5).
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Hoebink 2005). On the one hand, EuropeAid officials generally insisted that the working 
relationship with DG DEV was efficient and cordial, with coordination mechanisms now in
o  i
place to ensure continuity between policy and implementation phases. On the other hand, 
DG DEV interviewees and African officials demonstrated a different impression of this 
split, indicating that one of the major bottlenecks for a more effective policy was found in 
the division between strategy formulation phases and the actual implementation of projects 
and programmes. According to one high-level EC official, the split had created significant 
rupture and disappointment amongst long-time EC staff, rivalries and tensions at the level 
of management (but not at the technical level), difficult reconciliation on clashing views, 
and generally insufficient cooperation mechanisms. African officials were also of the 
opinion that although the creation of EuropeAid was meant to improve the implementation 
of aid, the division of labour in Brussels had had little impact on the effectiveness of the 
policy on the ground (see also Hoebink 2005).34
3.3 Policy (in)coherence between development and other external policies
The separation of programming between ACP and non-ACP countries, and 
development policy and external relations, poses another constraint on the Commission’s 
position as an international donor. Co-existence between development and foreign policy 
goals has become a central element in the EC’s development policy since Cotonou, by 
integrating security and political elements into the EC-ACP framework and proposing a 
radical overhaul of the EU-ACP trade regime. Furthermore, development instruments such 
as financial assistance have come to constitute an important part of the EU’s foreign
• 35  •policy. Development aid has become an important instrument through which the EU can 
attempt to achieve its foreign policy objectives: it functions as an instrument for reaching 
poverty-reduction (developmental) objectives, while simultaneously providing a tool with 
which to promote political objectives, through conditionality or orienting aid towards non- 
traditional development areas such as migration or trade.36 However, increased coherence 
and the shift towards a co-existence between development and foreign policies have been
31 Interviews EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC2; EC 13).
n Ibid. (EC 10; EC11).
33 Ibid. (EC 10).
34 Interview Namibian diplomat: Berlin, March 2008 (N l); Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: May 
2008 (SI), June 2008 (S3); Interview Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G3).
35 Indeed, as note in a OECD DAC report on the EC’s development policy: “increasingly the EU views 
development action as an instrument o f foreign policy” (DAC 2007: 12).
36 The integration o f development with other foreign policy areas was confirmed in the 2005 Policy  
Coherence fo r  Developm ent (PCD), which recognised that aid alone was insufficient in reducing poverty and 
that many o f the EU’s other policies had a decisive impact on the developing world. It stressed the need for 
improvement in coherence between development and the EU’s non-aid policies.
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much more difficult to attain in practise, as shown by the division between DG DEV and 
RELEX. In an effort to ensure greater coherence amongst the EU’s external policies, the 
2000 reforms reshuffled responsibilities amongst the different DGs. ACP trade-related 
issues were made the competence of DG Trade, while RELEX became responsible for all 
non-ACP countries, managing the delegations, heading the implementation of EC aid 
through EuropeAid, managing thematic budget lines and ensuring coherence amongst the 
EU’s external relations in general. This left DG DEV with the sole responsibility of 
formulating development policy in general, and managing relations (but not 
implementation of aid) with the ACP. According to Dearden, this split points at “the 
unresolved issue of the relationship between a ‘poverty-reduction’-orientated development 
policy and the wider concerns of EU external relations” (2008a: 23). Indeed, while DG 
DEV has focused mainly on making poverty reduction the central objective of its policy, 
DG RELEX’s budget lines have been “more directly placed within the wider political and 
foreign policy objectives of the EU” (Riddell 2007: 68; see also Carbone 2007: 48). 
Although the importance of policy coherence in shaping the EU’s relations with African 
countries will become especially evident in the chapters considering trade and migration 
policies, even at the level of aid this division at the practical level between DG DEV and 
RELEX has an important impact on the EC’s position as a donor, because it impacts on 
how coherently it promotes or pursues its policies, which in turn shapes other actors’ 
perceptions of and strategies for negotiating with the EU, as outlined in Hypothesis 2c (see 
Chapter 1).
A last constraint is found in the EU’s use of development policy to reach its foreign 
policy goals. Development policy is increasingly “considered a field of action which allows 
the EU to reinforce both its internal and external legitimacy” (Orbie and Versluys: 86).37 It 
is now widely argued that development has come to serve as a means for enhancing the 
EU’s image internationally and legitimise its position as a relevant foreign policy actor or 
to further the image of the EU as a concerned, active, and relevant international actor (see 
Olsen 2002, 2004, 2005; Crawford 2007). The increasing use of the policy as a means to 
achieve foreign policy goals affects the EU’s relations with Africa because policy 
(in)coherence can influence others’ perceptions of the EU as a capable and legitimate 
international actor and because this can constrain the EU to conducting its relations or 
implementing its policies according to meeting these wider objectives rather than achieving 
the goals of the individual policies. Indeed, as noted in the introduction and according to
37 Indeed, Commission Communications and Council Conclusions on the policy have increasingly highlighted 
the need for increased visibility o f the EU as a both a development and foreign policy actor.
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Zartman and Rubin’s definition of power as a perceived relationship (see Chapter 1), 
although perceptions of power are based on objective realities, they are also shaped by the 
EU’s actions, and the effectiveness and impact of these in a particular context. Therefore, if 
the EU is perceived to be using its development policy to promote foreign policy objectives 
rather than development objectives, this is likely to have an impact on outsiders’ 
perceptions of the EU as a truly concerned or altruistic development actor. Inconsistencies 
between rhetoric and practise can lead to a lowering of expectations on the part of others, 
and even diminish their willingness to cooperate. Furthermore, if the EU is perceived as 
constrained to its wider interests, recipient countries might be more likely to devise 
strategies for dealing with the EU as a donor in which it can expose these constraints and 
exercise leverage and/or control.
4 Conclusion
In conclusion, it is worth considering Hoebink’s view of the EU’s position as a 
development actor in the world:
The European Union has, in spite of its limited capacities, become more of a 
global player than ever, but can it live up to this role? The Commission does not 
seem to have either the organisational or intellectual capacity to play an important 
global role in the field of development cooperation. This is partly due to staff 
deficiencies, both in numbers and expertise, and to the limitations that EU 
member states impose on the Commission. It is also partly caused by the complex 
decision-making process in Brussels, particularly the disconnection between 
policy making and policy implementation (2005: 1).
In sum, there exist certain constraints that the EC faces as a development actor which need 
to be accounted for when examining its relations with weaker actors. This is so because 
firstly, even as the structurally stronger actor, constraints can undermine or weaken the 
EU’s potential to utilise its resources to meet its preferences, and secondly, because weaker 
actors’ perceptions of the EU’s capabilities are not necessarily congruent with the power 
that it possesses in terms of financial weight and resources. The EU’s potential to be an 
influential leader or simply an effective development actor is sometimes undermined by the 
way in which its policies, goals, and instruments are operationalised. Indeed, “incoherence 
across issue areas ,.. lack of perceived legitimacy and, to a lesser extent, an excessive focus 
on internal co-ordination” (Elgstrom 2007:949), can lead to the pursuit of policy objectives 
which is at times less effective and influential than the EU’s power may have it seem 
capable of. It is important to take into consideration the constraints that the Commission 
faces because of the way it affects its position vis-a-vis other actors, but more importantly, 
how it affects others’ perceptions of the EU as a relevant development actor. Indeed, as
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posited in the previous chapter, if the EU is viewed by outsiders as incapable of effectively 
transforming its rhetoric into action, these perceptions might affect both the EU’s position 
to negotiate with outsiders, as well as affect outsiders’ strategies in dealing with the EU.
Although power asymmetry characterises donor-recipient relations, it has been 
suggested that certain constraints and conditions faced by both the donor and the recipient 
intervene in shaping the environment in which aid recipients conduct their relations and 
negotiate with donors, and more importantly, can account for occurrences in which the 
process or outcome is not exclusively determined by the stronger party. Because aid 
relationships are shaped by both contextual and relational factors between donors and 
recipients,
the outcom e o f  aid negotiations are the product o f  the encounter between recipient 
and donor preferences, and the ability o f  each actor to successfully achieve their 
preferred outcom es is heavily constrained by the conditions under which each faces 
the other (the negotiating capital they can draw on) and the negotiating strategies 
they adopt to pursue their preferences (W hitfield and Fraser 2008a: 38).
Importantly therefore, the constraints and strengths faced by both actors should be explored 
in order to better understand why or why not some recipients have been successful in 
negotiating their aid preferences.
The aid relationship between the Commission, as the donor, and African countries 
as recipients, is based on asymmetric distribution of power between the two parties. Yet 
power asymmetry with regards to differences in structural resources available to each party 
does not necessarily dictate an outcome in favour of the structurally stronger party. Indeed, 
the aid relationship between the EC and the Africa is far more complex than this, with 
recent institutional and administrative reforms, increased opportunities for recipient country 
ownership and participation in the determining the aid cycle, and continuing administrative 
and political constraints faced by the Commission, significantly challenging the idea that 
structurally stronger actors necessarily hold all the cards.
While the focus here was largely on the EU side of the aid relationship, an 
assessment of recipient countries’ position vis-a-vis the EU is also necessary in order to 
draw relevant conclusions as to why certain countries are able to exercise leverage and 
control despite power asymmetry. The next chapter will explore how and to what degree 
the conditions for weaker actor leverage and ownership as outlined in the hypotheses 
presented in the previous chapter (see Tables 1.2 and 1.3), have influenced the negotiating 
position of Senegal and Ghana in their aid relations with the EU. Despite a similar overall 
aid framework, the countries have adopted differing strategies in negotiating their aid 
preferences vis-a-vis the EC, with Senegal proving largely successful in maintaining
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ownership and having its preferences met particularly during the initial programming 
phase, while Ghana, although not necessarily unsuccessful, preferring a less proactive 
approach to promoting its preferences and allowing donors to take more of a leading role in 
determining the outcome of aid negotiations.
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Chapter 3
Exercising leverage and control in aid and development cooperation: 
Senegal and Ghana’s aid relations with the EC1
This chapter explores the extent to which Senegal and Ghana have or have not been able to
challenge the traditional donor-recipient relationship by exercising leverage and control
vis-a-vis the EC in aid relations. Although power asymmetry characterises donor-recipient
aid relations, it does not determine that the process or outcome of these relations always
favours the stronger actor. Elgstrom has claimed that:
B y all standards, the bargaining strength o f  the ACP countries is very small. Their 
relative bargaining power is extrem ely weak regardless o f  whether w e look at their 
aggregate or their issue-specific power. Their need for aid resources is desperate, 
and their alternatives are few  in a world where total aid flow s are stagnating. Their 
dependence on the EU is far-reaching (2005: 178).
At the same time, contextual and relational factors intervene in this power asymmetry and 
can create conditions under which weaker actors can reach their preferences. Based on the 
case studies of Ghana’s and Senegal’s relationship with the Commission as a donor, this 
chapter illustrates how the countries’ perceptions of the EU have influenced their strategies 
towards the EU, and the extent to which institutional, economic, ideological and political 
factors have created conditions for exercising leverage and ownership.
Senegal and Ghana are amongst the most aid-dependent countries in West Africa. 
Foreign aid is a major source of finance for imports, public investment and social services 
(Kaplan 2006: 83). Numerous bilateral and multilateral donors are active in both countries 
and have traditionally played an important role in the formation of national development 
policies and agendas. In fact, both countries have been able to attain more and better aid as 
a result of their favourable position vis-a-vis donors. Indeed, it can be said that the 
countries enjoy a rather ‘successful relationship’ with the EC, and most international 
donors, meaning that they are not seen as ‘problematic’ aid recipients, as they largely fit 
donor requirements for aid, such as political stability in a tumultuous region, a 
commendable record of good governance and democracy, a willingness to implement 
structural economic reforms, combined with low-income status and high levels of poverty. 
These factors have made Ghana and Senegal attractive aid recipients, because donors “can
1 The author thanks Dr. Robert Leurs, from the University o f Birmingham, and Ms Erin Coyle, from the 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI), for their assistance in providing documentation for the purposes of  
completing this chapter.
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point out developmental success to an often sceptical audience at home” (Schmitt 2008:1). 
At the same time, Ghana and Senegal face similar constraints in terms of institutional 
capacity and this poses as a major constraint in their ability to exercise leverage and control 
in their aid relations with donors. Despite these similarities and despite these weaknesses, 
the countries have adopted diverging approaches in their relations with the EC, which have 
led to differing degrees of leverage and control being exercised.
The first section of this chapter presents some basic aid facts and statistics on Ghana 
and Senegal, to facilitate comparison in later sections of the chapter. The second section 
presents the case study of Senegal’s aid relations with the EC. The Senegalese government 
is effective in aligning EC development strategies with its national development framework 
and has been able to attain increases in the type of aid it prefers. In this sense, Senegal has 
demonstrated considerable ownership in the negotiation phases of the aid relationship. Yet 
constraints faced by the EC combined with the constraints faced by the government have 
made it more difficult for the government to exercise leverage. The third section presents 
the case of Ghana. It demonstrates that although it too has attained the aid it prefers, the 
government has failed to exert ownership. Instead it has adopted a consensual position, 
where the programming of aid, project administration, budget support initiatives, and donor 
coordination efforts have been initiated and driven by donors such as the EC rather than by 
the government.
The case studies highlight some important findings about how the EC’s 
development policy and the EC as a donor is perceived in recipient countries, as well as 
how these perceptions have contributed to shaping the countries’ strategies vis-a-vis the 
EC. The findings confirm that the EC is constrained in several ways in the effective 
delivery of aid and in engaging with recipient governments. Furthermore, the case studies 
demonstrate that an evident power asymmetry between donors and recipients does 
constrain the recipient’s room for manoeuvre, in that capacity constraints and aid 
dependency, combined with limitations faced by the donor, hamper the exercise of 
leverage. Thus the structural realities and differences between the donor and the recipient 
have an important impact on determining the process and outcome of aid negotiations. Yet 
the findings also confirm that despite these structural realities, contextual elements also 
intervene in determining such processes and outcomes, allowing recipient countries to 
maintain control in their aid relations with donors and to negotiate congruent with their 
national interests and preferences, and not merely those of the donor.
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1 Comparative aid facts and statistics on Senegal and Ghana
Senegal and Ghana demonstrate a considerable need for aid, in terms of their poverty levels 
and the developmental challenges they face. Senegal is one of the poorest countries in the 
world, accepting Least Developed Country (LDC) status in 2001. Although the economy 
has grown steadily over the past decade due to economic reforms, wealth was not equitably 
distributed and caused inequality to increase rapidly (CEC-GoS 2003: 13). Ghana has 
proven to be quite a success story within the region of West Africa, in that it has twice the 
per capita output of most other countries in the region and poverty trends have been 
favourable over the last 15 years, yet extreme poverty remains a problem (see Table 3.1). 
Although Ghana is not an LDC, “its population and Government suffer the same or similar 
hardships and constraints as do countries officially designated as LDCs” (WFP 2001: 13).
Table 3.1: Senegal and Ghana poverty and development levels
Senegal
Poverty 
ranking in 
terms of 
GDP per 
capita 
(2007; out of  
178 countries)
108
Population 
living in 
extreme 
poverty
(2008; less than 
$ 1.25 a day)
33.5%
Population 
living below 
the poverty 
line
(2001,2007)
33 -  54%
Ghana 95 30% 28.5%
Sources: UNDP 2008; CIA W orldFactbook  2001, 2007.
Human 
Development 
Index Ranking
(2008; out of 
179 countries)
153
142
Human
Development
Level
(2008)
Medium
Medium
On the political front, Senegal is considered a symbol of peace, democracy, ethnic
and religious tolerance in a region characterised by instability. In 2000 it further
consolidated its strong democratic record, when elections led to a peaceful change of
power. Ghana is a model for democracy and good governance in Africa and has been
consistently praised by the EC and other donors for its,
Overall good record with regards to ... rule of democratic principles, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedom; the country’s constructive and stabilising 
role in the context of regional conflicts and crisis; and encouraging progress in 
poverty reduction, based on a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy and prudent 
economic policies. (CEC-GoG 2004: 14).
Given the combination of Senegal and Ghana’s poverty levels, with their relative political 
stability, a solid democratic record, and willingness to undergo difficult macroeconomic 
reforms, both countries are considered attractive aid recipients (see CEC-GoS 2004:15-16).
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Both Senegal and Ghana are aid dependent (see Table 3.2). In Senegal, foreign aid 
is the principal source of financing development, encompassing half of all public 
investment and a quarter of the government’s budget (MEF 2008a: 6). Since the 1980s, aid 
flows to Ghana increased considerably, making it one of the highest recipients of aid per 
capita in sub-Saharan Africa (Quartey 2005: 1080).
Table 3.2: Senegal and Ghana aid dependency
Net ODA
($ millions)
Aid per capita
($)
Aid dependence
(ODA as % of GDP)
2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005
Senegal 423 689 41 59 9.9 8.5
Ghana 600 1120 30 51 12.4 10.6
Sources: World Bank 2007; UNCTAD 2006
Aid as % 
capital 
formation
2000
46.2
50.5
2005
35.8
36.0
Foreign Direct 
Investment
(as % of GDP)
2000 2005
19.0 13.5
30.0 19.4
Furthermore, both countries also have a large number of donors actively contributing to 
their developmental efforts. The number of donors is particularly high in Senegal, while the 
number of ODA donors in Ghana set to expand even more in the near future. The EU (the 
Member States and the EC) is the primary donor, while the Commission on its own ranks 
amongst the top 10 donors in both countries (see Table 3.3).
Table 3.3: Overview of donors in Senegal and Ghana
Senegal
Ghana
Major bilateral and 
multilateral donors
(2005-2010)
World Bank; France; EC 
AfDB; US; Japan; Canada; 
Germany 
World Bank; US; UK; 
AfDB; EC; Netherlands; 
Denmark; Germany
Number
of
donors
(2007)
60
30
EU donor 
ranking
(2007)
1st
(50-60% of ODA)
1st
(35-40% of ODA)
Commission 
donor ranking
(2006, net 
ODA
Overall 
Commission 
donor ranking
(2006-2010,
disbursements) expected net ODA 
disbursements)
Sources: CEC-GoG 2007; CEC-GoS 2007; EU Donor Atlas 2008
EDF aid commitments to both countries have risen steadily, including per capita 
commitments (CEC-GoG 2007; CEC-GoS 2007; see Table 3.4 and Figure 3.1). Amongst 
the ACP, the countries have received slightly above average aid commitments from the 
Commission, indicating their status as preferred aid recipients (CEC 2007f; see Table 3.5).
2 With the discovery o f  oil o ff the Ghanaian coast in 2007 Norway resumed its development cooperation, and 
the Czech Republic is also considering becoming a donor (Schmitt 2008).
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Table 3.4: EDF aid commitments and disbursements to Senegal and Ghana
6th EDF 7,b EDF 8,h EDF 9th EDF 10,h EDF
(1985-1990) (1990-1995) (1995-2001) (2002-2007) (2008-2013)
Committed Disbursed Committed Disbursed Committed Disbursed Committed Disbursed3 Committed Disbursed4
Senegal 267.29 266.2 202.67 193.66 273.83 206.26 282 80.87 298.8 N/A
Ghana 121.65 121.45 266.22 257.27 264.74 193.53 311 116.77 374.6 N/A
Sources: CEC 2007f; CEC-GoG 2007; CEC-GoS 2007
Figure 3.1: EDF aid commitments to Senegal and Ghana, (1985-2008)
400 n
350
300
Senegal
S 250 w
 ^ 200
B 150
Ghana100
1985 1990 1995 2002 2008
Sources: CEC-GoG 2007; CEC-GoS 2007
Table 3.5: Top 15 ACP EDF recipients
Country Total 9th EDF
Allocation
Ethiopia 538.00
Mali 375.00
Uganda 363.00
Tanzania 355.00
Burkina Faso 351.00
Zambia 351.00
Niger 346.00
Malawi 345.00
Mozambique 329.00
Madagascar 327.00
Ghana 311.00
Senegal 282.00
Benin 275.00
Chad 273.00
Nigeria 266.00
Source: CEC 2007f
The next sections will use these statistics and trends in Senegal’s and Ghana’s aid relations 
with the EC in analysing their efforts at exercising leverage and/or control.
3 Payments are ongoing until 2010.
4 Payments have not yet commenced.
92
2 Senegal
EC aid, and the Commission as a donor, are seen to play a critical role in Senegal’s 
developmental efforts. The EC is considered amongst the country’s priority donors with 
which relations are essential. The EC is seen as the only donor that disburses aid in large 
sums, which allows for the implementation of grand projects and programmes that have a 
significant impact on the country’s development.5 The EC’s critical role and the importance 
of its contributions as perceived by the Senegalese government, provide it with some 
weight in Senegalese development efforts. In this sense, Senegal’s perception of the EC as 
a development actor is partially shaped by the objective reality that it is the structurally 
more powerful actor (see Hypothesis 1). This constrains the extent to which the 
government can fully exercise leverage when or if EC preferences do not conform with its 
own. Thus, the government does not feel it has the capacity to refuse EC aid or circumvent 
cooperation altogether.6 At the same time, the government’s perceptions of the EC are also 
shaped by the EC’s actions in Senegal and by the contextual environment in which aid 
relations operate. Indeed, it is these factors that have created the conditions under which the 
government has been able to maintain some control over its aid framework. This is further 
explored below.
2.1 The EC -  Senegal aid framework
Senegal’s national development framework is set out in the country’s Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the primary instrument for development cooperation 
with donors (AFRODAD 2007a: 12).7 The most recent version of this is the PRSP II (2006 
-  2010), which has set as a main objective the raising of economic growth to 7% per year 
so as to halve poverty by 2015, and place Senegal in line with the targets set out in the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Despite this, since 2003, Senegal has experienced average growth rates of around 
5%, insufficient for halving poverty and graduating out of LDC status by 2015. In view of 
this, in 2007 the government took the initiative to align an Accelerated Growth Strategy 
(Strategic de Croissance Acceleree - SC A) with the PRSP II, to jumpstart the economy and
5 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: May 2008 (SI; S2); June 2008 (S3; S4; S6; S7).
6 Ibid. (S7; S9).
7 The first PRSP was implemented from 2003 to 2005, and focused on wealth creation, capacity building and 
development o f social services, improvements in the living conditions o f the poor, and implementation of the 
strategy and monitoring o f outcomes.
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* 8reduce poverty by using exports to drive wealth and job creation between 2007 to 2011. 
The PRSP and the SCA are the main instruments with which donors are expected to align 
their interventions and reinforce national ownership of the government’s development 
strategies. Accordingly, the government is keen to have donors support its national 
development framework and the government’s priorities (MEF 2008,2008a; AFRODAD 
2007a: 13).9
The EC’s development strategies for Senegal are aligned with the government’s
th
own strategies. Thus for example, in the 9 EDF, the EC aimed to support the 
government’s efforts towards poverty reduction through project aid and budget support 
dedicated to three focal sectors: good governance, regional integration infrastructure (road 
transport) and sanitation infrastructure (CEC-GoS 2002: 18-22). For the 10th EDF, the EC 
aimed to align its strategy entirely with the PRSP II, focusing on reducing the incidence of 
poverty through strong economic growth, facilitating access to basic social services, 
protecting the most vulnerable, and promoting good governance and the rule of law through 
a mixture of project aid and budget support (CEC-GoS 2007: 31-35).
To acquire more ownership over where and how aid was spent, the government was 
keen to induce donors to increase budget support as opposed to project aid (AFRODAD 
2007a: 19; Leurs 2002: 33; OECD 2005: 115).10 This was largely in-line with the EC’s 
preferences as well, with the EC noting that “the option to reinforce budgetary support in
tlithe 10 EDF notably responds to European Commission’s desire to give States more 
responsibility in implementing aid and to support the macro-economic reform policies and 
management of public finances implemented by the Senegalese government” (CEC-GoS 
2007:23). Furthermore, in focusing more intensely on budget support, both the government 
and the EC aimed to make aid flows more predictable and reduce the high incidence of aid 
volatility, while at the same time relieving the EC of some of the high transaction costs 
associated with administering project aid (see below; Schmidt 2006).
While the EC had provided some budget support prior to the 9th EDF, until 2003 
this was suspended, “due to irreconcilable difficulties with the public financial management 
system and its lack of transparency” (Entwistle e t  a l  2005: 123; Schmidt 2006: 44).
8 The SCA focuses on the promotion of investments through improving the Senegalese business environment 
and on the promotion o f developing 5 crucial economic sectors: agriculture and agro-industry, fishing, 
tourism, textile, and information and communication technologies (ICT).
9 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: May 2008 (S2); June 2008 (S3; S4).
10 Ibid. (SI; S2; S3; S4; S6); Interviews EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC13; EC14). Budget support only 
constitutes a small proportion o f total incoming aid; in 2008 it represented only 15% o f total donor 
commitments and 5% of disbursements (AfDB-OECD 2008: 543). As o f2008, only a few donors contributed 
to budget support, namely France, the World Bank, the EC, the Netherlands, and the AfDB, and most 
recently, Germany (MEF 2008a: 5).
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Regular EC budget support for Senegal began in 2003 with the implementation of the 9th 
EDF, encompassing 26% of the total aid package. Despite a willingness to move away 
from project aid, disbursement of the last tranche of budget support suffered major delays 
in December 2007, when it was judged that the country had not met all the necessary 
conditions (MEF 2008a: 28; CEC-GoS 2007: 22-23). Regardless of the problems 
surrounding EC budget support in the past, in 2004 mid-term review (MTR) the EC 
increased budget support to €53M, and under the 10th EDF this increased considerably to 
over 50% of total programmable aid allocations. The significant increase in budget support 
directly corresponded to the government’s preference for increasing this type of aid.11
At the same time, significant problems and obstacles remain between the 
Senegalese government and donors, namely a very high aid volatility and limited 
coordination and harmonisation amongst donors. Firstly, while the increase in EC budget 
support is a success for the government in securing the type of aid it prefers, the delays in 
disbursing budget support also point to fundamental problems which persist in the EC -  
Senegal aid framework. High aid volatility in Senegal is evident amongst all donors, 
making “one of the major characteristics of external assistance in Senegal, the low 
disbursement ratio from several development partners” (Entwistle et a l 2005: 123). Only 
about 10 -  30% of incoming aid is actually disbursed and/or implemented (MEF 2008a: 7; 
Leurs 2005: 381-382). Several studies and interviews indicate that amongst the different 
donors present in Senegal, the EC is considered the worst performer in terms of timely and 
predictable disbursements (SPA 2006; OECD 2005: 117).12 For example, under the 9th 
EDF, aid projects were slow to get started, with implementation suffering from severe 
delays. At the end o f2005, of all the aid the EC committed to Senegal since the beginning
thof the 9 EDF cycle (6240M), only 7% had been disbursed. It was only with the signing of 
the budget support programme in December 2005 and the approval of a major road works 
project, that funds eventually began flowing more regularly in 2006 and 2007, thus raising 
the disbursement rate to 27% at the end of 2007 (CEC -  GoS 2007: 21).
Secondly, although Senegal is highly committed to the implementation of the 2005 
Paris Declaration, both the government and donors consider coordination and 
harmonisation of donor practises and procedures as fundamentally in need of improvement 
(MEF 2008; OECD 2005).13 With such a large number of donors active in Senegal, the 
government faces a particular challenge in implementing and absorbing incoming aid, and
11 Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S4).
12 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: May 2008 (SI); June 2008 (S3; S7); Interviews EC‘, Brussels: 
April 2008 (EC6; EC 13; EC 14).
13 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: May 2008 (S2); June 2008 (S3).
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administering relations with the different donors. Although, some significant progress in 
donor coordination has been made (AFRODAD 2007a: 18),14 most of these processes 
remain merely informal, with limited opportunities for the government to participate, 
leaving donors to coordinate in a setting removed from the government (Ibid : 19).15 Lastly, 
delegated and silent partnerships, in which two or more donors represent one another in 
policy dialogue (‘silent’), or in which one donor manages funds for a particular project or 
programme of another donor (‘delegated’), are currently not active in Senegal. Only about 
19% of all the donor missions in the country are ‘joint missions’ (OECD 2008c: 13). 
Indeed, according to one government official, although in theory donor coordination and a 
division of labour are in place, in practise this has not taken hold, with the government 
finding it increasingly difficult to manage all of its many donors.16
Aid relations between the EC and Senegal are a mixture of both notable successes 
and evident difficulties. On the one hand, the EC’s strategies are aligned with those of the 
government and aid allocations have moved away from project aid towards budget support, 
according to both the government’s and the EC’s preferences. On the other hand, the high 
volatility of EC aid, a failure to absorb incoming aid, and limited donor coordination efforts 
have made relations with donors difficult for Senegal especially in the implementation 
phase. The next section will demonstrate that although it can not be ascertained that 
Senegal has exercised leverage vis-a-vis the EC, through the pro-active role adopted by the 
government vis-a-vis the EC especially in the programming phase of aid negotiations it has 
been able to maintain some control. However, government pro-activeness in the 
programming phase has not been extended into the implementation phase or in increasing 
aid effectiveness, indicating a lack of leverage and control in the latter phases of the aid 
cycle.
14 From the mid-1980s, donors and the government have met in formal Consultative Group (CG) meetings 
coordination (Olaniyan 1996: 136). Since 2003, these meetings have been held on an annual basis. 
Furthermore, thematic donor groups now operate according to the main pillars of the government’s poverty 
reduction strategy. These are mainly informal discussion groups and constitute mechanisms of support for the 
government in the elaboration and the implementation o f policies and development strategies. They also 
constitute a forum for exchange o f experience and coordination between donors (UNDP 2003: 7). At present 
there are 13 thematic groups, each headed by one or more lead donors according to their area o f expertise 
(AFRODAD 2007a: 19)
15 Other problems in coordination include the insufficient coverage o f some sectors and themes due to a lack 
of interest or insufficient resources, a scattering of donor interventions in too many sectors thus decreasing 
their overall impact, and insufficient information sharing amongst donors (MEF 2008b; UN 2005).
16 Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S3).
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2.2 Leverage and control in EC-Senegal aid relations?
The Senegalese government has established ownership particularly over the 
programming process of EC aid interventions and aligning this aid to support the 
government’s development goals. Indeed, Commission officials recognise that their 
Senegalese counterparts demonstrate a good capacity to promote their preferences 
regarding where and how aid is spent. EC interviewees referred to Senegalese officials as 
generally “very good and advanced negotiators who clearly know what they want” and as 
“proud in their achievements and very keen to take on a leadership position” in negotiating
• 17 • *aid. Accordingly, Commission negotiators who have encountered government officials in 
aid negotiations note that although negotiations are sometimes tough (especially prior to the 
onset of budget support, see below), Senegalese counterparts are well-prepared in the 
promotion of their own preferences as regards the allocation of aid and have demonstrated 
a good capacity to forward their own preferences onto the EU in the aid programming 
phase.18
In what ways has the government demonstrated control? The government has 
negotiated with donors, the EC included, on its own terms and according to its own 
government structures. With regards to the EC, one Senegalese interviewee mentioned that 
although the EC often holds the “misconceived expectation” that dialogue must be 
conducted with high-profile figures within the government, rather than liaising with 
technical staff with relevant expertise,19 Senegalese officials have insisted that dialogue be 
conducted at the technical level, and that the locus of initiative and leadership in 
formulating national development strategies remain with experts in the Ministry of
• 7 nEconomy and Finance (MEF). Furthermore, according to Senegalese officials, although 
the EC decides the geographical and/or thematic area in which to concentrate its aid 
interventions, as with other donor strategies, this is first approved by the government. 
Technical experts in the MEF claimed that if projects or donor frameworks did not fit with 
Senegalese strategies they would be sent back to the donor and accepted only when deemed
71adequate. While this is not to say that the government has the capacity to refuse aid 
should donor preferences not match those of the government, it does show that the 
government has a strong willingness to negotiate with donors until its preferences are met
17 Interviews EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC6; EC 14); Interview EC Delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 16).
18 Ibid. (EC6; EC14; EC17); Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S3).
19 Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S3).
20 Ibid. (S3; S4).
21 Ibid.
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and to cooperate with donors only under the premises of its national development 
framework.
Senegal’s assertion of ownership has, according to the government, the EC, and 
other donors, translated into most donors, including the EC, “supporting the government’s 
policy agenda” (OECD 2005:115). Government ownership over the development process, 
and more specifically, over the government’s aid policies was also confirmed in a recent 
survey on Senegal’s progress in implementing the 2005 Paris Declaration: donors agreed 
that “the government maintains the primary role in the elaboration and implementation of 
national strategies ... The national objectives and development and aid policies enclosed in 
the PRSP translate into a veritable political willingness concerning strong engagement on 
the part of the government” (MEF 2008a: 38; see also MEF 2008: 116). Thus, “Senegal’s 
framework for selecting aid projects ... is apparently rational, coherent, fairly 
straightforward, and not insignificantly, government-driven” (Clark et a l 1997: 152). 
Although the government recognises its genuine need for assistance, it has taken a 
leadership position in aligning donor interventions with the government’s framework and 
has exerted considerable control over aid programming.
The government has also demonstrated ownership by instigating increased donor 
confidence in national systems through reforms, and initiating the formulation and signing 
of a fundamental framework agreement between the government and donors (MEF 2008a:
*yy
26). In 2003, the government initiated major reforms of the management system of public 
finances and of procedures for public works contracts. Although these reforms were based 
on recommendations of international financial institutions such as the World Bank, 
importantly, these were initiated by the government with the intent of firstly creating the 
conditions for a stronger adherence to and involvement of its citizens in public policies, and 
secondly, to construct an environment in which investors and donors could better conduct 
their interventions by substituting project aid with budget support. The implementation of 
these reforms demonstrated and reinforced the government’s commitment to enhancing 
coordination and harmonisation amongst different donors (OECD 2005:116), in addition to 
creating more transparent and efficient institutional mechanisms for transferring funds from 
donors to the government (AFRODAD: 24). Indeed, “improving the effectiveness of the 
government’s financial administration is seen as crucial, as success in this area would have
22 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: May 2008 (S2); June 2008 (S4; S7).
23 “L’enjeu primordial pour le Gouvemement, consiste k creer les conditions d’une plus forte adhesion et 
d’une plus forte implication des populations et des citoyens aux politiques publiques. L’autre enjeu majeur 
sera de batir un cadre qui permettra aux partenaires de la communaut6 fmancidre intemationale, de mieux 
concevoir et conduire leurs interventions dans le pays en substituant les aides-projets actuelles par Paide 
budgdtaire dont la mobilisation sera simplifi^e,” (MEF 2007).
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the advantage of increasing the credibility of the state and would thus facilitate aid to 
general budgets” (AFRODAD: 20; see also MEF 2008: 117).
While on the one hand, commitment to reforms indicates the government’s 
intention to assert ‘ownership’ according to the understanding of the concept as expressed 
in the Paris Declaration, on the other hand it is important to highlight that government 
control is evident in the role the government has adopted vis-a-vis donors in increasing 
budget support. In January 2008, the government signed the “Framework Arrangement 
between the Senegalese Government and the Donor Partners Concerning Budget Support” 
(ACAB) with five major development partners.24 Both the government and the EC (and 
other relevant donors) expressed strong confidence in the ACAB initiative, and viewed this
9 <as major breakthrough in increasing donor confidence. Indeed, the EC has admitted that 
its decision to augment budget support allocations in the 10 EDF was strongly linked to its 
recognition of the government’s own initiative in implementing the ACAB (CEC-Senegal 
2007: 23; MEF 2008: 117).26 Importantly, the fact that the ACAB was initiated by the 
government after the implementation of budget support in 2003, demonstrates how Senegal 
took a leadership position in promoting its preferences for increasing budget support 
allocations. This is evident when comparing Senegal’s position to Ghana (see below), 
where donors rather than the government initiated a framework agreement for budget 
support in 2003, requiring the government to undertake reforms as a condition for receiving 
budget support. In Senegal, donors contributed to budget support before such a framework 
was in place, and the government took the initiative to establish its own system to 
coordinate these contributions and to encourage donors to continue this type of aid, thus 
demonstrating control.
Senegal’s assertion of control was also evident in its behaviour towards the EC 
during the aid programming phases. Here, control, alongside the EC’s willingness to 
engage with the government’s request, were essential in increasing budget support
97allocations. Prior to the onset of budget support, Senegalese aid negotiators were seen by
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Commission officials as being “difficult” and often “unwilling to compromise.” For 
example, during the negotiations of the 10th EDF, the Commission was initially hesitant to 
increase budget support, given the government’s past failures in implementation and 
meeting conditions. Negotiations were said to continuously reach stalemates, as no
24 France, World Bank, EC, Netherlands, AfDB, and Germany.
25 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: May 2008 (SI; S2); June 2008 (S4; S7); Interviews EC, 
Brussels: April 2008 (EC6; EC13; EC14).
26 Interviews EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC 13; EC 14).
27 Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S4).
28 Interviews EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC6; EC 13).
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concessions were being given on the EC side, while the Senegalese side remained reluctant 
to accept more project aid over budget support. In 2006, a new head of delegation was 
posted to Senegal, who was said to be extremely keen on budget support. It was only with 
the converging of interests at a crucial time in the negotiations, that agreement was 
eventually facilitated, and Senegal was able to secure significant budget support allocations 
as preferred. On the one hand therefore, the government was not able to exercise any 
significant leverage vis-a-vis Commission negotiators, as agreement was reached not 
because of Senegalese influence, but due to an eventual converging of interests between the 
parties. On the other hand, through its continual resistance to accepting less budget support 
than was anticipated and despite initial EC reluctance to submit to their demands for 
increased budget support, the government maintained control by negotiating and 
cooperating according to the government’s terms and preferences. Although dialogue 
between the EC and Senegal has been fairly difficult in the past (CEC-GoS 2007: 22), it is 
only with the prospect of budget support that the Senegalese government has demonstrated 
increased willingness to engage with EC.30
Yet, while the government has exhibited control and pro-activeness in the aid 
programming phase, this has clearly been lacking in the implementation phase and in donor 
coordination efforts (MEF 2008a: 32-34; AFRODAD 2007a: 18).31 As Leurs notes, “the 
current problem is no longer one of inadequate national ownership of the development 
agenda but, rather, a problem of inadequate ownership in terms of the management of 
different projects and programmes” (2002: 17).32 Despite the government control during 
the programming phase, it has not improved aid management systems and has been too 
overwhelmed by the number of donor interventions to adopt an effective leadership role in 
coordination efforts (MEF 2008a: 32; Leurs 2005: 382; AFRODAD 2007a: 19-20; OECD 
2005: 116, 118; Enwistle et al. 2005: 123). Government officials note that coordination 
efforts have mainly been driven by the EC, and that particularly at the level of policy 
initiatives, the EC has led efforts to develop frameworks for increasing dialogue amongst 
donors and between the donor community and the government.33 Indeed, the government 
recognises that “efforts for enhanced division of labour are on-going thanks to donors’ 
initiatives” (MEF 2008b). For example, informal thematic donor groups for coordination
29 Interview EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC 13); Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S3; S4).
30 Ibid. (EC6; EC 13; EC 14). With the promise o f increased budget support, high-level government officials 
are participating more actively in the negotiations (MEF 2008a: 24, 32, 33).
31 Ibid. (EC 13); Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S3).
32 Ibid. (EC3; EC 13); Ibid. (SI; S3; S4; S7).
33 Ibid (S3).
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were initiated by donors with minimal input and involvement on the part of the government 
(AFRODAD: 19).
Why has Senegal been able to maintain control during the aid programming phase, 
but has failed to replicate this in the latter phases of the aid cycle? Why has the government 
been able to adopt a leadership position in negotiations, but fails to do so in donor 
coordination? Given power asymmetry between donors and recipients, Senegal’s failures 
may be rather unsurprising. At the same time, it is unexpected that a poor and aid- 
dependent country like Senegal has indeed managed to retain control in aid negotiations 
with the Commission. The next section will explore the reasons behind Senegal’s successes 
and failures in exercising leverage and control in aid relations with the EC.
2.3 Explaining the EC-Senegal aid relationship
2.3.1 Perceptions o f the EC as a donor
As posited in Chapters 1 and 2, the perceptions that other actors hold of the EC 
affect the their relations with it. Perceptions of the EC as a capable or incapable, coherent 
or incoherent, or united or divided donor shape a recipient government’s strategy vis-a-vis 
the EC and contribute to its success or failure in exercising leverage and control. So how is 
the EC as a donor perceived in Senegal, and how has this affected aid relations?
In Senegal, the EC is seen as facing three types of constraints which have adversely 
affected EC-Senegal aid relations. Firstly, Senegalese officials have continuously 
characterised the EC aid process as complex, long, and bureaucratic. The size of the EC’s 
aid projects and programmes, combined with difficult planning, implementation, and 
results monitoring processes requires significant effort from the Senegalese side to follow 
one of its many donors. This creates a significant constraint on the government, which has 
limited technical capacity in management and administration (see below).34 EC 
interviewees also noted that one of the major bottlenecks in aid relations with Senegal, and 
indeed with the ACP in general, is the intense pressure the Commission faces to deliver 
quality aid. This pressure has led to complex and long procedures for approving aid 
projects and disbursement decisions (see Chapter 2), which in turn affects the EC’s 
relationship with recipient countries.
34 For example, while the administration o f EDF requires staff o f about 15 people, the administration of other 
donors only requires two to three people (Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: May 2008 (SI); June 
2008 (S3; S4; S6)).
35 Interviews EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC6; EC 13).
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Secondly, there is a wide consensus amongst Senegalese authorities that the process 
of decentralisation between the EC headquarters in Brussels and the delegation is not yet 
effective (Leurs 2005: 383; 385).36 While the government prefers working closely with the 
delegation, many decisions continue to pass through Brussels first, increasing project 
implementation times and stalling disbursements. Implementation times for a particular 
project or delays experienced on the ground are often not communicated clearly between 
the delegation and Brussels, resulting in Brussels being generally misinformed or unaware 
of what is happening on the ground. At the same time, the delegation lacks adequate 
authority necessary to adjust projects according to local conditions. This affects 
Senegalese officials responsible for relations with the EC, in that they are often left 
uninformed about the status of project approvals and disbursement decisions, largely 
because the delegation itself is also uninformed. Thus, procedures and terms of approval for
aid projects in Brussels are not communicated clearly and in a timely manner to both the
10Senegalese side and to a lesser extent, the delegation. In this regard, Senegalese 
interviewees often compared the EC to other multilateral and bilateral donors, noting that 
where decentralisation had been fully implemented it had resulted in significantly improved 
quality aid programmes and dialogue (MEF 2008a: 31).40 Indeed, as was noted in a recent 
evaluation of aid processes in Senegal, donors “whose work is organised in a decentralised 
manner and which are awarded larger amounts of power seem to be able to fulfil their 
commitments with greater ease” (MEF 2008: 117; see also Leurs 2005: 385). Thus the 
failure of complete decentralisation on the part of the EC has had negative consequences on 
the perceptions of the recipient government.
Lastly, some interviewees noted that effective aid relations often come down to a 
number of well-informed and capable individuals in the delegations who are willing to 
build up relationships with their counterparts in the Senegalese ministries.41 One 
interviewee for example, noted that under the 9th EDF there were significant staffing issues 
in the delegation which contributed to the difficult dialogue. Indeed, as noted, it was only 
with a major change in the staffing situation during the 10 EDF negotiations that dialogue 
improved.42 Furthermore, as noted in a previous study on aid delays in Senegal, although 
“the hiring of additional staff and more local/longer term staff, especially in Embassy based
36 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: May 2008 (SI); June 2008 (S3; S4; S6).
37Ibid. (SI; S3; S4).
38 Interview EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC6); Interview EC Delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 17); Interviews 
Senegalese government, Dakar: May 2008 (SI); June 2008 (S3; S4).
39 Ibid. (EC6); Ib id  (S1;S3; S4).
40 Ibid. SI; S3; S4; S6; S7).
41 Ibid. (SI; S3; S4).
42 Ibid. (S3)
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aid sections” is seen by the government as reducing disbursement delays (Leurs 2005:385), 
the EC has not been particularly successful in this regard. One Senegalese official with over 
20 years experience working with the EC, noted that delegation staff were not recruited on 
the basis of their expertise in the country or an understanding of EC aid procedures, and 
that by the time these necessary skills had been acquired, they were re-posted due to a high 
turnover rate (see also CONCORD 2007: 9). Accordingly, this hampers the building of 
effective, long-term working relationships and dialogue (MEF 2008a: 37).43
As a result of this complexity, Senegalese counterparts have at times expressed 
disinterest in collaborating with the EC. Some government officials see EC constraints as 
undermining the EC’s position vis-a-vis other donors, which are considered more 
accessible and preferable in order to meet short-term development goals because aid is 
disbursed quickly.44 This point is particularly important, because it highlights just how the 
EC’s excessive bureaucratic procedures and regulations have hindered successful relations 
with some recipient countries, and has placed it in a less favourable position compared to 
other donors. Therefore, although the EC is considered an important donor in Senegal, a 
perception largely shaped by the objective reality of the EC’s financial weight, if it is 
unable to convert its resources into a capacity to engage with the government it 
consequently affects the government’s expectations and perceptions of the EC negatively 
and jeopardises its position as an important development actor in comparison to other 
relevant donors (Hypothesis 2a). Perceptions shaped by the EC’s actions in other countries, 
are therefore an important element in shaping the government’s strategy towards the EC.
The extent to which these perceptions translate into exercising leverage and/or 
control however, is dependent on certain contextual factors in EC-Senegal aid relations. It 
is argued below that Senegal’s ability to maintain control in these relations derives from: a 
strong institutional capacity for strategy formulation; a strong socio-economic framework 
and government initiative in adopting a donor-supported reform agenda; an increasingly 
important geo-strategic position; and a strong ideological conviction in maintaining 
ownership over national strategies and defending these in aid relations with donors. In this 
respect, despite the power asymmetry that exists between Senegal and the EC, contextual 
elements intervene in determining outcomes which are congruent with the interests of the 
developing country. At the same time, the structural realities of this aid relationship, such 
as the government’s limited capacity to administer aid and its numerous donors, combined 
with limitations faced by the EC as a donor have resulted in a rather problematic
43 Ibid. (SI).
44 Ibid. (SI; S3; S4; S7).
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implementation of aid and a lack of government leadership in coordinating aid. These 
constraints can also explain the lack of leverage and control in the later stages of the aid 
cycle. Senegal’s position vis-a-vis the EC, and its ability to maintain control is therefore 
assisted by intervening contextual factors, but at the same time constrained by the
institutional consequences of aid dependence, in that weak administrative capacity in
/
combination with high donor transaction costs constrain the government’s room for 
manoeuvre and its ability to exert control and exercise leverage beyond the aid 
programming phase.
Based on the factors listed in Table 1.3 in Chapter 1, the following sub-sections will 
explore the factors that have constrained and facilitated leverage and control for Senegal.
2.3.2 Institutional factors
Institutional factors have strongly contributed to both the successes and failures of
the Senegalese government in exercising leverage and control vis-a-vis the EC. To a large
degree, the problems in the EC-Senegal aid relationship, as outlined above, can be
attributed to evident institutional shortcomings faced by the Senegalese government. In this
regard, Senegal’s aid absorption capacity is notably very low, with excessive administrative
procedures within the government and the multiplicity of donor procedures constraining the
government’s capacity to administer and implement aid and coordinate different donors
(OECD 2005: 118; Leurs 2005: 382; AFRODAD 2007a: 7, 15). Government procedures
are characterised by their complexity and multiplicity and hamper the implementation of
aid and lead to a low absorption of funds (AFRODAD 2007a: 7, 15; Leurs 2005: 384).
Capacity constraints are even more evident in a country like Senegal, because of the
number of different donors, projects, and programmes that the government must administer
and coordinate. Indeed, as one Senegalese interviewee said:
Senegal is very strong when it com es to telling donors exactly what w e think and 
how  w e want things done. Ownership in aid programming is not a problem ... The 
main issue for Senegal is implementation. The M inistries, including the MEF, have 
weak administrative and technical capacities. This is where w e need reinforcements.
W e want more ownership in steering aid flow s.45
Indeed, the high proliferation of donors has placed an excessive administrative burden on 
the government, with different donors requiring different procedures and promoting 
different priorities. Therefore, “an effective partnership between the Government and the 
external partner community is still undermined by multiple and diverging procedures each 
development agency requires, forcing the Government to prepare multiple reports
45 Ibid. (S3).
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depending upon the funding source and to build capacity around different procedures” 
(Enwistle et al. 2005: 123). Accordingly:
This problem constitutes one o f  the decisive factors o f  the w eakness o f  the capacity 
o f  financial resources in the Senegalese administration. In effect, the m ultiplicity o f  
the donors’ procedures... results in protracted projects’ operation time w hich, in its 
turn, engenders additional costs and lessens the impact o f  developm ent programs. 
(AFRO DAD: 19).
Although these institutional constraints have limited the opportunities for Senegal to 
exercise leverage and control beyond the aid negotiation phase, it is nevertheless important 
to outline that there exists a “relatively significant capacity for strategy formulation within 
the Government” (Entwistle et al.: 127), which it is able to communicate effectively when 
the government is solicited for participation and input. Indeed, it is namely this phase 
which “present(s) the best hopes for recipient government to control national development 
strategy and policies”, and although government participation is expected during 
implementation, evaluation and revision, these phases “tend to reflect weak negotiating 
capital and allow ‘control’ only within constraints” (Fraser and Whitfield 2008: 7). It is 
precisely in the latter stages of the aid framework where Senegal experiences the most 
significant constraints in exercising leverage and control, because opportunities for 
participation are limited, decisions are at the donor’s discretion, and government capacity is 
inadequate. Yet where the country’s participation is solicited or even crucial, and where the 
government has a strong capacity for formulating and presenting strategies, it has made full 
use of these opportunities by strongly expressing its views and preferences, and by 
maintaining its position even in the face of donor disagreement.
2.3.3 Economic factors
Economic factors have strengthened Senegal’s negotiating position vis-a-vis the 
EC, and have allowed the government to maintain control during the programming phase. 
The government’s increased access to alternative sources of funding for example, has 
provided the government with the confidence to maintain its position throughout aid 
negotiations. In March 2000, a landslide presidential electoral victory by Abdoulaye Wade 
of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) ended the near 40-year rule by the Socialist 
Party (PS). Wade’s victory was later followed by another major win in the legislative 
elections in April 2001 in which Wade’s Sopi coalition gained an overwhelming majority in 
the parliament. The new government has been aggressively pursuing relations with non- 
traditional donors such as China, India, Dubai, and Iran, which Wade sees as offering a 
more flexible and less bureaucratic alternative source of funding (Reuters 2007; Wade
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2008). In 2005, Wade re-established diplomatic ties with China, leading to immediate 
contributions to economic and trade projects and cooperation especially in fisheries, 
agriculture and infrastructure construction, the areas the government is most interested in 
developing and promoting. Furthermore, Senegal began awarding aid and investment 
contracts to Middle Eastern, Asian and African donors and firms, often at the expense of its 
traditional donors and trade partners {African Business 2007). In addition, Senegal has also 
been constructing closer ties with the countries of the Organisation of Islamic Conference 
(OIC), namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates, which in recent years have 
contributed significantly to Senegal’s development efforts {Daily Nation 2007). Although it 
cannot be argued that non-traditional donors and alternative sources of funding have taken 
the place of traditional donors, at the same time the government views these alternative 
resources as having created a more competitive environment in which traditional donors 
must compete against new development partners for financing projects and securing major 
development projects.46 Thus, although a country may be dependent on a stronger actor, 
thus evidencing the power asymmetry that characterises their relations, the availability and 
willingness to access alternative sources provides weaker countries with increased 
confidence and room for bargaining vis-a-vis a visibly stronger actor.
2.3.4 Strategic factors
Senegal’s ability to maintain control has also been strengthened by the country’s 
increasingly important strategic position. This factor is especially relevant, because 
Senegal’s strategic position is largely politically oriented, rather than policy oriented, and 
as such, this has enhanced its position vis-a-vis donors. Indeed, as posited in Chapter 1, it is 
a country’s ability to construct itself as a strategic actor for political reasons in the eyes of 
donors, rather than for policy reasons, such as a good reform record, which allows for a 
stronger position to exercise leverage and/or control. Indeed this difference will become 
clearer when considering the Ghana case study.
After the election, Wade expressed strong interest in raising Senegal's regional and 
international profile, by diversifying Senegal’s foreign relations away from its traditional 
Francophone focus (Galvan 2001; Chafer 2003:163; Schraeder2001: 56). Indeed, although 
Senegal’s “historical background as the major centre for French imperialism in West 
Africa” (Edi 2007: 167) played a significant role in establishing the country as a leader in 
Francophone Africa, Senegal’s foreign policy has taken on a new direction since the
46 Ibid. (S3; S4; S7).
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election, and Wade’s international efforts undoubtedly boosted the country’s international 
profile (Edi 2007: 167; Schraeder: 55; Fall 2004). As a pan-Africanist, Wade worked to 
change the image of Africa and increase the power of African heads of state beyond their 
national borders, with the promotion of democracy and development as top priorities on 
Senegal’s international agenda (Lefebvre 2003:61). He was one of the founders of NEPAD 
and his government’s efforts were crucial to brokering a cease-fire in the Ivory Coast when 
ECOWAS forces failed to do so, and later in negotiating a solution to the crisis. 
Furthermore, Senegal’s diplomatic capacities were significantly enhanced by its military 
commitments to the region, especially in neighbouring Guinea Bissau and the Gambia (Edi: 
166-167). Indeed, Senegal’s role at the regional level has also been echoed in the other two 
areas explored in this thesis, trade and migration, where the government has successfully 
uploaded its preferences onto the ECOWAS negotiation platform regarding trade and has 
taken the lead on joint cooperation on migration between the EU and the West African 
region (see Chapters 5 and 7).
According to EC interviewees, Senegal’s important position both in the region and 
on the continent has strengthened its position vis-a-vis its major donors. Aside from its 
democratic record and peace and stability within Senegal, it has also developed a wider 
diplomatic role in terms of regional political leadership, especially conflict and crisis 
management and mediation.47 This point is particularly relevant for Senegal’s relations 
with the EC, because, as noted in Chapters 1 and 2, in the EU’s increasing use of 
development policy as a means to achieve wider foreign policy goals, countries where the 
EU’s security and economic interests are high have increased in importance on the EC’s 
development agenda, in terms of funding and the EU’s presence (see also Olsen 2004). 
Indeed, according to one EC interviewee, “In aid negotiations, it cannot accept to be treated 
any worse off than other countries in the region, and it really works hard to stay as a top aid 
recipient. Senegal seems to be really aware of its strategic position in West Africa, and 
what that means in relations with donor interests, and it uses this in negotiations with the 
EU.”48 The fact that Senegal has been particularly instrumental on the political and security 
(and economic) fronts in West Africa, has bestowed the image of an influential regional 
and continental political leader on the country. This in turn, has strengthened its negotiating 
position vis-a-vis the EC which has an interest in these areas and has allowed the
47 Interviews EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC 12; EC 14); Interview EC Delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 17).
48 Interviews EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC6). During the negotiations o f the 10th EDF, the government tried 
to convince the EC to increase budget support by conducting and referring to studies on and missions in other 
countries in the region (namely Mali and Burkina Faso), which despite a weaker socio-economic environment 
had moved towards this support much earlier. These strategies were considered crucial tools to convince the 
EC meet the government’s preferences (Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S3)).
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government to adopt a stronger position to maintain control over its development agenda 
when negotiating aid.
2.3.5 Political/Ideological factors
Lastly, Senegal’s political environment has also contributed to the ability to 
maintain control over its development framework and in aid negotiations with the EC. 
Specifically, a highly centralised presidential system of government and the strong mandate 
for reform at the time of aid negotiations with the EC contributed to its ability to maintain 
control. With a large parliamentary majority, the government was in a strong position to 
initiate and continue donor-supported economic reforms and the implementation of large 
infrastructure projects introduced by the previous administration (EIU 2008). In addition, 
splits and political rivalries within the opposition party helped to maintain the strength of 
Wade’s position and his coalition. In general, Wade’s first term was characterised by his 
widespread domestic popularity, with support confirmed by another landslide victory in the
2007 presidential elections. Not only has Senegal’s democratic track record, strong regional 
leadership, and a strong reform-oriented agenda increased support from Western donors 
such as the EC, the strong political legitimacy of the government at the time of the 
negotiations and Wade’s central position contributed to the strong conviction by the 
government to adhere to national strategies in aid negotiations. Indeed, interviews with 
government officials showed that although the government is aware that it is constrained by 
economic deficiencies and that donor support is crucial in meeting the government’s 
objectives, strong political leadership and widespread public support for government 
policies were fundamental in the government’s pursuit of these objectives during 
negotiations with the EC for the 10th EDF.49
After the 2007 elections, Wade came under tough domestic scrutiny and criticism 
for not having realized many of his campaign promises, fuelled by a food crisis in mid-
2008 and speculation that Wade planned to have his son succeed him in 2012. Discontent 
with Wade was subsequently confirmed in local elections in March 2009, in which the 
opposition won most major cities including the capital, Dakar. Furthermore, fragmentation 
and friction within the ruling coalition also increased, with the coalition’s composition 
subject to frequent change. Although political rivalries and Wade’s waning popularity may 
have some consequences on the legitimacy of the government’s negotiating mandate, at the 
same time, an environment of consensus on overall policy goals and a capacity to
49 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: May 2008 (SI; S2) June 2008 (S3; S4; S7).
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“formulate long-term strategies relatively well” (BTI 2007a: 15, 17) strengthens the 
government’s ability to put forward its preferences vis-a-vis the EC in aid negotiations. 
Indeed, “democratic principles as well as (market oriented) economic and foreign policies 
are based largely on a consensus among the Senegalese elite” (BTI 2007a: 17). Therefore 
Senegal’s ability to exert control during the programming phase can be attributed to a 
political environment of consensus on overall policy goals, that has led to the formulation 
of government-owned strategies which it then defends and pursues in relations with donors.
The government’s fundamental conviction in exerting and maintaining ownership 
over its national strategies has driven the government to negotiate aid programmes 
according to priorities that fit with its own strategies and goals. Senegal’s adherence to the 
concept of ownership over national strategies prevails also in the trade and migration fields, 
and has afforded the country with a significant level of control in negotiations with the EU. 
A strong conviction of country ownership over the national development strategy was 
expressed clearly in the various interviews conducted with Senegalese aid officials. All 
interviewees concurred that the country’s strongest advantage vis-a-vis donors was in fact 
the capacity to exert the country’s preferences especially in the programming phase, 
precisely because of the strong conviction that the government’s development strategies, in 
other words, the PRSP and complimentary programmes such as the SCA, are very much 
country-owned.50 Indeed, the PRSP is seen as a result of a wide participatory process, 
formulated mainly on Senegalese initiative, and although donor partners did participate, 
they did not play the main role in the formulation of the strategy (Entwistle et al. 2005: 
124-135; MEF 2008a: 38). Furthermore, the strategy is seen as having been formulated 
with Senegalese interests in mind, rather than with the view of pleasing the donor 
community. Indeed, although the EC alongside other donors did not approve of the PRSP’s 
strong focus on agriculture, for example, the government nevertheless maintained its 
position, clearly highlighting the extent to which Senegalese interests prevail in the 
strategy.51 In this regard, government officials view the national development strategy as 
something to be promoted and defended in their relations with donors, and have strongly 
projected these interests in aid negotiations with the EC. Therefore, as posited in Chapter 1, 
a high degree of domestic political legitimacy of the government and a strong electoral 
mandate favour recipient country control in that it confers upon the government a strong
50Ibid. (SI; S2; S3; S4; S7).
51 Indeed, Entwistle et a l  note that, “the EU and other external partners maintain that the emphasis on 
supporting agriculture as a principal source o f wealth creation is not realistic given its low contribution to 
overall GDP. However, the Government maintained its position, which is the result o f the participatory 
process and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have organized meetings to defend this position. The wealth 
creation pillar o f the PSRP remains essentially unaltered in this respect” (2005: 135).
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negotiating mandate and a strong conviction that preferences should be defended vis-a-vis 
donors (see also Whitfield and Fraser 2008: 41).
The Senegalese case study has illustrated that on the one hand, aid recipients can be 
successful in maintaining control in relations with donors. Senegal has taken a driver’s seat 
during the aid programming negotiations with the EC, indicating that “leadership by the 
government -  or by a few champions within the government -  in the developing country 
has a significant impact” on determining outcomes in favour of a government’s preferences 
(Eurodad-GMF 2008: 25). On the other hand, it also shows the extent to which aid 
dependence has negatively affected Senegal’s institutional capabilities to exercise leverage 
beyond aid allocation negotiations. While in theory, a high proliferation of donors should 
mean more money and greater choice in financing development, in reality, Senegal’s 
institutions are so overwhelmed by the complexities of development financing and the 
number of donors present in the country, that this impedes leverage and control 
significantly beyond the agenda-setting and policy formulation stages of the aid framework. 
In sum, from the Senegalese case study, it can be concluded that although institutional, 
economic, ideological, strategic, and political/ideological factors do allow for control in an 
aid relationship in which power asymmetry characterises the structural environment, 
genuine weaknesses faced by both the recipient and donor have confined this to the early 
stages of aid negotiations and led to problematic aid implementation and government 
leadership in later stages.
3 Ghana
Although the EC is not Ghana’s most important donor, as in Senegal, its assistance is seen 
as essential in furthering the development prospects of the country.52 The fact that the 
government considers the EC’s contributions as essential, combined with Ghana’s aid 
dependency in general, illustrates a similar power asymmetry between Ghana and the EC as 
in Senegal. Indeed, as a rather important donor in Ghana, the EC can potentially use its 
financial weight to push its interests and preferences onto the government. This also 
indicates that Ghana’s perceptions of the EC are in part shaped by the objective reality of 
the EC’s wealth. As one Ghanaian interviewee put it, “The EC is the donor, period. That 
says enough about the kind of strength they have in a country like Ghana.” However, as 
shown in the Senegal case study, a country’s strategy for dealing with a donor is also 
shaped by its perceptions of the donors actions in the recipient country. Furthermore
52 Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G3; G4; G5; G8).
53 Ibid. (G3).
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contextual factors intervene to allow the recipient to exercise leverage and/or control in 
determining its own development framework or in negotiating according to its terms and 
preferences, as well as constraining both countries and donors in, for example, the timely 
delivery of aid commitments.
For the most part Ghana has a mixed record in pushing its preferences and shaping 
the aid framework vis-a-vis the EC. The government has a solid national development 
framework with which the EC has mostly aligned its strategy; the government has been 
keen on increasing budget support contributions, an area in which EC policies and 
practises, like in Senegal, have converged with the preferences of the government; and 
donor coordination efforts are advanced and effective. Furthermore, both Ghanaian and EC 
aid officials hold the overall perception that dialogue has been positive and constructive, 
and indeed communication with the government is considered exemplary and well- 
organised.54 At the same time, the government has not adopted a leadership position in its 
relations with the EC, and indeed the programming phase, project aid administration, 
budget support initiatives, and donor coordination efforts have been driven and/or initiated 
largely by donors such as the EC rather than the government, forgoing government 
leverage and control of aid relations.
3.1 The EC -  Ghana aid framework
Ghana’s development framework is the country’s version of the PRSP, the Growth 
and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II) for 2006 to 2009.55 The GPRS II focused on 
developing essential areas required to foster and sustain economic growth and propel 
Ghana into achieving middle income status by 2015 (NDPC 2005; AFRODAD 2007: 16). 
Furthermore, “the GPRS was enshrined as Ghana’s core framework for development 
planning” (Woll 2008: 75), with which donors were expected to align their development 
strategies.
For the most part, the EC’s aid strategies in Ghana have largely been aligned with 
the government’s national development priorities. The EC has in fact adapted its own aid 
preferences to those laid out in the GPRS (CEC-GoG: 25).56 Based on the government’s 
development strategy outlined in the GPRS I, under the 9th EDF the EC sought to
54 Interviews EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC2; EC 12; EC 15); Interview EC delegation, Accra: September 2008 
(EC 19).
55 In 2003 Ghana finalised the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) to cover the period o f 2003 to 
2005, which was endorsed by Ghana’s main development partners in 2004, and allowed Ghana to become the 
14th country to complete HIPC debt relief.
56 Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G3; G8); Interview EC delegation, Accra: 
September 2008 (EC 19).
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contribute to poverty reduction through the promotion of economic growth, by contributing 
to rural development, road transport, and macro-economic support. Under the 10th EDF, the 
EC sought to fully align its country strategy with the GPRS II with a mixed funding 
strategy of project aid and budget support.
To acquire more ownership of where and how foreign aid is spent, both the 
government and donors have been keen to increase budget support (MoFEP 2008; Quartey 
2005: 1085-1089).57 Under the 9th EDF, the EC allocated €60M to budget support, or
i L
approximately 26% of the aid package. As in Senegal, under the 9 EDF, EC budget
co
support in Ghana experienced delays and some disbursements were withheld. Despite 
this, the EC increased its budget support in the mid- and end-of-term reviews in 2004 and 
2007,59 as well as under the subsequent 10th EDF, where Ghana secured €175M in budget 
support, or 50% of committed aid. Both sides acknowledge that the move towards budget 
support has increased transparency and effectiveness, and importantly, lessened the 
management burden on both the donor and the recipient (Schmitt 2008: 2).60
Aside from increasing budget support contributions, the Ghanaian government is 
also keen to enhance coordination and harmonisation of donor practises. The high 
concentration of donors in Ghana has made coordination efforts important in effectively 
implementing aid and easing the burden on the government and donors alike. Donor 
coordination in Ghana is considered extensive and advanced (AFRODAD 2007:5; Schmitt 
2008; Eurodad-GMF 2008: 17-19).61 The EC’s strategies too, are seen as highly 
complimentary to that of other donors, as a result of various coordination mechanisms
which are in place and which have been strengthened since the Paris Declaration (CEC-
£*\
GoG 2007:27). Furthermore, as noted by EC delegation officials, joint missions with EU
57 Since 2003, eleven donors have actively increased their budget support contributions. In 2008, budget 
support amounted to 5% of total government revenue and a quarter o f total ODA (Schmitt 2008: 2).
58 In 2005, failure by the government to provide evidence o f its performance caused delays in assessing the 
government’s progress needed for disbursement. This led to many donors, including the EC, delaying their 
disbursements until a positive assessment had been completed. In 2006, an EC performance assessment 
concluded that some triggers for disbursement of the performance tranche had not been met, leading to 40% 
of the performance tranche being withheld (SPA 2007:48-49; CEC-GoG 2007:29; Interview EC Delegation, 
Accra: September 2008 (EC 19); Interviews EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC2; EC 15)).
59 Budget support amounted to €90M or 32% during the mid-term review and €102M or 34% in the end-of- 
term review.
60 Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G3; G8); Interviews EC Delegation, Accra: 
September 2008 (EC 18; EC 19).
61 Since the 1990s, donors have met in Consultative Group meetings led by the World Bank (Harrigan and 
Younger 2000:198; Whitfield and Jones 2007: 8-9). Since 2005, these have developed into high-level Annual 
Partnership meetings that now require government participation.
62 Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G3; G4; G5; G8); Interviews EC Delegation, 
Accra: September 2008 (EC 19).
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Member States and new initiatives such as the ‘silent’ or ‘delegated’ partnership have
• 63helped to induce a constructive working relationship amongst donors.
The main problem in EC-Ghana aid relations however, is the predictability of EC 
aid disbursements. Although aid volatility is not as significant as in Senegal, Ghanaian aid 
officials have nevertheless identified this as one of the most significant problems in their 
relations with the EC.64 As in Senegal, under the 9th EDF the disbursements of aid for 
major projects were slow to start, with the implementation of funds suffering from delays in 
major financing decisions. Indeed, by 2005 only 20% of the EC’s committed aid had been 
disbursed. While this is significantly lower than Senegal’s aid volatility, and is also an 
average rate for disbursements for the entire ACP group, Ghana experienced elevated 
delays despite its generally favourable position as an aid recipient, and particularly despite 
the fact that actual implementation of aid is considered “generally satisfactory” (CEC-GoG 
2007: 26.). It was only when the EC’s aid relations with Ghana were devolved to the 
delegation, that payments improved and reached record highs at the end of 2005. Since 
then, disbursement trends in Ghana have been more favourable {Ibid.).
In many respects, the EC-Ghana aid relationship is similar to that of Senegal: Ghana 
receives high aid allocations, EC development strategies for the country have been aligned 
with those of the government, and budget support allocations as preferred by the 
government, have increased considerably. Furthermore, in Ghana donor programmes and 
strategies are well-coordinated and complimentary, and aid volatility is improving. Yet as 
the next section demonstrates, much of Ghana’s aid framework has not been initiated by the 
government itself, but rather by donors such as the EC. Indeed, while the government has 
assumed a participatory role in aligning EC strategies with the national development 
framework, increasing budget support allocations and donor coordination, the EC has 
exhibited a more pro-active approach alongside other major donors.
3.2 Leverage and control in EC-Ghana aid relations?
The government’s approach to its relations with the EC has been mostly 
compromising. Although the EC’s strategy for Ghana has largely been aligned with the 
GPRS II, interviews conducted in Accra and Brussels revealed that it was mainly donors 
pushing the government with regards to its development strategies. While dialogue with the
63 In 2007,45% o f all donor missions were jointly operated, reducing the work burden for the government and 
donors (OECD 2008a: 15). The EC is now represented by France in the agriculture and energy sectors, in that 
France is seen as holding the comparative advantage in these fields, while the EC represents France in 
transport and environmental protection sectors. Similar such arrangements are now in place between the EC, 
the UK, and the Netherlands (Eurodad-GMF 2008: 18; AFRODAD 2007: 25).
64 Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G3; G4; G5; G8).
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government is constructive and cordial, the government is perceived to be lacking in 
ownership and initiative in both formulating and putting forwarding its national 
development goals and objectives.65 This confirms similar findings by Whitfield and Jones 
(2007,2008,2008a) who have noted that while in theory the ministries should develop the 
national development strategies that form the basis of negotiating with donors, in reality, 
donors are very much involved in shaping and creating such programmes and strategies in 
the first place. Donors have a tendency to “skew strategies towards their individual projects 
or priorities, which do not always coincide with government priorities” (Whitfield and 
Jones 2007: 13-14).
Thus donors, including the EC, tend to come to the government with ready-made 
projects and programmes, with the government’s role in shaping these being reactive. 
Based on comments made by the government on various EC-formulated documents,66 and 
general impressions on government pro-activeness from EC interviewees, the Ghanaian
(\ 7government has not made use of opportunities to shape its aid framework. Ghanaian 
interviewees agreed that, despite limited room for manoeuvre provided by the EC and 
limited capacity by the government to be more pro-active (see below), in general it has 
been reluctant to diverge from the EC’s strategies or decisions, preferring to opt for a more 
cooperative approach. It was felt that any other approach would not be conducive to the 
positive dialogue crucial to securing EC aid and improving its implementation. In its 
relationship with the EC, the government has focused much more intently on maintaining 
cordial donor-recipient relations, even if that implies taking on a responsive or reactionary 
role. In this regard, “the clear incentive for staff... is to keep the relationship friendly and 
to maximize the flow of resources” (Fraser and Whitfield 2007:14), rather than to exercise 
control over aid strategies by either rejecting these or requiring changes should these not fit 
government preferences.
Although the government is keen on increasing budget support, in this area too it 
has not been driving the strategy. The increased EC budget support allocations can be 
attributed to, on the one hand, the government’s willingness to enact reforms to inspire
so
donor confidence in national financial systems. Reforms have enhanced Ghana’s public
65 Interview EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC 15); Interviews EC delegation, Accra: September 2008 (EC 19; 
EC20).
66 For example, the government’s reactions to the 2004 EC’s mid-term review document merely consisted in 
highlighting spelling and grammatical errors, while completely agreeing with the EC’s review o f the 
country’s progress and decisions to re-distribute aid allocations (CEC-GoG 2004).
67 Interviews EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC 12; EC 15); Interviews EC delegation, Accra: September 2008 
(EC 19; EC20).
68 Since the mid-1990s, the government has enacted several confidence-building measures, enhancing the 
effectiveness and transparency of the government’s management capacity of aid (AFRODAD 2007:13,21), 
including a public financial management reform programme a comprehensive budgeting system, a more
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and financial management system, and translated into increased aid commitments from
donors (AFRODAD 2007: 13; CEC-GoG 2007: 12). Furthermore, as in Senegal, these
reforms have been coupled with framework agreements and initiatives to facilitate dialogue
amongst donors and the government on budget support. In 2003, the government together
with the eleven major donors, including the EC, signed the Multi-Donor Budget Support
(MDBS), which stimulated budget support in Ghana (AFRODAD 2007: 19-22). Indeed,
“MDBS as well as other initiatives to increase transparency and accountability in the aid
management structure has resulted in increased DP (Development Partners) confidence and
translated into increased aid” (Ibid.: 21).
On the other hand, the government has assumed a rather passive position in driving
this agenda. As one Ghana expert observed:
In spite of all the obvious progress, one guiding principle of the Paris Declaration -  
that o f‘ownership’ by the national government -  plays only a minor role in Ghana.
There can be no doubt that Ghana is pursuing a reform agenda to develop the 
country, and it has succeeded in many respects. Yet, the resolutions reached in Paris 
have not given this government any additional momentum (Schmitt: 2).
For example, although the MDBS is the main instrument guiding budget support, it was 
initiated by a small number of donors. The government in turn “responded positively to this 
initiative as it provided some answers to challenges encountered in other forms of 
development assistance” (MoFEP 2008: 1). Furthermore, the MDBS itself required the 
government to undertake reforms of its institutions to make aid delivery more effective and 
transparent, indicating that many of the confidence-building reforms were donor-initiated. 
Thus while in Senegal, the ACAB, a similar framework, was largely initiated by the 
government, in Ghana this framework was formulated by the donors to permit the move to 
budget support and alleviate some of the transaction costs associated with project aid.
Lastly, initiatives to strengthen donor coordination efforts have also been led by the 
donor community. Although according to the World Bank (2006) the government has taken 
overall responsibility for coordinating development assistance, the instruments facilitating 
coordination were implemented by donors. According to the government, coordination and 
harmonisation amongst donors is one area in which the EC has taken the lead by “moving 
beyond the rhetoric.”69 The EC is seen as having driven coordination efforts by 
systematically consulting other Member States, instigating coordination meetings, initiating
transparent system for the acquisition o f goods and services. Furthermore, the Auditor General’s role in 
examining the accounts of the various ministries has been strengthened, leading to increased ministerial 
accountability. Lastly, the Ministry o f Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) has become the central 
coordinating agency for aid, significantly reducing aid transaction costs (Woll 2008: 80).
69 Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: 17 September 2008 (G3; G4; G5; G8).
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* 70framework agreements such as the Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS), and 
outlining which donors hold the comparative advantage in a particular sector. The 
government acknowledges that the EC has taken the initiative to organise donors more 
coherently and harmonise practices.71 For example, the G-JAS was “an entirely donor-led 
process” (Eurodad-GMF 2008: 18), headed mainly by the EC, World Bank, the UK, 
Germany, and Canada (Schmitt 2008: 3). Notably, the EC delegation was considered to be 
a crucial initiator and leading partner in this effort (CEC-Ghana 2007:33), while the central 
coordinating ministry, MoFEP, “only observed such donors efforts from afar” (Schmitt: 3). 
Some observers note that “the Ghanaian government was hardly involved in developing the 
G-JAS, seeing it as the donor’s business to organize themselves” but at the same time 
producing a much less ambitious document than in a country like Tanzania, for example, 
where the government participated actively in the formulation of their framework 
(Eudodad-GMF: 25).
Although “efforts to improve aid management and donor harmonization in Ghana 
by both GoG (Government of Ghana) and development partners are advanced and 
commendable ... the attempts at improving aid effectiveness in Ghana appear to be largely 
donor-driven with minimal evidence of active government leadership in the process” 
(AFRODAD: 5). Although in 2008 the government announced its intention to take a more 
active role regarding donor coordination, in general “Ghana has not had the right 
coalescence of factors to drive this agenda” and indeed has not displayed a leadership 
position in improving the division of labour amongst donors (Eurodad-GMF: 19). 
Furthermore, in allowing donors to lead coordination, Ghana has forgone “a scenario where 
donors’ agendas compete with each other ... [and where] Ghana has the advantage of 
playing the highest bidder willing to support government reform programmes that are 
genuinely owned by the government” (Woll 2008: 85). Instead, it has opted for a 
compromising approach, in which the primary focus is on securing aid rather than 
controlling the aid framework. Indeed, this largely confirms findings by both Carbone 
(2008: 227) and Whitfield and Fraser (2008: 40) that the Commission’s increasingly 
important role in leading donor coordination has resulted in a reduced space for negotiation 
for recipient governments.
Given the power asymmetry that exists between donor and recipients, it may come 
as no surprise that Ghana has not exercised leverage and control in aid relations with the 
EC. Yet, as the Senegalese case shows, although power asymmetry imposes structural
70 The G-JAS, signed in March 2007, aims to fully align donor support with Ghana’s development priorities.
71 Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: 17 September 2008 (G3; G4; G5; G8).
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constraints on the exercise of leverage and control, it does not determine that the process 
and outcomes of aid negotiations should necessarily be driven exclusively by the stronger 
actor. Although the donor can indeed impose conditionalities on the recipient, withhold aid 
should it consider performance unsatisfactory, and possesses the ultimate decision-making 
power, the Senegalese case demonstrated that certain contextual factors permit aid 
recipients to retain some control particularly in the aid programming despite this being 
largely in favour of the donor. The following section will explore the reasons behind 
Ghana’s inability to maintain the same level of control as witnessed in the Senegalese case. 
In so doing, it will become evident that although many of the structural conditions of power 
asymmetry are similar in both cases, Ghana has adopted a consensual strategy in its aid 
relations with the EC largely due to embedded aid dependence.
3.3 Explaining the EC-Ghana aid relationship
Despite important successes in the EC-Ghana aid relationship, and a generally 
positive donor-recipient relations, Ghana has not maintained control or exercised leverage 
in its aid relations with the EC. This lack of leverage has a threefold explanation: policy 
and institutional factors within the EC are perceived to constrain the government’s room for 
manoeuvre; institutional capacity constraints faced by the government limit opportunities 
for asserting leverage and control; and contextual factors point to an embedded aid 
dependency which has led to aid-dependent behaviour on the part of the government. The 
government is focused on pleasing its donors rather than exerting ownership and control, 
leading to an overall passive or reactionary approach in which donors have taken more of a 
leadership role in directing aid relations.
3.3.1 Perceptions o f  the EC as a donor
Firstly, Ghana’s leverage and control in aid relations with the EC has been limited 
largely because of the way the EC is perceived to limit government control. The EC’s own 
aid procedures, institutional obligations, and policies are seen as constraining the 
government’s possibilities to assume a leadership role. Several government officials have 
noted that although the GPRS is solidly in place and reflects the government’s development 
goals, donors continue to push their own development agendas. This is especially true for 
project aid, where the terms of the agreement usually do not leave much room for 
negotiating country preferences. Whitfield and Jones note that:
72 Ibid. (G3; G4; G5).
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Donors still come with their ready made project proposal, although they do some 
consultations in the relevant ministry, and the government has to negotiate changes 
... but senior civil servants and Ministers show a varying degree of will to do so 
and seem willing to accept something closed rather than reject aid altogether ... 
Government officials and civil servants negotiate as far as they think they can on a 
particular loan or grant, but accept the aid package in the end, even if the policy and 
programmes attached to them do not adhere to a ministry’s priorities or are seen by 
government negotiators as not particularly useful (2008a: 4, 23).
Ghana does not perceive itself to be able to maintain control during the programming 
phase, an area where Senegal instead, has managed to ascertain ownership by approving 
and allocating donor proposals according to the government’s priorities (see above). 
Whitfield and Jones’ observation, and interviews conducted, show that the government is 
reluctant to decline aid proposals even if these do not entirely fit its preferences, 
highlighting the extent to which the government remains constrained by aid dependence. 
Furthermore, this indicates that traditional donor-recipient power relations, where donors 
use their financial leverage to drive national development strategies, and recipients have 
limited room for manoeuvre in terms of their preferences due aid dependence have 
remained largely in place in Ghana.
Yet Whitfield and Jones also state that “donors have a reputation for more or less 
flexibility on project design” noting that, for example, the US has often adopted a ‘take it or 
leave it approach’ when presenting proposals to the government, while the UK has tended 
to be more flexible when negotiating with Ghanaian officials {Ibid.: 23). Therefore, the 
combination of donor flexibility and the willingness and/or capacity on the part of the 
government to negotiate its preferences challenges the expected outcome in a situation of 
traditional power asymmetry between donors and recipients. Ghanaian officials claim that 
the possibility of negotiating its preferences in the EC aid framework especially during the 
aid programming phase, the formulation of the CSP/NIP, and reviews, is limited, with the 
EC considered “not very flexible” compared to other donors.74 Opportunities for the 
government to put forward its own positions are limited to consultations and commenting 
on an already pre-formulated strategy. Although the programming process is considered 
somewhat participatory, in that the government is consulted, the government sees itself as 
confined to a rather reactionary role due to the fact that EC procedures surrounding project 
aid do not allow the government to initiate.75
Secondly, Ghanaian aid officials consider the EDF an aid instrument that severely 
restricts country control over aid programmes and projects, because funds are allocated and
73 Ibid. (G3; G8).
74 Ibid. (G3;G4; G5; G8).
75 Ibid. (G3; G4; G5; G8).
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disbursed according to EC procedures and regulations, making the use of country systems 
minimal. Although Ghanaian public financial management has improved and the country’s 
procurement system is considered to be “above average”(OECD 2008a: 4-5; Eurodad- 
GMF: 13), EC funding largely bypasses these in favour for the EC’s own aid disbursement 
and implementation procedures.76 In relation to this, government officials found it 
frustrating that ownership was often undermined because the EC bypasses the local or 
domestic level when contracting experts and/or companies to undertake EC-funded 
projects, while other multilateral donors, such as the UN and World Bank, firstly consult 
the local and national level when contracting experts. Although the allocation of contracts 
should ideally be at the discretion of the National Authorising Officer (NAO), it was noted 
that the EC exerts strong pressure in terms of its preference for tenders. Furthermore, 
officials argued that the allocation of contracts follows subjective criteria and is conducted 
on a project-by-project basis rather than according to standard criteria. In the EC’s relations 
with Ghana therefore, “donor-employed or donor-contracted staff have often become 
instrumental in preparing and implementing programmes on behalf of the recipient state 
itself’ (Fraser and Whitfield 2007: 15), thus failing to build-up local expertise in 
implementing the EC’s aid, as well as forgoing government control over the execution of 
projects and programmes. Government officials considered this an imposition on ownership
77and a major weakness in their relationship with the EC as a development partner.
Thirdly, although aid volatility has improved, the EC’s procedures are seen as 
contributing significantly to the remaining delays. According to officials, the EC operates 
according to complicated and stringent procedures, making the utilisation of funds difficult 
and complex (see also Eurodad-GMF: 23). Other donors were considered to have less
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complicated procedures and more predictable aid flows. Some observers even placed the 
EC at the bottom of the donor list in terms of aid predictability and bureaucratic aid 
management procedures. Indeed, the disbursement of funds and the complexities of
• 7Qfinancing agreements are considered to be another major weakness of the EC in Ghana.
Furthermore, incomplete decentralisation to the delegation is seen as contributing to 
aid delays. On the one hand, government officials described the relationship with the 
delegation as cordial and constructive and were keen to note that the delegation respected
O A
the role of the NAO and the government’s position. On the other hand, the extent to
76 The EC’s use o f Ghanaian public finance and procurement systems has actually dropped from 41% to 32% 
of all aid disbursed between 2005 and 2007 (OECD 2008; Eurodad-GMF: 13).
77 Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G3; G4; G5).
78 Ibid. (G3; G4; G5; G8).
79 Ibid. (G3).
80 Ibid. (G3).
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which the government could successfully project its own position onto the EC, and the
delegation in particular, was seen as depending on the relationship between the delegation
and EC headquarters in Brussels. In this regard, Ghanaian officials found that despite
81Commission reforms, and despite a very differing opinion from EC interviewees, 
devolution had not reached the level necessary to give sufficient autonomy to the 
delegation to make the aid process run smoothly, and give the government the necessary
O 'y
room to manoeuvre when negotiating with the delegation. This is especially so in 
comparison to other major donors in Ghana, such as the US, where decentralisation has 
provided officials with “considerable decision-making authority” and therefore improved 
relations with the government (Eurodad-GMF: 23). Although improvements have been 
noted, in that the delegation is now able to approve higher amounts of funding without 
having to consult Brussels, improvements are considered minimal. Indeed, the continuous 
need to consult Brussels contributed to the delays prominent in EC aid processes as well as 
created a significant disconnect between headquarters, the delegation, and the
83government.
In relation to this, government officials were also keen to mention that, just as in 
Senegal, the type of relationship constructed with the EC is highly dependent on the 
staffing situation in the delegation. Indeed, it was noted that although the high EC turn-over 
rate does create an obstacle to effective cooperation, at the same time it also allowed for 
“increased flexibility” or “a breath of fresh air” when new and dedicated incoming staff 
arrive at the delegation. Furthermore, it was noted that the importance of staffing in 
‘making or breaking’ the relationship was more pronounced in relations with the EC than 
with other donors, indicating that this is an important element in providing the government
fid.with increased opportunities for reaching its preferences.
As in the Senegalese case therefore, Ghana tends to hold a rather negative 
perception of the EC’s capabilities as an effective donor. Although the EC’s financial 
strength makes it an important donor, its ineffectiveness instead confers the image of a 
donor that is often conflicted and constrained by its own administrative shortcomings. Yet 
unlike Senegal, the negative perceptions that Ghana has of the EC have not necessarily 
translated into a strategy in which the government can exercise leverage or control vis-a-vis 
the EC. It is argued below, that this is largely due to the fact that unlike Senegal, which has
81 EC interviewees in Brussels and Accra concurred that although the delegation cannot make disbursement 
decisions, the delegation was largely autonomous in their decision-making (Interview EC, Brussels: April 
2008 (EC2); Interview EC delegation, Accra: September 2008 (EC 19)).
82 Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G3; G4; G5; G8).
83 Ib id  (G3; G4; G5).
84 Ibid. (G3; G4; G5).
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a strong conviction of government ownership, Ghana perceives its own power and capacity 
to exercise leverage and control vis-a-vis the EC as severely limited and constrained. This 
can be explained by the different contextual factors, as per Table 1.3 in Chapter 1, 
operating in the Ghana-EC aid relationship
3.3.2 Institutional factors
As in Senegal, Ghana’s inability to exercise leverage and control vis-a-vis the EC 
can be partially explained by institutional capacity constraints. EC interviewees note that 
the role of the NAO is weak in Ghana, mainly due to understaffing and a lack of technical
Of
expertise. Ghanaian officials too acknowledge that due to the complexities typical of 
interactions with the EC, the government finds it difficult to assert ownership. Indeed, the 
transaction costs in dealing with the EC portfolio are considered much higher than those for 
any other donor, while MoFEP, and the EU desk in particular, are restrained in resources 
and technical expertise. One Ghanaian official noted that the delegation was in a much 
stronger position to negotiate with the government because they had more technical 
capacity and information at their disposal. Furthermore, both the EC and government 
officials consider that the government’s limited role can also be explained by coordination 
problems experienced within the government itself. In this regard, designating MoFEP as 
the central coordinating agent for development aid has increased competition amongst the 
different line ministries, which previously coordinated and negotiated directly with donors, 
but must now go through MoFEP to receive funding (Woll 2008: 80). The move has also 
required increased internal communication mechanisms to be put in place between MoFEP 
and the different line ministries. At present however, communication amongst the different 
ministries is considered insufficient for pursuing the government’s aid preferences and 
administering the implementation of aid.
Thus, Ghana’s lack of leverage and control can be partially explained by the EC’s 
position as a donor and the constraints it places on the government, and by the limited 
institutional capacity of the Ghanaian government. Yet in the Senegalese context, aid 
officials perceived the EC’s position and weaknesses similarly to their Ghanaian 
counterparts, and institutional capacity constraints were also present, if not more 
pronounced. Therefore other explanations need to be considered in accounting for the lack 
of leverage and control in Ghana’s aid relations with the EC.
85 Interview EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC2).
86 Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G3; G4; G5; G8).
87 Ibid. (G3; G8); Interview EC delegation, Accra: September 2008 (EC 19).
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Ghana’s aid dependence, and the extent to which this has driven the government’s 
behaviour towards donors, is a crucial factor in the country’s negotiating strategy towards 
donors. Indeed, in its aid relationship with the EC, Ghana exhibits some of the 
characteristics often found in aid-dependent countries, which in Ghana are present not only 
at institutional level, but are embedded politically, significantly affecting the government’s 
way of dealing with its donors. As Whitfield and Jones indicate, “Ghana is aid dependent, 
b u t... aid dependence is about much more than the size of aid flows. Aid dependence is a 
way of working within the aid receiving government, of relating to donors, of negotiating
Q Q
aid” (2007: 1). Aid-dependent behaviour has led to a situation in which Ghana has 
focused on pleasing its donors rather than exerting ownership and control over its national 
strategies, and has led to an overall passive or reactionary approach in which donors have 
taken more of a leadership role in directing aid relations (Whitfield 2005,2006; Whitfield 
and Jones 2007,2008; Woll). To a large extent, the intense presence of and long-standing 
relations with donors have led to a “general negotiating strategy which starts by recognising 
its [the government’s] own subordination. By doing so, it fundamentally undermines its 
negotiating strength and perpetuates its weakness” (Whitfield 2008: 350). In Ghana, “the 
government... speaks the donor discourse and wants to be seen as a ‘good partner’, using 
that as a source of negotiating capital” (Whitfield 2008: 347), but this has not conferred it 
with leverage or control. Yet, as will be demonstrated, the economic, strategic, ideological, 
political factors which have allowed Senegal to maintain control in the aid programming 
phase of aid relations with the EC, in Ghana have failed to favour government control over 
its relations with the EC.
3.3.3 Economic factors
In the absence of alternative financing resources and faced with economic decline 
and a growing debt burden in the 1980s and 1990s, the Ghanaian government led by Jerry 
Rawlings and the National Democratic Congress (NDC), came to rely increasingly on 
assistance from donors to finance its development activities, while undertaking a 
macroeconomic reform process driven by the advice and conditions from IFIs and major 
donors (BTI 2007: 18; Whitfield and Jones 2008). The far-reaching economic reforms by 
the government have made Ghana one of the most successful reformers in Africa (Tsikata 
2001). Yet the intense involvement of donors and IFIs in these reforms also set the scene
88 Importantly however, “an embedded aid system does not mean that donors ultimately control governments, 
that they can always get their policy preferences implemented, nor that they are the most powerful actors 
involved in governance processes. It simply means that they are important and seemingly permanent players 
within the state, within policymaking, and within the political landscape” (Whitfield: 444).
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for a situation “where donors have a large influence on policy and participate intimately in
policymaking and implementation processes” (Whitfield 2008: 346). In 2001, the New
Patriotic Party (NPP) led by John Kufuor won elections, ending the near 20-year NDC rule.
The NPP promoted a strong development vision, focused on strengthening private and
manufacturing sectors. Yet the new government was also faced with a severe economic
crisis caused by rising oil prices and a sharp decline in the price of commodity exports.
Furthermore, it inherited what has been termed an embedded aid system, in which,
donors are embedded within the state. This position results not only from their 
financial contributions to the budgeting process. Donors have also routinised and 
semi-institutionalised the ways in which they interact with state institutions, and in 
which they participate in the design, implementation and monitoring of government 
programmes and policies (Whitfield 2006: 144; see also Whitfield and Jones 2008: 
195-197).
The combination of this intense influence by external actors, a looming economic crisis,
and the lack of alternative economic resources available to the government, consequently
limited the government’s room for manoeuvre vis-a-vis donors and control over national
development strategies. Although the government’s development policies are seen as
government-owned, these were namely derived to please donors, rather than with the
developmental needs of the country in mind (AFRODAD 2007: 28; see also Killick and
Abugre 2001: 20; Whitfield 2005, 2006; Woll 2008). Beyond the formulation of its
development framework, similar behaviour on the part of the government is found in
relation to the government’s reform agenda which was not only initiated by donors but
which was also largely oriented towards fulfilling donor requirements for increased
accountability and transparency (AFRODAD). It is thus evident that “Ghana needs the
support o f ... development partners more than they need Ghana. The dire economic straits
of the country underpin the need for strengthening of relations with the wider international
community ... the government has therefore gone to great lengths to deepen relations [with
donors]” (Boafo-Arthur 2007: 244).
A recent change in Ghana’s economic position may, however, affect the
government’s leverage and control vis-a-vis donors in the future. Indeed, as Whitfield
appropriately notes:
With an upsurge in economic growth and access to new sources of finance from 
China and the international capital market ... the government has more room to 
pursue its development vision, set its own policy agenda and implement it with new 
resources, with or without the support of traditional donors ... The issuing of 
commercial debt, the discovery of oil, and increasing loans, grants, and trade with 
China may also be giving this Ghanaian government the self-confidence that 
previous governments have lacked. (2008: 347-348).
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Indeed, “all these factors imply that Ghana, the donor darling, is becoming less dependent 
on classic donors” (Schmitt: 3). Although at present it is somewhat premature to consider a 
significant change in the governments’ negotiating strategies, at the same time, this point is 
important to consider because it further highlights the extent to which economic factors 
interfere in power asymmetry between recipients and donors and confer increased leverage 
and/or control upon the weaker actor. Furthermore, this further shows that when a country 
is highly dependent on foreign aid, and lacks alternative resources, it is much less likely to 
pursue a strategy that may go against the preferences of the stronger actor.
3.3.4 Strategic factors
The EU Strategy for Africa acknowledges that Ghana is part of a group of “stable 
countries (that) play an essential role in stabilising their regions and setting an example of 
what can be achieved in a favourable political climate ... In west Africa, Ghana is the 
prime example of a well-governed and stable country which has been able to convert 
economic growth into tangible development achievements” (CEC 2005b: 10). This image 
of Ghana as a ‘success story’ has led to the country becoming an ‘aid darling’, and has 
assisted Ghana in maintaining favourable relations with donors. One EC official claimed 
that the need to identify a ‘success story’ in the EC’s development efforts in Africa, has 
afforded Ghana certain privileges as an aid recipient, in that the EC has the tendency to “go 
with closed eyes and even overlook certain under-achievements” when, for example, 
development goals or conditions are not fully met.89 At the same time however, unlike 
Senegal, Ghana’s status as a ‘success story’ is policy-oriented rather than politically- 
oriented, in that its success is based on its willingness and ability to implement reforms, 
adhering to donor-imposed conditionalities, and its economic and democratic stability. 
Although this allows Ghana to receive high aid allocations and maintain cordial relations 
with donors, it has not led to leverage or control.
Ghana has “proven to be a cooperative, constructive, reliable and dynamic partners 
in the international arena, especially in the sub-region” (BTI2007: 22), where the foreign 
policy of Kufuor and the NPP consisted in building cordial relations with the region 
through a policy of ‘good neighbourliness,’ or pursuing international donors and IFIs 
through economic diplomacy to raise awareness of Ghana’s economic and developmental
89 Ibid. (EC 12); Tsikata (2001) has also pointed out that during the 1980s, the IMF and World Bank were also 
flexible in their application o f conditionality towards Ghana, largely because reforms seemed to be working 
and the government gave a sense of commitment to the reform process.
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problems (Boafo-Arthur 2007).90 Although the NPP government “successfully chartered a 
vibrant sub-regional policy that has enhanced the country’s reputation both as a peaceful 
country and a peace-maker” {Ibid.: 242), Ghana’s international efforts have had a manifest 
economic bias with a view to attaining national development objectives and have been 
directed towards maintaining stability in the region with a view to maintaining internal 
stability within Ghana {Ibid. : 225), rather than establishing it as a regional and continental 
leader capable of influencing wider policy processes and outcomes. Furthermore, unlike 
Wade’s dynamic and sometimes controversial position as a continental leader, former 
President Kufuor, “among his African colleagues, is not considered competent in matters 
concerning international affairs and conflicts” (BTI: 22). Even in the trade and migration 
fields, Ghana’s position as a regional leader has been modest compared to Senegal, where 
the country’s influence at the ECOWAS level has been overshadowed by the influence of 
the UEMOA (Union economique et monetaire ouest-africaine), and where it has not 
actively participated in any regional schemes on migration (see Chapters 5 and 7). Indeed, 
according to Edi, while Ghana’s strategic position within the region rests mainly on its 
political maturity and its democratic and economic stability, Senegal’s derives mainly from 
“its diplomatic offensives in West African affairs,” and its military commitments, in 
addition to its relative political stability (2007: 166-167). Therefore, “despite Ghana’s 
important role within West Africa as a relative haven of democracy and political stability, 
and as a potential model for its neighbours,” and its successes in implementing economic 
reforms, Ghana’s potential for using this strategic position to exercise leverage on the EC is 
actually quite limited, because the “security and economic interests [in Ghana] for the EU 
are low” (Crawford 2007:186). This thus further confirms that although a country’s ability 
to construct itself as a success story may lead to high aid allocations, it does not necessarily 
lead to leverage or control. Instead, it is a country’s ability to construct itself as a strategic 
actor for political reasons in the eyes of donors, rather than for policy reasons based on its 
good reform record that allows for a stronger position to exercise leverage and control.
3.3.5 Pol itical factors
Lastly, Ghana’s political environment has contributed to the government’s inability 
to exercise leverage and control, in that the entrenchment of aid dependency in domestic 
politics has shaped the government’s preferences and consequently its consensual
90 During his rule from 2000 to 2008, Kufuor assisted in the peace effort in neighbouring Liberia and Ivory 
Coast, and submitted Ghana to the first peer review by NEPAD. Ghana has been .active at regional level 
through its participation in the ECOWAS, and at the continental level, through its involvement in the African 
Union (AU).
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negotiating strategy. Ghana’s political environment is characterised by highly competitive 
party politics and “a distinct tradition of political parties that are attached to certain 
ideologies not evident in many other African countries” (BTI 2007: 9). Intense electoral 
competition has led to pressure on the government to deliver visible goods and services in 
the short term to meet high expectations of its constituencies (Whitfield and Jones 2008: 
195; see also Hutchful 2002). This pressure to deliver and the focus on staying in power has 
discouraged government officials from pursuing policies or programmes that do not fit 
donor priorities to secure donor funding. The government came to negotiate “on donor- 
initiated programmes, policies, and projects, under the strategy of maximising aid inflows” 
(Whitfield and Jones: 188). Furthermore, the government also developed a ‘let the donors 
do it’ approach particularly towards increasing budget support and donor coordination, 
which have been mainly initiated, led and run by donors, with the government acting as a 
participant rather than a leader.
Ghana’s consensual negotiating strategy highlights the extent to which aid 
dependence tends to be both institutionally and politically entrenched in its relationship 
with major donors. In the Senegalese case aid dependence is institutional, in that it 
constrains the effective administration and implementation of aid. But dependence has not 
led to decreased government control over development strategies or in exhibiting 
sometimes difficult and averse behaviour in aid negotiations in order to gain increased 
concessions. In the Ghanaian case, although the institutional elements of aid dependence 
are also present, political elements such as the tendency to manage aid relations according 
to donor preferences (pleasing the donor) and allowing donors to take overall responsibility 
for the aid framework with minimal government leadership (let the donors do it) have led to 
a strategy which favours cordial relations with donors in order to receive maximum aid 
allocations, rather than opting for government control at the possible expense of forgoing 
aid. In its aid relations with the EC therefore, the Ghanaian government was not able to 
exercise leverage nor maintain control.
4 Comparisons and Conclusions
Based on the two case studies of Senegal and Ghana, three overall conclusions can be 
drawn about the extent to which recipient countries are able to exercise leverage and 
control in aid relations with the EC. Firstly, many of the constraints faced by the EC in 
turning its rhetoric on development into coherent and effective actions do indeed affect its 
position vis-a-vis recipients and the outcomes and processes of its aid relations. In this 
regard, the case studies demonstrated that although power asymmetry characterises aid
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relations, it is nevertheless crucial to establish that both parties face limitations and 
constraints. Constraints faced by the donor can partially explain why donor-recipient 
relations are more complex than just merely favouring the structurally stronger actor. They 
show that power asymmetry is largely relational, in that strengths and weaknesses faced by 
donors have a significant impact on the recipients’ negotiating strategy and consequently 
their ability to achieve their preferences vis-a-vis a stronger actor.
The case studies clearly illustrated that the Commission’s procedures in managing 
aid in cooperation with recipient countries continue to be difficult, bureaucratic, and not 
necessarily conducive for government ownership over the implementation of EC aid. In 
both cases, government officials tended to view the EC as one of the worst performers in 
terms of the complexities of its administrative procedures and the predictability of its aid 
disbursements. This not only constrains the government’s position toward the EC, but it 
also significantly affected the overall effectiveness of the EC’s aid contributions, as these 
were often delayed or unimplemented. These findings therefore give further weight to the 
notion that regardless of the major reforms undertaken in the Commission’s development 
policy, its capacity to deliver an effective and flexible policy remains severely constrained, 
and these constraints in turn impact the EC’s position as a development actor not only vis- 
a-vis other relevant donors, but also vis-a-vis the recipient country.
In addition, decentralisation from Brussels to the delegations has not been perceived 
to have sufficiently taken hold in either country. The limited decision-making power 
afforded to the staff on the ground is considered to be a major bottleneck in establishing 
successful and effective communication between the EC and the government. Indeed, as 
will be shown in the following chapters, the relationship with the delegation and especially 
the expertise of delegation staff is a recurring element shaping the recipient government’s 
approaches and strategies vis-a-vis the EC. The case studies also highlight that 
“personalities” or individuals matter in terms of assisting countries’ in meeting their 
demands or in making or breaking a successful aid relationship, and that this is seemingly 
very pronounced in the EC’s relations with recipient countries. A change in the delegation 
staffing situation assisted Senegal in attaining its preferences for increasing budget support, 
while in Ghana, staffing changes were seen as facilitating communication and dialogue, 
consequentially resulting in improved aid disbursements. At the same time, the “power of 
individual personalities” or rather “the dependence on committed individuals also makes 
(aid) processes quite vulnerable, particularly in countries where there is a high staff turn­
over rate” (Eurodad-GMF 2008: 24). In general, the roles of the delegation vis-a-vis 
Brussels and delegation staff vis-a-vis the recipient government can be considered a crucial
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element in providing a recipient government with negotiating room. In sum, the case 
studies have shown, that as posited in Hypothesis 2a, if the EU is perceived to be 
inconsistent or even incapable of negotiating or implementing policies, this negatively 
affects actors’ perceptions of the EU’s ability to exercise power. In this sense, while the EU 
may raise external actors’ expectations in terms of what it is structurally capable of, the 
inability to meet those expectations due to constraints or incapability or even unwillingness 
can considerably affect perceptions.
A second finding to come out of the chapter is that although in highly aid-dependent 
countries such as Senegal and Ghana, power asymmetry between the donor and the 
recipient is a reality, recipient governments have shown various degrees of leverage and/ 
control in their relations with the EC. Both Senegal and Ghana recognise the EC as having 
ultimate decision-making power when it comes to how much and what kind of aid to 
allocate, and when and how to disburse it. Despite this evident asymmetry however, 
recipient countries do have some room for manoeuvre in negotiating their preferences vis- 
a-vis a donor such as the EC. While neither country demonstrated to have exercised 
leverage, the cases however confirm that asserting government control is possible despite 
power asymmetry.
As per the definition of leverage in Chapter 1, which refers to an actor placing its 
interests on the agenda and modifying or shifting the behaviour, decision, or preferences of 
others, in neither of the cases can the countries be considered to have successfully exercised 
leverage in its aid relations with the EC. As a matter of fact, the case studies instead 
demonstrated that to a large extent, preferences between EC and the recipient country often 
converged, as the case of budget support clearly outlines. In fact, donor and recipient 
preferences have seemingly been dictated by the trends of the larger international aid 
environment, currently embodied in the Paris Declaration (advocating donor coordination 
and harmonisation of practises, aid effectiveness through increased predictability of aid 
flows, and increased government ownership through participation and dialogue). The 
Commission thus wants to be seen as a good donor capable of delivering timely and 
effective aid, while the recipients want to receive more predictable and effective aid while 
minimising the conditionalities attached to it (see Whitfield 2008). This implies then, that 
in the case of Senegal and Ghana, outcomes of the aid relationship may be mutually agreed, 
and be mutually agreeable, and this is not necessarily as a result of the exercise of leverage 
by either the donor or the recipient, but rather as a result of broader international trends in 
aid which both the Commission and the countries have tended to adhere to. But if their 
preferences converge, thus averting the exercise of leverage, can the same be said for
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control? Different from leverage, control does not imply that one actor can influence 
another to accept its preferences, but rather it refers to the ability of an actor to conduct 
relations with other actors according to its own terms and own initiatives rather than those 
imposed or influenced by others. While the exercise of leverage was not present in aid 
relations between the EC and Senegal and Ghana, there is some evidence of government 
control.
The Senegalese case demonstrated that government initiative in adopting a donor- 
supported reform agenda, an important strategic position congruent with EU interests, a 
strong shared sense of the government’s negotiating strengths and capabilities, and the 
intention to maintain ownership over national strategies provided Senegal with the 
confidence to assert control over its development priorities, while resisting initial EC 
reluctance to increase its budget support allocations. Although, as in Senegal, the EC’s 
strategies in Ghana are aligned with the government’s development framework, the fact 
that this framework is not entirely country-owned and the limited room for country 
ownership afforded in the negotiation and administration of EC project aid, as perceived by 
Ghanaian aid officials, differentiates Ghana from Senegal. As Ghana’s main preference has 
been to prioritise the maximisation of aid flows over government control, the government 
has taken on a more consensual approach, confining its role to consultation once the EC’s 
country strategy is already in place.
The case studies also gave significant insight into just how contextual elements 
have actually favoured or prevented government control in aid relations. In this regard, 
many of the propositions posited in Chapter 1 on the conditions for leverage and control 
have indeed been shown in the case studies. Firstly, at the economic level, the lack of 
availability of alternative resources to finance development activities severely constrains 
governments’ room for manoeuvre, and more importantly impacts the type of relations 
governments construct with donors. Secondly, a government’s ability to initiate 
successfully a macroeconomic reform agenda and refer to its efforts in aid negotiations 
with donors can also assist in its pursuing its preferences vis-a-vis the donor. At the 
strategic level, the differences between Ghana’s and Senegal’s influential positions at the 
regional level, and the extent to which their regional efforts are congruent with the EU’s 
interests have also impacted their position in negotiations with the EC. Indeed, despite its 
poverty, Senegal’s regional diplomatic efforts have a notable impact on its relations with 
the EU in all three policy fields examined in this thesis, indicating that a country’s regional 
presence and the strategic position in which this places the country is an important factor in 
exercising leverage vis-a-vis the EU. Lastly, at the political level, the presence of a
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competitive party system in Ghana has required the government to pursue cordial relations 
with donors, in order to maximise aid flows. This has contributed to the creation of a 
politically-embedded aid system, in which government control has been bypassed. In 
Senegal, an overall consensus on government strategies amongst Senegalese elite combined 
with a strong electoral mandate has instead provided the government with a strong 
negotiating mandate and a strong conviction that policies should be duly defended and 
promoted vis-a-vis donors.
Finally, aid dependence, and specifically its level of entrenchment at the 
institutional and/or political levels in recipient countries impacts a country’s ability to 
exercise leverage and control. In Senegal, institutional aid dependence made for weak 
capacity in administering aid and managing its many donors. In Ghana, aid dependence is 
more entrenched at the political level, impacting the government’s position and negotiating 
strategy vis-a-vis the EC. The Ghanaian government is more constrained by its willingness 
to please the donor or by the tendency to let donors drive aid processes and outcomes, 
largely because aid dependence had led to “relationships becoming so routine that 
negotiators know what different donors want to see in national plans and sector strategies 
and pre-empt donor preferences in order to be seen as willing reformers and to gain 
maximum finance and favour” (Fraser and Whitfield 2007: 14). Indeed, the case of Ghana 
demonstrates how embedded aid dependence can, “undermine the government’s 
negotiating strength, in the sense that it undermines the government’s willingness to 
develop and pursue its own policy agenda and to mobilize domestic public support around 
it” (Whitfield 2008: 355).
In sum, Ghana and Senegal are structurally weaker than the EC, and certainly, the 
EC maintains ultimate decision-making power in its aid relations with the countries. 
However, within this structural environment, firstly, both the donor and the recipient are 
often constrained in their room to manoeuvre vis-a-vis one another, and secondly, 
contextual factors intervene so as to allow some government control over its aid relations 
with the EC. The next two chapters will explore the extent to which this power asymmetry 
operates in the EU’s trade relations with African countries.
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Chapter 4
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations 
and constraints on the EU as a trade negotiator
The purpose of this chapter is threefold: firstly, to explore the dramatic changes in the EU’s 
trade policy towards Africa; secondly, to analyse how these changes have impacted on the 
EU’s relations with Africa; and thirdly, to establish the EU’s constraints and capacities in 
exercising power as a trade negotiator with Africa. The EU-ACP negotiations, from 2002 to 
2009, aimed at establishing regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) have been 
difficult and consistently plagued by stalemate. While the EU maintains that the ACP will 
reap enormous benefits from the EPAs, scholarship, opinion from civil society, and many 
of the ACP themselves point towards potentially detrimental effects of the EPAs on 
development. The EPAs significantly challenge the dynamic of the long-standing EU-ACP 
relationship by dramatically altering non-reciprocal trade preferences and dividing the ACP 
into smaller regional groupings. Many African countries contend that the EU’s negotiation 
platform has been beset by inconsistency between rhetoric, which emphasises cooperation, 
flexibility, and developmental concerns, and the actual negotiating approach, which focuses 
on securing trade gains and the EU’s position in international trade. The EU, on the other 
hand, contends that the EPAs are positive trade tools for development encouraging 
economic reform, regional integration and free trade, and will integrate the ACP into the 
global economy, while maintaining and renewing the unique ties between the EU and ACP. 
Due to the contentious environment of the negotiations, and the divergence in views 
between the negotiating parties, EPA negotiations constitute a significant and valuable area 
for investigating the possibility of weaker actors exercising leverage and control vis-a-vis a 
stronger actor.
This chapter illustrates that similar to the case of aid, in the EU’s trade relations 
with Africa a significant power asymmetry exists. This is because of the sheer size of the 
EU’s market, its vast experience in conducting trade negotiations at the international level, 
compared to the extreme marginalisation of most African economies at the global level and 
the significant capacity constraints faced in terms of human resources and technical 
expertise in the field of international trade. Unlike newer policy areas in EU-Africa 
relations (see Chapters 6 and 7 on migration), where the EU may have fundamental 
interests in seeking out cooperation with certain countries for strategic purposes, in trade,
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the EU does not have particular strategic interests in most African countries. Thus, their 
structural bargaining strength is significantly weaker than that of the EU, the primary 
market for African exports (see Orbie and Faber 2007). The EU, therefore, seemingly 
“holds almost all the cards: market power (access to the common market); financial power 
(development assistance); and negotiating muscle” (Draper 2007: 20). However, also 
similar to the aid case, the EU faces constraints in projecting its preferences fully onto 
African countries because political and institutional factors limit its potential to convert its 
economic power and experience into preferred outcomes. This by no means suggests that 
the EU is incapable of conducting trade negotiations, on the contrary, “the European Union 
is in fact capable of some degree of strategic action ... When push comes to shove, the EU 
is more often than not capable of prioritising its interests and hammering out a relatively 
coherent policy line” (Pilegaard 2003: 11). At the same time, there are limits to the EU’s 
power that have important implications for the way in which the actors negotiate and 
formulate their own demands.
The chapter provides a brief description of how EPAs have created a significant 
shift in EU-ACP trade relations, and the consequences of this on the ACP group. The 
second section will argue that this shift can be largely explained by the instrumentality that 
this provides the EU for obtaining economic and strategic interests as a trade power and 
legitimising its ‘actomess’. A third section examines the type of power relationship that 
exists between the parties in the context of trade negotiations, and argues that regardless of 
the EU’s structural power, as a trade negotiator it faces institutional and political 
constraints including policy incoherence, limited coordination, and divergences between 
the Commission and the Member States/Council, and within the Commission, between the 
different directorate generals (DGs) responsible for external policies. It is argued that these 
constraints have impacted the EU’s negotiating position vis-a-vis African countries, 
because of how this influences their perceptions of the EU which in turn shape their own 
negotiating strategies.
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1 A Shift in EU-ACP Trade Relations
For nearly three decades, the Lome Conventions granted the ACP non-reciprocal trade 
preferences, providing duty-free access to the EU’s market for most exports. This was 
sustained through a World Trade Organisation (WTO) waiver, allowing EU-ACP trade 
relations to override adherence to the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) rule (the principle of 
non-discrimination in trade preferences amongst WTO members). With the waivfcr expiring 
at the end of 2007, in 1996 the EU introduced the concept of the EPAs as an alternative 
trading scheme.1 These would establish a new framework in which trade relations could be 
fully compatible with WTO requirements, while simultaneously promoting “sustainable 
development of the ACP States, [facilitating] their smooth and gradual integration in the 
world market, and [contributing to the] eradication of poverty” (ACP Secretariat 2002: 1, 
5). The EPAs would gradually remove significant trade barriers between the EU and the 
ACP, by liberalising “substantially all trade” in a ‘development-friendly’ manner. The 
EPA negotiations required the EU and the ACP to negotiate regional Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs), with provisions in three key areas:
• Trade in goods, where discussions centred around which products would be subject 
to tariff elimination, the transition period for reciprocal market access and tariff 
elimination, and safeguards and special arrangements for sensitive products;
• Trade in services4 and trade-related areas, removing barriers to trade in competition 
policy, investment, intellectual property rights, sanitary and phytosanitary measures
1 As stipulated in the Commission’s 1996 Green paper on relations between the European Union and the 
ACP countries on the eye o f  the 21st century.
2 As stipulated in Article XXIV, Clause 8, o f the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
3 Countries opting out o f the EPA scheme could continue trading with the EU either under the Generalised 
System o f Preferences (GSP), which is WTO-compatible because it provides all developing countries with 
non-reciprocal, non-discriminatory and autonomous trade preferences by allowing their exports to enter the 
EU at lower tariffs, but does not cover all exported products and erodes preferential trade as competition is 
amongst all developing countries; or the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, granting non-reciprocal duty 
and quota free access to all products aside from arms to Least Developed Countries (LDCs), also WTO- 
compatible, because it allows for special treatment of such countries.
4 ‘Services’ covers sectors such as health, construction, tourism, hotels and restaurants, maritime transport, 
legal services, accounting, architectural services, engineering, information and communications technology, 
audiovisual services, wholesale and retailing, environmental services, insurance and entertainment. The 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), a WTO treaty entering into force in 1995, aimed to 
liberalise trade in services amongst WTO members in four areas: Mode 1 - Cross border trade, or the delivery 
of a service from the territory o f one country into the territory o f another country; Mode 2 - Consumption 
abroad, or the supply o f a service of one country to the service consumer of another country; Mode 3 - 
Commercial presence, or services provided by a service supplier of one country in the territory o f another 
country, and Mode 4 - Presence o f natural persons, or services provided by a service supplier o f one country 
through the presence o f natural persons in the territory of another country.
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(SPS), standardisation and certification, public procurement, labour standards, data 
protection, and environment;
• The development ‘dimension’, providing mechanisms to meet both the adjustment 
costs and address the supply-side constraints facing the countries in implementing 
the agreements.
In 2002, the EU and the ACP began negotiations on EPAs. In the first phase, which 
lasted for little over a year, the negotiating parties were the ACP group as a whole and the 
Commission, and sought to identify the main objectives and structure of the subsequent 
regional negotiations. The second phase of negotiations, from 2003 to 2007, consisted in 
negotiations between the Commission and six regional configurations: Central Africa, East 
and Southern Africa, Southern Africa, West Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific Islands 
(see Table 4.1). In 2008, the negotiating parties embarked on a third (and initially 
unforeseen) phase, as agreement failed in the most contentious of issue areas, namely trade 
in services, trade-related areas, and the development dimension, which left the negotiations 
for the most part unsettled by their expected termination date of December 2007.
1.1 Regionalisation of the ACP
The first phase of negotiations was characterised by general failure of ACP 
negotiating efforts. While in principal the ACP group clearly expressed the intent to 
maintain the “overriding principle of unity and solidarity in their approach to the EPA 
negotiations”, acknowledging that “it will be easier for the ACP to secure a better deal from 
the EU if they negotiate collectively than if they negotiate at an individual, regional or sub­
regional level” (ACP Secretariat 2002a: 5), in effect, ambitions to maintain unity were 
unsuccessful. After only seven months of negotiations, the parties reached a decisive 
stalemate over the framework and principles of EPAs: the ACP wanted a binding 
agreement on guidelines for the second phase of negotiations at the regional level, but the 
Commission maintained that the first phase served merely as a forum for clarification of 
issues thus making a binding agreement unnecessary. As a result of a high-level political 
compromise between the Commission and the ACP, the first phase concluded in October 
2003 with a Joint Declaration and Joint Report serving “as a point of reference, and to 
provide guidance, for the negotiations to be conducted at the regional level.” However:
On the whole, the first phase of all-ACP negotiations can be seen as a failure for the 
ACP and somewhat of a victory for the EU. Indeed, the ACP Group claimed to keep 
its cohesion, and defend common interests throughout these negotiations. Yet, they
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reached no substantive agreement with the EU after one year of “negotiations”, that 
were in fact closer to discussions of clarification. (Bilal and Grynberg 2007: 18).
While the EU successfully advanced its interests, the ACP failed to secure its position as a 
unitary group. According to ACP officials, EU pressure to negotiate along regional lines 
damaged the group’s ability to negotiate with single unitary strength.5 In fact, while the 
ACP opposed commencing the second phase of negotiations without first finding 
satisfactory agreement at the all-ACP level, the Commission pressured regional groups to 
commence negotiations even before the first phase was completed (Bilal and Grynberg: 5). 
Decisions by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the 
Communaute Economique et Monetaire d’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) in April 2003 to 
launch the second phase of negotiations without agreement in the first phase, undermined 
ACP unity and gave clout to the Commission’s position to commence regional-level 
negotiations (Third World Network 2003). In effectively dividing the ACP into regional 
groupings, EPA negotiations significantly altered the composition of the country bloc, and 
signalled “a clear change of paradigm in the ACP-EU partnership,” and perhaps more 
dramatically, “mark[ed] the end of the specificity of the group of ACP countries in their 
relations with the EU” (Bilal and Grynberg: 5; see also Hurt 2003 and Farrell 2005: 269).
While the division of the ACP has weakened the group’s status as a ‘special’ and 
‘privileged’ partner, the regional integration efforts that EPAs are expected to build upon, 
reinforce and consolidate, have posed their own set of problems and difficulties for the 
ACP. Firstly, conflicting and mixed loyalties and obligations within some of the regional 
groupings, particularly in Africa, where membership of previously existing regional 
integration projects often overlaps, has required some countries to choose one grouping 
over another, and has “likely exacerbate[d] a situation that is already inchoate and 
fragmented” (Farrell 2005: 269). For example, in the West African configuration two 
regional bodies are responsible for negotiating the EPA with the EU, namely the 
ECOWAS, a regional grouping of 15 Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone countries, 
and the Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), a customs and 
monetary union between 8 mainly Francophone countries. While the ECOWAS Secretariat 
actually services the EPA negotiations, the UEMOA also participates. Yet as illustrated in 
the next chapter, although both regional groupings are West African, significant tensions 
between the two groups has often stifled progress in finding a common position. Although 
the actual compositions of the regional groups were decided by the ACP, and were largely
5 Interviews Namibian diplomats, Berlin: March 2008 (Nl); Brussels: April 2008 (N2); Interview Ghanaian 
government official, Brussels: April 2008 (Gl).
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based on already ongoing regional integration processes, according to some African
officials the Commission pressured countries to chose certain configurations over others.6
A second consequence of regionalisation is that of a potentially artificial and forced
regionalisation process driven by the preferences and interests of an external actor rather
than by those of the region (Bilal and Grynberg 2007: 15; Bilal 2004). Bilal and Grynberg
contend that unless EPAs allow the ACP to retain significant room for determining the
composition, pace, and format of regional integration, there exists a “danger that
considerations about the relationship with the EU take precedence over regional concerns”
(2007:15). Indeed, the conclusions of the second round of negotiations at the regional level
have clearly highlighted the difficulties facing regional integration efforts with the EU
acting as the external guarantor. At the end of 2007, except for the Caribbean, no region
signed a full EPA. In fact, most African non-LDCs (except for Nigeria, the Republic of the
Congo, Gabon and South Africa) and two Pacific non-LDCs initialled interim goods-only
agreements by the 2007 deadline, thus guaranteeing the continuation of trade preferences
beyond 2008, while the negotiations were forced to continue throughout 2008 and 2009 on
unsettled issues.7 In West Africa, for example, only Ghana and Ivory Coast initialled an
interim EPA, while only Ivory Coast actually signed in 2008. In Southern Africa, all
countries except for South Africa initialled, while South Africa, Angola, and Namibia are
refusing to sign, leading to a situation in which integration efforts could be undermined
unless all countries eventually sign a full regional EPAs. Although attempts at regional
integration are by no means new to Africa, these processes have been difficult to
consolidate in the past, and have often been considered more artificial rather than truly
substantive (Bilal 2004: 6-7; Ravenhill 2004:134). Weak integration projects have limited
Africa’s and the ACPs capacity to negotiate effectively with the EU not merely because of
apparent institutional capacity constraints but also due to diverging goals, objectives and
interests between the countries. Indeed:
political will [amongst the countries] may be insufficient [for collective agreement]. 
Conflicting interests may generate tensions within the region. Even in the presence 
of explicit commitment to negotiate as a group, weak institutional capacity may 
prevent many groupings from effectively defending the interests of their members 
during the negotiations with the EU (Bilal 2004: 14)
and this can potentially harm the implementation and functioning of the EPAs.8
6 Interviews Namibian diplomats, Berlin: March 2008 (Nl); Brussels: April 2008 (N2).
7 The timeline o f the negotiations became a particularly heated issue o f contention between the ACP and the 
Commission. The Commission refused to request another WTO-waiver, but in October 2007 it proposed 
interim goods-only agreements. Non-LDC countries that did not sign an interim agreement as o f January 1, 
2008 are trading under the EU’s GSP regime.
8 Interview Ghanaian government, Brussels: 01 April 2008 (G l).
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Table 4.1: EPA regional groupings,9 (June 2009)
Caribbean+ Central Africa Eastern
Africa*
Eastern &
Southern
Africa
Pacific Islands Southern
Africa
West
Africa
Antigua & Cameroon** Burundi Comoros* Cook Islands Angola Benin
Barbuda Central Kenya DR Congo Fiji Islands* Botswana** Burkina Faso
The Bahamas „ African Rep. Rwanda Djibouti Kiribati Lesotho** Cape Verde
Belize Chad Uganda Eritrea Marshall Islands Mozambique* Gambia
Dominica Congo Tanzania Ethiopia Micronesia Namibia* Ghana*
Dominican Gabon Malawi Nauru S. Africa" Guinea
Republic Sao Tome & Mauritius* Niue Swaziland** Guinea Bissau
Grenada Principe Madagascar* Palau Ivory Coast**
Guyana Seychelles* P. N. Guinea* Liberia
Haiti Observer Sudan Samoa Mali
Jamaica Equatorial Zambia* Solomon Islands Mauritania
Montserrat Guinea 10 Zimbabwe* Tonga Niger
Saint Lucia Tuvalu Nigeria
St. Kitts & Vanuatu Senegal
Nevis Sierra Leone
St. Vincent Observer Togo
&Grenadines Timor-Leste
Suriname 
Trinidad &
Tobago_____________________________________________
+ Indicates region/country that signed a comprehensive EPA 
* Indicates region/country that has initialled an interim EPA 
** Indicates region/country that signed an interim EPA
1.2 Why the shift? Underlying motives
The major overhaul of EU-ACP trade relations has been justified by the EU by the
need for WTO-compatibility. The Lomd trade framework clearly discriminated against
other developing countries facing higher trade barriers than the ACP and these practices
were thus challenged by other WTO members, forcing the EU to give heavy concessions to
obtain and maintain the waiver.12 The Lome framework significantly jeopardised the EU’s
negotiating position vis-a-vis emerging economic powers in the developing world, such as
China, India, and Brazil, and compromised EU interests in securing a competitive position
in these growing and upcoming markets (CEC 1995: 6; Babarinde and Faber 2007: 28-29;
Orbie and Faber 2007). It has been argued that while the issue of WTO compatibility does
11indeed form the discursive element surrounding the need for EPAs, in reality, the EU 
chose to alter its trade relations with the ACP due to wider economic and geo-political 
concerns. Farrell suggests that the EU’s promotion of WTO-compatibility highlights the
9 Cuba and Somalia did not negotiate.
10 In late-2008, Equatorial Guinea withdrew from the negotiations and took observer status.
11 The EU and South Africa’s current trade relations are conducted under the terms o f the bilateral Trade and 
Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA), however in February 2007 the EU allowed South Africa to be 
included in the Southern African EPA configuration subject to certain conditions.
12 The EU’s request o f a temporary waiver in 2000 faced contestation from Latin American banana-exporting 
countries, Asian tuna-exporting countries (Thailand in particular), and the US (Dickson 2004: 51-56).
13 Interviews EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC1; EC3; EC4; EC5; EC9); Interviews EC delegation, Dakar: June 
2008 (EC 16); Accra: September 2008 (EC 18).
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EU’s “trenchant pursuit of what are really neo-liberal goals and the extension of economic 
liberalisation in the interests of the EU” (2005:279; see also Orbie and Faber 2007), which 
indicates that relations with Africa (and the ACP) are largely conducted according to the 
EU’s interests rather than broader normative concerns. As such, the ending of the Lome 
trade framework, and the introduction of EPAs can be attributed to an instrumental choice 
to secure the EU’s own interests. Young and Peterson insist, for instance, that the rising 
influence of developing countries has significantly altered the balance of power of the 
multilateral trading system, in which the EU had to change its position in the face of 
growing pressure from influential developing countries in order to continue defending its 
interests (2006: 803; see also Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004:14). Furthermore, although the 
EU did indeed come under pressure from the WTO either to reform its policy or to submit 
to further concessions, preferential treatment towards the ACP had generally fallen out of 
line with the EU’s priorities. Ravenhill contends that the “EU’s lack of interest in 
expending further political capital to secure a continuing WTO waiver for its trade relations 
with the ACP was symptomatic of the low priority that the relationship held for Brussels” 
(2004: 129). Dickson echoes this criticism when she pointedly notes that, “as the world’s 
largest trading bloc, it seems unlikely that the EU did not have the capacity to alter or 
adjust the interpretation of WTO rules to benefit more developing countries. It seems that 
political will was lacking” (Dickson 2004: 51-57; see also Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006: 
920; Young and Peterson: 807).
Instrumentalist motives can also account for the EU’s preference for regionalising 
the ACP under the new trade framework. Elsig (2007) argues that economic objectives 
alone (e.g. trade gains, influence in key upcoming markets, competitive advantage, etc.) do 
not sufficiently explain why the EU chooses to promote a regionalisation in relations with 
third parties. He insists that promoting a regionalist framework not only assists the EU in 
attaining both an influential economic stronghold in key regions, but also allows it to 
construct significant spheres of political influence. Therefore, “the mission to export the 
European model is clearly embedded in the EU’s strategy of working towards a multipolar 
world” (Elsig 2007: 25). In promoting regional integration, the EU actively reinforces and 
reproduces its own success story, and puts forward its “belief in the utility of regions as a 
unit of organizing the global economy” (Aggarwal and Fogarty: 14; see also Young and 
Peterson: 805).14 In conducting negotiations and promoting trade agreements on a regional
14 Interview EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC1).
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basis, the EU endorses its own model of regional integration.15 Whether intentional or not, 
“through such exchanges the EU defines, reinvents and legitimizes itself’ (Elsig 2007:26), 
therefore serving as, “a means of enhancing the EU’s normative power and a reflection of 
this power, since it is in this context that EU exceptionalism, its unique character as an 
integrative polity among nations, truly matters” (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006: 914).
The changes in the EU’s trading scheme vis-a-vis the ACP point to a triumph for 
more globalist orientations in the EU’s trade policy, and in its relations with the developing 
world (Orbie 2007: 32-34), as the ACP’s privileged status on the EU’s trade agenda is now 
significantly altered and as any possible unitary negotiating position of the group has been 
weakened. In fragmenting the ACP group, the ending of non-reciprocal trade preferences 
challenges the entire dynamic of the EU-ACP relationship, generating a need to understand 
what options remain for ACP countries and regions to coordinate their negotiating efforts 
and how the countries and regional groupings have managed to achieve their preferences 
and goals in the area of trade.
2 Constraints on the EU as a trade negotiator
The evident structural power asymmetry between the negotiating parties does not 
necessarily imply that the EU is always capable of employing its structural power to attain 
its preferences when negotiating trade agreements with weaker countries or regions. This 
section establishes both the capacities and constraints faced by the EU as a trade power, 
and argues that institutional and political weaknesses can act as a constraint in converting 
its structural power into actual bargaining strength. In international trade, the EU holds 
immense structural power: as Meunier and Nicolaidis note, “the sheer size of the single 
European market and its more than forty-year experience of negotiating international trade 
agreements have made the EU the most powerful trading bloc in the world” (2006: 907). 
Structurally therefore, the EU’s power cannot be underestimated, and furthermore shows 
the manifest asymmetry in structural power between the EU and the ACP. While the EU’s 
share of world trade is estimated to be 30%, Africa’s is less than 3%. Despite preferential 
access to the EU market, the ACP’s share of exports to the EU fell by more than a half, 
from 8% in 1975 to 2.8 % in 2000 (Orbie and Faber 2007). The EU’s economic strength 
also provides it with significant weight in bilateral and multilateral trade relations. Because 
trade policy was a Community competence from the very beginning of the EC, the EU’s 
extensive experience in trade policy and negotiations has also provided it with a significant
15 Even if, as Farrell argues, this model is “far removed from the model o f integration that has evolved within 
the EU itself’ (2005: 266).
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capacity to convert its structural power into bargaining power in relations with other actors 
(Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 88; Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006: 908-909). In addition, 
trade as a Community competence means that an official mandate is given to the 
Commission to negotiate on behalf of the Member States. Therefore, in negotiations the EU 
can present itself as a unitary actor with significant economic weight and extensive 
negotiating experience.
Furthermore, the EU’s trade policy has become an important instrument through 
which it attempts to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Indeed, various Community 
policies such as trade (and development, enlargement, aid, etc.) have acquired a “growing 
foreign policy relevance” (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 12). Trade (and trade 
negotiations) therefore serve a twofold purpose: they function as instruments for reaching 
economic objectives (through economic means), while simultaneously offering a tool with 
which to promote political objectives. The EU is therefore both a ‘power in trade’ and a 
‘power through trade’, with the former referring to the EU’s sheer economic size and 
strength, and the latter to the EU’s increasing use of “access to its huge market as a 
bargaining chip to obtain changes in the domestic policies of its trading partners” (Meunier 
and Nicolaidis 2006: 910). While, “the first goal of EU trade power is self-evident: the EU 
is using its power to secure concessions from others about market access” as a foreign 
policy instrument, the EU can also use trade “to achieve non-trade objectives, from the 
export-specific rules flanking market integration (social, environment, safety standards) to 
more political or strategic linkages” (Ibid.: 910). The Commission’s insistence on including 
agreements on services and other trade related-areas in regional EPAs (despite failed 
agreement on these issue areas at the WTO level), offers a clear indication of the EU’s 
keenness to shape both global economic policies and international trade innovations.16 The 
regionalisation of the ACP further demonstrates the EU’s intent on shaping regional 
economic and political processes, not only because it deems this beneficial for economic 
and developmental progress, but arguably also because this is seen as further legitimising 
the EU’s own integrationist achievements and objectives on a global scale (Keukeleire and 
McNaughtan 2008: 13). Therefore, the exercise of power towards third parties through an 
instrument such as trade is not merely a tool for securing economic interests, but also a tool 
for promoting and securing wider strategic interests abroad.
At the same time, it is important to consider the extent to which the EU may be 
limited or constrained as a foreign policy actor. Although the EU certainly possesses both 
structural and bargaining power, the institutional and political constraints it faces in trade
16 Interview EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC9).
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policy, and especially in employing trade as a foreign policy instrument, have limited the 
extent to which its structural power can truly be converted into bargaining power. Elgstrom 
(2007) has argued that the EU’s potential to be an influential leader can be undermined by 
the way in which policy actions are operationalised. Thus, “incoherence across issue areas 
... lack of perceived legitimacy and, to a lesser extent, an excessive focus on internal co­
ordination” (Elgstrom 2007: 949), leads to a foreign policy which is at times less muscular 
and influential than the EU’s power in trade, or structural power, would have it seem 
capable of. Because “political and institutional factors determine how such structural 
foundations materialize into actual power” (Meunier and Nicolaidis: 907), the EU faces 
limits in translating its structural power into actual influence. Meunier and Nicolaidis argue 
that these limitations make for a ‘conflicted’ power through trade, both internally, as 
different Member States hold different preferences as how best to exert this power, and 
between the EU’s guiding principles, values and interests, which are often inconsistent with 
one another, leading to incompatible and diverging policy initiatives and practices. The 
institutional and political constraints faced by the EU as a foreign policy actor therefore 
create a disjunction between the EU’s structural power and its actual bargaining power. 
Therefore, as posited in Chapter 1, constraints faced by the EU, and incongruence between 
the EU’s overall power and its capacity to convert this into influencing outcomes or 
shaping processes according to its preferences also impacts its relations with outsiders and 
consequently their perceptions of the EU as a trade and foreign policy actor.
In analysing foreign policy practises (and the impact of these) of an actor such as 
the EU, it is problematic and even misleading to assume that the EU is able to act as a 
unitary actor in all instances. Similar to what has already been seen in the area of the EU’s 
aid policy towards Africa, the constraints the EU faces in trade are found firstly in the 
Commission’s relationship with the Member States, where tensions between the 
intergovernmental and the supranational levels lead to occasional disjunctive between the 
different institutions and actors involved in EU trade negotiations. Although the Member 
States have indeed delegated to the Commission the task of negotiating trade agreements on 
their behalf, differing Member State interests, opinion and scrutiny of the Commission’s 
task can constrain the Commission’s freedom of movement with regards to other actors. A 
second constraint is found at the level of policy coherence amongst the different EU 
policies with an external or foreign policy dimension. Incoherence can be largely attributed 
to divergence in views that exist at the internal level of the Commission between the 
different DGs that hold different competences in relation to the EU’s external relations. In 
the case of the EPAs, this concerns namely DG Trade, as the chief negotiator of the
141
agreements, DG DEV, responsible for development cooperation and aid policies towards 
the ACP, and to a lesser extent, other DGs that hold competence in specific areas of 
concern {e.g. DG Agriculture and DG Enterprises and Industry). While the different DGs 
are expected to collaborate and coordinate their positions to ensure coherence in the EU’s 
policies and external relations, the EPA negotiations have shown a rather problematic 
divide and incoherence particularly between the trade and development aspects of the 
negotiations.
2.1 The Commission’s relationship with the Member States/Council
Certainly the Commission has a strong mandate to conduct trade negotiations with 
external actors. It has the exclusive right to initiate policy proposals and to suggest 
negotiations, while the Council approves the Commission’s proposals by Qualified 
Majority Voting (QMV). Throughout the negotiations, the Commission regularly reports on 
its progress to the Article 133 Committee consisting of Member State trade officials, whose 
main task is to ascertain that the Commission indeed remains within the Council’s 
negotiating mandate and to consider Commission proposals, which are then forwarded for 
approval to the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). The extent to 
which the Commission can negotiate its own preferences therefore, is largely determined 
by the extent to which the Council restricts or allows the Commission to interpret and 
utilise its mandate. “In principle, as long as they remain within the limits set by the 
mandate, Commission negotiators are free to conduct bargaining with third countries as 
they wish. In practice, the negotiators’ latitude and flexibility vary case by case, depending 
on the member states’ willingness to give up control over the issue being negotiated” 
(Meunier and Nicolaidis 2005:257). At times, this system of delegation can create tension 
and conflict between the preferences of the Council and those of the Commission. Indeed, 
“in the Common Commercial Policy, as in other areas, there has always been a degree of 
tension, not to say distrust, between the Member States and the Commission” (Bretherton 
and Vogler 2006: 68).
To the extent that there is significant contestation between the Commission and the 
Council, and even amongst individual Member States, the EU risks weakening its position 
of strength as a single unitary actor. This can have significant impact on the other 
negotiating party’s perception of the Commission’s bargaining strength, which in turn 
partially contributes to its strategy in negotiating with the EU (see Hypothesis 2b in 
Chapter 1). This is so because power is relational, which means that power asymmetry and 
the way it affects negotiating processes and outcomes can only be understood by
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considering both the way in which an actor perceives its own power as opposed to that of 
others, and how it perceives the other actor’s power as opposed to its own. As assumed in 
Chapter 1, the extent to which the Commission’s negotiating position appears to be 
representative of a consensus amongst the Member States and between the Commission 
and the Council, is important in shaping other actors’ perceptions of the EU’s power to 
convert its economic strength into bargaining strength. This assertion is echoed by 
Elgstrom, whose empirical findings confirm that “EU unity contributes to the perceived 
power of the Union” (2007: 950). Elgstrom further suggests that when the EU is perceived 
as a unitary actor with a unitary position, it limits the possibility of other actors to seek out 
either interlocutors or actors more sympathetic to their position within the EU, to influence 
and shift positions (‘divide and rule’); if the EU is perceived as united in its position, or 
‘speaking with one voice’, the Commission is in a stronger position to consolidate the 
views of the Council or Member States with those of its negotiating opponent (i.e. a win-set 
in a two-level game). Meunier (2000; 2005), on the other hand, has argued that internal 
conflict, particularly between the Commission and the Member States can actually serve as 
a source of bargaining power for EU trade negotiators. This is so because, “when the 
negotiating opponent knows that the EU cannot deviate from its offer, the Community can 
use its institutional constraints as an excuse for not coming up with enough concessions” 
(Meunier 2000: 117). While this should certainly be considered a negotiating tactic or 
strategy the EU can employ in trade negotiations, the extent to which this necessarily 
confers bargaining power on the EU is debatable. Indeed, Meunier’s understanding of the 
EU’s bargaining power does not take into account that power is relational, nor does it 
account for a situation in which power asymmetry between the EU and others is manifest.17 
Therefore, Meunier does not consider how the negotiating opponent’s perception of the 
EU’s power and its ability to convert this power into bargaining strength can actually shape 
and influence the opponent’s own actions and strategies.
The EPA negotiations illustrate how divisions within the EU affected the ACP’s 
perception of the EU and consequently weakened the EU’s bargaining strength. The 
Commission did employ the strategy of referring to its institutional constraints as a 
negotiating agent in order not to concede to the demands of many of the ACP regions in 
relation to the ‘development dimension’ aspect of the EPAs. Throughout the negotiations, 
the Commission argued that the EPAs could act as trade tools for development through 
trade liberalisation, a solid policy framework for investment, increased competitiveness and
17 Meunier analyses transatlantic trade negotiations in four areas o f trade. The EU and the US negotiate in an 
environment where structural power asymmetry is much less evident than in negotiations between the EU and 
developing countries.
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market access. But “while most of the ACP would agree with the EU on the development 
opportunities entailed in an EPA, they tend to consider trade liberalisation and regional 
integration as necessary, yet far from sufficient, conditions to foster development and 
alleviate poverty” (Bilal and Grynberg 2007: 20). Thus for the ACP, for EPAs to be 
development-friendly instruments of trade, the EU would have to take account of the 
developmental realities, needs, and strategies of the ACP (Meyn 2008: 517-518). This 
meant that mechanisms needed to be established to meet both the adjustment costs and 
address the supply-side constraints facing the countries in implementing the agreements 
and liberalising trade. In 2006, ACP ministers requested that an EPA-Adjustment Facility 
be established, binding the EU to increasing funds to help the ACP adjust to the EPAs (see 
Table 4.2). The Commission however argued that unless this provision was formally 
integrated into its negotiating mandate by the Council, it was unable to link further 
assistance to the EPAs because this would go beyond the Commission’s mandate.18 It 
further argued that such assistance was already provided for by the EDF, with the ACP 
insisting that this displaced aid away from developmental focal areas and that they would 
prefer to bypass the burdensome aid allocation and distribution methods typical of the EDF.
Table 4.2: Overall EU and ACP positions on the EPAs
EU ACP
Trade in Goods
Trade liberalisation constitutes 90% o f  all 
trade, with some room for asymmetry, 
with full market access for ACP imports 
into the EU and ACP tariff elimination on 
80-90% o f  EU imports.
A 10 to 15 year transitional timeframe for 
reciprocal market access with exceptions 
for highly sensitive products.
Some protection for highly sensitive 
products.
Trade liberalisation should range between 
60 to 80% o f all trade, with a large degree 
o f  asymmetry, with full market access for 
ACP exports and ACP tariff elimination 
on circa 60% o f  EU imports.
A long transitional timeframe up to 25 
years which takes account o f  the needs 
and constraints o f each individual country 
in the EPA configuration.
Guaranteed protection for highly sensitive 
products.
Trade in Services 
and
Trade-related
issues
EPAs should have a binding commitment 
on trade in services and other trade-related 
areas as they are fundamental to the 
development efforts o f the ACP.
EPAs should take account o f  trade in 
services and other trade-related areas, but 
agreement on these should not be binding 
while these issues are still undergoing 
negotiation at the WTO level.
18 The Commission has used this strategy on several occasions during the EPA negotiations. For example, the 
Pacific region’s demands to integrate labour market access (M ode 4) provisions into the services chapter o f 
the Agreements, have continuously been rejected on the grounds that these go beyond the Com m ission’s 
mandate in trade negotiations, and should therefore be discussed at the individual Member State level (Van 
Criekinge 2009: 186).
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EPAs will generate development through EPAs must provide for short-term
trade liberalisation, market access, and compensation and assistance to address
increased investment opportunities. adjustment costs, supply-side constraints,
_  , . and institutional weaknesses.Development
Dimension 1 0 th EDF takes account of EPA- The EU needs to make a binding
related needs through NIPs, RIPs, and commitment towards assistance. An EPA
various Facilities. Aid for Trade Adjustment Facility should be established
commitments offer trade-related to address specific needs in adjusting to
assistance towards EPA-adjustments. an EPA.
As the negotiations progressed, some EU Member States criticised the
Commission’s reluctance to discuss a more comprehensive development dimension, with
the UK being the most active.19 In March 2005, the UK Departments of Trade and Industry
(DfTI) and International Development (DfID) released a highly critical paper in which the
government communicated its position on EPA negotiations. According to a leaked letter
by a Commission official, the position paper was considered to be ‘“ a major and
unwelcome shift’ in the UK’s approach” (The Guardian 2006). Furthermore,
The UK’s statement was significant in that it opened up for a much broader criticism 
of the negotiations. Henceforth, an increasing number of member states would begin 
to openly question the negotiating stance of the Union, including most notably the 
latter’s insistence on reciprocity (i.e. that the ACP countries have to open their 
markets for EU exports too). For the Commission’s negotiating team, this 
‘interference’ in the conduct of the negotiations has obviously been a source of 
concern. By suggesting that the EPAs can and should be ‘development instruments’ 
rather than mere trade agreements, the dissenting European voices were implicitly 
undercutting the DG Trade strategy, which had been to present the EPA-as-trade- 
agreements as the only viable, legal, and logical outcome of the negotiation process 
(Pilegaard 2009: 272).
Discontent with the Commission’s role took a more active turn under the UK’s EU Council 
Presidency in the second half o f2005. During the presidency, the UK established an EPA 
Expert Group, chaired by the Commission and consisting of representatives from the 
Member States, DG Trade, and DG DEV, to promote informal dialogue and consultations 
between the Member States on the EPAs.20 Importantly, the UK also began acting as a kind 
of interlocutor between the Commission and the ACP, which according to interviewees had
• 9 1begun seeking Member State support for their position on the development dimension. In 
turn, the UK offered the ACP its support for their concerns which in turn assisted the UK
19 This is particularly worthy o f note, because the Trade Commissioner at the time of the negotiations was 
British, making for an interesting clash between the UK government and its Commissioner.
20 During the UK presidency, the Commission released a Communication on Trade and Development Aspects 
o f  the EPA Negotiations, which detailed the state-of-play o f the negotiations and the efforts to integrate a 
development dimension. At the December 2005 European Council summit, Member States pledged to 
increase assistance for trade capacity-building efforts of the ACP. The increased Aid for Trade commitments 
are equally co-financed by the EC and Member States’ bilateral assistance. This commitment was further 
reiterated in the October 2007 draft EU  Strategy on A id  fo r  Trade, which specified that o f the €2 billion 
increase, 50% would be destined towards the ACP.
21 Interviews UK government, London: May 2008 (UK1); June 2008 (UK2).
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“with tools to influence policy on the Union side,”22 on making the EPAs more 
development-friendly.
The extent of both the UK’s influence and its actual divergence from the 
Commission is debatable; indeed EC officials maintain that while the UK’s position was 
indeed very vocal publicly, it never significantly challenged the Commission’s negotiating 
mandate and for the most part, the UK’s position was largely in line with that of the 
Commission 23 Furthermore, there is some disagreement amongst UK government officials 
as to how much the government can really influence the EU’s trade policy.24 Nevertheless, 
the discrepancies in positions between the UK, to a lesser extent other Member States
r
(and the European Parliament) , and the Commission are important in that they created the 
image of a divided actor for some of the ACP countries, and consequently contributed to 
shaping their negotiating strategies. Indeed, interviews with African trade officials confirm 
that although the EU is certainly in a stronger position to negotiate, it is also seen as 
constrained in ‘imposing’ its preferences because of the controversial image of the EPAs 
created in part by public Member State divergence on the content of the negotiations. 
Although officials were aware of their weak negotiating strength, because they knew of the 
controversies surrounding the Commission’s approach to the negotiations and the tensions 
within the EU itself, one negotiating strategy at their disposal was to refer to the EU’s 
weaknesses, however limited, or to refuse signing agreements which did not meet their 
preferences.27 As demonstrated in the following chapter, the case of Senegal offers a 
concrete example of how one country used this image of the EU to go against the position 
of the Commission, propose new demands, and actually influence the negotiations despite 
the fact that it was neither directly negotiating the agreements, nor had any structural power
22 Ibid. (UK2).
23 Interviews EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC1; EC3; EC9).
24 Interviews* UK government, London: May 2008 (UK1); June 2008 (UK2).
25 While the Commission saw binding commitments in these areas as fundamental to the development efforts 
o f the ACP, the ACP were reluctant to accept this, because these issues had already been forced out o f recent 
WTO negotiations due to strong opposition from developing countries. Because the Commission used WTO 
compatibility as the justification for EPAs, insistence on including an extensive set o f trade-related issues 
beyond WTO requirements was met with resistance. The issue o f integrating trade in services and other trade- 
related areas into the EPAs was also met with opposition from some Member States. In 2005, Poland 
expressed concern about the Commission’s insistence on integrating non-essential elements into the EPAs. 
Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the UK also expressed concern. In December 2007, as the WTO- 
waiver was set to expire, these countries issued a statement urging the Commission to demonstrate increased 
flexibility in reaching agreements with the ACP.
26 The European Parliament (EP) also took a critical position on the Commission’s negotiating tactics. In 
2006, the EP Committee on Development called for increased efforts on making the EPAs development- 
friendly. While the EP is not formally consulted on trade negotiations, in practise, the Commission reports to 
the EP, and can consider the its position. While the actual impact o f the EP is difficult to assess, it is 
mentioned here because its divergent position vis-a-vis the Commission is nevertheless important in creating 
an image o f the EU as not entirely united in its position.
27 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S6; S8; S9); Interview Namibian diplomat, Brussels: 
April 2008 (N2).
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as one of the poorest countries in the world. This confirms Hypothesis 2b posited in 
Chapter 1, that because perceptions are in part shaped by external actions and the 
effectiveness and impact of these, if the EU is perceived as inconsistent in its position or 
actions between the Member States/Council and the Commission, it affects other actors’ 
perceptions of the EU, and may even allow other actors to seek interlocutors or actors more 
sympathetic to their position and with which they can exercise leverage.
2.2 Policy (in)coherence in trade negotiations
In Chapter 2, it was argued that the institutional set-up within the Commission 
regarding policy formulation, implementation, and coherence affected its effectiveness as a 
development actor and the extent to which the EC could translate its structural strength as a 
donor into actual concrete action and influence. Similar to aid policy, incoherence in trade 
negotiations can affect the EU’s effectiveness as a trade negotiator especially in cases 
where the negotiating opponent’s preferences and interests extend significantly beyond 
trade, as is the case in the EPA negotiations. Although within the Commission different 
DGs are delegated different tasks with regards to trade negotiations with third parties, the 
preferences and the extent of each DG’s role will partially determine the degree to which 
the Commission can operate as a unitary negotiator and promote a coherent approach to the 
negotiations.
In 2000, ACP trade-related issues were moved from DG DEV to DG Trade, with 
DEV retaining the responsibility for development policy and managing relations with the 
ACP. In the EPA negotiations, DG Trade was thus given the main negotiating task. This 
signalled the first time that the ACP would negotiate with EU officials other than DG DEV 
as per the long-standing development aid framework. While DG Trade’s position and 
progress were to be tightly coordinated with DG DEV, and to a lesser degree with DG 
Agriculture and DG Enterprises and Industry, DG Trade adopted a leadership position not 
only in conducting the negotiations, but also vis-a-vis other relevant DGs (Hudson 2006: 
63-64). For the most part, though, this coordination remained purely rhetorical. While DG 
Trade assumed a leadership position in the negotiations, DG DEV limited itself to restricted
98policy input. Some ACP interviewees noted that as the negotiations proceeded, increasing 
discrepancies between the positions of DG Trade and DG DEV became evident, especially
90on the form and shape of the development dimension. DG DEV’s annual reports
28 Interviews EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC4; EC5).
29 Interviews Namibian diplomats, Berlin: March 2008 (Nl); Brussels: April 2008 (N2); Interview Senegalese 
government, Dakar: June 2008 (S6).
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expressed similar concerns with regards to the possible undermining of coordination and 
coherence efforts between the different DGs. The 2005 report noted that “ensuring the 
coherence of Community policies with an impact on developing countries is a major source 
of risk. This risk is most relevant with respect to trade, notably in EPA negotiations, which 
is a critical dimension for development policy, but the capacity in this area is concentrated 
in DG Trade” (CEC 2005: 19). While the 2006 report noted some progress in coherence 
between development and trade coordination efforts, it nonetheless reiterated that despite 
the increased competences in trade assigned to DG DEV, the risk of coordination failure 
with DG Trade persisted (CEC 2006: 5, 18). Interestingly, similar reports by DG Trade, 
while recognising the need for the integration of a development dimension in EPAs, made 
no mention of increased coordination efforts with DG DEV.
Although development was the most significant policy area in which coordination 
and coherence was necessary during the negotiations, other relevant policy areas were also 
not integrated into the discussions on the EPAs. Olsen (2009) has demonstrated that in the 
context of the EPA negotiations no link was ever established between prominent EU 
security debates and trade, illustrating how the EU’s external policies are 
‘compartmentalized’ into separate ‘policy sub-sectors’, and explaining why external 
policies towards the ACP tend to lack coherency (see also Pilegaard 2006, 2009). Other 
relevant policy areas which affect the ACP and which overlap with trade were also 
excluded from the discussions. For example, although migration has a complementary 
relationship with both development and trade, EU trade negotiators have been reluctant to 
integrate far-reaching labour provisions into the agreements, firstly because this is said to 
go beyond their negotiating mandate, and secondly because the EU considers migration 
first and foremost a security issue and has therefore kept the policy exclusive to that 
domain (Van Criekinge 2009).
The leadership position of DG Trade in the negotiations is particularly relevant for 
understanding the incoherence of the Commission’s position as regards other relevant 
issues such as development, because the preferences and interests of the different DGs 
essentially depend on the policy area in which they operate (Frennhoff Larsen 2007: 440- 
63). Accordingly, if DG Trade’s interests essentially lie in promoting trade liberalization 
and ensuring WTO compatibility in FT As with other countries and regions, then it would 
seem reasonable to assume that policy domains such as development are difficult to 
integrate into the framework for EU trade negotiations. This is particularly so because the 
position of DG Trade within the Commission is significantly stronger than that of DG 
DEV. Indeed, the fact that the EPA negotiations required DG Trade to begin negotiating
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with actors that were traditionally the exclusive competence of DG DEV, has weakened the 
position of DG DEV and development policy in general, while strengthening that of DG 
Trade (see also Olsen 2009; Pilegaard 2006). The failure to integrate provisions for other 
overlapping policies into the negotiations demonstrates a particular limitation in mandating 
DG Trade to lead negotiations on agreements that have important implications for the 
development prospects of the ACP. Pilegaard notes that “the fact that the EPA negotiations 
were structured and conducted by DG Trade had a significant effect on the negotiation 
process and the relatively aggressive stance of the Union. In the meantime, the 
development arm of the EU played ‘second fiddle’ providing too little input, too late” 
(2009: 264).
Due to the dominant position of DG Trade, the Commission’s approach to the EPAs
came to be seen as incompatible with the softer rhetoric advocating development-friendly
EPAs (Bilal and Grynberg 2007: 3). Incoherence between different policy areas also
affected the perception that the ACP had of the EU in its approach to the negotiations:
The ACP countries have found negotiating with the Commission rather confusing; 
they have assumed that their DG Trade counterparts are speaking on behalf of the 
whole Commission (on behalf of the EU), and have been puzzled to discover that 
DG Trade is unable to deal with issues such as development assistance. This is 
particularly problematic because the ACP countries’ decisions about whether to 
enter into EPAs will necessarily hinge on whether or not sufficient assistance is 
provided to support their preparations for, and adjustment to trade liberalisation 
(Hudson 2006: 64).
Perhaps more importantly, it also shaped their perception of the EU as a capable and 
concerned development actor. Elgstrom has argued that “the normative and persuasive 
power of the EU diminishes if the developing countries don’t believe in the good intentions 
proclaimed by the EU and instead focus on incoherence between verbal rhetoric and 
perceived behaviour” (2008: 12). Furthermore, in Elgstrom’s analysis of other actors’ 
perceptions of the EU’s power and its potential to act as a leader in international trade 
negotiations, he finds that an actor’s perception of the EU can obstruct the EU’s position of 
power and leadership. Importantly, he finds that other actors perceive the EU to be 
inconsistent in its approach to third parties and lacking sufficient legitimacy as a leader in 
trade negotiations, which is ultimately perceived as caused by excessive internal 
coordination leading to slow decision-making and inflexible positions (Elgstrom 2007: 
958-962). Such perceptions of the EU by other actors are evidenced also in the 
aid/development and migration fields. As was assumed in Chapter 1, the way in which the 
EU is perceived by these actors is important because it shapes their strategies and decision­
making with regards to the EU and can also partially explain why negotiating processes and
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outcomes are not necessarily always in the EU’s favour. As Elgstrom notes, “if one
negotiating party does not accept the proclaimed self-image of its opponent, or sees it as
inconsistent with the actual behaviour of that actor, it will doubt the sincerity and
credibility of the actor and hesitate to agree to its proposal” (2008: 12; see also Chapter 1).
As another EPA observer has noted:
Most ACP feel dissatisfied with the results reached so far and mistrust the EC’s 
intentions in the ongoing negotiations towards a comprehensive EPA. Should the 
comprehensive EPAs not provide an outcome that is regarded as an achievement by 
both sides, the ACP will implement them only if the sanctions of non­
implementation exceed the costs of implementation (Meyn 2008: 516).
Indeed, as posited in Hypothesis 2c, countries might then be more likely to lower their 
expectations of the EU, and in turn adopt strategies that might more closely assert their own 
preferences, or they may just be less willing to cooperate with the EU.
Indeed, the inconsistency between the EU’s trade policy and other relevant and 
overlapping external policies, and the dominance of DG Trade in leading the negotiations, 
significantly affected the ACP position towards the negotiations and in turn led to a perhaps 
unexpected outcome. Even though the countries came under pressure to conclude the EPAs 
or face the risk of losing vital trading preferences, when the 2007 deadline came, all ACP 
regions, except for the Caribbean, refused to sign full EPAs, largely because the most 
controversial and difficult issues had not been satisfactorily settled. In particular, the ACP 
expressed discontent with the Commission’s reluctance to meet their request for integration 
of the development dimension, and unsatisfactory agreement on trade in services and trade- 
related areas (ACP Council of Ministers 2007). The EU’s offer of an interim agreement is 
particularly relevant for understanding both how actors’ perceptions of one another can 
affect the leverage that each side exerts vis-a-vis one another. The mere fact that the 
Commission placed the offer on the negotiating table is an important indication of its limits 
as the so-called more powerful actor. While the Commission claimed that its offer should 
be interpreted in light of its concern for the ACP which risk losing trade preferences 
altogether, it can also be seen as the Commission’s final effort to save its reputation as an 
effective international trade negotiator, in the face of increasing criticisms and concerns 
over its conduct during the difficult negotiations. Thus, “while the Commission sees its 
interim offer as ‘significant progress’, others have interpreted the move as a face-saving 
exercise, creating empty shell agreements that allow the EU to avoid re-imposing tariffs on 
those countries willing to conclude an agreement but unable to sign a comprehensive EPA 
by year-end” (Kabuleeta and Hanson 2008: 1).
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This last-ditch effort by the Commission to save the negotiations from failure 
provides a concrete indication of its limits in accomplishing its preferred outcome vis-a-vis 
a much weaker actor. The extent to which the ACP can exert any sort of leverage or 
ownership vis-a-vis their Commission counterparts lies in the acknowledgement that “there 
are significant political constraints in the EU” (Rampa 2007: 3). Failed agreement would 
not only have been disastrous for many of the ACP, but could also have significantly 
damaged the international image the EU is trying to promote and construct both abroad and
o n
at home. While the all-out failure of negotiations could have potentially injured the 
conception of the EU’s power as an international trade negotiator, it certainly illustrated the 
limitations of the EU’s potential to use its structural power to negotiate a preferred 
outcome. Regardless of the EU’s experience in negotiating international trade deals, failure 
to conclude the far-reaching EPAs by the date it had initially envisioned, and the ACP’s 
refusal to sign without the further negotiation of sensitive issues, shows the limitations that 
the EU continues to face as a trade negotiator. Indeed, as posited in Hypothesis 2d, when 
the costs of failed agreement are high for the EU, or if the EU is perceived as constrained 
by its wider interests, the weaker actor will be more likely to devise a strategy in which it 
can expose these constraints and exercise leverage in finding agreement or influencing the 
agenda. In 2008, a third phase of the negotiations commenced, in which initialled 
agreements were signed and then underwent a ratification process by the EP and national 
parliaments, and in which contentious areas such as trade in services and trade-related 
issues and development are being negotiated and integrated into comprehensive regional 
EPAs. In most cases a deadline for concluding these was set for the end o f2008 (except for 
the ESA and EAC configurations, where no timeframe was set), however in all regions 
negotiations continued well into 2009. According to ACP officials, this third phase has 
been characterised by a less tense negotiating environment, with the EU acknowledging a 
need for increased flexibility and willingness to find agreement on sensitive issues (ACP- 
EU JPA 2009). The ongoing status of the negotiations and the continual slipping deadlines 
is a further indication of the EU’s constraints in exercising leverage in trade negotiations; 
as negotiations continue until satisfactory agreement is found.31
30 Kabuleeta and Hanson (2007) suggest that the Caribbean’s choice to sign a full EPA saved the EU from 
public humiliation.
1 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S8; S9); Interview Namibian diplomat, Brussels: 
April 2008 (N2).
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3 Conclusion
Based on the EU’s economic strength and its experience in trade negotiations, it could be 
reasonably assumed that in trade negotiations with weaker actors such as the ACP, the EU 
holds all the cards in terms of bargaining strength. Yet because power is not merely 
possessed, but rather operates through an interactive, dynamic, and intersubjective process 
in which contextual factors determine an actor’s power, establishing the strengths and 
constraints faced by the EU in its trade relations with weaker actors is crucial in creating a 
more complete depiction of its actual capabilities to follow up its policy rhetoric with 
coherent and meaningful actions. Together with the findings of the EU’s strengths and 
weaknesses as a development actor in Chapter 2, the limitations of the EU as a trade 
negotiator demonstrate the importance of considering the constraints faced by both parties 
in a power asymmetric relationship. Although power asymmetry characterises both aid and 
trade relations between the EU and Africa, in both issue-areas or policy fields the EU is 
constrained in the extent to which it can fully convert the power it possesses in the 
realist/neorealist sense into power over other actors, as described by rationalists such as 
Baldwin, Habeeb, Keohane and Nye, and Zartman and Rubin, or power to shape outcomes, 
agendas, and preferences, as described by constructivists such as Bachrach and Baratz and 
Lukes (see Chapter 1). The gap between the EU’s power as a possession and its power over 
or power to has important implications on both the EU’s ‘actomess’ in trade and external 
policies, but also on its relations with outsiders. How the EU acts vis-a-vis African 
countries can impact their perception of the EU and influences the formulation of their 
strategies for dealing with the EU. Furthermore, because power is context-bound, the way 
in which these perceptions shape the exercise of leverage and control vis-a-vis the EU will 
depend on the extent to which contextual conditions favouring leverage and ownership are 
present (see Table 1.3 in Chapter 1).
This chapter has considered the changing relationship between the EU and 
Africa/ACP in the area of trade, and in doing so, has focused particularly on the recent 
negotiations between the two parties aimed at establishing Economic Partnership 
Agreements. The negotiations and the scope of the actual agreements have been one of the 
most contentious issues to arise between the EU and the ACP, and have created a 
paradigmatic shift in relations between the historical ‘partners’. Furthermore, the EPAs 
have divided the ACP into regional groupings, significantly altering the negotiating 
position of the ACP as a group, and having created problematic loyalties and negotiating 
positions within the regional configurations themselves. It was argued that this dramatic
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shift in EU-ACP relations can largely be explained by the EU’s interests to secure an 
influential trading position both in the multilateral and regional trade arena; a decreasing 
interest and lack of political will in the EU in general in defending ACP interests at the 
multilateral level in the face of emerging interests in other policy areas and geographical 
regions; a general will of the EU to promote and consolidate regional integration processes 
as part of an effort (whether intentional or not) of exporting the EU’s own regional model 
abroad; and a general conviction that this is a “logical mode of organizing the world 
economy and promoting economic development within regions” (Aggarwal and Fogarty 
2004: 14). However, regardless of its apparent structural strength, the institutional and 
political constraints faced by the EU both as a trade negotiator and as a foreign policy actor 
create a disjunction between the EU’s structural power and its ability to influence and 
negotiate a preferred outcome. Divergences between the intergovernmental and 
supranational levels (i.e. the Commission and the Member States/Council), internal 
divergences at the Commission level (i.e. DG Trade and other relevant DGs), and policy 
incoherence between trade and overlapping external policies such as development, affect 
the ACP’s perception of the EU as a consistent, legitimate and capable international 
negotiator. Therefore other actors’ perceptions of the EU’s power are not necessarily 
congruent with the actual economic or ‘structural’ power that the EU possesses and this 
affects the formulation of their strategies and their decisions in negotiations with the EU. 
The next chapter explores this in more detail through a case study of Senegal and Ghana’s 
strategies, decisions, and ability to influence decision-making in regional trade 
negotiations.
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Chapter 5
Exercising leverage and control in trade relations:
Senegal and Ghana in West African -  EU trade negotiations
This chapter explores how Senegal and Ghana have or have not been able to achieve their 
preferences in regional trade negotiations between the EU and the West African sub-region. 
Although the countries do not possess significant economic strength and face considerable 
institutional capacity constraints in negotiating trade agreements, their perceptions of the 
EU as a trade power and certain contextual factors have permitted the exercise of leverage 
and to a lesser extent control, vis-a-vis the structurally stronger actor. Certainly power 
asymmetry is a defining characteristic of trade relations and negotiations between 
developed and developing countries or in this case, regions. Although Bilal and Walker 
note, “the conclusion of interim agreements which contain provisions that many ACP 
negotiators disapprove of shows the power-bias in favour of the European Commission and 
the limitations of ACP countries and regions acting individually” (2008: 3), this chapter 
demonstrates that at the individual country level there has still been some scope to 
influence the negotiating processes and outcomes.
The chapter shows that despite Senegal’s development challenges, its marginal 
position in world trade, and the fact that it did not directly negotiate EPAs with the EU, it 
was able to influence the regional negotiating mandate by placing development issues at the 
centre of the region’s demands vis-a-vis the EU. Furthermore, by mobilising considerable 
opposition against the agreements, it affected the EU’s negotiating position vis-a-vis the 
region. This can be attributed to Senegal’s pro-activeness and influence in the region, 
especially at the level of the UEMOA, its domestic political and economic context, and the 
perception it holds of the EU as a trade negotiator. Ghana has been unable to shift the 
negotiating agenda closer to its preferences. This is due to the fact that it holds an entirely 
different perception of the EU, has a limited ability to influence the ECOWAS agenda due 
to regional divisions, and a differing domestic political and economic context. >
The chapter confirms that these differing approaches to relations with the EU 
largely form the basis of the countries’ strategies in all three of the policy fields examined 
in this thesis. It also demonstrates that although the EU is structurally stronger and a more 
experienced trade negotiator than most African countries and regions, the constraints it 
faces in the trade field influence and shape other actors’ perceptions of the EU’s power.
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These perceptions in turn influence the strategies and approaches actors adopt vis-a-vis the 
EU. Finally, it expands the findings on the ability of some African countries to negotiate 
their preferences and why this may pose a challenge to the traditional view of relations 
between the EU and Africa as necessarily always favouring the structurally stronger actor.
1 The West African regional configuration and EPA negotiations
Before examining the position and strategies of Senegal and Ghana, the characteristics of 
the West African configuration and its position in the EPA negotiations must be identified. 
Out of the six regional configurations negotiating an EPA, West Africa is the most 
important region both in terms of exports to and imports from the EU, constituting nearly 
40% of all EU-ACP trade. The EU is the region’s main trade partner, accounting for 35% 
of trade (CEC 2005). The EPA negotiations are therefore of key importance for the 
economic and developmental future of the region and the individual countries participating 
in the negotiations (CTA 2009: 1,12). Yet it is also the region where the EU has particular 
interests in negotiating a comprehensive EPA because of the region’s proximity to the EU, 
and the trading potential this offers.1
Figure 5.1: ECOWAS trade partners, (2005)
Rest of the 
world, 14%
MERCOSUR,
3%
ASEAN, 4% /i;
China, 4%
Africa, 12%
Source: CEC 2005
1 Interview EC delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 16); Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 
(S6; S9).
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Two important characteristics in the West African configuration have played an 
important part in shaping the region’s and individual countries’ positions on EPAs. First, it 
is the only region where two regional organisations are jointly negotiating the EPAs: 
namely, the ECOWAS, grouping together 15 anglophone, francophone and lusophone 
countries, and which aims to establish an economic and monetary union, a regional 
market, and free movement of goods and people; and the Union Economique et Monetaire 
Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), which co-exists within the ECOWAS as a customs and 
monetary union between 8 mainly francophone countries, sharing a common currency 
(CFA) which is pegged to the euro.4 The joint negotiation arrangement poses a significant 
challenge. The UEMOA is considered a model for economic and monetary integration in 
Africa (CEC 2008b). Through substantial assistance from France and the EU, the UEMOA 
Commission has developed significant technical and administrative capacities and 
expertise, and is considered the “driving impulsion in strengthening and further deepening 
economic integration between its member states” (CEC 2008b). The integration efforts of 
the ECOWAS are limited, faced with a multiplicity of challenges in terms of political 
commitment from an economically, politically, and socially diverse group of countries, the 
coexistence of separate ECOWAS and UEMOA integration schemes, and significant 
rivalries between the two organisations (Asante 2004:60-61; Adebajo 2004:45; Diaw and 
Tran 2008: 5; Aryeetey 2001:25-27). Yet, in jointly negotiating the EPAs with the EU, the 
region has had to accelerate regional integration and establish common positions on trade 
issues, such as harmonising a common external tariff (CET),5 identifying a common list of 
sensitive products to exclude from liberalisation, consolidating liberalisation schedules, 
identifying key service sectors vital for economic development, and identifying supply-side 
constraints and adjustment costs of a regional EPA.
Second, “the economic and demographic disparities within west Africa have a direct 
influence on the importance of the countries in trade with Europe” (CTA 2009: 14) and 
have implications on countries’ positions on the EPAs. The West African configuration has 
the highest concentration of LDCs (12 out of 16) of all of the regional EPA configurations. 
Thus most countries in the region can continue trading with the EU under the EB A and are
2 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.
3 Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo.
4 Non-UEMOA members have their own currencies and are preparing a second monetary zone (West African 
Monetary Zone -  WAMZ) that is expected to merge with the UEMOA’s.
5 In 2001, ECOWAS Heads o f State decided to harmonise their import tariffs with the UEMOA CET adopted 
in 1998. In line with WTO requirements, the UEMOA CET places customs duties into four major categories 
or bands: essential goods (0%); staple goods, including basic raw materials, capital goods and specific inputs 
(5%); intermediate goods and inputs (10%); and final consumer goods (20%).
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not constrained to negotiate an EPA to secure trade preferences. Furthermore, because the 
levels of development between the countries vary, finding a common regional position has 
been more difficult because of diverging interests. Non-LDC countries, Ghana, Ivory 
Coast, and Nigeria constitute more than 80% of West African exports to the EU,6 while 
Nigeria alone accounts for 60% of all exports, of which fossil-fuel products are primary 
(CEC 2007a; see Figure 5.2). While Nigeria’s concentration in the energy sector makes its 
economy considerably less dependent on the EU, exports from Ghana and Ivory Coast are 
concentrated mainly in the agricultural sector, meaning they have a greater interest in 
signing an EPA to maintain access to the EU market.
Figure 5.2: ECOWAS exports, (2005-2007)
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Negotiations on the EPA commenced in October 2003, and took place on three 
levels: between the chief negotiators, consisting in the presidents of the ECOWAS and 
UEMOA and the EU’s Trade Commissioner; between senior civil servants, led by 
ECOWAS and UEMOA Trade Commissioners and DG Trade; and between trade experts, 
namely the directors of trade in the ECOWAS and UEMOA and officials from DG Trade, 
DG DEV, and other relevant DGs (CTA 2009: 3). In February 2007, chief negotiators 
identified three requirements to be met for the region to conclude a full EPA by December 
2007: the establishment of EU-financed EPA support programme; the drawing up of 
timetables for market access; and the drafting of the text of the agreement. At the deadline, 
negotiations failed on the content and scope of the EPA, because of delays and divisions at
6 Cape Verde is currently undergoing a transitional phase from LDC to non-LDC status. It will be able to 
export to the EU under the EBA for a transition period o f  at least three years.
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the regional level in the preparation of a common negotiating position, and major 
disagreement with the EU on multiple aspects (CTA: 2). The European Commission 
rejected the region’s request for an extension of the WTO waiver, and instead offered the 
possibility of a goods-only interim EPA, which was rejected by the region. The EU then 
moved to negotiate at the bilateral level with the non-LDCs, leading to Ghana and Ivory
# n
Coast initialling an interim agreement, and Nigeria applying for the EU’s GSP scheme. 
According to many observers, the result of the West African negotiating process “has 
highlighted the fragility of the political process of regional integration, the difficulty of 
proposing compromises against a background of diverging interests among countries, and 
has exacerbated the different approaches taken by ECOWAS and UEMOA” (CTA: 2; see 
also Bilal and Braun-Munzinger 2008; Ukaoha 2009). In January 2008 ECOWAS Heads of 
States confirmed their intent to continue EPA negotiations and reach a full regional 
agreement by June 2009. In this third phase, the region has accelerated its integration 
efforts considerably, though challenges remain before the new deadline.8 In fact, at the time 
of writing, the June 2009 deadline had once again slipped, and had been moved to October 
2009 {The Guardian 2009; CEC 2009).
Senegal and Ghana are both part of the West African regional grouping. Because 
both countries are not directly negotiating EPAs, analysing how the countries have been 
effective in achieving their preferences vis-a-vis the EU in negotiations, is a slightly more 
difficult task because direct or formal influence in negotiations is not possible. However, 
analysing their influence is nonetheless relevant in understanding the overall capability of 
African countries to exercise leverage and control. In fact, the countries make interesting 
case studies for three main reasons. First, their rather diverging positions on the EPAs, at 
least in terms of their criticism on the negotiations, is important in understanding how 
perceptions of the EU influence their positions and strategies towards the negotiations, and 
how these in turn shape negotiating processes and outcomes. Secondly, the countries’ 
differing positions and experience in regional organisations and integration efforts are an
7 The Commission rejected Nigeria’s request, because it had failed to ratify one o f the 27 necessary 
agreements for GSP plus, namely the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime o f  
Genocide (CEC 2008).
8 It presented a draft market access offer to the EU for liberalisation; it began elaborating a regional list o f  
sensitive products; and negotiated a resolution to adoption o f the CET likely to be finalised only by October 
2009. The definition o f a regional list o f sensitive products was delayed due to delays from some countries in 
developing individual national lists and the need to identify a methodology to aggregate national lists into a 
regional one. As regards the CET, although all ECOWAS members are required to harmonise their import 
tariffs with that o f the UEMOA’s, Nigeria resisted adopting the regional until the creation o f a fifth band (at 
35%) was eventually agreed by Heads o f State. Negotiations are said to be nearing completion on trade 
defence instruments, sanitary and phytosanitary rules, technical barriers to trade, and trade facilitation. At the 
time o f writing, remaining issues to be negotiated include trade in services, trade-related issues, market access 
offer, the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause and the development dimension (ECDPM 2009; CTA 2009).
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important element in further understanding country leverage in trade negotiations with the 
EU. Lastly, Senegal is an LDC, while Ghana is not; their economic and developmental 
situations thus significantly influence their positions on the EPAs. Questions therefore arise 
as to what extent the countries’ effectively managed to shape the regional negotiating 
position, to what extent they influenced the outcome of the negotiations, and how 
effectively they promoted their interests during the last phase of the negotiations.
2 Senegal
Since the 1990s, Senegal’s share in world trade has declined due to diminishing 
competitiveness and overall low international demand for its exports. The country has a 
very small export market, concentrated in a limited number of agricultural sectors. As its 
main trading partner, the EU (mainly France, Italy, and Spain) accounts for around 30% of 
Senegal’s exports (fish, peanuts, petroleum products, phosphates, and cotton) and 50% of 
imports (food and beverages, machinery, and fuels) (World Bank 2008a: 2; see also Figure
5.3 and Table 5.1). Senegal’s economy also depends significantly on the export of services 
(28% of exports), concentrated mainly in tourism (World Bank 2008a: 2; Broadman et al. 
2007: 82-83).
Figure 5.3: Evolution of Senegalese exports to and imports from the EU,
(1996-2008)
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Table. 5.1: Senegal Import and Export Partners, (2007)
Top 10 import partners Top 10 export partners
France 25% Mali 25%
UK 6% France 9%
China 4% Gambia 7%
Thailand 4% India 7%
Spain 4% Spain 6%
Netherlands 3% Italy 6%
Nigeria 3% Switzerland 4%
United States 3% Guinea 3%
Italy 3% Guinea-Bissau 3%
India 3% Mauritania 3%
Source: Centradex 2007
Although characterised by a generally poor business climate, in recent years Senegal has 
undertaken significant regulatory reforms, and in 2009 it was considered sub-Saharan 
Africa’s top reformer, ranking fifth worldwide (World Bank 2009). Largely due to past 
shortcomings in its business environment and structural hindrances to developing the 
country’s trade potential, foreign direct investment (FDI) has also been very low (IMF 
2008). The main challenges to developing Senegal’s trade potential lie in the development 
of its infrastructure, which currently hinders the expansion of its trade activities; widening 
the scope of its exports beyond a narrow range of primary commodities; strengthening its 
capacity to regulate and comply with imposed technical standards; and developing the 
private sector so it can compete with other major agro-industrial exporting countries. 
According to the OECD, Senegal faces three major challenges to developing its trade 
potential: strengthening the government’s capacity to formulate strategies that fit the needs 
of the private sector; creating an investment-friendly climate to boost the private sector; and 
expanding the private sector’s production capacities and marketing skills (OECD 2007; see 
also IMF 2008).
An EPA would not significantly improve Senegal’s access to the EU market, but it 
would improve market access for the EU. At the same time, because a large share of 
Senegal’s imports come from the EU and import tariffs constitute a significant proportion 
of total revenue for the country (nearly 15%), the elimination of customs duties on most EU 
products would lead to a significant decline in government revenue and pose as a challenge 
to fiscal management (UNECA 2004; Zouhon-Bi and Nielsen 2007: 10; Berisha-Krasniqi 
et al 2008: 9, 34; IMF 2008: 40-49). Thus while an EPA would allow the EU to increase 
its exports up to 10.5%, this would be accompanied by a 10% loss in total government 
revenue due to the loss in import tariffs (Zouhon-Bi and Nielsen 2007: 12). At the same 
time, following the EU’s rhetoric on the development potential of the EPAs, the agreements 
are expected to promote predictability and security for trade and investment and facilitate
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an environment conducive for business. Therefore, although the government may not gain 
significant trade preferences and will lose fiscal trade revenues, the EPAs are supposed to 
provide development-friendly trade tools upon which Senegal is expected to expand its 
trade potential.
The government’s major concern regarding the EPAs resides exclusively in making 
the agreements conducive to the country’s economic development.9 This is not surprising, 
given Senegal’s position in world trade alongside the several structural and capacity 
constraints it faces in preparing for liberalisation and developing trade potential. The 
government views the EPA as a positive trade and development tool, only if a financial 
support instrument is put in place to improve its and the region’s competitive advantage. 
The government has therefore focused on the links between the progressive opening of its 
market and the implementation of such a financing instrument needed to bring its economy 
up to the level required for liberalisation and integration into the global market (Nguessan 
2005: 55-56). It has consistently declared that it will not sign the agreements unless a 
development dimension is fully and successfully integrated into the agreements. Senegal’s 
position towards the EPA was summarised accurately by Oumar Wade, an EPA advisor to 
the Senegalese Ministry of Trade when he said that African governments “try to use the 
EPA as an instrument for strengthening their economic and financial capacities, and a tool 
to gain access to the world economy. They do not have a pronounced interest in gaining 
market access, because the access they enjoyed under the Lome regime has led to a decline 
in exports. Hence what they need is not market opening, but a strengthening of supply-side 
capacities” (2007: 26).
The government’s second fundamental position towards the EPAs regards its 
potential for sustaining regional integration. Senegal is a member of the UEMOA and the 
ECOWAS, but has benefited mostly from its membership of the former. Since 1995, 
Senegal’s exports to other UEMOA countries contributed to more than 75% of overall 
growth in total exports (Diaw and Tran 2008: 15). Furthermore, Senegal has proven its 
commitment to closer integration in the UEMOA by being amongst the first countries to 
adopt convergence criteria, harmonise taxes, adopt the CET, and contribute significantly to 
structural funds towards development of the region. Despite Senegal’s opposition to the 
EPAs prior to the 2007 deadline, the government nonetheless continued its participation in 
the ongoing negotiations process throughout 2008 and 2009, and has demonstrated a 
willingness to move the negotiations forward so as not to undermine the regional
9 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S6; S8; S9); Interview EC delegation, Dakar: June 
2008 (EC 16).
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integration process.10 The government has declared it is fully prepared to work together 
with the other ECOWAS countries, especially Ghana and Ivory Coast, in reaching 
agreement on a full regional EPA, provided the EU agrees to the development dimension. It 
is seen as absolutely essential that regional capacity should be strengthened, and that the 
region make an intense effort to accelerate integration and reach a solid common position.11
Considering that the government’s interests in the EPAs lie almost entirely in the 
development potential of the agreements and strengthening regional capacity and 
integration, what has been Senegal’s strategy for promoting these interests vis-a-vis the EU, 
and how successful has the government been in its efforts? The next section explores this in 
more detail.
2.1 Senegalese strategy on the EPA negotiations
There have been two ways in which the government was able to achieve its preferences vis- 
a-vis the EU. Firstly, Senegal was one of the most vocal and active critics of the EPAs, 
stirring considerable controversy surrounding the Commission’s negotiating strategies. 
Secondly, although Senegal opposed the EPAs, it also campaigned actively for integrating 
a development component into the agreements. It has largely been upon Senegalese 
insistence that the region placed the development dimension at the centre of its negotiating 
position vis-a-vis the Commission, with negotiations on this making considerable progress 
since the onset of the Senegalese campaign. Senegal’s contribution to the ‘anti-EPA 
campaign’ affected the EU’s position towards the region, in that after the interim 
agreements were initialled with Ghana and Ivory Coast, both the EU and the region have 
given increased concessions to meet each others’ preferences and secure a mutually agreed- 
upon outcome of the negotiations.
Due to the perceived lack of efforts on the side of EU negotiators to integrate a 
development dimension, Senegal became one of the strongest opponents of the EPAs 
during the second phase of the negotiations. While many ACP countries were largely 
unsatisfied with the Commission’s approach, Senegal, alongside a handful of other African 
countries (mainly Nigeria and South Africa), took a lead in the campaign against the EPAs 
and openly declared their refusal to sign. In May 2007, the Senegalese Minister of Trade, 
the government’s EPA advisor, and a civil society delegation confirmed that the 
government had no intention of signing agreements which did “not take into due
10 Interview EC delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 16).
11 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S8; S9).
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consideration development aspects” (Le Bulletin d ’Infos 2007). In November 2007, Le 
Monde published an article by Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, in which he 
criticised the EU for failing to adequately integrate a development dimension into the 
agreements and indicating the likely rejection of the agreements by West African 
governments (Wade 2007). The extent of Senegal’s opposition and discontent was again 
voiced during a press conference at the December 2007 EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon, 
where Wade claimed that it was clear that Africa had rejected the EPAs. He further 
solicited that it was necessary to find alternatives to the EPAs, but that the current state of
17the negotiations was unacceptable to African governments (API 2007). In January 2008, 
Wade launched yet another initiative against the EPAs, by mobilising the African diaspora 
in Europe to protest in Brussels, led by a delegation headed by the first vice-president of the 
Senegalese National Assembly, and by organising protests in Dakar that same month (EU 
Observer 2008). In so doing, Wade “cemented his position as the African leader most 
vocally opposed to the EU's proposed Economic Partnership Agreements” (IPS 2008a) and 
Senegal became “one of the strongest voices in Sub-Saharan African against EPAs” (IMF 
2008: 40).
The government claims it was not against the EPAs as such, but that it was 
unsatisfied with the form and the content of the negotiations (APS 2009).13 Senegal 
therefore adopted a strong stance on the integration of a development dimension into the 
Agreements. Already in 2006, the government began pushing for a more development- 
friendly approach to the EPAs, insisting that “development needs and concerns have not 
been taken on board by the EU” and that because of this, the EPAs should be challenged 
(Fair Trade 2006). The government began soliciting for impact studies to be conducted to 
assess each country’s needs and concerns,14 insisting that the adjustment costs faced by 
ACP countries be taken into due consideration. Furthermore, the government strongly 
advocated that the deadline for completing the negotiations be postponed until regions were 
sufficiently integrated and prepared to discuss regional-level trade agreements. Lastly, it 
insisted that the priority of the EPAs were the development and not the trade dimension, 
which entailed earmarking additional resources towards improving capacities in 
production, stimulating ACP economies, and eliminating poverty (Fair Trade 2006).15 This 
position was also forwarded by Senegal’s president in his Le Monde piece, where he urged
12 Wade stated: “It is clear that Africa rejects the EPAs ... We are not talking any more about EPAs... We’re 
going to meet to see what we can put in place of the EPAs. It was said several times during the plenary 
session and it was said again this morning: African states reject the EPAs” (E U  Observer 2007).
13 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S6; S8).
14 Prior to this, Senegal rejected two studies, as they did not meet the government’s requirements due to the 
poor standards.
15 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S6; S8; S9);
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the EU to consider the alternative option of negotiating what he termed Development
Partnership Agreements (DPAs), which would allow for “mutually enriching and equitable
development” between Europe and Africa (Wade 2007). Wade’s vision for Senegal was:
to establish the DPA as a long-term development and cooperation scheme, rather 
than a purely commercial one ... Development will create the production required 
for international trade, and the potential isn’t big enough at the moment to get 
involved in these agreements. The tendency is to renegotiate agreements to be based 
more on reciprocal advantages, development and cooperation (OBG 2008: 8).
The DPA idea cemented Senegal as “a driving force behind plans to offer a regional 
alternative to the controversial EPAs” (OBG: 7). In this sense, both Senegalese and 
Commission officials noted that Senegal’s strategy had become one of “asking the 
impossible, just to get a little.”16
In criticising and opposing the EPAs and in pushing for consideration of a 
development dimension, Senegal was able to exert leverage in two ways. First, Senegal 
managed to contribute to the Commission’s shift in its approach to the negotiations with the 
region. Second, it managed to make development aspects a priority issue on the region’s 
negotiating agenda from 2008 onwards. According to Senegalese and some Commission 
officials, it was mainly on account of Senegalese opposition to the EPAs that the regional
1 *7level negotiations broke down in late 2007. As the negotiating deadline neared, Senegal 
became increasingly active in soliciting other countries in the region to refuse the EPAs and 
request an extension of the WTO waiver instead. While it was unsuccessful in convincing 
negotiators to extend the waiver, Senegal was instrumental in rejecting the Commission’s 
attempt to negotiate an EPA solely with the UEMOA once it was clear that an ECOWAS 
EPA would not be concluded by 2007.18 This led the Commission to move to bilateral 
negotiations with the only non-LDCs in the region, and the rest of the region to refuse 
interim agreements. Following this, Senegal became increasingly active in criticising the 
Commission’s decision to negotiate bilaterally, and in pushing the region to speak with one 
voice regarding their concerns (Daily Express 2008).19 As noted by some Commission 
interviewees, the situation between West Africa and the EU had become so tense and 
controversial due to Senegalese criticism, that a shift in both the EU’s and the region’s 
approach was necessary to continue the negotiations into 2008 and 2009. This shift
16 Ibid. (S6); Interview EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC1); Interview EC delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 16).
17 Ibid. (S8; S9);Ibid. (EC16).
18 Ibid. (S9); Ibid. (EC9).
19 The Senegalese government acknowledged that when the deadline came around, each ECOWAS country 
was constrained to defend its own interests and that the regional structure was not prepared to meet the 
queries o f these countries once the EC negotiators chose to shift negotiations from the regional to the 
individual country level (Interviews Senegalese government officials, Dakar: June 2008 (S8; S9)).
20 Interview EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC1); Interview EC delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 16).
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occurred in the form of the region adopting a renewed road map for regional integration, 
and significantly accelerating its efforts to overcome fundamental points of divergence, 
while the Commission took into closer consideration calls for integrating an adequate 
development dimension into the agreements. According to Senegalese and Ghanaian 
officials, the negotiations continuing beyond 2007 have been less tense, with the EU 
acknowledging a need for increased flexibility and willingness to find agreement on issues 
concerning the region (ACP-EU JPA 2009).21 Although this by no means implies that the 
shift in the Commission’s position can be attributed exclusively to Senegalese criticism and 
activism, it is nevertheless important to recognise that Senegal’s strategy was influential in 
producing increased flexibility on the part of the negotiators, as it became increasingly 
evident that movement was not possible unless the EPAs were seen as mutually beneficial 
for both the EU and the region. Indeed, as one Commission official noted, the loud 
criticisms hailing from Senegal and its important voice in regional and continental affairs 
made it a “voice to be reckoned with” and one that the EU could not easily ignore given the 
contentious environment surrounding the negotiations.22 As such, Senegal’s behaviour vis- 
a-vis the EU can be considered as largely ‘non-compliant’, as outlined in Chapter 1.
Secondly, Senegal managed to make development aspects a priority issue on the 
region’s negotiating agenda from 2008 onwards. Indeed, in April 2008, the region produced 
a draft ‘EPA for Development’ (termed PAPED) programme, largely based on Senegal’s 
proposal for DP As, setting out an estimation of needs and costs for regional integration, a 
calendar for EPA implementation, and funding priorities for adjustment costs, 
competitiveness, capacity production, inter-regional trade development and infrastructure. 
The programme was presented to and accepted by the Commission in October 2008 subject 
to assessment studies. Senegalese and Ghanaian interviews alike claim that the 
establishment of the programme and the Commission’s positive response constitute a major 
step forward regarding demands for the integration of a development dimension.23 
Furthermore, some Commission officials have noted that the West African configuration 
has emerged as the region that has taken ownership of its development programme, by 
taking the initiative to find concrete and realistic solutions on how to integrate this into the 
EPAs.24 Aside from a number of unresolved issues which remain to be negotiated between 
the region and the Commission, the finalisation and adoption of the PAPED, in conjunction
21 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S8; S9); Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: 
September 2008 (G2; G7; G10).
22 Interview EC delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 16).
23 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S8; S9); Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: 
September 2008 (G2; G10).
24 Interview EC delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 16); Accra: September 2008 (EC 18).
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with the EU’s and the region’s Aid for Trade strategy, and additional EU and regional 
funding, is considered to be a crucial determinant for concluding negotiations successfully. 
Although failure to find agreement resulted in the region pushing back the June 2009 
deadline to October 2009 (a decision in which Senegal is also said to have been 
instrumental),25 it is expected that the reality of such a development-oriented funding 
mechanism will eventually lead to the signing of a regional EPA (The Guardian 2009). 
Although actual agreement has yet to be reached, Senegal can be considered successful in 
achieving its preferences for the EU to accept the country’s (and the region’s) concerns, 
after the more contentious phase of the negotiations was concluded. Importantly, Senegal 
was able to politicise the debate on the EPAs by mobilising significant opposition to the 
agreements and questioning whether the agreements were truly development-friendly. In so 
doing, it managed to place its concerns on the negotiating agenda and encourage the 
Commission to consider its concerns more closely. The reasons behind Senegal’s success 
are explored in the next section.
2.2 Explaining Senegalese influence in the EPA negotiations
Senegalese strategy and the exercise of leverage in EPA negotiations derived from 
Senegal’s perceptions of the EU as a divided and an incoherent actor in the negotiations, 
which in turn influenced the country’s critical approach to the negotiations, and from 
certain contextual factors present at the country level, such as, a favourable and well- 
organised institutional context for strategy formulation; the political utility of the critical 
approach taken at the highest level of government; the economic position of Senegal as an 
LDC and the increasing presence of alternative trading partners; and lastly its strategic and 
influential position in the region. In this respect, despite the evident power asymmetry that 
permeates Senegalese-EU trade relations, relational and contextual factors have intervened 
to allow for significant influence of a structurally much weaker Senegal on a structurally 
stronger EU.
25 Correspondence Senegalese government, June 2009 (S9).
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2.2.1 Senegal’s perceptions o f the EU: United or divided? Consistent or inconsistent?
Senegal’s criticisms of the EU’s approach to the negotiations and its efforts to give 
increased space for negotiations on the development aspects of the EPAs can be partially 
attributed to its perception of the EU as divided and incoherent. Senegalese interviewees 
confirmed that although the Commission was certainly a capable trade negotiator, and 
divisions within the negotiation structure were not noted, at the same time, Senegal had 
also developed a distinct awareness of the contentiousness of the Commission’s positions 
within the EU, namely amongst Member States. Senegalese officials saw such divisions as 
a “strategic opportunity” to voice concerns, noting that informal links and contacts with EU 
actors not directly negotiating the EPAs helped get its position across. A meeting between 
Development Commissioner Louis Michel and President Wade in 2006 was cited as an 
important opportunity for Wade to communicate Senegal’s position. An informal meeting 
between Senegal’s Minister of Trade, Mamadou Diop, and UK Minister of Trade and 
Development, Gareth Thomas, at the April 2008 UNCTAD Conference on Trade and 
Development in Accra, was also cited as an episode in which a Member State had come 
forward to show its concern and support for the Senegalese position, providing an informal 
door through which some influence on the negotiations could be exercised. Lastly, some 
Member States also provided additional funding for capacity building and impact studies 
on the EPAs. These occurrences too were seen as assisting Senegal in putting forward its 
position. Interestingly, one Senegalese official considered that although having certain 
Member States (most notably the UK and the Netherlands) ‘on their side’ was considered 
to have facilitated the exercise of leverage, such Member States were seen as “strategic 
actors which use tools such as offering support or consideration for the country’s position 
and demands” as a tactic to gain broader political support domestically and abroad.27 Thus 
Member State divergences from the Commission’s position were therefore not necessarily 
seen as divisions within the EU, but as a negotiating strategy or strategic manoeuvring by 
the Member States.
Another perception shared widely was that of incoherence between the EU’s trade 
policy and other overlapping policies, namely development. This was especially noted in 
terms of the perceived inconsistency between the rhetoric espoused at the beginning of the 
negotiations, soliciting a development-friendly approach to trade negotiations, and the 
actual negotiating approach, which was perceived to have failed to take account of
26 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S8; S9).
27 Ibid. (S9).
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development aspects.28 Interestingly, all interviewees referred to a talk delivered by then- 
trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy at the launch of regional trade negotiations in 2003, in 
which the development aspect of the EPAs was stressed, but which officials feel the 
negotiations side-lined. Another issue was the inability of Commission negotiators to fully 
understand the constraints and problems facing the region, due to their lack of experience 
on the ground or expertise in the region. It was noted that negotiators took a very
9Qtheoretical approach to the negotiations without considering the regional realities. All 
Senegalese interviewees confirmed that it was namely the perception of the EU as 
inconsistent in terms of rhetoric and actual practise and its incapability to consider regional 
realities that prompted the government to campaign against the EPAs and to resist signing 
the agreements.
Inconsistency in the EU’s approach towards third countries in trade negotiations 
therefore shapes actors’ perceptions, influencing their strategy towards the EU, and 
consequentially contributing to negotiating processes and outcomes. Importantly, the 
diverging positions amongst the Commission and Member States and the Commission’s 
inconsistent approach to the negotiations, as perceived by Senegalese officials was 
considered a ‘ weakness’. In other words, throughout the negotiations, Senegal developed 
an awareness of some of the constraints the Commission faces as a trade negotiator. This 
image was furthered by the understanding on the part of Senegalese officials that the 
Commission too has to negotiate a successful outcome, not only to secure trade interests, 
but also because of the pressure it faces from Member States. In this sense, one interviewee 
noted that the Commission “cannot afford to not negotiate with West Africa.” Indeed, as 
Draper has rightly noted, “whilst it is true that the EU is clearly the dominant partner, it, 
too, needs a successful outcome to these negotiations and will have to be willing to 
compromise in order to get it” (2007: 21). The realisation on the part of Senegal of the 
Commission’s constraints prompted the government to adopt a critical position towards the 
negotiations and to orient the EU towards considering its concerns and preferences.
Aside from Senegal’s perceptions of the EU, contextual factors considerably 
contributed to Senegal’s success in exercising leverage. Indeed, as will become apparent, 
many of the factors favouring leverage, as outlined in Table 1.3 in Chapter 1, are clearly 
present in the Senegalese case. It is argued that these contributed to making the Senegalese 
strategy for leverage effective vis-a-vis the EU.
28 Ibid. (S6; S8; S9).
29 Ibid. (S8).
™ Ibid. (S6; S9).
31 Ibid. (S9).
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2.2.2 Institutional factors
As in the case of aid negotiations, although the government faces several major 
constraints in implementing trade policy and coordinating positions amongst relevant 
ministries (see Diene 2002: 4; WTO 2003), Senegal has a strong institutional capacity for 
strategy formulation, which it is able to exploit in negotiations because of its strong
• 'XOconviction of ownership over its trade policy. This is seen as having assisted the 
government in placing issues such as the development dimension at the centre of the 
regional debate and negotiations with the EU.33 According to one Senegalese negotiator 
this capacity and this conviction of ownership are due to the fact that the government’s 
position derives from a participative approach and consultations with relevant stakeholders, 
and because of the technical expertise and experience available due to Senegal’s past 
experience with UEMOA trade negotiations.34
On the one hand, Senegal’s institutional capacity to effectively deal with trade 
negotiations is limited, because “like other LDCs, Senegal has a large number of trade- 
related needs and its problems are exacerbated by the difficulty of implementing (trade) 
agreements, the lack of human and institutional capacity and supply constraints” (WTO 
2003a: 28). In 2001, with a view to implementing future WTO agreements, following up on 
the EPA negotiations, and preparing national positions to submit to the UEMOA/ECOWAS 
Commissions, the government established the National Committee for International Trade 
Negotiations (Comite National des Negotiations Commerciales Internationales - 
CNNCI). Although this structure is considered a significant point of strength in defending 
the country’s interest in relevant trade fora because it has improved national trade 
negotiations skills and assisted in tackling the issues related to international trade and trade 
negotiations (Diene 2002: 1-3), its effectiveness is also severely constrained by a lack of 
equipment, logistical resources, and an adequate budget for undertaking impact studies 
(WTO 2003: 18).
On the other hand, the CNNCI is said to have been particularly instrumental in 
facilitating multi-stakeholder dialogue and consensus building, consultations and
32 Ibid. (S8; S9); Interview EC delegation official, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 16).
33 Ibid. (S8; S9); Ibid. (EC16).
34 Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S8).
35 The CNNCI serves as a permanent framework for consultation and coordination between the government, 
the private sector and consumer organisations, on all matters concerning the implementation of bilateral, 
regional and multilateral trade agreements. The Committee assists in the preparation and adoption of national 
positions for negotiations that aim to reflect national priorities, and analyses the negotiations and policy issues 
(like the impact o f the trade agreements on Senegalese economy) to propose remedial national (and regional) 
trade policy measures and strategies (WTO 2003a: 17-18).
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information dissemination, and coordinating negotiation themes between different forums. 
It provided a forum for stakeholders to consider and provide inputs to the government for 
formulation of trade policies and identification of negotiation priorities. There has also been 
active involvement of the private sector, facilitating the development of public-private 
partnerships and collaboration on trade issues (Diene: 2-4). Non-governmental 
stakeholders and civil society organisations were thus involved and made a significant 
contribution to the formulation of national strategies. For example, the CNNCI facilitated 
the creation of a coalition between farmer organisations, trade unions, and government 
officials to participate in the protests against the EPAs in late 2007 and early 2008. One EC 
official claimed that the active civil society involvement in the campaign, and the 
collaboration between relevant stakeholders regarding opposition to the EPAs, made a 
significant contribution to shaping the government’s position on the EPAs (see also APS 
2007; IPS 2007). According to the government, the fact that its position was based on a 
national consensus assisted in pushing its position onto the EU and the region, while 
creating a sense of ownership over the government’s strategy. Indeed, as in aid 
negotiations, government officials viewed the country’s approach to the negotiations as 
something to be promoted and defended, by strongly projecting its interests and concerns 
onto the regional and EU levels. Therefore, the government’s consideration of other views, 
and the consolidation and overlapping of the government’s views with those of other 
national (and regional) stakeholders, influenced the government’s conviction of ownership 
over its strategy, and facilitated the intensity with which it was willing to pursue a critical 
approach towards the EU. As in the aid field, a conviction of ownership in the institutional 
setting prevails.
Furthermore, Senegal’s efforts to influence the EPA negotiations have also been 
successful because of its institutional architecture for managing regional integration and 
uploading its preferences to the regional level. According to Senghor, the organisational 
ranking within the government of regional integration units and departments in West 
African countries “is indicative of the status accorded the roles, functions and outputs, and 
with which goes resources” (2007: 151). Senegal was the first West African country to 
create a Ministry for African Integration in 1991, which was later incorporated into the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2001, and has since played an increasingly active role in 
promoting national positions at the ECOWAS level, despite limited staffing and funding. 
The regional integration department ensures the participation of Senegal in the ECOWAS,
36 Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S9).
37 Interview EC delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 16).
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disseminates ECOWAS decisions, coordinates positions, and participates in the 
government’s formulation of positions on the ECOWAS, although its role in the latter is 
rather limited (Senghor 2007:151,155,165-166). Importantly however, policy formulation 
for regional integration has been much more strongly exhibited through the unit responsible 
for UEMOA affairs, located within the Ministry of Trade and Finance, which since its 
inception in 1994, has “enjoyed visibility and more access to resources” (Senghor 2007: 
165). The unit has played an important role in ensuring the implementation of UEMOA 
integration measures, but more importantly, it has helped to consolidate Senegal’s position 
as a leader within the regional organisation. This has favoured the country’s strength in 
inserting its preferences in the regional negotiating position with regards to the EPAs (see 
below).38
Lastly, the technical expertise the government has available in terms of trade 
strategy formulation has also contributed to Senegal’s success. The experience Senegal has 
gained in trade negotiations with the UEMOA in such areas as regional trade liberalisation, 
the establishment of a monetary union, and the CET has significantly assisted the 
formulation of a strategy towards the EPAs. The previous experience of Senegalese trade 
negotiators coupled with the general perception and understanding that Senegalese officials 
tend to be ‘good negotiators’ overall, have assisted the government in promoting its 
position. Indeed, similar to perceptions held of Senegalese negotiators in the aid field, EU 
trade negotiators characterised their encounters with Senegalese trade officials as often 
difficult, but certainly “intractable, well-prepared, and focused on getting their position
-JQ
across,” or possessing “a good expertise and a good capacity for strategy formulation that 
has allowed them to rise to the challenge.”40 Indeed, according to one Commission official, 
Senegal’s ability to resist and its continuous insistence on integrating a financial instrument 
to offset the negative consequences of the EPAs is the country’s biggest strength.41 The 
experience of Senegalese officials in other regional trade fora and the perceptions that its 
negotiating opponent, in this case the Commission, hold of their capacity to negotiate on 
behalf of the country’s national interests and preferences have contributed to Senegal being 
able to exercise considerable leverage in the EPA negotiations.
38 Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S8).
39 Interview EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC1; EC9).
40 Interview EC delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 16).
41 Ibid. (EC 16).
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2.2.3 Economic factors
Senegal’s economic position has also contributed to its ability to influence the 
negotiation process, especially regarding its refusal to initial the interim agreements. Some 
Commission interviewees claim the main reason why Senegal was able to lead the 
campaign against the EPAs was because the country did not stand to lose preferential 
access to EU markets by not signing an EPA. Indeed, Senegal, as an LDC, is eligible for 
the EU’s EBA initiative.42 Certainly, this factor partially explains Senegal’s position 
towards the EPAs and towards the EU as a trade negotiator in general. Therefore, as 
outlined in Chapter 1, a country’s ability to exercise leverage is linked to the whether it has 
an alternative to fall back on in case of dissatisfaction with its opponent’s negotiating 
position.
At the same time, the extent to which this factor confers leverage on a country 
should not be overstated for three reasons. Firstly, while being an LDC afforded the 
government breathing space in deciding whether to eventually sign a full regional EPA, it is 
not the main reason why such strong opposition was made against the agreements. 
Senegalese trade experts claim that the country’s LDC status is precarious, and that it is 
likely that it may soon graduate out of LDC status.43 The government is aware that its trade 
preferences need to be secured regardless of its LDC status, and trading under the EBA is 
not considered a sustainable option for the country’s economic development. Secondly, 
because of its UEMOA membership, the country is directly concerned by commitments to 
liberalisation and tariff elimination taken by non-LDC Ivory Coast, one of Senegal’s main 
regional trade partners. The failure to sign an EPA, and reliance on the EBA for market 
access, is seen by the government as being highly problematic for the purposes of 
strengthening regional integration (GoS 2007:5). Lastly, similar activism and opposition to 
the EU and the agreements such as the one expressed in Senegal was not found in the other 
LDCs in the region, and even amongst other ACP LDCs. Indeed, Senegal was amongst the 
most publicly active amongst ACP LDCs in voicing its discontent with the EU’s conduct in 
the negotiations and the content of the agreements. This indicates that although the 
country’s LDC status may indeed have given it more room for manoeuvre, this factor 
cannot entirely explain a country’s strategy and exercise of leverage.
A second economic factor to consider is how Senegal’s position in international 
trade affects its position towards the EPAs and the exercise of leverage. Senegal has begun
42 Interview EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC9); Interview EC delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 16).
43 Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S9).
172
orientating its trade flows away from its more traditional European partners, towards South- 
East Asia, namely China and India (Diaw and Tran 2008; Broadman 2007; see Figures 5.4 
and 5.5). The government is also awarding trade and investment deals to Middle Eastern, 
Asian, and African firms, often at the expense of its European partners. The onset of 
increased trade with alternative partners has been welcomed in Senegal, with Wade quoted 
as saying that Europe was “lagging behind Asian economic powers China and India in the 
race to snap up trade and investment deals in resource-rich Africa” (Reuters 2007; see also 
Wade 2008). Furthermore, Senegal is trading more within the West African region. Its 
exports towards UEMOA countries have increased dramatically, growing from 13% in 
1990 to more than 30% in 2005 (Diaw and Tran 2008: 7; see Figure 5.4).
Figure 5.4: Trends in Senegalese exports, (1990-2005)
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Figure 5.5: Trends in Senegalese imports, (1990-2005)
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This reorientation towards the region and non-traditional economies has occurred at the
expense of traditional partners, notably France. Indeed, “trade between developing
countries have expanded mainly at the expense of the former industrialised partners ...
Senegal has taken advantage of a favourable international trade pattern where there is
significant scope for improving trade among developing countries themselves” (Diaw and
Tran 2008: 15). Although Senegal cannot entirely bypass trade relations with the EU, as it
remains a key trading partner, the country’s expanding trade interest has allowed it to
gradually become less dependent on traditional partners, while increasingly focusing on
South-South trade and investment. Indeed, the Senegalese case highlights that:
ACP attitudes towards the EU that are changing. The main reason is that the EU has 
become a less and less attractive market for ACP products. This is due not only to 
the progressive erosion o f  preferences ... but also to increasingly stringent food 
safety standards. Both factors contribute to decreased export revenues for traditional 
ACP exports such as fish, meat, fruits, vegetables, spices, oil and horticultural 
products. ACP diversification to markets that demand less onerous conditions is the 
logical outcome” (Meyn 2008: 526-527).
According to the government, the ability to access alternative trade partners has also 
provided increased room to manoeuvre with regards to the EPAs, because it does not have 
to sign the agreements to secure its trade preferences. Furthermore, the government has 
developed a distinct awareness that the EU cannot afford not to negotiate with the region, 
and that complete failure of the negotiations is not an option.44 This is so because the EU is 
seen as increasingly concerned about other economic players, such as China and India,
44Ibid.
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which could eventually surpass the EU’s dominant economic position.45 Indeed as Kohnert 
notes:
The political and economic domination of African states by the EU and Africa’s 
former colonial powers perpetuates asymmetrical power relations in the new 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Most African governments welcome the 
mounting Chinese influence as a counterbalance to the imposition of Western 
conditions on aid and the unfair trade policies of major Western global players. 
Western donors regard the takeoff of Africa's economic relations with China with 
growing suspicion (2008: 22).46
Just as in aid negotiations therefore, a country’s ability to access alternative resources or its 
expanding relations with non-traditional trading partners, plays a role in its ability to resist 
the preferences of a structurally stronger trade partner such as the EU, and secondly, in the 
shaping of critical positions towards this partner, largely because the risk of forgoing trade 
preferences is less so than in countries which are perceived as more dependent on the EU.
2.2.4 Political factors
Another contextual factor that has allowed for Senegalese leverage is found in its 
domestic political environment. According to Commission officials, much of the 
government’s activism in the campaign against the EPAs, and its efforts in organising 
opposition movements in Europe and Senegal were actually politically motivated. In this 
sense, protest movements were considered ‘orchestrated’ in order for the government, and 
especially Wade, to divert domestic attention away from mounting criticism of the 
government (see Chapter 3) and other pressing issues such as the country’s looming energy 
and food crises.47 Indeed, just two days after the EPA protests in Dakar, a general trade 
union strike was also scheduled to take place. The EPA demonstrations led trade unions to 
postpone the strike and gave the government additional time to negotiate with the unions. 
In December 2007, Development Commissioner Louis Michel also dismissed Senegal’s 
opposition against the EPAs as a “political debate,” claiming that Wade was instigating an 
“imaginary conspiracy” (see Gueye 2007). Other EU observers instead argued that the 
Senegalese position was politically and ideologically oriented, and “rooted in the idea of
45 Such concern was confirmed by several EC interviewees: Brussels, April 2008 (EC1; EC3; EC4; EC9). 
One interviewee said “the fact that China has become very aggressively active in Africa, and the increasing 
interest o f India, Brazil and Japan in the continent’s mineral wealth, has complicated the negotiation process 
because Europe is no longer the main player on the continent” (Accra: September 2008 (EC 18)).
46 In an article in the Financial Times, Wade wrote: “When it comes to China and Africa, the European Union 
and the US want to have their cake and eat i t ... China, which has fought its own battles to modernise, has a 
much greater sense o f the personal urgency o f development in Africa than many Western nations ... Not just 
Africa but the West itself has much to learn from China. It is time for the West to practise what it preaches 
about the value o f market incentives” (Wade 2008).
47 Interview EC delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 16).
175
African socialism,” which Wade, as a staunch pan-Africanist was trying to espouse to gain
Aa
greater political credibility. Although the motives behind the government’s critical 
position on the EPAs are not essential in understanding leverage, it is important to note that 
the country’s political environment and the ideological orientations of its president at a 
critical time in the negotiations are seen by the EU, as contributing to its activism against 
the EPAs. What is particularly important to highlight, is that in taking an overt political 
position on the EPAs, Senegal was particularly effective in mobilising an opposition 
movement and gaining media attention on the EPAs, thus strongly contributing to the 
controversy and criticism surrounding the EPAs. According to one Commission official, as 
one of the only tools that individual ACP countries have available to influence the 
negotiations, this was done with the “intent of exercising leverage on the Commission.”49
2.2.5 Strategic factors
Finally, Senegal’s ability to influence the negotiations can be explained by its 
strategic and influential position in the region. Indeed, Senegal has demonstrated a “long­
standing commitment and a leadership role in integration schemes in the continent” 
(Senghor 2007: 165), is a fundamental player in the UEMOA, and has adopted a critical 
role in fostering integration in francophone West Africa (Schraeder and Gaye 1999: 134- 
135). Not only is there a strong conviction on the Senegalese side that the country is a 
critical player in the region, but similarly there is recognition that it also has a strong 
capacity to orient other member states towards its position.50 This leadership role is 
exhibited mainly at the level of the UEMOA, where Senegal has used its position within 
the organisation to influence the regional negotiating platform, which in turn were 
forwarded onto the EU. For example, Senegal was the primary country to push for the 
creation of a regional ministerial committee (Le Comite ministeriel de suivi de 1’APE) to 
follow the negotiation process. Based on the Senegalese CNNCI, the committee eventually 
became a joint UEMOA/ECOWAS committee. Both Senegalese and Ghanaian (see below) 
interviewees note that despite UEMOA/ECOWAS Commissions lacking capacity in 
negotiating with a structurally much stronger and more experienced European Commission, 
the regional committee has nonetheless been instrumental in assisting regional integration, 
consolidating a negotiating position, and providing a space for member countries to
48 Interview EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC9).
49 Ibid. (EC9); Interview EC delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 16).
50 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S8; S9); Interview EC delegation, Dakar: June 2008 
(EC 16).
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influence and participate in the negotiation process, capacity permitting.51 According to all 
West African trade officials interviewed, the presence of the UEMOA, the previous 
experience in regional integration efforts in the francophone countries, and the leadership 
of Senegal within the organisation, have been fundamental in determining the region’s 
negotiation positions, the process, and the outcomes. While interviewees disagree on 
whether these factors have been a positive or negative influence for the region (see below), 
all concurred that this influence shaped the negotiations.52
In addition to Senegal’s influential position in the UEMOA, another strategic factor 
which has assisted Senegal is the country’s reputation for being a ‘diplomatic’ country, 
which in adopting ‘political positions’ on regional integration issues has determinedly 
shifted the debate on the EPAs to considering development aspects much more closely than 
the Commission initially envisioned. According to one Senegalese government official, 
Senegal’s diplomatic reputation and ties with Europe, the region, and the African continent 
helped the government to seek out and access interlocutors or actors sympathetic to its 
position, which as noted above, was an important technique used in the government’s 
strategy for promoting its position at the European level.53 Thus while a country like 
Nigeria is seen by the region and the EU as using its economic weight to influence the 
region and to get positions across (see below), Senegal instead uses its political weight to 
exert influence.54
All this is not to say that Senegal is not aware of its own weaknesses and constraints 
or those of the region.55 Nevertheless, the case study has demonstrated that a country’s 
perception of the EU in addition to certain contextual factors have contributed to a 
successful strategy in shaping the regional negotiating agenda in the EPA negotiations and 
in convincing the EU to more closely consider the country’s preferences and interests. The 
Senegalese case shows that despite the constraints that developing countries face in 
negotiating trade agreements with a structurally stronger and more experienced EU, the 
perception a country holds of the EU and certain contextual factors have all contributed to a 
weaker country successfully achieving its preferences vis-a-vis the EU. In line with the
51 Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S8); Interviews Ghanaian government, Brussels: 
April 2008 (Gl); Accra: September 2008 (G2; G7).
52 Ibid. (S8; S9); Ibid. (G2; G7; G10).
53 Ibid. (S9).
54 Interviews Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S6; S9); Interviews Ghanaian government, Brussels: 
April 2008 (Gl); Accra, September 2008 (G10); Interview EC delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 16).
55 For example, all interviewees concurred that regional integration efforts needed to be stepped up, and that 
communication between member states especially at the level o f the ECOWAS was often difficult. 
Furthermore, different capacity constraints in each o f the countries are seen to have slowed the integration 
process. One Senegalese interviewee also considered the fact that the region is negotiating with one o f its 
biggest and most important donors as a weakness in the region’s capacity to negotiate with the EU as an equal 
partner (Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S9)).
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factors outlined in Chapter 1, these contextual factors are: an institutional context allowing 
for strategy formulation and ownership of government strategies; an economic context in 
which alternative resources give more room for manoeuvre vis-a-vis the EU; a political 
context in characterised by strong high-level leadership and political utility of adopting 
certain ideological positions; and Senegal’s strategic position in the region.
3 Ghana
Since the mid-2000s, Ghana’s share in world trade has increased slightly while overall 
economic growth has also witnessed a positive trend (World Bank 2008; AfDB-OECD 
2008a: 334). Agriculture is a crucial sector and accounts for 35% of GDP and employs 
nearly 60% of its work force. Ghana also has a growing service sector, concentrated mainly 
in tourism, infrastructure, financial and social services, contributing to 43% of GDP, and 
with trade in services outpacing trade in goods, accounting for 25% of total exports in 
2006. The EU is Ghana’s main trade partner, accounting for nearly half of exports (mainly 
gold, cocoa, timber, and tuna) and around 30% of imports (mainly machinery, petroleum, 
foodstuffs) (see Figure 5.6 and Table 5.2).
Figure 5.6: Evolution of Ghanaian exports to and imports from the EU,
(1996-2008)
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Table 5.2: Ghana’s import and export partners, (2007)
Top 10 import partners Top 10 export partners
Nigeria 10% South Africa 26%
China 10% Burkina Faso 13%
UK 9% Netherlands 11%
United States 1% Switzerland 7%
Belgium 6% France 5%
Germany 5% Belgium 4%
India 4% UK 4%
South Africa 4% United States 3%
France 4% Germany 3%
Netherlands 4% Malaysia 3%
Source: Centradex 2007
Compared to other sub-Saharan African countries, Ghana has a relatively good business 
environment. In 2007, it ranked amongst the world’s top reformers in improving its 
business climate, while in 2008, it ranked sixth amongst all sub-Saharan African countries 
in overall business climate. Improvements have led to increased investment (World Bank 
2008; 2009; AfDB-OECD 2008a: 335), yet significant challenges continue to face the 
country in realising its economic and development potential. Its continuous dependence on 
the export of a few primary commodities and a lack of diversification in exports, make it 
highly susceptible to external trade shocks (AfDB-OECD 2008a: 338). Other structural 
constraints such as limited supply capacity and small-scale production in the agriculture 
and industry sectors, limited trade support services such as infrastructure, ICT, and a severe 
energy crisis have also restricted the country’s trade potential and translating of economic 
growth into development (Patel 2007: 18).56
Various studies estimate trade liberalisation would not significantly improve 
Ghana’s market access to the EU (Patel 2007: 11; Hinkle and Newfarmer 2005: 19). The 
EPA would be worth less than 1% of the value of the country’s exports to the EU, while it 
would allow the EU to increase its exports by up to 11%. At the same time, the elimination 
of import tariffs would lead to an estimated 7% loss in total government revenues (Zouhon- 
Bi and Nielsen 2007: 12).57 Although Ghana would therefore not reap any significant 
benefits from the EPA in terms of trade preferences, it could, for example, provide the 
country with market access improvements and more favourable Rules of Origin for 
Ghanaian exports; increase local capacity to comply with standards and certification 
requirements; and remove the barriers for entry into the EU market for services (Patel: 11- 
12).
56 Interview Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G7).
57 This is significant considering that in 2006, FDI and remittances constituted 3.4 and 1.3 % of GDP (World 
Bank 2008: 2).
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The government considers that, in view of the country’s relatively small domestic 
market, growth must come through increased international trade. This is to be achieved 
through increased regional and global integration, streamlined export and import 
procedures, a diversified and strengthened export base, promotion of agricultural 
processing, geographical diversification towards ECOWAS, and full use of preferential 
market access (WTO 2007:12). The government therefore considers the EPA as potentially 
beneficial and an important legally binding instrument guaranteeing market access to the 
EU. For these reasons it has been intent on engaging in the negotiation process.58 It also 
attaches great importance to integrating a development dimension into the final text of the 
regional EPA, to provide the country with instruments to overcome supply-side constraints 
{Daily Guide 2008). At the same time and in contrast to Senegal, Ghana considers the 
development of its trade capacity and strengthening the competitiveness of its industries as 
a much more important element of the development dimension (i.e. supply-side 
constraints), as opposed to receiving increased financial assistance to cope with the short­
term effects related to diminished revenues from import tariffs (i.e. adjustment costs).59
Like Senegal, Ghana also attaches great importance to regional economic 
cooperation and integration, which since 2005, has become an official objective of the 
government’s trade policy. Ghana has proven its commitment to the integration process by 
adopting the UEMOA’s CET in 2005 and has been an important recipient of trade-related 
assistance for regional integration towards infrastructure and strengthening regional 
productive capacities. Indeed, as it is entirely surrounded by UEMOA countries, yet trade 
with its neighbours is limited, closer economic integration is considered fundamental in 
order for Ghana to meet its developmental goals. The government considers the EPAs as 
potentially beneficial instruments for pushing regional integration of the ECOWAS faster 
and further, through trade facilitation, capacity-building and technical assistance. At the 
same time, like most of the ECOWAS countries, the government is concerned that regional 
integration efforts are not sufficiently advanced to allow for a full-fledged FTA, and could 
therefore result in dividing the region. Furthermore, Ghana is particularly concerned with 
the implications of failure to sign a regional EPA for the country’s trade prospects. As one 
of three non-LDCs in the region, the LDCs choice not to enter into an EPA but trade 
through the EBA would imply the creation of border controls and rules of origin between
58 Interviews Ghanaian government, Brussels: April 2008 (Gl); Accra: September 2008 (G10; Gl 1).
59 Ibid. {G l). This is not to say that it does not attach any importance to the adjustment cost side o f the EPAs 
development dimension. In general however, the government has focused much more on how the EPA will 
address supply-side constraints (Interview Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (Gl 1)).
180
LDC and non-LDC in West Africa, which would further increase barriers to economic 
integration in the region (Patel: 24).60
Therefore, Ghana’s interests in the EPA are clearly found in continuing market 
access to the EU, in enhancing its trading potential and capacities, and in strengthening and 
advancing regional integration. Considering Ghana’s position and its interests, and 
considering that Ghana’s view on the EPAs differs from Senegal’s, what has been Ghana’s 
strategy towards promoting these interests vis-a-vis the EU, and how successful has the 
government been in its efforts?
3.1 Ghanaian strategy towards the EPA negotiations
Similar to its position in aid negotiations, Ghana’s strategy on the EPAs has relied on 
a rather consensual or accommodating approach towards the EU, while at the same time 
relying on the ECOWAS to negotiate on its behalf. Indeed, all Ghanaian interviewees 
insisted that the possibility for influencing the negotiations and the EU was minimal 
because the negotiating mandate had been delegated to the regional level.61 Unlike Senegal 
therefore, Ghana did not perceive any opportunities for directly influencing the EU, and 
instead concentrated its efforts at the national and regional levels. Furthermore, at the 
national level, most efforts to either prepare the government’s position on the EU or 
influence the region’s negotiating mandate were left to technical staff, with many 
interviewees noting that political interest and commitment to the negotiations only came as 
the 2007 deadline approached.62 During most of the negotiating process therefore, aside 
from occasional calls for increased EU flexibility on the developmental concerns of the 
ACP (see WTR 2006), the government took a mostly passive approach to the negotiations, 
while technical experts were left to prepare the government’s positions on issues to be 
forwarded to the regional level.
A few months before the negotiations were due to end, high-level figures in the 
government became more involved and interested in the negotiations and began publicly 
voicing Ghana’s position. Yet unlike the loud activism on the part of Senegal’s Wade, 
Ghana’s then-president Kufuor was much more apprehensive about criticising the EU’s 
approach. He insisted that the EPAs were mainly aligned with the government’s economic 
and development interests and offered the potential for becoming development tools to 
build Ghana’s productive capacity, competitiveness and industries, and enhance regional
60 Interviews Ghanaian government, Brussels: April 2008 (Gl); Accra: September 2008 (G2; G7; G10; Gl 1).
61 Ibid. (Gl; G2; G7; G10; G il) .
61 Ib id  2008 (G7; G10).
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integration. At the same time, in 2007 the president requested the EU to consider
extending the deadline for the negotiations and to consider addressing the barriers to trade
and procurement and assist the ACP countries in preparing their markets for liberalisation
{Daily Graphic 2007). This position was reiterated by the then-Trade Minister, who
indicated in November 2007 that Ghana and the ECOWAS, were not ready to sign the
agreements and had made the decision to refrain from signing at the December deadline
{The Statesman 2007).
Yet as the deadline approached, in view of securing continued market access and
faced with the risk of losing trade preferences, the government’s ‘strategy’ or choice was to
shift its position of not signing a regional EPA to initialling the interim agreement.64
Importantly, as a non-LDC, Ghana had only one alternative option in continuing its trade
with the EU, namely the GSP or GSP plus scheme. Although in mid-2007 the GSP plus
was briefly considered as an alternative option, it was eventually deemed inappropriate for
securing Ghana’s trade interests, as this did not offer a binding legal agreement and was
subject to periodic review and could be withdrawn unilaterally by the EU, thus creating “an
uncertain environment, which does not encourage investors and will not serve the
development interest of ACP countries,” according to one Ghanaian trade official {Public
Agenda 2007).65 After initialling the agreement the government came to face public, civil
society, and trade unions criticism for undermining the regional position of resistance
against the EPAs. In May 2008, Kufuor reiterated the government’s position, noting that
Ghana was compelled to sign the agreements as a safeguard against losing its trade
preferences vis-a-vis the EU:
The government is very much aware of the criticism it has attracted. The EPA is a 
transitional arrangement for getting our produce and products into the European 
market. It is the way to save the country's export industry and thereby protect jobs 
and earn revenue while the Doha negotiations for a fairer global trade system still 
proceed. In the West African sub-region, the two countries that are caught up in the 
dilemma are Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. Apart from Nigeria, the rest are classified as 
Least Developed Countries, which are exempt from the payment of tariffs on the EU 
market. Nigeria on the other hand is so endowed with oil revenue that it could afford 
not to sign the Agreement. Ghana cannot. I therefore urge our labour movement to 
appreciate the position of government during this period (GoG 2008).
Indeed, the months following the initialling of the interim EPA saw the government 
defending and justifying its decision, both at the national and regional levels,66 and with the
63 Ibid. (G7; G10); Interview EC delegation, Accra: September 2008 (EC 18).
64 Ib id  (Gl; G2; G7; G10; Gl 1).
65 Ibid. (G10; G il) .
66 Interviewees claim that Ghana’s decision to enter into an interim agreement with the EU needed to be 
explained to the region due to initial criticism from some ECOWAS countries on their decision to negotiate at
182
•  fnEU stepping up pressure for Ghana to sign and ratify the agreements. The government’s 
strategy towards the EPAs was therefore mainly oriented towards the national level, firstly 
in developing technical positions to present to the ECOWAS, and then to support the EPAs 
and defend the government’s decision when faced with public discontent over initialling 
the agreement.
It is noteworthy that since the change of government in December 2008, the interim 
EPA has not been signed or ratified. Several stakeholders approached the new government 
with concerns over the previous government’s decision to sign the interim agreements 
without adequate national consultations. Ghana’s Trade Union Congress told the new 
government that “Ghana initialling the EPA was a stab on the back of ECOWAS, which in 
October 2007 called for the extension of the EPA negotiations deadline having recognised 
the Sub-Region was not in a position to sign or initial any form of EPA ... In our view the 
action by Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire is a threat to regional integration” (GNA 2009). In April 
2009, the new government announced that it would re-engage with the EU on the EPAs, 
but only after consultations with national stakeholders were incorporated into the 
government’s position to be discussed with the EU. The government also claimed that if the 
agreement was found to be against the interests of the country, Ghana would ensure that 
adequate development assistance was committed to address adjustment costs {Public 
Agenda 2009). In May 2009, the new president, John Atta Mills criticised the EPAs and 
claimed it would lead to European countries dumping highly-subsidised goods and services 
on Ghana {The Statesman 2009). The new government’s position on the EPAs seemingly 
indicates a shift in strategy in dealing not only with the EU, but also in its approach at the 
national level.
3.2 Explaining Ghana’s inability to influence the EPA negotiations
The inability of Ghana to significantly influence the negotiations can be attributed 
firstly to Ghana’s perceptions of the EU as a powerful and united trade negotiator, 
especially in relation to how it perceives its own negotiating weaknesses compared to the 
EU. Secondly, this can be attributed to contextual factors present at the country and 
regional levels: namely, an institutional context characterised by a lack of experience and 
expertise in trade negotiations and a lack of adequate consultations between the 
government and relevant stakeholders and civil society; an economic position which left
the individual level (see The Statesman 2008a). (Interview Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 
(G7; G10); Interview EC delegation, Accra: September 2008 (EC 18)).
67 Interview Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G7).
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the government with little alternative but to sign an interim agreement to protect its trade 
interests, and a general inability to project its interests as a non-LDC; apolitical situation in 
which high-level political engagement was limited and where pressure to deliver led to the 
decision to initial the interim agreement; and lastly, a less than strategic position in the 
region where Ghana’s weight is marginal compared to the dominant position of the 
UEMOA. As such, the relational and contextual factors outlined in Chapter 1 have not 
favoured Ghana’s exercise of leverage vis-a-vis the EU.
3.2.1 Ghana’s perceptions o f the EU: United or divided? Consistent or inconsistent?
Ghana’s lack of influence on the regional trade agenda and its inability to 
significantly influence the process and outcomes of the negotiations can be partially 
attributed to its perceptions of the EU, especially in relation to its own understandings of 
the country’s inability to exercise leverage vis-a-vis the EU. Unlike Senegalese 
interviewees, Ghanaian government officials could identify no weaknesses in the EU, and 
felt that negotiators were firm, prepared, constructive and open to address the country’s 
concerns. Furthermore, interviewees were unable to identify any divergences within the 
EU, either between Member States and the Commission, or between DG Trade and DG 
DEV (or other relevant DGs). While some Member States, most notably the UK and 
Germany, provided funding for EPA-negotiation capacity-building, officials could not 
identify any particular instances in which the government was able to voice its concerns 
vis-a-vis Member States, nor did they view Member States as potential interlocutors 
between the government and the Commission.69 Indeed, as one interviewee noted, “there 
were absolutely no cracks in the EU’s negotiating machine. They are extremely well- 
trained and experienced negotiators and this clearly shows in the way they handled the 
negotiations.”70
This perception of the EU as a united and prepared negotiator in trade is particularly 
relevant to understanding the Ghanaian approach to the negotiations when considered in 
relation to the government’s understanding of its own strengths and weaknesses. Amongst 
interviewees, there was a strong conviction that the country could not significantly 
influence the negotiations. In this sense, Ghana very much recognised its ‘weaker’ position 
vis-a-vis the EU and acknowledged that the power asymmetry between the country and the 
EU was of such magnitude that it limited the scope for forwarding its interests firstly onto
68 Interviews Ghanaian government, Brussels: April 2008 (Gl); Accra: September 2008 (G2; G7; G10; Gl 1).
69Ibid. (Gl; G2; G7; G10; G il) .
10 Ibid. (G l).
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the EU, and to lesser extent, onto the region. According to officials, this inability to 
influence the negotiations is considered to originate namely at the regional and country 
levels (see below).71 As such, the major problem that Ghana faces in pursuing its 
preferences in the EPA negotiations, does not necessarily concern the EU as a trade 
negotiator per se, but is seen as due to constraints in the domestic and regional context 
which limit its ability to influence the negotiations.
Any criticism that was voiced on the EU’s position mainly concerned the lack of 
policy coherence between trade and development aspects. As in Senegal, interviewees felt 
that the EU’s negotiating position diverged from its initial position, which more strongly 
referred to development-friendly trade agreements.72 Yet, one aspect that was common 
amongst most interviewees was the view that the EU had become more willing to discuss 
development issues during the third phase of the negotiations, and although exact funding 
modalities and the amount of funding to be made available to the region were still subject
7*}to negotiation, many consider this a positive step towards a development-friendly EPA. 
Although the EU’s negotiation agenda was perceived to have been mainly trade-driven, 
officials were confident that if an adequate development dimension was inserted into the 
agreements, the EPAs could provide potentially very useful tools for strengthening capacity 
and development potential. One interviewee noted, “for the EPAs to be successful tools for 
development, the EU will have to fulfil its end of the bargain too, which implies more 
resources to address supply-side constraints. I am confident that we can reach agreement on 
this. The EU does not have mercantilist interests in Africa, and it is not looking for market 
access. Instead, the EPA is a tool for development.”74 Unlike the Senegalese position, 
Ghanaian officials held a view of the EPAs which was not radically different from the EU’s
nc
own position. Ghana did not seek to influence the negotiations because the position 
adopted by the government largely converged with the idea of the EPAs that the EU was 
trying to champion, and because Ghana was seemingly satisfied with progress made on 
integrating a development dimension.
71 Ibid. (G2; G10).
72 Ib id  (G2; G7; Gl 1).
73 Ib id  (G2; G7;G10;G11).
14 Ib id  (Gl 1).
75 Interview EC delegation, Accra: September 2008 (EC 18).
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3.2.2 Institutional factors
A major factor constraining Ghana’s ability to exercise leverage is found in the 
country’s institutional context. Ghana’s institutional framework for trade negotiations is 
similar to that of Senegal. Since 2006, the Ministry of Trade has overall responsibility for 
the formulation, implementation, and monitoring of Ghana’s trade policies and officially 
oversees trade negotiations. An Inter-Institutional Committee (IIC) on Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations follows trade negotiations and aims to ensure participation of different
'7Ainstitutions and stakeholders in formulating the government’s position (WTO 2007:10). 
The IIC and the subcommittee on EPA negotiations have the “critical role in ensuring 
formulation and validation of regional negotiation positions ... [and] advise ministries on 
the appropriateness of signing EPAs at the end of negotiations” (South Centre 2007: l).77 
As regards regional integration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Cooperation and 
NEPAD is responsible for coordinating the implementation of regional integration, 
facilitating the opening of the regional market to Ghana’s private sector, and aligning these 
processes with the country’s national development framework.78
Despite this institutional set-up, similar to Senegal, the government faces several 
constraints that have hampered its effectiveness in terms of trade policy formulation and 
negotiating strength. Indeed, “until recently, Ghana did not have a coherent trade policy as 
policies were scattered in various documents and ministries, making it difficult to have an 
overall view of the direction of the Government’s trade strategies, and the linkages between 
trade policy and the broad economic development plans” (WTO 2007: 2 1).79 An OECD 
study on Ghana’s capacity in trade negotiations noted that coordination between the 
different ministries responsible for trade matters was poor, without any formal mechanisms 
for coordination in place. Furthermore, often the government preferred sending “poorly- 
equipped officials (from non-Trade Ministries) to deal with technical aspects of trade 
negotiations”, rather than making use of the expertise (however limited) available in the
76 The IIC was established in 1995 as a follow-up the WTO Uruguay Round, with a view to strengthening 
Ghanaian capacities in trade negotiation and benefited from external funding from its inception, thus allowing 
for a building-up o f expertise and experience.
77 Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G2; G10); Interview EC delegation, Accra: 
September 2008 (EC 18).
78 Regional integration has long been a priority area for the government, leading to the creation of a Ministry 
o f Economic Planning and Regional Integration, which replaced by the Ministry o f Regional Cooperation and 
NEPAD in 2003, and then merged with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2006. The Ministry contains a 
division dedicated towards the regional cooperation and is further divided into six sections responsible for 
different aspects o f regional integration (Senghor 2007: 153).
79 Ghana Trade Policy framework adopted in 2005 represents the first concrete attempt to provide “clear and 
transparent guidelines for the implementation o f the Government’s domestic and international trade agenda” 
(WTO 2007: 9).
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Trade Ministry (OECD 2000: 3). Thus a lack of sufficient technical, financial and human 
resources has been, and continues to pose a major constraint on the country’s negotiating 
capacity and is considered a major handicap in pushing its position. Yet as shown in the 
Senegalese case study, similar institutional constraints have not necessarily translated into 
an ineffective position towards influencing the regional agenda or influencing the EU’s 
approach towards integrating a development dimension into the regional agreement. 
Indeed, there are two important differences in the institutional context of Senegal and 
Ghana that have favoured leverage in the former, but led to a more passive approach in the 
latter.
Unlike Senegal, the government’s position and approach to the negotiations did not 
represent a consolidated view amongst the government, relevant stakeholders, and civil 
society. At the institutional level, no appropriate mechanism existed to allow other actors to 
participate in formulating the Ghanaian approach to the negotiations. Indeed, Ghana’s ICC 
failed to provide a space for other national views on the EPA. One advocacy leader noted 
that the “the institutional committee is not working and everything is centered in the 
ministry,” (The Statesman 2007a; see also IPS 2007a), a position which was echoed by one 
government interviewee who agreed that the ICC had failed to consider the views of other 
stakeholders, leading to intense criticisms of the government’s decision to initial the interim
OA
EPA. Indeed, while in late 2007, trade unions and civil society urged the government to 
consider the GSP plus option instead of the interim EPA (Ghanaian Chronicle 2007), the
o 1
government had already decided that it would sign the interim EPA. According to some 
interviewees, the fact that other stakeholders were not adequately consulted, and the 
significant criticism that followed the decision to enter into the agreements, minimised 
ownership over the country’s negotiating position, and negatively impacted the
OA
government’s position within the region and its ability to influence the negotiations.
A second important difference in the institutional context is the varying levels of 
experience of trade officials in regional negotiations. While Senegal has gained 
considerable strategic and technical expertise through its active participation in the 
UEMOA, Ghana’s regional integration prospects have focused almost entirely on the 
ECOWAS. All interviewees noted that because the EPA is unprecedented, the government, 
and more specifically the Ministry of Trade does not have the expertise needed nor well- 
trained negotiators with the level of experience necessary to take on the myriad of issues 
the EPA negotiations require the government to tackle. It was noted that national experts on
80 Interview Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G7).
81 Ibid. (Gl; G7).
82 Ibid. (G l).
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EPAs can provide only limited input in to the negotiating process, because either technical 
knowledge was lacking, or because many other trade files (namely the WTO) are being 
handled simultaneously, constraining capacity.83 The different negotiating mandates and 
timetables place considerable stress on Ghana’s institutional capacities (WTO: 20). 
Furthermore, the actual number of people working on EPA and EPA-related issues is also 
limited (three in the entire Ministry), and the continuous re-posting of expert technical
• » fid •advisors has created a lack of institutional memory during the entire negotiations. While 
this is not to say that Senegal does not experience similar institutional constraints in terms 
of capacity and expertise, a fundamental difference is found in the strength and experience 
Senegal has gained through UEMOA membership. Indeed as noted in the Senegalese case 
study, it is namely the unit responsible for relations with the UEMOA within the Ministry 
of Trade, which has led policy formulation on regional affairs and consolidated the 
country’s strategic position in the organisation. In fact, some Ghanaian government 
officials have suggested that the extensive experience of the governments of UEMOA 
member states in economic integration and trade liberalisation have assisted their ability to 
influence the region in formulating a negotiating position vis-a-vis the EU. Ghana’s lack 
of experience in trade negotiations is considered a major handicap in terms of its ability to
QiT
influence the negotiations beyond the national level.
3.2.3 Economic factors
Ghana’s economic position is another major contributing factor to the government’s 
inability to exercise leverage. Unlike Senegal, Ghana was not in a position to risk forgoing 
EU market access by refusing to sign an interim agreement, significantly affecting the 
country’s position in the negotiations. Interestingly, Ghana’s choice to initial the agreement 
is quite similar to its approach to aid negotiations (see Chapter 3), which has been mostly 
reactionary or compromising to please the donor and avoid the risk of forgoing critical aid 
commitments. Similarly in the EPA negotiations, due to lack of a suitable alternative 
trading scheme and to avoid the risk of losing trade preferences, the government felt 
compelled to opt for the interim-EPA. Indeed, if a country’s ability to exercise leverage is 
linked to an available alternative that more closely fits its national interest, then the case of 
Ghana clearly indicates that trade dependence on the EU market and a non-LDC position
83 Ibid. (G2; G7; G10).
M Ib id  (G7; G10).
*5 Ib id  (G1;G2;G10).
86 Ib id  (G2; G7; G10).
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significantly shaped the government’s position in the negotiations. Indeed, the following 
observation seems rather accurate: “Most EPAs rather mirror the prevalent power 
asymmetries ... Since most non-LDC ACP countries lacked the ultimate source of 
bargaining power of the weaker party, namely, the ability to walk away from the EPA 
negotiations, they had to accept the interim EPA text” (Meyn 2008: 524).
A second economic factor constraining the country’s bargaining power, is its position 
in international trade, and more specifically, its trade relations with alternative trading 
partners. Ghana’s bilateral trade with the EU has declined, while it share of imports 
originating from China and India has increased.
Figure 5.7: Ghana’s Share of Trade with the EU and Alternative Partners,
(1990-2008)
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Indeed, Ghana is actively pursuing alternative markets for its main export, cocoa (IPS 
2008). Furthermore, China and India have also increased their foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in Ghana, ranking second and third next to the UK in FDI in 2007 (Idun-Arkhurst 
2008: 18). According to Idun-Arkhurst, “by being the most diversified source of FDI, 
China is contributing to the creation of basic industrial capabilities” (2008: 21), and is 
therefore aligning with the government’s interests in addressing supply-side constraints to
q •n
develop increased trade capacities. At the same time, in comparison to Senegal, the 
presence o f China and India has been met with a rather mixed reaction from the 
government and the public. Although Kufuor praised China for its development assistance 
to Africa, the government and trade unions alike are increasingly concerned that this trade
expansion is not necessarily in the country’s long-term development interests (Idun-
88Arkhurst and Laing 2007: 19). The more cautionary approach to alternative trading 
partners in Ghana, especially in comparison to Senegal’s ‘open arms’ policy is important,
87 Ibid. (Gl).
88 Ibid. (G l). For example, Ghana’s cocoa exports to China and India face higher tariffs than other cocoa- 
producing LDCs, which is seen as discouraging investment in this crucial sector (Reuters 2008).
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because it indicates that the country is less inclined to forego favourable trade relations 
with the EU as it does not see alternative sources as a viable alternative to traditional trade 
partners.
In addition, Ghana also trades much less within the region and with Africa in 
general, than Senegal (see Figure 5.8). In 2004 and 2005, less than 3% of Ghana's exports 
went to other ECOWAS countries (mainly Guinea, Benin, and Nigeria), and only about 2%  
of its imports came from within the region (mainly Togo) (WTO 2007a: 16). The current 
limited trade flows between Ghana and the region further constrains Ghana’s choice to 
continue preferential access with the EU, and limits its room for manoeuvre. As such, the 
Ghanaian case confirms that expanding trade relations with non-traditional partners is an 
important factor in determining a country’s approach to trade negotiations with structurally 
stronger partners such as the EU.
Figure 5.8: Ghana’s and Senegal’s exports to Africa, (1990-2008)
Source: IMF DOTS 2009
A last economic factor constraining Ghana’s ability to exercise leverage is found in 
relation to its overall economic position within the region. Specifically, the presence of an 
economically stronger Nigeria and the dominant position of LDCs have positioned Ghana, 
as a non-LDC but with a relatively small and volatile economy, in a middle-ground 
position. Indeed, the fact that Ghana is one of three non-LDCs in a region dominated by 13 
LDCs, has constrained its ability to upload its interests onto the regional agenda, largely 
dominated by the influence and preferences of LDCs. Aside from differing economic 
interests due to the different levels of industrialisation and development facing these two
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groups of countries, market access and reciprocity obligations do not affect the LDCs 
should they wish not to negotiate a regional EPA, while for countries like Ghana and Ivory 
Coast, the loss of market access is a significant threat. Ghanaian observers claim that 
divergences in interests between the LDCs and non-LDCs have caused a stalemate at the 
regional level, that high-level political intervention is needed to reach a solution.90 
Furthermore, officials indicated that because the UEMOA, which is composed of a 
majority of LDCs, is seen as having largely dominated the regional negotiating mandate 
(see below), Ghana’s opportunities for influence and leverage have been even more 
limited.91
In addition, the presence of Nigeria and the limited strategic relationship Ghana has 
with the strongest economy in West Africa has also hampered Ghana’s potential for 
leadership, influence and leverage in the negotiations. Officials noted that Nigeria has been 
very effective at complicating the regional integration process, shaping the regional agenda, 
and convincing the EU to more closely consider the region’s concerns and interests.92 
Nigeria’s position in the region is particularly important for understanding Ghanaian 
prospects for leverage because of what this implies for Ghana’s potential position of 
regional leadership. Because Ghana is not a member of the UEMOA, its main economic 
alliance in the region has been with Nigeria. This alliance however has not meant greater 
economic influence for Ghana, as Nigeria has pursued its own economic interests. Indeed, 
as Aryeetey notes:
W hile Ghana and Nigeria have been traditional anglophone partners in the sub-region, 
this relationship has never been translated into greater priority being attached to the 
bilateral relationship. The current stimulated relationship is driven more by a felt 
urgency to respond to the perceived lack o f  interest from the Francophone partners, at 
the behest o f  France, in faster integration ... Ghana is perceived to be pulled in 
separate directions by different political pressures, but the lack o f  an open debate 
suggests that whichever way the country chooses to go the final decision w ill be a 
matter o f  diplomatic and political convenience, rather than a well-thought out strategy 
(2001:32).
Therefore, the important economic presence of Nigeria and the rather loose partnership 
between Ghana and Nigeria has not necessarily helped it to gain influence in the economic 
affairs of the ECOWAS, and consequentially limited its bargaining strength in the 
negotiations.
89 For instance, Ghana has more protective interests in liberalising certain sectors and industries, whereas the 
LDCs have preferred to liberalise these immediately because they are more underdeveloped.
90 Interview Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G7).
91 Ibid. (G7; G10).
92 Ibid. (G7; G10). Nigeria’s economy is larger than that o f all ECOWAS countries combined, yet its trade 
policy is much more restrictive, creating considerable difficulties when it resisted adopting the regional CET 
and demanded the creation of a fifth tariff band. The request sparked controversy and led to the date for 
implementation o f the CET to slip twice, once in January and again in July 2008.
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3.2.4 Political factors
Ghana’s political environment is another contributing factor hampering the country’s 
effectiveness in influencing the negotiations. As mentioned above, it has been noted by 
some government officials that political leadership and engagement in the negotiation 
process remained limited until the 2007 deadline approached. According to one official this 
led to decisions being taken on the basis of a weak consultation between the political and 
technical levels, and furthermore led to a very technical approach to the negotiations. It 
was only when the negotiation deadline neared, and the “reality of losing trade preferences 
became imminent,” that political figures began demonstrating interest in the negotiations 
and began taking note of the implications for Ghana.94 This explains the difference between 
the Senegalese and Ghanaian approaches to the negotiations: while in Senegal high-level 
political involvement immediately dominated the government’s approach to the 
negotiations, in Ghana the government’s approach remained rather passive because it was 
left mostly to the technical experts to formulate an approach with interest demonstrated 
only at a later stage in the negotiations.
Another political factor that has influenced Ghana’s approach is the presence of 
highly competitive party politics, leading to pressure on government officials to deliver 
visible development results in the short term. Indeed, another parallel can be drawn here 
between Ghana’s position in aid negotiations and its positions towards the EPAs. While in 
aid negotiations the pressure to deliver and the desire to stay in power have led the 
government to forego ownership over development policies and programmes in order not to 
risk losing crucial aid, in the trade sphere similar pressure to secure market access with its 
most important trade partner have led to accusations that decisions were made and positions 
adopted based on short-term interests and political expediency, rather than on adequate 
consultations between the technical, ministerial, and political levels.95 Some government 
officials saw the decision to initial the interim EPA as an attempt to gain credibility vis-a- 
vis the EU and demonstrate the government’s commitment to the EPAs. Indeed, not only 
was there an urgency to initial the interim-EPAs to secure market access, the decision was 
also in line with the government’s foreign policy focus on economic diplomacy vis-a-vis 
major donors and trade partners (see also Chapter 3).96 However, according to one 
interviewee, in doing so, “the focus on the development dimension, namely the adjustment
93 Ibid. (G7).
94 Ibid. (G7; G10).
95 Ibid. {G l).
96Ibid. (G10; G il) .
192
costs, supply-side constraints, and financial support was undermined, because the 
government felt it more opportune in the short-term to give into EU pressure and 
demonstrate its positive approach to the negotiations than securing long-term commitment 
to other essential areas.”97 This highlights how Ghana’s political framework has influenced 
its position in the negotiations, and has seemingly compromised its ability to exercise 
leverage vis-a-vis the EU when faced with the pressure to initial the interim EPA.
3.2.5 Strategic factors
The last contextual factor influencing Ghana’s exercise of leverage is found in its 
less than strategic position regarding the region’s negotiating mandate. Ghanaian 
interviewees identified a set of problematic issues at the regional level which impacted on 
the country’s ability to get its position across. Firstly, all interviewees mentioned the issue 
of capacity problems at the regional level, in that the level of expertise and the quality of 
negotiators was not at the level necessary to take into consideration the position of all 
member states, and to negotiate with the EU. Communication between the capitals and the 
regional secretariats was low. National experts are said to lack access to negotiating 
material and seldom receive reports from the regional level. Furthermore, direction from 
the regional level is seen as lacking, and this hampered the pursuit of the country’s interests 
vis-a-vis the regional level, and was also a major factor in the government’s decision to
QO
enter into the interim agreements when approached by the EU bilaterally.
Secondly, some interviewees claim that major tensions exist between the UEMOA
and ECOWAS, which are seen as severely hampering the formulation of a unitary approach
to the negotiations. Due to better and more funding and integration sustained by external
(mainly French) guarantors, the UEMOA is seen as having taken a dominant position in
formulating the regional negotiation agenda. Indeed, as one observer notes:
So successfully has UEMOA check-mated and undermined ECOWAS that all that the 
latter now spends a great deal of its time doing is to harmonise its programmes with 
those of the former, hold joint ministerial meetings, seek the convergence of the 
economic and financial policies and the harmonisation of the legal framework, 
accounting procedure and statistics of both ECOWAS and UEMOA. In any case, such 
convergence will for long remain a pipedream since UEMOA countries constitute a 
majority of ECOWAS member countries and as such can play both judge and jury. In 
spite of the apparent unity that exists, ECOWAS is a house divided against itself. 
(Adebayo 2004: 45).
97 Ibid. {G l).
98 Ibid. (Gl; G2; G7;G10;G11).
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These tensions have also affected the negotiations. One report on the EPA negotiations 
pointed out: “There is a need to strengthen collaboration between UEMOA, whose 
integration agenda is more advanced, and ECOWAS, whose membership is larger and 
more heterogeneous. Information flows between the two need to be optimised, and trickle 
down to different countries of the region” (South Centre 2007). Although some 
interviewees have praised the expertise and experience of the UEMOA and some of the 
UEMOA countries," others claimed that this constrained Ghana’s ability as a non- 
UEMOA country to effectively shape the agenda and influence the negotiations.100 One 
official said:
It is namely the UEMOA that is driving us, and they have a strong voice. But we need 
to have a voice too or our interests and those of the ECOWAS will not be met. Ghana 
feels intimidated and isolated, and under pressure to break through this framework. 
Because of this sense of isolation within the region and the inability of the Secretariat 
to respond to our concerns, we felt compelled to negotiate with the EU at the bilateral 
level.101
As a non-LDC and non-UEMOA country, Ghana was not strategically placed to influence 
the regional agenda and the EPA negotiations. Its rather isolated position in the region 
limited Ghana’s scope for influence vis-a-vis the region, and consequentially vis-a-vis the 
EU.
This case study has demonstrated how a country’s perception of the EU in addition 
to certain contextual factors have contributed to an unsuccessful strategy on the part of the 
Ghanaian government in shaping the regional negotiating agenda on the EPA negotiations 
and in influencing the EU to consider the country’s preferences and interests. Importantly, 
the Ghanaian case shows that on the one hand certain structural constraints, especially in 
terms of institutional capacity, a country’s economic dependence on the EU, and limited 
access to alternatives affect the ability to effectively promote interest vis-a-vis a structurally 
stronger EU. On the other hand, the case study also illustrates how structural constraints 
alone do not determine power asymmetry between strong and weak actors. Indeed, the 
Ghanaian case shows that a country’s perception of the EU as trade power and capable 
negotiator, political factors, such as the pressure to deliver in a highly competitive political 
system, and strategic factors, such as a country’s position of influence within (a divided) 
regional configuration, are crucial when analysing a country’s ability to exercise leverage 
in regional trade negotiations with the EU.
99 Ibid. (Gl; G10).
100 Ibid. (G2; G7).
101 Ibid. (G l).
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4 Comparisons and Conclusions
Based on the two case studies of Senegal and Ghana, three overall conclusions can be 
drawn about how some African countries have or have not been able to exercise leverage in 
trade relations with the EU. Firstly, the case studies demonstrate some relevant findings 
about how the EU is perceived as a trade negotiator in both countries, and how both its 
strengths and weaknesses can assist or constrain its ability to engage effectively with these 
countries in the trade field. In Senegal, the EU was perceived to be mostly inconsistent and 
divided in its approach to the EPA negotiations. This perception firstly led Senegal to 
adopting a highly critical approach towards the EU because of its perceived inconsistency 
and secondly it led the government to approach interlocutors within the EU that were seen 
as more closely considering Senegal’s main concerns. In Ghana, the EU was instead seen 
as a strong, capable, and united negotiator, and this was seen as creating significant power 
asymmetry in the face of Ghana’s perception of its own weaknesses and constraints. 
Furthermore, despite the inconsistency between the EU’s development-friendly rhetoric 
and its trade-oriented approach in the actual negotiations, Ghana did not perceive this as an 
opportunity to press the EU to more closely consider its own position, because indeed, the 
government took a rather positive approach to the negotiations from the outset.
These findings confirm the hypotheses on perceptions posited in Chapter 1. The 
case of Ghana confirms that objective reality does influence perceptions of the EU’s power 
(Hypothesis 1). The EU was perceived as the more powerful actor and one with which 
cooperation is necessary given the country’s marginal and dependent position. However, 
when the EU is perceived as unable or unwilling to convert its policy rhetoric into practise, 
as evidenced by its lack of willingness to integrate an adequate development dimension, it 
does indeed lower countries expectations of the EU and negatively affects their perceptions 
of the EU (Hypothesis 2a). Yet no definite conclusion can be made on the extent to which 
this affects weaker actors’ strategies, because while in the Senegalese case, this did 
contribute to less willingness to cooperate, in the Ghanaian case, this did not affect the 
country’s strategy to become more conflictual as opposed to consensual. These differences 
can likely be explained however, by the differing contextual factors which encouraged or 
constrained leverage and control (see below). Furthermore, when the EU is perceived as 
inconsistent in its position or actions between the Member States/Council and the 
Commission, it affects actors perceptions of the EU as a unitary actor, and allows them to 
seek out interlocutors or actors more sympathetic to their position within the EU or to 
influence and shift their positions (Hypothesis 2b). Incoherence between the various
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policies which constitute the EU’s external actions also affects actors’ perceptions of the 
EU’s capacity to effectively engage with outsiders. When the EU is perceived as being 
incoherent in translating policy rhetoric and actual actions, countries are likely to adopt a 
more critical approach towards the EU and either push for their own policy preferences or 
decline cooperation with the EU. On the other hand, when the EU is perceived as a 
powerful, united, and capable trade actor, countries are less likely to oppose its position and 
will likely adopt a more consensual approach to its relations with the EU (Hypothesis 2c). 
Lastly, when the EU is perceived as constrained by its wider interests, or constrained to 
finding an agreement, as was Senegal’s perception of the EU, the exercise of leverage by 
the weaker party is favoured, as awareness of these constraints acts as a source of 
bargaining strength (Hypothesis 2d).
Findings on the EU’s constraints and capabilities and how this influences a 
country’s perception of the EU also build upon previous conclusions made in Chapter 3 on 
aid relations, where it was similarly shown that the countries’ perceptions of the EU as 
overly bureaucratic, its inability to effectively engage with recipient governments on the 
ground, and a perceived lack of coherence between official rhetoric and actual practise, 
impacted on the EU’s relations with the countries and contributed to shaping these 
countries’ negotiating strategies. In this sense, both the aid and trade case studies indicate 
that power relations between the EU and Africa are not merely based on structural strengths 
and constraints: the way in which both actors perceive each others’ strengths and 
weaknesses also affects the way in which the actors choose to conduct these relations. 
Therefore, a country’s ability to exercise leverage vis-a-vis the EU is found in its awareness 
of the EU’s capacities and constraints and how this affects its strategies.
The case studies have also shown that structural constraints faced by developing 
countries affect their ability to negotiate with the EU, yet these do not determine the 
process and outcome of negotiations. In this sense, the case studies further confirm the 
hypotheses posited in Chapter 1 regarding the factors which constrain or favour weaker 
actor leverage (see Table 1.3). At the institutional level Ghana and Senegal are limited in 
their ability to transform their preferences into actions, because of capacity constraints and 
limited experience in negotiating trade agreements. Yet the Senegalese case shows how an 
institutional structure allowing for other domestic actors to influence the government’s 
overall position and its past experiences in other trade fora have provided it with a good 
capacity for strategy formulation and a conviction of government ownership. The lack of 
these elements in the Ghanaian case gives more weight to the notion that on the domestic
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front, overall consensus and government ownership of policies positively contributes to a 
country’s ability to exercise leverage.
The case studies have highlighted how a country’s economic circumstances can 
pose a very significant structural constraint on its choice and ability to enter into trade 
agreements with the EU, even if these do not entirely correspond to the country’s 
preferences and interests. Indeed, while the Senegalese case demonstrates how its position 
as an LDC and the availability of alternative trading partners gave it breathing space with 
regards to its decision not to initial the agreements, the Ghanaian case instead indicates how 
non-LDC status and predominant dependence on the EU for market access severely 
constrained its room for manoeuvre. As in the aid relations therefore, the lack of 
availability of alternative resources and the extent of dependence on the EU is a crucial 
factor in determining leverage.
Other contextual elements, such as a country’s political environment and its 
strategic position within the region, have affected the exercise of leverage. The political 
utility and involvement by high-level government figures in adopting a critical approach to 
the EPAs assisted Senegal in stirring considerable opposition towards the EU, while the 
political expediency, pressure to deliver, and limited involvement of high-level political 
figures in Ghana instead resulted in the government accepting the interim agreement but 
also thereby stirring domestic discontent. Lastly, the strategic position of the two countries 
in the region was an important factor in determining leverage. Indeed Senegal’s 
membership of the UEMOA in combination with the leadership position taken by that 
regional organisation has certainly assisted its ability to influence the regional negotiations. 
Ghana’s sense of isolation within the region and from the ECOWAS Secretariat with 
regards to the negotiations have instead constrained its ability to promote its interests at the 
regional level. Therefore, the case studies confirm that although a power asymmetry exists 
in EU-Africa trade relations, contextual factors can intervene to create more or less 
favourable conditions under which weaker actors can exercise leverage.
Finally, in relation to the above two points, this chapter illustrates an emerging 
pattern with regards to the countries’ strategies vis-a-vis the EU, with important 
implications for understanding a country’s inability or ability to exercise leverage, and to a 
lesser extent, control. In both aid and trade relations, Senegal has apparently been more 
effective in promoting its interests and agenda onto the EU, regardless of power 
asymmetry. While engagement with the EU is considered essential, ‘ownership’ and 
government ‘control’ strongly prevail. Its influential position in the region also provides it 
with a strategic importance in negotiations with the EU. Ghana demonstrates a rather mixed
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record of promoting its preferences vis-a-vis the EU. It has adopted cooperative and 
consensual strategies towards the EU, due to its strong awareness of differences in power. 
Although the government is keen on maintaining ownership in the different policy spheres, 
policy processes and outcomes are mostly either externally-driven, as in aid, or nationally- 
oriented, as in trade, weakening Ghana’s ability to influence external actors such as the EU.
In conclusion, the case studies have given further weight to the notion that although 
power asymmetry is a prominent characteristic in relations between weak and strong actors, 
relational and contextual factors intervene significantly in this structural environment so as 
to create conditions under which weaker actors can influence stronger actors. The last two 
chapters will explore how this power asymmetry operates in the relatively new area of 
cooperation between the EU and Africa, migration.
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Chapter 6
Migration Policy: Agenda-setting with Africa and EU constraints
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the extent to which the EU’s external migration 
policy has impacted on its relations with Africa, while the following chapter will explore 
the extent to which migrant-sending countries in West Africa have or have not been able to 
move migration policy towards one which engages with the countries’ own migration 
agendas. Migration is an issue area which deserves due consideration in view of the 
developmental challenges that continue to face African countries. Indeed, both on the EU 
and African side, there is an increased recognition that migration and development 
complement one another, and that through a coherent and coordinated policy of joint 
migration management,1 migration can be beneficial to both countries of origin and 
destination. The recognition of the increasing importance of migration has spurred 
intensive and extensive dialogue between the EU and Africa. The EU has realised that in 
order to stem migration flows it needs to seek cooperation from sending countries. It is 
therefore crucial to establish the extent to which this dialogue has given African 
governments a new opportunity for exercising leverage and control vis-a-vis the EU.
The first section of the chapter reviews some of the major developments in the EU’s 
approach to migration in relations with the ACP. It shows that high-level dialogue 
particularly with Africa on joint migration management has become a priority item on the 
EU’s political agenda. Cooperation with countries of origin has intensified, technical and 
financial assistance for migration management have increased, and efforts to combat illegal 
immigration have been prioritised. The EU has sensitised African countries to the 
importance of the migration phenomenon for the EU and for the countries’ development, 
but at the same time, agendas are characterised by diverging interests and concerns. The 
second section reviews Africa’s views on managing migration. Here the focus has largely 
been on making migration a positive tool for development, focusing on four main areas:
1 “Joint migration management” has been used by the EU and various international organisations to describe 
the dialogue and policies being negotiated and implemented between countries o f origin, transit, and 
destination in order to maximise the benefits and minimise the disadvantages o f migration for all actors 
concerned. Management essentially refers to policies which aim to reduce irregular migration, promote the 
rights and protection o f migrants, reduce economic pressures that influence outward migration, and regulate 
labour migration. Countries are ideally to work together to find a common or burden-sharing approach 
towards migration.
2 It should however be noted that because this is a relatively new policy field in which the EU and Africa are 
now cooperating, conclusions drawn will necessarily be tentative and merely aim to identify possible 
instances o f leverage and control in a rather unchartered and continually-evolving area in EU-Africa relations.
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remittances, mitigating the brain drain and encouraging brain gain, addressing the root 
causes of migration, and building domestic capacity and ownership. African governments 
generally agree with the need to coordinate migration agendas and have been willing to 
engage in dialogue with the EU provided this considers the concerns of both origin and 
destination countries. The last section analyses the EU’s capacities and constraints in 
formulating an effective and coherent approach to cooperation with migrant-sending 
countries. Although the EU has endorsed a balanced and comprehensive approach, in 
practise it has employed a combination of repressive measures and incentive mechanisms 
meant to induce countries of origin to comply with readmission and migration control 
measures. This has led many observers to argue that the EU has opted for a ‘coercive’ 
approach over the more ‘open’ approach preferred by countries of origin. Furthermore, 
regardless of the EU’s increased efforts in formulating an effective and comprehensive 
migration policy, the institutional and political constraints it faces tend to weaken its 
effectiveness, and therefore its ability to meet its preferences in migration dialogue with 
countries of origin. These constraints affect the perceptions and shape the strategies of the 
countries with which it is aiming to establish cooperation.
This chapter demonstrates that although the EU-Affica relationship is characterised 
by power asymmetry, careful consideration of the context in which such relations take 
place is essential in establishing both parties’ limitations and capabilities. On the one hand, 
power asymmetry is evidenced by the possibility of the EU to implement restrictive 
measures to prevent and control migration flows, and through the use of coercive measures 
to induce or even force sending-countries to cooperate in prevention and control, despite 
the significant pull factors for migration originating in the EU. On the other hand, migrant- 
sending countries are constrained in the prevention and control of their migration flows 
because of limited institutional and technical capacities, in addition to the significant push 
factors they face. Indeed, this makes for a situation of power asymmetry between the EU 
and Africa. Yet, unlike the aid and trade fields, in migration the EU does not hold the 
ultimate decision-making power. The need to engage migrant-sending countries to 
cooperate in stemming migratory flows challenges the traditional power asymmetry 
between the weak and the strong. The necessity for cooperation and the increased strategic 
importance of migration for the EU are expected to create a more balanced relationship in 
which both parties can make demands and concessions; this may have given some African 
governments a new scope for influencing the EU.
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1 Migration in EU-Africa relations
The EU’s commitment to the formulation of a migration policy has grown significantly and 
rapidly since its initial formation in the Amsterdam Treaty.3 The gradual institutionalisation 
of the policy (Geddes 2000) and the growth of high-level political discourse on migration 
matters have had significant implications for the EU’s relations with migrant-sending 
countries. Africa has witnessed an increasing willingness from the EU to engage in 
cooperation efforts geared at developing a joint strategy on migration. The Cotonou 
Agreement, which in linking migration with development and inserting clauses on 
migration into the text, brought the issue to the forefront of the EU’s relations with Africa. 
The insertion of a migration clause, Article 13 (see Appendix I), was amongst the most 
contentious issues during the Cotonou negotiations, highlighting the weight and importance 
of the issue for both the EU and the ACP. It defines the parameters of the EU-ACP 
dialogue on migration, and is essentially the result of a difficult compromise between the 
parties’ different views and interests on migration. On the EU side, Member States, under 
domestic pressure to reduce illegal migration stemming from Africa, strongly endorsed the 
integration of a readmission clause into the Agreement. On the ACP side, securing the 
protection of the rights of their migrants’ residing and working in the EU was the most 
relevant concern (Vanheukelom et al. 2006: 6). As a compromise, the first part of Article 
13 considers EU and ACP obligations towards migrants by committing to the right of fair 
treatment for legal migrants; equal treatment of ACP nationals in the EU and vice versa; 
EU support for the training of ACP nationals; facilitating access to education for ACP 
students; and support for the economic and social development of migrant-sending regions. 
The second part of the article instead deals with illegal migration, requiring individual ACP 
countries to negotiate readmission agreements with the EU, as well as soliciting 
cooperation in joint migration management.4
3 Since the 1997 Treaty on European Union (i.e. the Amsterdam Treaty) policies previously under the Justice 
and Home Affairs pillar (illegal immigration, internal and external border controls, movement of non-EU 
nationals and refugees) moved to the Community pillar. As in all policies under the first pillar, the 
Commission has the sole right to propose legislation. Since 2004, decision-making power is shared between 
the Council and the Parliament, and all Council decisions must be made by qualified majority voting.
4 This is where compromise between the parties was particularly difficult. In October 1999, the Tampere 
European Council established that readmission clauses would henceforth be included in all EU agreements 
with third countries. The need to integrate a readmission clause in Cotonou was communicated to the ACP in 
December 1999, a few months prior to the conclusion o f the negotiations in February 2000. The issue was 
met with fraught resistance from the ACP, on the grounds that the obligation to readmit any third country 
national which had entered the EU illegally was incompatible with international law. (This was later 
concurred by the EU’s Legal Service, which stated, “it is doubtful whether, in the absence o f a specific 
agreement to this effect (readmission) between the concerned states, a general principle o f international law 
exists, whereby these states would be obliged to readmit their own nationals when the latter do not wish to 
return to their State o f origin” (Statewatch Bulletin 2000)). The issue was left unsettled until the final round of
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Since Cotonou, steps have been taken to regularise dialogue on migration 
particularly with Africa. Following developments at the June 2002 Seville Summit, which 
focused on efforts to reduce illegal immigration and proposed steps to harmonise migration 
policies within the EU, the Commission released the Communication on integrating 
migration issues in the European Union’s relations with Third Countries, in December 
2002. The Communication examined the driving forces and root causes of migration and 
proposed to address these more closely by integrating migration into the EU’s external 
policies, with a particular focus on the link between development policy and migration 
(CEC 2002). Shocking events in Ceuta and Melilla in 2005, in which several unarmed 
African migrants were killed while attempting to surmount blockades surrounding the two 
Spanish enclaves in Morocco, prompted a call for dialogue with Africa on how to stem 
migration flows. In 2005 the Council adopted the Global Approach to Migration: Priority 
actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean, prompting action in three key areas: 
strengthening cooperation and action between the Member States, increasing dialogue and 
cooperation with Africa and the Mediterranean, and promoting the creation of a framework 
for funding and implementation of a strategy on migration.5 In Rabat in July 2006, the EU 
and Africa adopted a joint Action Plan outlining a series of repressive measures including 
stronger border controls to curb illegal migration, and the need to negotiate readmission 
agreements, as well as incentive measures such as assistance in improving access to 
education, strengthening training opportunities for legal migrants, and a proposal for 
facilitating circular migration. The meeting was followed by a high-level EU-Africa 
Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development in Tripoli in November 2006 where 
both sides agreed to step up efforts to tackle the root causes of migration by mainstreaming 
migration into development strategies. In December 2006, the Council urged the 
establishment of a comprehensive migration policy, which would include partnerships with 
key migration countries and regions (CEU 2006). A second Ministerial conference took 
place in Paris in November 2008, where the parties agreed to a multi-annual programme of 
cooperation based on enhancing legal migration, combating illegal migration, and 
establishing synergies between migration and development policy. A Partnership on
negotiations, where the EU and ACP eventually agreed that readmission clauses would be negotiated at the 
bilateral level between individual countries and the EU.
5 The G lobal Approach  lists nine areas in which it aims to strengthen cooperation with Africa. Six are 
particularly worth noting: make migration a shared priority for political dialogue between the EU and African 
Union (AU); establish partnerships with key African countries and regional organisations; identify migration 
routes and increase cooperation between countries o f origin, transit and destination along those routes; 
initiate enhanced dialogue with key sub-Saharan African states on the basis of Cotonou’s Article 13; study the 
root causes o f migration to establish a long-term approach to tackling these; and launch initiatives to promote 
and facilitate remittances (CEU 2005).
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Migration, Mobility and Employment, also became one of the strategic priority areas under 
the Joint EU-Africa Strategic Partnership agreed in Lisbon in 2007, setting out an ambitious 
agenda for long and short term cooperation. Lastly, the European Pact on Immigration and 
Asylum, adopted by the Council in October 2008, again reaffirmed the EU’s intent on 
creating comprehensive partnerships with countries of origin and transit.6
Cooperation at the regional and individual country levels has intensified. Migration 
issues have featured prominently on the EU-ECOWAS troika agenda, as the regional 
organisation is considered to play a key role in dialogue between the EU and Africa, 
resulting in a working group on migration in May 2006. The group has stressed the “value 
of regular political dialogue on migration and development in identifying areas for practical 
cooperation and in facilitating coordination” (ECOWAS-EU 2007). At the individual 
country level, the EU has sent diplomatic missions to key African countries to negotiate 
readmission agreements and secure cooperation in combating illegal migratory movements, 
based on Cotonou’s Article 13. The dialogue has been led by EU delegations and embassy 
staff of Council Presidencies as well as interested Member States, and ideally covers, “a 
broad range of issues from institution and capacity building and effective integration of 
migrants to return and the effective implementation of readmission obligations, in order to 
establish a mutually beneficial cooperation in this field” (CEU 2005: 5). In 2006, the first 
such missions were sent to Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal, and in 2007 further missions 
were sent to Cape Verde, Ghana, and Ethiopia.7
Financial and technical assistance have also been established as important 
instruments in order to help sending countries to better manage migration flows and to 
counter illegal migration. Assistance in migration-related areas has been incorporated into 
the EDF. In 2006, €25 million was devoted towards the creation and funding of an intra- 
ACP Migration Capacity Building Facility, focusing on the management of south-south 
migration by financing capacity-building measures and cross-border programmes. Under
i t
the programming phase of the 10 EDF, ACP countries with a heavy migration outflow 
were required to integrate migration profiles into their CSPs. Besides containing
6 The P act commits the EU to concluding EU-level and bilateral migration agreements with clauses on legal 
and illegal migration, readmission, and development; encourages Member States to provide increased legal 
opportunities for migration through temporary or circular migration schemes; incites cooperation with third 
countries to prevent illegal immigration; aims to integrate migration and development policies; and promotes 
diaspora engagement (CEU 2008; 2008a).
7 The Council contends that the missions have been fruitful and mutually beneficial: “the missions have 
resulted in the launch of a comprehensive dialogue addressing all the relevant migration and migration-related 
issues which are of concern to both sides. The missions have also resulted in a better understanding o f the 
positions o f the EU and of the countries concerned, as well as o f the challenges faced by both sides, and in a 
reinforcement o f mutual cooperation. This dialogue, which is tailored to the specific situation and needs o f  
each country, is expected to be taken forward locally by the representations o f the Member States and o f  the 
Commission” (CEU 2007).
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“information relevant to the design and management of a combined migration and 
development policy” (CEU 2006: 34), these profiles set out the process of migration 
dialogue with the countries, and helped to identify priorities for funding migration-related 
activities and projects. Migration profiles were integrated into 18 CSPs, while for Cape 
Verde, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal, migration has been directly integrated into 
the countries’ NIP. Further to the EDF, several ACP countries and several projects geared 
at tackling migration issues received funding under the Aeneas scheme.8 As a general 
objective, the scheme aimed to provide specific and complementary financial and technical 
assistance to third countries in support of efforts to manage migration flows.
In the area of legal migration, the EU has begun taking steps to increase access to its 
labour market. As initially specified under the December 2005 Commission’s Policy Plan 
on Legal Migration, and later endorsed by the Council, from 2007 to 2009 the Commission 
will propose a set of legislative measures facilitating legal entry and enforcing the socio­
economic rights of four categories of migrants: highly-skilled workers, seasonal workers, 
remunerated trainees and intra-corporate transferees, while securing the legal status of 
already admitted migrants (CEC 2005a). In 2007, the Commission proposed the so-called 
‘Blue Card directive’, which aims to recruit highly-skilled workers to the EU by offering a 
single work and residence visa, and the ‘Rights directive’, which aims to facilitate migrant 
integration by giving access to a range of socio-economic benefits (CEC 2007c, 2007d). 
The Blue Card was approved by the Council in May 2009, and Member States have two 
years to incorporate the new provisions into their domestic legislation.9 The EU has also 
been particularly keen on implementing measures to avoid the permanent establishment of 
migrants, but rather encourage circular migration. The Communication in May 2007 on 
Circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third 
countries offers a clear indication of the EU’s intent on ensuring that legal labour migration 
is temporary. Furthermore, the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum acknowledges 
that legal migration provisions must take account of the priorities, needs, and reception 
capacities of each of the EU’s Member States (CEU 2008a: 5-6). To this extent, circular 
migration is seen as benefiting both countries of origin and destination, by allowing for 
adjustments of migration flows according to the demands of Member States’ labour 
markets, while simultaneously promoting transfer of skills and avoiding the brain drain by 
ensuring that legal migrants return home after their work experience (CEC 2007e; CEU
8 Under the EC budget for 2008-2013, Aeneas was replaced by the Thematic Cooperation Programme with 
Third Countries in the Developm ent Aspects o f  M igration and Asylum.
9 While the Commission has expressed its intention to define the conditions o f entry and stay for other 
selected categories o f economic migrants, at present the EU’s legal migration policy has focused exclusively 
on facilitating the recruitment and integration of highly-skilled labour.
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2008a: 5). In light of this, the Council has approved the creation of mobility partnerships 
with third countries, and is currently implementing pilot schemes in Africa and Eastern 
Europe.10 These partnerships create a commitment by the EU to increase labour market 
access in addition to assistance on border security through Frontex, the EU’s external 
border agency.
Increased political engagement on migration with Africa has also been coupled with 
an increased use in security instruments to fight illegal immigration. Since 2005, Frontex 
has begun carrying out studies on surveillance systems and risk analysis reports on African 
migratory routes, as well as implementing several border patrolling missions mostly in 
West Africa using Member State resources. Additionally, in 2006 the Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism (RRM), funded projects in Senegal and Mauritania to tackle illegal migration.11 
In July 2008, the EU adopted the Returns Directive, allowing for the detainment of illegal 
migrants for up to 18 months and a five-year ban on their return to the EU (EP 2008). It 
was the first major piece of legislation on migration passed by the co-decision procedure. 
Member States now have two years to implement the directive into national law. 
Furthermore, the Blue Card scheme also imposes penalties on employers hiring illegal 
immigrants. Finally, the European Pact has made the EU’s commitment to fight illegal 
immigration all the more evident, where two of the five priority areas for action concern 
strengthening border controls and ensuring readmission and return of illegal migrants (CEU 
2008).
Increased high-level dialogue between the EU and Africa and the various policy 
initiatives being formulated and implemented undoubtedly indicate the EU’s interest and 
intention to work in cooperation with countries of origin and transit in regulating and 
managing the migration phenomenon (Gnisci 2008: 85). The intensification of the EU’s 
efforts on the continent and the gradual establishment of a concrete framework for 
cooperation and action in migration matters, has also increased pressure on African 
governments to consider more closely how migration affects the continent. Although the 
placing of migration issues on the African agenda has largely been spurred by European 
pressure, at the same time the interests and issues of concern between the EU and Africa 
are somewhat divergent. Indeed, as the next two sections demonstrate, the African 
approach to migration has focused on enhancing the positive effects of migration for 
development, while minimising its negative effects.
10 In 2008, pilot programmes were launched with Cape Verde and Moldova, with similar schemes expected to 
be launched with Senegal and Georgia (CEU 2008a).
11 The RRM is an instrument which allows the EU to respond urgently to the needs o f countries which are 
threatened with or undergoing severe political instability or suffering from the effects o f a disaster.
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2 The African migration agenda: making migration work for development
With the growing interest on the EU side to place migration issues high on the agenda, the 
African side too has begun to consider migration as an important element to be placed on 
the national political agenda. African governments now accept that migration cannot be 
seen in isolation of development policy, and as such, they are aiming to ensure that 
migration does indeed contribute to development. It is crucial to understand just what type 
of effect migration has on the development prospects of sending countries, as “a growing 
consensus is now emerging that, although migration does not automatically lead to 
favourable effects, it can contribute to development and poverty reduction, provided an 
appropriate and consistent policy is pursued” (Zoomers et a l 2008: 4). To this extent, the 
African migration agenda has focused on four major issues: remittances, mitigating brain 
drain and encouraging the brain gain, assistance in fighting root causes, and capacity- 
building in migration management.
Perhaps the most positive effect of migration on development is visible in 
remittances, or the private transfer of funds migrants send to their countries of origin. 
Although in Africa ODA and FDI continue to represent the most significant flows of 
capital, remittances are steadily on the rise and are less volatile. Indeed, in heavy migrant- 
sending countries remittances can positively contribute to development by reducing 
poverty, stimulating economic growth, and deepening financial development (Gupta et al 
2007). Yet the transaction costs of sending remittances are high, as is the risk of deportation 
in the case of irregular migrants, discouraging regular remittance flows while reinforcing 
the use of informal channels. In countries where remittances constitute an increasingly 
important source of revenue, governments have placed the facilitation and 
institutionalisation of remittance flows high on the national agenda.
Secondly, the African migration agenda has focused on encouraging the positive 
link between migration and development through potential gains in human capital and 
promoting economic growth. Certainly, migration acts as a temporary ease on 
unemployment strains due to the departure of surplus labour (OECD Development Centre 
2007: 60-61; Adepoju 2008: 26). However, the long-term loss of skilled migrants 
specialised in sectors of particular relevance to development has led to ‘brain drain’ 
becoming a major problem for Africa, where the rate of university graduates who have 
migrated to Europe is higher than in any part of the world (Katseli et a l 2006:19). The loss 
of skilled professionals can mean a loss in productivity and knowledge, a loss of return on 
investment in training and education, and a loss in potential revenues. Furthermore, the
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brain drain mainly affects the health and education sectors through the loss of key 
professionals, making the delivery of critical social services difficult (OECD Development 
Centre 2007: 70-71). Some African governments have begun exploring ways to encourage 
migrants to return and contribute to developmental efforts in their country of origin. 
Furthermore, circular migration schemes, which can mitigate the negative effects of brain 
drain, are also very high on the African agenda. Return and circular migration are seen to 
contribute to ‘brain gain,’ or knowledge transfers and the acquisition of social capital as 
return migrants bring new skills, information, and technologies, which in turn contribute to 
stimulating economic growth through enterprise-creation and investment (Xenogiani 2006: 
21). Brain gain is also stimulated through increased engagement with the diaspora, which 
facilitates the forging of trade, investment and development links between origin and 
destination countries. Diaspora networks are often also very participative in political 
advocacy, charity and cultural exchanges (Adepoju 2008: 33). Indeed, involving the 
diaspora in development processes is yet another item of high importance on the African 
migration agenda.
Thirdly, African migrant-sending countries have also demanded more assistance in 
tackling ‘root causes’ which act as the main ‘push factors’ for migration, such as poverty, 
unemployment, political and economic instabilities, overpopulation, and even natural 
disasters. To this extent, assistance in the creation of increased employment opportunities 
in the country of origin and schemes which provide incentives for potential migrants to stay 
through higher wages and better working conditions have played an important role in 
requests for migration-related assistance. Furthermore, because institutional capacity 
required to formulate and implement migration policies is relatively weak, governments 
have also been keen on assistance towards capacity-building and training of officials to deal 
with migration issues at the domestic level (Adepoju 2008:40). Thus the need to coordinate 
migration initiatives and policies amongst relevant stakeholders in the country of origin, as 
well as institutionalising information exchanges and dialogue with destination countries is 
considered necessary for better management of migration flows.
With migration bringing potential developmental benefits to Africa, it should come 
as no surprise that in cooperation with destination countries, African governments have 
focused on the positive benefits of the phenomenon. At the all-ACP level, the 2006 
Brussels Declaration and Plan of Action outlined the ACP’s commitment to developing a 
migration dialogue with the EU, as well as identifying the need for developing a holistic 
approach to migration. At the pan-African level, since 2006 the African Union (AU) has 
started to develop a common position on African migration policies and has also
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participated in migration dialogue and initiatives with the UN and the EU. The common 
position emphasises the challenges migration poses for the continent, providing guidelines 
for member states to implement common measures advocated by national, regional, and 
international bodies. The framework focuses not only on the development aspect of 
migration, but also recognises the need to work with countries of destination to combat 
irregular migration flows (Gnisci 2008: 97-98). At the regional level several economic 
communities have begun formalising migration management dialogue. East Africa has only 
very recently begun regional dialogue on migration, holding its first workshop on migration 
in May 2008, initiated namely under the auspices of the AU’s migration framework and the 
EU-Africa migration dialogue. The region aims to launch a Regional Consultative Process 
on migration between the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as well 
as strengthening cooperation on migration with North Africa.12 The Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) established the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa 
in 2000, to facilitate regional cooperation and dialogue. This initiative has yet to develop 
concrete regional policy actions however (Oucho 2008: 66). The West African region, and 
more specifically the ECOWAS, has instead taken the lead in Africa in developing a 
regional framework for migration management. In January 2008, the ECOWAS adopted 
the Common Approach on Migration, highlighting firstly the region’s commitment to 
adopting a common legal framework and key principles on migration, and secondly setting 
out an action plan for implementing a framework on migration and development. Although 
the formulation of the Common Approach was largely influenced by EU pressure on the 
region to develop a coherent framework (Oucho 2008: 96), at the same time, the 
willingness of West African governments to engage in regional migration dialogue has 
been driven by the recognition that prospects for successful regional integration are 
strongly linked to both intra-regional and international migration dynamics present in West 
Africa. The ECOWAS has tended to focus on the linkages between migration, 
development, and regional integration (Gnisci 2008: 106).13
Although there are some differences in the various emerging agendas on the 
continent, some common factors characterise the African position on migration {Ibid.). 
Firstly, the role of EU/European influence in the formulation of an African migration 
agenda cannot be understated, as increased salience of migration and much of what is
12 IGAD is a regional development organisation in East Africa, whose members include Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.
13 ECOWAS is currently fully implementing a policy o f free movement o f  persons. The Protocol on Free 
Movement o f Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment, o f May 1979, formalised the free 
movement o f ECOWAS citizens, and is considered a trend-setter in migration policy development and 
management (Adepoju 2007). The region recognises that internal migration stemming from free movement 
can contribute positively to development and stem international migratory pressures originating in the region.
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happening at the African level has been a reaction to increased pressure from the 
international community, and especially Europe, for better joint management of migration 
(Zoomers et a l 2008:4). Secondly, the need to better coordinate and harmonise migration- 
related policies, country and regional frameworks, and international efforts at joint 
migration management, also features heavily on both agendas. The different African 
initiatives have demonstrated a clear commitment to dialogue and cooperation amongst 
relevant stakeholders. Indeed, dialogue has become ever more frequent and intense, and in 
general, African governments have been willing to engage provided the dialogue considers 
the concerns of both origin and destination countries. That said, while there has been a 
considerable acceleration of both EU and African efforts in developing a strategy of joint 
cooperation, the initial years following the Global Approach can be characterised mainly 
by “agenda setting with Africa” (Bosch and Haddad 2007: 17), or rather, in conducting 
dialogue to find a common approach to how best to deal with migration issues. Thus, “by 
furthering dialogue and co-operation with African partners to implement the global 
approach, a consensus has emerged -  theoretically, if not for the moment practically -  on 
the strategy linking ‘migration and development’” (Gnisci 2008: 85). But although the 
EU’s rhetoric on migration has clearly intensified, “it now remains to be seen whether 
concrete implementation can match the political statements made and policy initiatives 
taken” (Bosch and Haddad 2007: 17).
The EU has indeed stepped up its efforts in migration dialogue with Africa. Has this 
increased interest in cooperation with African countries offered opportunities for African 
governments to make demands on the EU? How have governments utilised these 
opportunities to meet their preferences? Has power asymmetry dictated the dialogue on 
migration, by favouring the EU’s preferences over those of African governments? In order 
to understand the opportunities that the migration dialogue has created for leverage and 
control, it is first necessary to investigate to what degree the EU itself is constrained in its 
application of an effective migration policy towards Africa, and how this might affect its 
position towards African countries. As the next section shows, institutional and political 
constraints weaken the effectiveness of the policy, and therefore the EU’s ability to engage 
fully with countries of origin in seeking cooperation on migration matters.
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3 Constraints on the EU in migration matters
The migration field represents a somewhat different issue-area than aid and trade. Although 
power asymmetry characterises relations even in this field (see above), it is not as 
pronounced as in the other two fields. Indeed, from the outset, there are two important 
differences that can be identified, which considerably alter relations between the parties. 
Firstly, the extent of a country’s dependence on the EU is far less pronounced in migration 
cooperation than in the other two fields. While in aid and trade it is namely the weaker 
country that needs to seek cooperation from the EU to meet its preferences, in migration it 
is mainly the EU that needs to seek cooperation from the country to reach its preferences. 
Secondly, the strategic importance of migration countries is much more a given than in the 
other two fields, where the countries necessarily need to construct themselves as either 
success stories or regional leaders. Given that strategic factors tend to favour weaker 
country leverage, the strategic position of migrant-sending countries is likely to affect their 
bargaining strength in migration dialogue with the EU.
Yet, even though power asymmetry in the migration field is less prevalent than in 
the other two fields, the EU does face very similar constraints in migration matters: policy 
overstretch and funding and human resource capacities; incoherence with other external 
policies; and limited coordination and harmonisation amongst the various levels of policy- 
and decision-making. These constraints limit the EU’s effectiveness in migration dialogue 
and the implementation of policies in its relations with migrant-sending countries.
3.1 Overstretch and financial and human resource capacities
The increased salience of migration issues on the EU-Africa agenda calls for 
relevant funding and policy expertise, requiring both sufficient financial and human 
resources. Yet as Bosch and Haddad (2007) rightly point out, the provision (or lack thereof) 
of adequate resources can be a significant impediment to progress. Thus a very concrete 
constraint on the EU’s ability to engage in a coordinated and coherent migration policy 
towards Africa is found in the limitations in resources which it is able and prepared to 
employ in executing the policy.
This limitation is found firstly in the resources, financial and human, being invested 
in the policy. Indeed, “progress can only be made if there are adequate resources. This is 
the case for the Commission, but also for Member States, and includes particularly the EC 
Delegations and Member State embassies where officials frequently have to cover a whole 
range of issues in addition to migration” (Bosch and Haddad 2007: 16). Although
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delegation staff are expected to engage in migration dialogue with African governments, 
the challenge in effectively managing the policy lies partly in allocating sufficient financial 
and human resources and time to the policy, and in building up relevant policy expertise to 
handle an increasingly important profile.14 Yet migration-related programmes implemented 
in the countries of origin are mostly managed through intermediary agencies such as the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) or the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). Since African governments are therefore not directly working with 
the EU, it is sometimes perceived as incompetent in handling the profile (see Chapter 7). 
Indeed, the Commission itself has acknowledged the EU’s limitations in migration 
management. In 2008 it proposed enhancing expertise on migration management through 
the exchange of information and expertise, and the training of delegation and Member 
States embassies’ staff (CEC 2008a: 12).
To induce countries of origin to engage fully and willingly with the EU’s migration 
initiatives, increased assistance dedicated to the migration and development field is 
essential, with the provision of resources to strengthen government capacities to manage 
migration on the ground (see Chapter 7). Indeed, early EU initiatives in Senegal, for 
example, were met disapprovingly by the government partially because development- 
related assistance could not be delivered due to the lack of an appropriate funding 
instrument.15 Although increased resources are now being invested in the policy and 
migration-specific financing instruments have been set up,16 the Aeneas budget was 
criticised as being too modest, and therefore limited the effectiveness of migration-related 
initiatives (Roig and Huddleston 2007: 378).
Furthermore, although the 10 EDF has integrated financial instruments dedicated 
to migration in some West African CSPs, yet regardless of the extensive migration 
discourse found in some of the CSPs, migration-related funding has been modest in 
comparison to other areas in which the EU aims to play an active role in the countries. 
Although Senegal’s CSP, for example, claims migration is a dominant theme in EU- 
Senegalese relations, and one in which the EU is committed to closer cooperation with the
tVigovernment, the migration profile was allocated €4M under the 10 EDF, less than 1 % of 
the country’s total allocation. Further to this, some interviewees have noted that the lack of 
EU expertise on migration matters (especially migration and development) is a major 
obstacle in creating a proper funding instrument for migration, while the instruments
14 Interview EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC6); Interviews EC Delegations, Accra: October 2008 (EC20), 
Dakar: June 2008 (EC 17).
15 Interview IOM, Dakar: June 2008 (12); Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S5).
16 The 2004-2008 budget for the Aeneas programme was €250M, while its follow-up programme (2007-2013) 
has increased the budget to 6384M.
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currently in place are considered limited and incomprehensive.17 The Commission is also 
aware that regardless of the many financial instruments dedicated to migration, problems 
remain in coordination amongst the different funding schemes (CEC 2008a: 13).18
Constraints due to limited resources and expertise may also arise from geographic 
expansion of the policy. Although the Global Approach initially prioritised relations with 
the Mediterranean and Africa, since 2007 it includes Eastern and South-eastern regions 
bordering the EU, and extends cooperation with countries of origin as far as Asia and the 
Middle East. In October 2008, the Communication on Strengthening the Global Approach 
noted that, “countries like India, China, Vietnam, Sri Lanka and the Philippines, as well as 
the Middle East are becoming increasingly relevant for the EU’s migration policy” (CEC 
2008a: 11), while also proposing to develop a structured migration dialogue with Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Certainly the most pressing migration movements towards 
Europe originate in the Mediterranean, Africa, and along the EU’s Eastern and 
Southeastern borders, guaranteeing that at least in the short-term, the EU’s concentration on 
these geographic areas remains. Yet, extending migration management globally will no 
doubt require additional financial and human resources. Although geographic expansion is 
essentially in line with a more comprehensive approach to migration, at the same time 
“such further broadening of the strategic horizon involves a risk of operational and 
financial overstretching” (Pastore 2007: 7), which in turn may undermine the EU’s 
effectiveness in managing such a far-reaching policy.
According to both European and African migration officials, the implementation of 
concrete policy initiatives in the field of migration can only be considered effective when 
the EU has adequate resources and policy expertise necessary to translate rhetoric into 
actions.19 As illustrated above however, the EU is at times faced with constraints in 
financial and human resource capacities in the implementation of migration policies in 
Africa. These constraints are important to take into consideration, because as posited in 
Hypothesis 2a, if the EU is unable to convert its rhetoric into practise because it lacks or is 
unwilling to employ the resources necessary, this is likely to weaken its effectiveness 
abroad and will consequently affect other countries’ expectations and perceptions of the EU 
negatively.
17 Interview IOM, Dakar: June 2008 (12); Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S5).
18 Other funding schemes include the Solidarity and Management o f Migration Flows Programme, launched 
in 2007, consisting in four financing instruments for external borders, integration, return, and refugees, and 
assists migration management in Member States with a heavy migrant inflow. Some migration initiatives 
have also been financed through the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, now replaced by the Stability Instrument.
19 Interview IOM, Dakar: June 2008 (12), Accra: September 2008 (13); Interview Senegalese government, 
Dakar: June 2008 (S5); Interview EC Delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 17).
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3.2 Policy (incoherence with other external policies
As an area that overlaps with other EU external policies, especially development,
trade, and security, and for joint migration management with countries of origin to be
effective, the EU considers coherence amongst the relevant policies and policy-actors
essential (CEC 2006c: 4; CEC 2008a: 12). Yet, although it is recognised that migration
policies overlap with and complement other policies, coherence has at times been lacking.
Trade policies and to a lesser extent development policies operate in separate policy
spheres from migration, while the justice, freedom and security policy field has instead
adopted a leadership position in the formulation and implementation of the policy. The
dominance of a security-led approach in the EU’s migration policy has led several
observers to point towards an “overwhelming presence of the ‘security rationale’
surrounding the debate concerning migration and development” (Chou 2006: 2-3). The
institutional set-up of the EU perpetuates this security-oriented approach and has led to
incoherence and a weakening of policy objectives abroad.
There are essentially two approaches which the EU can take in linking migration
and development policies: either to “use development tools to reach migration goals such as
tackling illegal immigration” or to “utilise migration tools such as legal immigration to
achieve development objectives” (Carrera and Chou 2006: 141). Importantly:
The former represents a more ‘coercive approach’ in the form of restricting or 
conditioning development aid if certain non-EU countries do not comply with 
member states’ requests on migration management and the readmission of illegal 
immigrants. The latter can be characterised as a more ‘open approach’, which seeks 
to foster the potential of ‘brain circulation’, circular migration and the positive 
effects of remittances (Carrera and Chou 2006: 141; see also Chou 2006, 2009).
In 2005, the Council adopted the Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), stressing the 
need for improvement in the coherence between twelve non-aid policy areas, including 
migration, and the EU’s development policy in order to meet the MDGs by 2015. PCD 
stressed the need to “promote the synergies between migration and development, to make 
migration a positive factor for development.” Specifically, the EU sought to promote 
managed labour migration; improve remittance flows; turn the brain drain into brain gain; 
promote responsible recruitment practises; diaspora engagement; and South-South 
migration management (CEC 2005:15). The Commission’s Communication on Migration 
and Development, released that same year, solicited similar actions, but added, 
“encouraging circular migration and facilitating return to the country of origin” as another 
priority area (CEC 2005g). In other words, in making migration policy coherent with the
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EU’s development policy, the EU aims for an ‘open approach’ by promoting migration as a 
positive factor for development in migration countries.
Although the EU has certainly demonstrated a willingness to engage positively with 
countries of origin, the growing trend in its approach towards Africa has been the 
combining of repressive measures and incentive mechanisms soliciting closer cooperation. 
Concessions given in the field of legal migration have been coupled with enhanced 
cooperation in combating illegal migration and requiring countries to sign readmission 
agreements. The pilot mobility partnership schemes, for example, go beyond simply 
offering temporary labour market access and increased assistance, by also requiring 
countries to cooperate on readmission and in the fight against illegal migration. The EU’s 
diplomatic missions to several African countries have also employed this approach, with 
dialogue intended to cover “a broad range of issues from institution and capacity building 
and effective integration of legal migrants to return and the effective implementation of 
readmission obligations” (CEU 2006a), as well as increased assistance and political 
engagement.
The integration of migration profiles and readmission clauses in agreements with 
third parties as well as recent legislation on illegal immigration “enhances the EU’s 
capacity to control and reduce unwanted immigration to its territory” (Lavenex 2002:162). 
These control elements are further coupled with instruments to induce third countries to 
cooperate with the EU in the first place, in that, “trade and aid are increasingly made 
conditional on the reduction of push factors and the readmission of persons staying illegally 
in the contracting party” (Lavenex 2002:162). Other scholars similarly argue that the EU’s 
approach has tended to be restrictive and weighted towards a politics of control (Boswell 
2003; Cespi 2006; Chou 2006; Niessen 1999; Lavenex 2002, 2007; Lavenex and Kunz 
2008; Pastore 2007; Sterkx 2008). Indeed, the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum 
clearly highlights the use of a carrot and stick approach, with the Council insisting that EU- 
level and bilateral migration agreements concluded with countries of origin should include 
clauses on legal migration and development but also on illegal immigration and 
readmission. In effect, the Pact commits the EU to undertaking not just closer cooperation 
with sending countries, but also to organising legal migration policies in accordance with 
each Member State’s needs and reception capabilities, to ensure that illegal migrants are 
sent back to their countries of origin or transit, and to increase the effectiveness of border 
controls (CEU 2008a). To this extent, “the Pact clearly heralds a more conservative 
approach to immigration ... It looks at immigration policies through the prism of ‘control 
first’, making this more explicit than in the past. Of the five areas identified for action, just
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one concerns promoting access to the EU, and even this refers to preventing illegal and 
undesirable migration” (Collett 2008). Thus while the EU seemingly promotes a 
development-friendly approach to migration management with third countries, recent 
policy developments and the combined used of coercive and incentive mechanisms point 
towards a much more restrictive approach. This shows a lack of policy coherence with 
development policy, which instead favours using foreign policy instruments, such as 
migration management, in order to achieve development goals.
Another area in which policy coherence has been limited is in linking trade and
migration. Labour market access provisions afforded in trade agreements are one way of
offering increased legal migration opportunities to developing countries. This can be done
through the liberalisation and regulation of a small subset of labour, i.e. the temporary
movement of persons across countries for the purposes of supplying services, also known
as Mode 4 in the language of the GATS. Mode 4 provides possible benefits to developing
countries through increased and facilitated circulation of labour, while the its temporary
nature encourages brain circulation. Yet partly due to the EU’s institutional set-up in trade
and migration policies, migration has not been successfully integrated into the EU’s trade
agreements with third countries. As evidenced in the non-integration of migration issues in
the EPA negotiations, the EU’s trade and migration policies actually operate in two very
separate policy spheres (Van Criekinge 2009). Although free trade agreements such as the
EPAs essentially have implications that go beyond trade, policy formulation and
0 \negotiations are headed by trade experts, without consultation of migration experts. 
Furthermore, granting Mode 4 provisions in trade agreements, and indeed legal migration 
in general, is an area of ‘shared competence’ between the Commission and the Member 
States, and one for which unanimity is required in the Council. As such, one very 
straightforward explanation for the lack of a comprehensive linkage between trade and 
migration is the insufficient level of competence afforded to trade negotiators in being able 
to give concessions in areas which go beyond trade policy and instead impinge on other 
policy areas such as migration. At the same time, this also leads to incoherence between 
policy areas which are essentially complementary.
20 Mode 4 is a subset of labour mobility in the sense that while it does refer to the movement o f workers 
across national borders, it only covers persons seeking access to foreign labour markets within specific 
sectoral roles, but not those seeking general access, nor does it apply to persons outside o f the service sector 
or to those seeking permanent employment. Although the temporary movement o f persons cannot be equated 
with international migration p er  se, as “it has none o f the cultural, social or political dimensions that are 
associated with international migration... its direct economic consequences are essentially those of migration” 
(Winters 2003: 4).
21 As noted by numerous observers, in the case of the EPA negotiations, DG Trade took a leadership position, 
with limited contact with relevant actors in other policy fields and other DGs (Baldwin 2006; Hudson 2006: 
63-64; see also Chapter 4).
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Thus, policy-making in migration continues to be dominated largely by the security 
field with limited attempts at better coordination with other relevant policies. Even in light 
of the changing discourse on migration in recent years through such developments as the 
Global Approach, mobility partnerships, and increased political dialogue with migrant- 
sending countries, the EU has continued to focus on migration control mechanisms rather 
than overcoming obstacles for greater policy coordination with other relevant fields. To this 
extent, “barriers towards greater policy coordination are sustained by the institutional set­
up of policy-making in the EU” (Lavenex and Kunz 2008:453). The external dimension of 
migration is governed mainly by the High-Level Working Group (HLWG) on Migration 
and Asylum within the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), and is 
largely composed of national justice and security officials, thus perpetuating command of 
the migration field by one policy group and posing as a barrier for linking migration to 
development and other complementary policies (Lavenex and Kunz 2008: 453-54; Chou
99 •2006: 17). Furthermore, according to Pastore, migration and development policies “are 
marked since an early phase by a certain strategic fuzziness, by intrinsic political 
ambiguities, overlapping competences, policy incoherencies and bureaucratic competition 
(including, at European level, turf battles within the European Commission)” (2007: 3). 
Indeed, one study found that for the most part, coordination on migration policy amongst 
the relevant DGs in the Commission has often been insufficient. In fact, the Commission’s 
justice branch (DG JLS) had taken a leadership role in the formulation of migration and 
development policies, often without adequate consultation with DG DEV on development 
issues, or DG RELEX on external policy coherence (Egenhofer et al 2006: 28; Sterkx 
2008: 127). To this extent, “the underlying logic is to use external cooperation as a means 
of achieving asylum and migration goals, in particular the improved management of 
migration flows and the fight against illegal immigration” (Sterkx 2008: 127). This is 
sharply in contrast to a development-oriented perspective, where the purpose is not to 
achieve migration goals through migration control, but to achieve development goals 
through migration management.
As long as migration continues to be seen mainly as a security issue rather than a 
development one, the link between migration and other complementary policies is likely to 
be limited. Furthermore, the fact that at the practical level migration has remained
22 Established in December 1998, the HLWG’s main task is the implementation of cross-pillar programmes in 
the main countries o f origin and transit. The HLWG draws up action plans for selected countries identified as 
heavy migrant sending countries, in which it stipulates short- and long-term measures for cooperation with the 
countries in the areas o f foreign policy, development policy, economic and humanitarian aid, conflict 
prevention, and combating illegal migration and organised crime. The HLWG is said to have a leading role in 
the EU’s migration policies with an external dimension (CEU 2002; Lindstrom 2005).
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embedded in the security field rather than being linked to other relevant policy fields 
demonstrates incoherence between stated policy objectives and actual implementation. The 
dominance of a security-oriented approach in migration constrains the EU’s capacity to 
engage fully with countries of origin, largely because the EU’s interests and policy 
objectives diverge from those of the countries of origin, which are instead seeking a more 
‘open’ approach to migration. Thus while in the trade field the inconsistency between trade 
and development policies affected the EU’s position in trade negotiations with African 
countries, a similar inconsistency in the migration field is likely to make countries less 
willing to engage with the EU, especially given the limited dependence and their strategic 
importance in this field. Thus, as posited in Chapter 1, inconsistency between external 
policies thus constrains the EU’s power to impose its preferences on African countries, 
while in turn shaping their strategies vis-a-vis the EU.
3.3 Coordination between the EC and the Member States
While Member States can agree on the benefits of developing a common migration
policy or a common position on migration, separate national policy agendas restrict an
effective and practical approach at the EU level (Sterkx 2008: 126-128).23 Although in
some areas the EU’s migration policy is becoming increasingly communitarised, EU
Member States have kept a firm grip on the external aspects of the policy, especially in
relation to cooperation on migration with third countries. This has created tensions between
the supranational and intergovernmental levels of policy-making and implementation of the
policy. These tensions, in turn, limit the EU’s ability to promote its policy objectives
abroad, as a lack of coordination between the different levels has weakened the potential
effectiveness of engaging with migration countries.
Firstly, policy coherence has suffered not only because of particular institutional
problems faced within the Commission (see above), but perhaps more importantly because
of the Member States’ role in shaping and orienting the policy according to their
preferences. Indeed:
Policy coherence between member states and the different instruments and DGs of 
the European Commission is at times lacking. This is particularly true on issues like 
migration, for which there are considerably contrasting policy agendas between 
justice and home affairs ministries and external relations and development ministries 
... The crucial determiners of European migration policies, however, remain the 
member states. It is the member states that have provided the main impetus for the 
incorporation of migration policies into EU external relations (Higazi 2005: 5).
23 Interviews IOM, Dakar: June 2008 (II; 12); Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S5).
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Not only do Member States steer policy orientations in migration, their approach has also 
tended to be geared towards security and migration control. According to Sterkx (2008), 
Member States have pushed for a security approach to migration rather than for policy 
coherence in external cooperation, evidencing the extent to which they tend to be 
concerned first and foremost with migration management for the purposes of migration 
control. This is to the disadvantage of the Commission’s preferences, where DG DEV and 
RELEX have generally expressed discontent with the JLS authority over the migration 
agenda, which is seen to undermine policy coherence (Sterkx 2008: 126-127; Lavenex 
2007; Boswell 2003: 632-635). Commission interviewees confirm that in general, Member 
States have adopted a much more restrictive approach towards third countries as opposed to 
the Commission, leading to a constant struggle for compromise on how the policy should 
progress, and more specifically, to what extent it should adopt a ‘coercive’ as opposed to an 
‘open’ approach to migration.24 Thus while the EU’s objective has been to pursue “a rather 
innovative (at least on paper) common migration policy compared to the tradition of its 
member states”, the policy “has encountered considerable difficulties in shaking off the 
prevailing approach at the level of its Member States, which often manifests itself in an 
opposite manner, that is, as biased towards restrictiveness and weighted towards controls, 
sectoral, reactive and essentially unilateral” (CeSPI/SID 2006: 5). Indeed, Gnisci reiterates 
this point well, when she writes that, “the EU’s global approach seeks to be integrated, 
balanced, negotiated and consensual. It shows that migration is now one of the strategic 
domains of negotiation between the Community and third countries. From the operational 
perspective, however, the ‘control’ issue is overriding and liberating national agendas from 
it is often difficult” (2008: 85).
Secondly, delegating competence in migration matters to the EU level is delicate 
because of the careful balance to be struck between cooperation amongst Member States 
and between Member States and the Commission on the one hand, and maintaining 
national sovereignty over migration matters, on the other (Brady 2008:18)25 Indeed, while 
cooperation and coherence in migration policy is encouraged, some Member States have 
been apprehensive towards delegating further competence to the EU. Even those Member 
States which have been the main architects of the EU’s emerging migration policy (namely 
France, Spain, and to a lesser extent, the Netherlands and the UK) have nevertheless
24 Interview EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC6); Interviews EC Delegations, Accra: October 2008 (EC20), 
Dakar: June 2008 (EC 17).
25 The securitisation o f some Member State migration policies post 9/11 has reinforced the link between 
migration and security. While this has not necessarily led to limitations on migration quotas, it has to some 
extent led to a reassertion o f national autonomy over domestic borders (Chisti 2002).
26 For example, in the formulation of a common migration policy, Denmark has an opt-out, and therefore does 
not participate in decision-making, while the UK and Ireland participate only on a case-by-case basis.
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continued to operate separate bilateral migration schemes. This bilateral element has led to 
EU efforts in cooperation with third countries being duplicated or surpassed, and to some 
extent even undermined (Sterkx 2008:126).27 For example, although the Commission has 
been given the mandate to negotiate readmission agreements with third countries on behalf 
of the EU, Member States also conduct bilateral talks with migration countries. 
Accordingly, “third countries do not understand this situation of parallel negotiations, and 
take advantage of it, which often results in the deferral of Community negotiations” {Ibid. : 
126).
This overlap of efforts in third countries goes further than readmission agreements 
however, and extends into the EU’s efforts at becoming more active in migration and 
development. A limited set of EU countries, namely France, Spain, and to lesser extent 
Italy, are managing African migration flows through ‘second-generation migration 
agreements. ’ These agreements apply a carrot and stick approach to managing migration 
flows, by giving labour access, financial or technical assistance, or investment 
opportunities to migration countries, in exchange for their cooperation in fighting illegal
•  • •  *}Q •migration and readmission. Bilateral agreements thus address both the individual Member 
States’ labour needs as well as some of the root causes of migration in third countries, 
while providing incentives for closer cooperation in controlling irregular migration 
(Panizzon 2008). Yet although this approach is similar to the EU’s approach, coordination 
between the Member States and the Commission (or in this case the delegation) is often 
inadequate. This often perpetuates an image of the EU as unable to adequately deal with 
migration matters, as opposed to individual Member States, whose bilateral efforts are seen 
as more relevant.30
A lack of coordination weakens the effectiveness and strength of the EU’s total 
efforts in third countries. As Sterkx rightly points out:
The premise of [the EU] is that external actions need to be coherent in order to have
any impact. If not, the position of the EU vis-a-vis third countries will be
27 Interview EC Delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 17); Interview IOM, Dakar: June 2008 (12); Interviews 
Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G6; G9).
28 As opposed to ‘first-generation’ schemes which can be classified mainly as guest worker programmes or 
working-holiday makers schemes.
29 Through its ‘co-development’ programme introduced in 2003, France has signed several Migration and Co­
development Agreements with African countries which seek to create channels for legal migration, fight 
illegal migration, and assist in the development o f sending countries. The programme also aims to mobilise 
diasporas, by facilitating productive investment, implementing local projects, and assisting return migrants. 
Since 2006 the Spanish government has signed Migration Cooperation Agreements with several African 
countries, which link control mechanisms, such as the deployment o f Spanish forces in the countries’ 
territorial waters in order to control illegal migration, with a development and trade dimension, by offering 
technical capacity-building assistance, equipment, and increased labour access as an incentive for 
cooperation.
30 Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S5).
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substantially weakened. However, the starting point of external action on asylum 
and migration is a division of competencies across several policy areas, a varied 
degree of communitarisation, and different perspectives on how to achieve policy 
coherence ... This reality causes overlap and cultivates a struggle for policy 
ownership which, in the end, is likely to damage the coherence and firmness of 
external action (2008: 125).
Thus coherence and coordination in the EU’s migration policy is undermined because of 
“the exclusion of key institutional actors who prefer the comprehensive approach from the 
decision-making process ... [and] the isolation of decision-making power within an 
institutional setting which favours the coercive strategy” (Chou 2006: 3). Inadequate 
consultation on the part of the security branch with other relevant policy actors has led to 
the dominance of a restrictive and limited approach being adopted at the EU level. 
Furthermore, tensions between the supranational and intergovernmental levels which 
characterise the EU’s migration policy have led to further perpetuating a security-oriented 
approach over a more comprehensive approach in migration cooperation with countries of 
origin. The fact that Member States have continued operating migration policies at the 
bilateral level while the EU level remains inadequately equipped to implement the policy, 
has undermined the total EU effort in engaging with third countries.
Have these constraints created opportunities for migrant-sending countries to put 
forward their own migration agendas? This question is particularly important, because it 
evidences, as assumed in Chapter 1, that when the EU’s actions are perceived as 
inadequate, uncoordinated, and/or incoherent, it affects actors’ perceptions of the EU to act 
as single unitary actor, and may even allow them to seek out interlocutors or actors more 
sympathetic to their position within the EU. Indeed as the next chapter will show, this is 
precisely the strategy the Senegalese government adopted in conducting migration dialogue 
with the EU and Member States.
4 Conclusion
This chapter has traced the evolution of the EU’s migration policy towards Africa. It was 
argued that although the EU has become increasingly active in promoting and instigating 
dialogue and policy initiatives at the African level, EU and African interests in migration 
do not always converge. Secondly, the chapter also outlined the extent to which the EU is 
constrained in fully engaging in migration dialogue with external actors because of three 
main reasons: financial and capacity constraints, inadequate policy coherence amongst 
migration and overlapping external policies, and a lack of overall coordination amongst the
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different decision-making and policy-implementing structures comprising the EU’s 
external relations.
Throughout the thesis, it has been demonstrated that power asymmetry between the 
EU and Africa is an overriding characteristic in relations between the two sides. In the aid 
and trade fields this asymmetry was found to be particularly prevalent, in that the EU had 
the ultimate decision-making power, considerably low interest in cooperating with Africa, 
and as the significantly wealthier actor, it could play on the power of the purse to either 
induce or refuse cooperation. Yet careful consideration of the context in which both aid and 
trade relations take place, essentially established that both parties’ were limited in their 
capacities and opportunities for negotiating and administering relations according to their 
preferences. Although these constraints do not necessarily create a level playing-field 
between the EU and Africa, the extent to which the EU was constrained affected 
effectiveness in dealing with African countries and their perceptions of the EU. As 
established in Chapter 1, power is therefore seen as operating through an interactive, 
dynamic, and intersubjective process in which the exercise of leverage is both contextual 
and relational. Given the different contexts in which power asymmetry operates in relations 
between the EU and Africa, does the same scenario play out in migration dialogue? Have 
the EU’s coordination and coherence gaps, provided migration countries with increased 
scope to steer dialogue and policy actions away from a purely restrictive framework, 
towards one which considers their concerns? The following chapter will explore these 
questions through a comparative case study of the strategies that Ghana and Senegal have 
adopted in migration dialogue with the EU.
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Chapter 7
Exercising leverage and control in migration cooperation: 
Senegal and Ghana’s relations with the EU in migration matters
This chapter discusses how the EU’s migration policy has affected the scope of influence of 
migration countries in West Africa, focusing specifically on two important countries of 
emigration towards Europe, Senegal and Ghana. The recent, yet sudden increase in the 
intensity of migratory movement between the continents has encouraged a renewed 
political engagement with Africa. Indeed, “the growing phenomenon of transit migration 
towards EU territory has given new strategic importance to certain African (especially 
Sahelian) countries ... This new strategic importance has favoured unprecedented forms of 
cooperation” (CeSPI/SID 2006: 10). The need for joint cooperation with migration 
countries in order to stem migratory flows challenges the traditional relationship between 
weak and strong actors and the effectiveness of coercive instruments to induce compliance. 
While developments in the EU’s migration policy sphere have tended to combine 
repressive measures with incentive instruments, African governments have instead focused 
largely on enhancing the developmental prospects that migration provides. Regardless of 
these diverging strategies, it is now widely recognised that migration can only be 
effectively managed through mutual engagement from sending and destination countries. 
The necessity for cooperation creates a more balanced relationship in which both parties 
can make demands and concessions.
This chapter will argue that some African governments, aware of the constraints the 
EU faces in effectively engaging in migration dialogue with them, have been successful 
firstly in repositioning the migration agenda in favour of development rather than purely 
focusing on migration control, and secondly, that they have been successful in driving and 
establishing ownership over joint cooperation schemes. While the EU’s migration policy 
towards Africa was characterised as geared exclusively towards a politics of control, the 
evolution of the migration agenda towards a more comprehensive approach considering the 
interests of destination countries can be partially attributed to the leadership of some 
African governments.
The case studies of Senegal and Ghana illustrate important trends emerging in the 
EU’s relations with migrant-sending countries in Africa. The first section of the chapter 
presents some basic migration trends between Ghana and Senegal, to facilitate comparison
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in later sections of the chapter. The second section considers the Senegalese case. It 
demonstrates that while the EU is constrained in fully engaging with the government, EU 
Member States have instead engaged intensely with Senegal in order to establish an agenda 
and policy framework for joint migration management. At the same time that Senegal has 
negotiated bilaterally, it has exerted non-compliant behaviour in dialogue with the EU, thus 
stalling negotiations until agreement can be found. In doing so, it has contributed to 
repositioning the EU migration agenda from one focused exclusively on migration control, 
to one which more closely considers the government’s concerns. Furthermore, the 
Senegalese government has adopted a pro-active approach in shaping the national 
migration debate, leading to increased ownership over its migration agenda in relation to 
external actors, namely the EU. The third section considers the Ghanaian case. In Ghana, 
the EU and the Member States have been less active, with efforts generally uncoordinated, 
narrow, and lacking in intensity. Furthermore, although EU engagement has generally been 
positively perceived, the government has shown a less pro-active approach in its relations 
with both the EU and Member States. The limited role of both the EU and the government 
has led to other international agencies playing a much more decisive role in migration 
policy formulation and implementation. As a result, the Ghanaian government has 
identified these agencies as the main actors shaping and leading national migration debates, 
and until recently, adopted a rather consensual approach to joint migration management 
with the EU.
The two cases demonstrate the constraints the EU faces in engaging with migration 
countries in migration dialogue and policy formulation, and perhaps more importantly, the 
extent to which these constraints can affect the EU’s policy objectives. Secondly, they 
demonstrate the extent to which a country’s perception of these constraints as well as the 
perception that the government holds of itself vis-a-vis the EU significantly shapes its 
position and strategies in conducting migration dialogue. Finally, they show how similar 
contextual factors present in the aid and trade policy areas, also operate in the migration 
context to allow for weaker actor leverage and control. To this extent, this final empirical 
chapter, contributes to confirming the notion that power operates through an interactive, 
dynamic, and intersubjective process in which contextual factors help determine the 
exercise of leverage and control of a weaker actor vis-a-vis a stronger actor.
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1 Comparative migration trends in Senegal and Ghana
Both Senegal and Ghana have experienced a heavy migrant outflow since the 1990s. Aside 
from Nigeria, they are the two sub-Saharan African countries with the highest contribution 
to migratory flows to OECD countries (DELSA-OECD 2004; see also Table 7.1). 
Traditionally a country hosting a large number of West African migrants in the 1970s, 
Senegal has been transformed into a country of outward migration. An intense economic 
crisis in the 1990s which negatively impacted employment and private sector development, 
combined with high population growth, have acted as push factors (Adepoju 2009: 21). 
While “international migration was initially a reaction to this crisis situation, it has 
meanwhile become the standard model for social advancement” (Gerdes 2007:2). Migrants 
have focused on Europe as their main destination, with France traditionally the country of 
choice (see Table 7.1). Since the late 1990s, migration flows from Senegal to Europe have 
increased rapidly, with Spain in particular experiencing a significant influx of migrants (see 
Figure 7.1). In the 1980s and 1990s Ghana moved from being mainly a country of 
immigration, hosting mostly West African migrants, to one of heavy emigration due to 
economic and political instabilities (Quartey 2006: 2-3). While the United States is the 
primary destination for Ghanaians, the UK, Southern Europe and France also host a 
considerable proportion of migrants (see Table 7.1).
Table 7.1: Migrants of selected West African countries in OECD countries, (2005)
Cape
Verde
France UK
Spain,
Italy,
Greece,
Portugal
Other
Europe
North
America
Japan,
Australia,
New
Zealand
Number
of
Emigrants
%
Pop­
ulation
(2000
UNPD)
% of W. 
Africans 
in 
OECD 
countries
12,404 328 50,543 13,272 27,411 28 103,986 23.1 9
Ghana 4,376 56,112 21,121 19,954 84,274 3,605 189,442 1.0 16
Mali 40,222 121 3,622 784 3,680 79 48,508 0.4 4
Mauritania 9,591 28 3,993 884 2,400 21 16,917 0.6 1
Nigeria 2,563 88,378 26,435 22,361 150,917 3,190 293,844 0.2 25
Senegal 82,116 723 41,476 3,781 12,739 299 141,134 1.4 12
Source: OECD Migration Database, 2005; IOM 2008
In terms of skill level of migrants there are some significant disparities between Senegal 
and Ghana.1 Most Senegalese migrants are considered low skilled, while a significantly 
lower proportion are highly skilled or medium skilled. Ghana, on the other hand, has a
1 Highly skilled refers to those with academic qualification up to the tertiary level; medium skilled refers to 
those with education up to upper secondary and post-secondary non tertiary; low skilled refers to those with 
less than upper secondary.
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much more proportionate distribution of skill levels amongst its migrants, where the 
majority are either medium or highly skilled, rather than low skilled (see Table 7.2).
Table 7.2: Skill characteristics of Senegalese and Ghanaian migrants, (2005)
Senegal Ghana
Characteristics % of migrants
H ighly skilled 19 31
Medium Skilled 24 38
Low  Skilled 57 27
Unknown 0.5 4
Source: OECD Migration Database 2005
Both countries have experienced brain drain. In Ghana, the number of highly skilled 
nationals that have left the country is exceptional and a significant problem. In 2005, Ghana 
ranked second in the world, as a country with a population over 5 million, in terms of the 
departure of highly-skilled nationals, with 47% choosing to migrate upon completion of 
their education. The problem is not nearly as significant for Senegal, where 17% of its 
tertiary-educated nationals have migrated (Ozden and Schiff 2006).
Senegal and Ghana have also contributed significantly to the influx of irregular 
migrants entering Europe. Although data on this is very tentative, and precise number are 
not readily available, some observations should be made. Senegalese migration has mostly 
taken the form of irregular migration, with migrants either overstaying on temporary visas, 
and to a lesser extent, entering the EU illegally via clandestine overland or sea routes 
(Gerdes 2007: 6; OECD 2008b: 39). Stricter controls along the overland routes in Northern 
Africa have also transformed Senegal into transit country, with a significant number of 
non-Senegalese migrants coming through Senegal in order to depart from its coastline 
(Spaan and van Moppes 2006: 14; Adepoju 2009: 21). In 2006, the irregular migration 
situation intensified significantly with the amount of migrants arriving on Spain’s Canary 
Islands increasing six-fold from the previous year,2 with half believed to be of Senegalese 
origin (Gerdes 2007: 6; see Figure 7.1).3
2 In 2005,4,800 migrants arrived on the Canaries. In 2006 this increased to 32,000 arrivals (Gerdes 2007:6).
3 Many o f these operations were carried out by Senegalese fishermen. Over-fishing in Senegalese waters has 
caused for a significant loss of employment opportunities for fishermen. Faced with this loss of income, some 
fishermen have become intermediaries in transporting migrants to Europe. Since 2006, European fishing 
fleets are no longer allowed to operate in Senegalese waters as the government chose not to renew its fisheries 
agreement with the EU (Ndione and Broekhuis 2006: 5; Gerdes 2007: 8).
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Figure 7.1: Trends in Senegalese Migration to Major Destinations, (1999-2006)
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Ghana also contributes to irregular migration with mostly low skilled migrants using 
migration routes via Morocco and Libya to reach Europe (mainly Italy or Malta) or via the 
West African coastline to reach the Canaries. However, Ghana’s contributions to irregular 
migration are not considered as significant as those of Senegal. Two (tentative) examples
number of illegal Senegalese migrants amounted to around 1,300, while illegal Ghanaians 
amounted to around 800 (Chiuri et al. 2005: 20); also in 2000, some 20% of Ghanaian 
migrants in Italy admitted to entering illegally or overstaying, while 50% of Senegalese in 
Spain admitted to this (NIDI/Eurostat 2001).
Lastly, both Senegal and Ghana are source, transit and destination countries for 
human trafficking (CEC-GoG 2006; Spaan and van Moppes 2006: 11; Adepoju 2005). 
Ghanaian women and children are trafficked to neighbouring countries for labour and 
prostitution, and to EU countries (mostly the UK and the Netherlands) for prostitution. 
Ghana also acts as a major transit country for Nigerian women being trafficked to Europe 
(Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands) for prostitution (Adepoju 2005: 78). Senegal is also a 
source and transit country for women trafficked to Europe and other parts of Africa. It is 
also a destination country for child trafficking from Mali and Guinea {Ibid. : 78).
The next sections will refer to these trends in Senegalese and Ghanaian migration in 
analysing the EU’s efforts in the two countries in establishing a joint framework for 
migration management.
give some indication of this: in 2000, the Italian Ministry of Interior estimated that the
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2 Senegal
The Senegalese government considers migration a positive phenomenon, bringing 
enormous benefits both at the level of the state and the individual migrant. The 
government’s migration agenda has taken a very strong orientation towards a migration- 
development nexus, by focusing primarily on the potential positive effects of migration. 
The government’s priorities for migration can be characterised as follows:4 Firstly, the 
government aims to engage closely with the Senegalese diaspora and involve them in the 
country’s development. Indeed, diaspora investments have been crucial to the expansion of 
the country’s infrastructure, and have created important knowledge transfers through 
cultural, scientific, and educational exchanges (Panizzon 2008a: 6-10; Ndione and 
Broekhuis 2006: 14; Tall 2002: 562-573). Secondly, the government also recognises the 
importance of facilitating remittance flows and orientating these towards productive use 
and investment in development (Tall 2002: 562-573; Tall 2005; Wabgou 2008: 158; 
Jettinger 2005).5 The promotion of official money transfers and their use for economic 
investments have become part of the national development strategy, demonstrating the 
government’s eagerness to channel sources of income provided by the diaspora towards 
investment and development (Ndione and Broekhuis 2006: 13). Thirdly, the Senegalese 
government is keen to encourage the return of migrants and to facilitate their reintegration 
into the economy so as to enhance technical expertise and build-up a return migrant 
knowledge-base. This is seen as positively contributing to the development of the country 
by generating brain gain and creating entrepreneurship opportunities that further generate 
employment and capital. At the same time, the government also recognises the successful 
reintegration of repatriated migrants as a priority item on its migration agenda (Gerdes 
2007: 7). Fourthly, mitigating the brain drain and avoiding the departure of skilled and 
semi-skilled labour by providing increased incentives for potential migrants to remain in 
Senegal is another important element on the government’s agenda. As such, the 
government is interested in developing programmes that favour skill retention through 
increasing training and employment opportunities, thus tackling one of the primary push 
factors for the heavy migration outflow and the consequent brain drain (Panizzon 2008a:
19-20). Lastly, the government has been active in requesting funding for capacity-building 
and increasing ownership of its migration phenomenon. This entails strengthening
4 Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S5); Interview IOM, Dakar: June 2008 (12).
5 Indeed, “given the increase in migrant remittances and their growing significance for the national economy, 
the topic o f migration has gradually found its way into the political discourse” (Gerdes 2007: 4). In 2007, 
Senegal was the fourth largest recipient of remittances in sub-Saharan Africa, estimated to be around 7% of 
the country’s GDP between 2000 and 2005 (Gupta et al. 2007).
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government capacity to regulate migration flows both by tackling irregular migration as 
well as creating legal opportunities for regular migration and increased employment 
opportunities at the national level.
In general, Senegal has been pro-active in developing a national migration agenda, 
and has actively embraced the migration phenomenon as an opportunity for furthering its 
development prospects (Ndione and Broekhuis; Panizzon 2008a, 2008b).6 According to 
Wabgou:
Senegal is one o f  the few  countries in sub-Saharan Africa to have addressed the 
migration o f  its people as a foreign and public policy issue and to have started 
dealing with these migratory flow s as a global reality in Africa, Europe and 
America. Across the country, the government has begun taking steps to promote 
migration policies, and to improve cooperation in migration management (2008:
141).
Furthermore, the government cooperates with destination countries in managing migration 
flows, so long as this takes into consideration the country’s developmental concerns, and
n
entails a strengthening of the government’s own capacity to manage migration. The extent 
of the dialogue and policy actions that have ensued between Senegal and the EU in the area 
of migration are further explored in the following two sections. The first section indicates 
the main developments in the evolving joint migration strategy between the two sides, 
while the second section investigates both sides’ strategies vis-a-vis one another in 
cooperation on migration management.
2.1 The EU -  Senegal migration dialogue and policy actions
Initial dialogue and policy developments on migration between Senegal and the EU 
were characterised by systematic divergence in interests and views. In 2006, the EU began 
its interactions with Senegal by pushing a migration agenda oriented largely towards 
control rather than development, or even joint migration management. Thus the 
fundamental interest in conducting dialogue with Senegal was mainly to find a common 
position on stemming illegal migration and implementing control measures, and secondly 
to find agreement on readmission and border controls.8 In May 2006, the EU mandated the 
Commission to send its first diplomatic mission to Senegal in order to initiate dialogue with 
the government under Cotonou’s Article 13. Although the Agreement had been signed and 
ratified in 2001, the sending of the mission nearly five years later was highly indicative of 
the interests of the EU in dealing with migration issues in Senegal, as the mission was sent
6 Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S5); Interviews IOM, Dakar: June 2008 (II; 12).
1 Ibid. (S5).
8 Ibid. (S5); Interviews IOM, Dakar: June 2008 (12).
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in the same year that Europe was facing a major migration influx from Africa, with West 
Africa, and Senegal in particular, positioned as a major point of origin and transit for 
clandestine migrants (see Figure 7.2). As is evident from the initial strategies employed in 
Senegal, the EU’s efforts there were concentrated on controlling this influx and seeking 
cooperation from the Senegalese government in averting departures.
Figure 7.2: Estimates of apprehended irregular migrants in Spain and Italy,
(1993-2008)
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Just three months after the dialogue was launched, the EU deployed the first 
Frontex missions (termed HERA) in Senegalese waters in September 2006, with Spanish 
financial support, and with missions continuing to operate well into 2009.9 Closely 
following the Frontex mission was the decision to implement the Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism (RRM) in April 2007, signalling the first time this emergency instrument was 
used to tackle irregular migration. Following dialogue with the Senegalese government, the 
RRM was employed as a means to assist national authorities, in cooperation with the IOM, 
to enhance their migration management capacities and combat irregular immigration.10
9 The missions are mainly run by Spanish border patrols services, in joint cooperation with France, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Italy and Senegal. During the course o f  the missions, the flow o f irregular migration is 
said to have decreased drastically, with both Spain and Senegal declaring the mission as largely successful 
(CEC 2006a; CEC 2006c; FRONTEX 2007; Panizzon 2008a: 29).
10 The RRM provided Senegalese naval forces with the equipment and training necessary to divert and avert 
departures from Senegal; it supported the reinsertion o f  repatriated irregular migrants and assisted in the 
voluntarily return; and it provided assistance to conduct com parative research on legislation in Senegal, 
Spain, France and Italy concerning the protection o f unaccompanied minor migrants, migrant rights, and other 
legal issues related to illegal migration (CEC-IOM 2007; Panizzon 2008: 29-30).
229
In addition, from 2004 to 2006 the Aeneas programme funded seven different 
projects in Senegal.11 Although the Aeneas projects strike some balance between migration 
control and management, the migration-development nexus was not prioritised in initial 
funding initiatives in Senegal. Indeed, majority of the projects focused mainly on 
combating illegal migration and strengthening Senegalese and regional capacity in this 
respect. Furthermore, all projects that concerned legal migration or migration management 
also included an element of migration control, and moreover were implemented 
commencing in late 2007 or early 2008, while projects focusing on irregular migration 
were mostly implemented in late 2005 and early 2006.
The initial phase of the EU’s migration dialogue and policy actions with Senegal 
therefore was oriented towards migration control and combating illegal immigration. To 
this end, both Senegalese and EU officials characterised initial dialogue between the two 
sides as negative, with progress being slow and difficult.12 On the one hand, the EU 
considered the Senegalese government to be largely uninterested in the dialogue, especially 
with regards to managing irregular migration. Secondly, an internal power struggle within 
the Senegalese government over which ministry would be in charge of migration policies 
(i.e. the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), made it unclear with whom 
dialogue should be conducted, thus minimising the impact of migration-oriented initiatives. 
Thirdly, the limitations in the dialogue were also partially due to the EU’s own constraints 
in undertaking a migration agenda. The EU delegation, which was mandated to follow-up 
on the dialogue, has admitted that it lacked the capacity, expertise and human resources 
necessary to carry-out this task effectively.13
On the other hand, according to the Senegalese side, the EU had initiated the 
dialogue without adequate concern for the government’s interests. For example, the initial 
use of the RRM, although deemed largely successful by both the EU and Senegal, was 
criticised as having undermined government ownership and capacity-building efforts in 
migration management.14 Indeed, the RRM was employed as a short-term financing 
instrument almost immediately following initial dialogue, after which the EU Development
11 The seven projects were: “Reinforcing and sustaining dialogue and management of irregular and transit 
migration in the Maghreb and originating in West Africa”; “Project Seahorse” and “Project Seahorse 
Network”, implemented by the Spanish Guardia Civil; the “Law enforcement capacity building project for 
West Africa in preventing and combating the smuggling o f migrants”; “Fit for Europe -  Training for positive 
migration”; “Implementation o f the Rabat Action Plan”; “Migration profiles in selected countries in West and 
Central Africa: A tool for strategic policy development”; and “Facilitating a coherent migration management 
approach in Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Libya by promoting legal migration and preventing further irregular 
migration” (CEC 2007).
12 Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S5); Interview EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC6); 
Interview EC Delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 17); Interview IOM, Dakar: June 2008 (12).
13 Interview EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC6); Interview EC Delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 17).
14 Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S5); Interview IOM, Dakar: June 2008 (12).
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Commissioner, Louis Michel, assured the government that long-term funding would be 
provided in order to assist in migration management. This assurance was made however, 
without a funding mechanism in place which could be immediately employed, hence the 
use of the RRM. Furthermore, initial dialogue under Article 13, under which the 
Commission has the competence to negotiate readmission agreements with ACP countries, 
was also tense and difficult. Senegal saw this as the EU unilaterally soliciting the signing of 
such an agreement without an adequate incentive mechanism in place for it to benefit from 
agreeing to an EU-wide readmission policy.15 This led to a series of difficult negotiations 
between the Commission and the Foreign Affairs Ministry on which migrants should be 
considered for readmission (namely only Senegalese nationals or also transit migrants).16
Most recently however, a shift in the dialogue as well as acceleration in positive
1 Hengagement with the government’s migration strategy has seemingly taken effect. In 
September 2007, the EU and Senegal released a joint declaration following the conclusion 
of the fourth migration dialogue meeting since 2006, noting that recent dialogue had proven 
fruitful, with agendas largely converging. Conclusions were made on three major issues: 
migration management, migration and development, and ongoing processes. Although the 
migration dialogue has continued to take account of illegal migration issues, the declaration 
indicates a definite shift in the scope of the dialogue by considering issues of concern to 
origin countries, such as legal migration, the nexus between migration and development, 
and domestic capacity-building (EU-GoS 2007). Recent policy initiatives have also 
demonstrated a closer convergence of agendas between the EU and Senegal. In June 2008, 
the Council mandated the Commission to commence negotiations with the government on 
an EU-wide mobility partnership (CEU 2008a). The mobility partnership essentially 
operates on incentive-based mechanisms, by granting increased labour market access in 
exchange for cooperation in fighting illegal immigration. At the same time it represents a 
shift from a purely unilateral control-oriented approach because it aims at joint cooperation 
in making migration a positive factor for development by facilitating measures on legal and 
circular migration between the country and those Member States interested in participating 
in the scheme (Chou 2009). Thus far the only pilot mobility programme to have been 
launched in Africa is with Cape Verde. Although the Cape Verdian case provides some
15 Roig and Huddleston (2007) argue that third-country willingness to sign readmission agreements is 
dependent on the integration o f incentives such as visa facilitation or even EU membership prospects. Since 
these incentives cannot be offered to many migrant-sending countries with whom the EC is conducting 
negotiations, readmission agreements are likely to remain stalled.
16 Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S5).
17 Interview EC Delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 17); Interviews IOM, Dakar: June 2008 (II; 12).
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insight in to what a mobility partnership might entail for Senegal, it is noteworthy that the 
countries face very different socio-economic situations. While Cape Verde has the 
strongest economy in West Africa, it has a low population, and poverty is not as prevalent 
thus constituting a “low risk for the EU, regarding mass migration,” yet Senegal is a low- 
income country with a large and mostly poor population (Affol News 2008). The fact that 
the EU is willing to enter into this type of agreement with Senegal is therefore significant to 
the interests it has in Senegal, and the importance that Senegal has gained in the EU’s 
migration agenda.
The evolution of the dialogue is also evident in the intervention strategy adopted for 
sub-Saharan Africa concerning financial programming from 2007 to 2010 for the 
programme replacing Aeneas. In addition to fighting illegal immigration and promoting 
readmission, the new thematic programme prioritises regional and trans-border migration 
dialogue and cooperation, strengthening domestic administrative capacity in migration 
management, implementing labour migration policies, fostering links between migration 
and development, and has even included migrant rights protection as a priority area (CEC 
2007b). Thus, according to observers, between 2007 and 2008, the migration dialogue 
between Senegal and the EU has moved from a purely migration control-oriented agenda, 
largely imposed by the EU, to one which more closely considers Senegal’s concerns and 
interests as a country of origin and transit. Accordingly, negotiations on legal labour 
migration schemes; increased dialogue on thematic areas, not only control; increased 
funding for labour migration and circular migration; as well as engagement from Member 
States to negotiate labour migration deals with Senegal are an indication of this changing 
framework. At the same time, observers also note that as the framework has moved from 
migration control to a more comprehensive approach of migration management, Senegal 
has also become more flexible on contentious issues such as readmission and cooperation 
on border management.19
Dialogue, policy actions, and cooperation on joint migration management between 
the EU and Senegal have evolved and intensified significantly since engagement 
commenced in 2006. The initially tense and difficult dialogue is said to have moved
18 Proposed initiatives in Cape Verde include the promotion o f legal mobility opportunities, facilitating legal 
migration, supporting return and reintegration, and ensuring effective migration management. A Migration 
Information Centre launched January 2009, provides information on legal migration opportunities in the EU 
and offers pre-departure preparation and training services, assists in strengthening capacities o f the national 
authorities, and provides information and assistance to return migrants The partnership will also facilitate 
cooperation in the area o f border management, security of identity and travel documents, the fight against 
human trafficking, as well as return and readmission of illegal migrants. The Mobility Partnership also 
addressed the links between migration and development, diaspora contributions, and facilitation of remittance 
transfers (CEC 2008; Chou 2009).
19 Interview IOM, Dakar: June 2008 (II).
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forward, where both the EU and the Senegalese government are now able to promote their 
own interests and policy agendas vis-a-vis one another. The mobility partnership currently 
under negotiation, for example, signals a significant step towards a more comprehensive 
framework for joint migration management between the two sides. In order to better 
understand the reasons behind this intensification and acceleration of cooperative efforts in 
the migration field, the following section will trace the strategies that both the EU and 
Senegal have adopted. It will become evident that a considerable pro-activeness on the 
Senegalese side, coupled with intense EU Member State efforts to establish a 
comprehensive framework have been crucial elements in moving forward the EU- 
Senegalese migration framework.
2.2 Senegalese leverage and control vis-a-vis the EU
On the one hand, movement towards a more comprehensive approach in migration 
management between the EU and Senegal can be partially attributed to a calming situation 
in illegal migration. The actions taken in 2006 at the international, EU, and bilateral levels
contributed to a significant reduction in the number of irregular migrants arriving in Europe
00in 2007. Thus the shift from an emergency situation to one of relative normality allowed
01for an increased visibility of development aspects in the EU-Senegal migration dialogue. 
On the other hand, the evolution of the dialogue can also be characterised by an increased 
Senegalese pro-activeness in establishing ownership over its migration phenomenon. While 
engagement with foreign actors is considered essential to the country’s developmental 
prospects, as has been demonstrated already in the aid and trade chapters, the concept of 
‘ownership’ strongly prevails in all policy spheres, and migration is no different. As such, 
the government has keenly focused on enhancing capacity in migration management rather 
than accepting the unilateral implementation of control mechanisms. Indeed, any 
Senegalese movement on cooperation in migration control is coupled explicitly with gains 
in areas related to migration and development, legal and labour migration, and/or domestic 
capacity-building.
It is here argued that Senegal has been successful in exercising leverage in 
migration dialogue with the EU for two main reasons: its perceptions of the EU and other 
contextual factors which have created opportunities for leverage and control. Firstly, the 
government has perceived the EU as constrained in its efforts at soliciting engagement and
20 According to the Spanish Ministry o f Interior, the number o f arrivals in the Canaries went from 32,000 in 
2006 to 9,500 in the first 10 months o f2007, as a result of better interception and collaboration with departure 
countries, and information campaigns informing potential travellers o f the risks.
21 Interview IOM, Dakar: June 2008 (II).
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coordination from migration countries. At the same time, the government has developed an
awareness of its own strategic position within the framework of EU cooperation on
migration. Senegal is therefore conscious that migration has given it an improved scope for
influence and has begun using dialogue and negotiations as an ‘instrument’ for shifting
00policies closer to its own national agenda (IRIN 2006). Thus the perceptions Senegal 
holds of the EU’s power to impose its preferences, as opposed to the perceptions it holds of 
its own power to reach its own preferences in migration dialogue have shaped the 
Senegalese strategy for dealing with the EU in migration matters. The strategy consists in 
the government’s conscious decision to bypass EU engagement in the interim, and 
cooperate more closely with specific Member States whose engagement more closely fits 
Senegalese preferences. At the same time, the intensification of bilateral cooperation has 
provided a basis upon which Senegal’s cooperation at the EU-level has been re-orientated 
towards a more comprehensive framework for joint migration management. Secondly, 
contextual factors, namely Senegal’s strategic position in the African-EU migration 
dialogue and its leadership role at the regional level have also assisted in creating 
conditions for successfully exercising leverage and control vis-a-vis the EU.
2.2.1 Perceptions o f  the E U
While, as in the aid and trade fields, the EU is seen as an extremely important and 
critical player in Senegal, and engagement is considered necessary for development, 
Senegal is also aware that the so-called weaknesses of the EU can limit or constrain 
effectiveness. Indeed, Senegalese government officials have identified several problems 
with regards to the EU’s position as an effective actor in migration cooperation. Firstly, 
there is a strong conviction that the EU at present is unable to deal adequately with the 
reality of migration issues facing the country. Thus, the government considers the 
Commission ill-equipped to deal with the migration profile. Procedures are described as 
long and bureaucratic and communication between the delegation and Brussels 
headquarters is seen as limited. The delegation of project implementation to external 
agencies or intermediaries such as the IOM or UNDP, rather than engaging with the 
government directly at the practical level has been perceived as failing to strengthen the 
capacity of the government in dealing with migration issues. This has led the government to
O'y
engage more closely with the intermediary agencies rather than with the EU.
22 Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S5).
23 Ibid. (S5); Interview IOM, Dakar: June 2008 (II).
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Secondly, government officials argue that it has been difficult to find satisfactory 
agreement with the EU in combining migration with development policies, because of the 
continual evolving nature of the EU’s migration policy. The Senegalese side is convinced 
that without a coherent or unitary EU policy on both legal and illegal migration, progress 
will be limited. Thus, “the contentious harmonization of EU wide labour market admission 
visa” policies, for example, are seen as “delaying the concretization of a wider and deeper 
EU migration policy” (Panizzon 2008: 53).
Thirdly, the image of this inability to adequately deal with the migration profile is 
further strengthened by the fact that intense Member State engagement has led to what has 
been perceived as an incoherent EU position on migration vis-a-vis the government. 
Coordination between Member States and the Commission is seen as lacking. Each 
Member State active in the country is seen as pursuing its own bilateral interests and 
political agendas, which are often much more significant and appropriate in relation to 
Senegalese preferences (Ibid.).24 Therefore, the Senegalese government perceives the EU as 
constrained on the three levels outlined in the previous chapter, namely in its ability to 
employ the resources and expertise necessary to effectively employ its policies; its inability 
to deliver a coherent and consistent approach towards migration cooperation by combining 
migration policies with development policies; and lastly, its inability to coordinate policy 
preferences and actions on migration between the Commission and the Member States.
2.2.2 The Senegalese strategy for leverage and control
How have these perceptions of the EU affected Senegal’s strategy in dealing with 
the EU in migration dialogue, and to what extent has Senegal exercised leverage and 
control vis-a-vis the EU in the area of migration? Senegalese perceptions of the EU as 
incapable, inconsistent, and/or incoherent, have led the government to make a conscious 
and strategic choice to stall negotiations at the EU-level until satisfactory agreement can be 
found, while in the meantime, engaging more intensely with Member States and 
intermediary agencies, which are seen as more capable in meeting its preference. In 
employing this strategy, the government has been able to begin shifting the dialogue at the 
EU level to more closely consider its preferences and has asserted significant ownership 
over national migration management.
In its negotiations with the EU, the Senegalese government has largely employed a 
strategy of non-compliance. In Chapter 1, this was defined as resisting intimidation or
24 Ibid. (S5); Ibid. (II).
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coercion by a structurally stronger actor, and its potential capability to employ threats or 
punishments and the refusal to comply with the other actor’s demands which could 
potentially lead to the disintegration of the relationship. This type of behaviour has been 
evident from the very beginnings of the EU’s attempts at establishing dialogue with the 
government, and has continued in present-day negotiations. Thus, in 2006, the government 
delayed the employment of the first FRONTEX mission, because it was unwilling to agree 
to the mission unless guarantees were made as to the treatment of intercepted migrants and 
additional funding. This issue was eventually settled when in August 2006 the Senegalese 
government was allowed to participate in the missions and therefore strengthen its own 
capabilities and expertise in migration management. In 2007, readmission talks between 
the government and the delegation stalled, as the Senegalese government resisted the 
inclusion of non-nationals in readmission agreements, unless sufficient guarantees on 
funding for capacity-building to effectively manage a large influx of repatriated migrants 
could be made (see also Roig and Huddleston 2007).
Due to the stalled readmission dialogue, the EU, on the initiative of Member States, 
began negotiating a migration mobility partnership scheme with Senegal, indicating that a 
Senegalese strategy of non-compliance has been largely successful in shifting the EU’s 
approach on migration management with the country. In March 2009 however, the 
negotiations on the mobility scheme also reached a stalemate, “as a result of Senegalese 
dissatisfaction with what they were to receive in return for the EU’s terms” (Chou 2009: 
10). Senegalese officials claim that the government has little interest in negotiating the 
agreement with the EU unless it clearly provides for increased development and capacity- 
building assistance for the government and improved labour market access for Senegalese 
migrants. Given the availability of alternative agreements already negotiated on the 
bilateral level with the most relevant destination countries, unless the EU is able to provide 
significantly improved terms for cooperation, the government remains uninterested in
9 7moving the talks forward. Interestingly, some observers have indicated that following 
Senegalese resistance in the negotiations, the EU is considering shifting its approach to the 
negotiations to more closely consider Senegalese demands, provided Member States agree
9to change the terms of the negotiations. It is increasingly being recognised on the part of 
both the EU and Senegal that it has become absolutely essential that a comprehensive 
cooperative framework is needed if any positive progress is to be made on joint migration
25 Ibid. (S5)
26 Correspondence Senegalese government, April 2009 (S5); Correspondence EC, May 2009 (EC6; EC 14).
27 Ibid. (S5).
28 Correspondence IOM, May 2009 (12); Correspondence EC, May 2009 (EC6; EC 14).
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management. To this extent, the relationship is evolving from an imposed one, to one of 
‘give and take,’ with movement in the fight against illegal migration possible only when the
• 29government can be expected to benefit in return for its cooperation.
At the same time that Senegal has adopted a non-compliant approach towards the 
EU, it has engaged with Member States in their efforts to develop a comprehensive 
approach to migration management, perceiving their efforts as far more relevant than the 
EU’s. Thus the EU is bypassed or undermined, because Member States are seen as more 
closely converging towards Senegal’s interests in migration. Bilateral engagement on 
migration in Senegal is not a new phenomenon, but has intensified since 2006, with the 
signing of bilateral migration agreements between Senegal and France and Spain. These 
agreements employ an incentive-based strategy for migration management by offering 
increased labour mobility, development assistance, or legal migration opportunities, in 
exchange for cooperation on illegal migration (Panizzon 2008: 55).
France’s ‘co-development’ programme has explicitly linked migration to 
development, while at the same time managing migration in cooperation with major 
sending countries. Co-development aims to promote the concerted management of 
migration flows and development, by mobilising the diaspora in France to contribute to 
development, facilitating productive investment, implementing local projects, and assisting 
return migrants in the reinsertion or setting-up of enterprises. In this regard, already in 2000 
France and Senegal signed a co-development convention, while in 2006 a more 
comprehensive, first of its kind, Migration and Co-development Agreement {Accord de 
gestion concertee des flux migratoires et de developpement solidaire) was signed, linking 
the creation of channels for legal migration and development assistance with cooperation in 
the fight against illegal migration. In 2008, this agreement was further supplemented by a 
quota agreement {Accord de quotas migratoires), providing residence permits to a number 
of Senegalese migrants, allowing them to immigrate, live and work legally in France, and 
offering the possibility for Senegalese nationals already living illegally in France to legalise 
provided they have secured a stable profession and whether French companies are 
interested in employing them.
Spain has also been particularly active in migration cooperation with Senegal. In an 
effort to stem the heavy flow of increased illegal migration originating from Senegal, in 
2006 the two governments signed an agreement {Acuerdo marco de cooperacion en 
materia de immigracion) in which Senegal agreed to cooperate on readmission, while Spain
29 Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S5); Interview EC Delegation, Dakar: June 2008 
(EC 17); Interviews IOM, Dakar: June 2008 (II; 12).
30 Ibid. {S5).
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would in turn recruit up to 4000 regular and seasonal Senegalese workers by 2008. The
agreement establishes a link between control mechanisms, such as the deployment of
Spanish forces in Senegalese waters, and development, by offering technical capacity-
building assistance, equipment, and increased labour access as an incentive for cooperation.
Although other EU Member States, such as Italy and Portugal have also been active at the
bilateral level in Senegal, France and Spain are considered to be at “the forefront of
designing these new templates for managing EurAfrican migratory flows” (Panizzon
2008a: 2). With Senegal being the first West African country to engage so extensively at
the bilateral level, this process has “initiated an overall positive migratory dialogue for both
Senegal and its counterparts in Europe” (Ibid.: 50-51).
Member States have thus remained the main drivers of the EU’s emerging
migration policies towards Africa. Indeed, as Panizzon argues:
For Spain, respectively France (sic), two EU member states driving the 
Europeanization of migration policies, the signing of migration management 
agreements with Senegal (and planning to extend the template to other West African 
countries) has been as important as it is ambiguous. Spain’s and France’s regulation 
of migratory relations towards West Africa, despite an interregional process set out 
by the EU and African ministers in Rabat in 2006, the Euro-African partnership for 
migration and development, sends mixed signals to the EU, as it seems that both 
France and Spain seek to re-assert EU Member States’ sovereignty over labour 
market admissions and overall competencies in migratory relations” (Ibid: 51-52).
The intense Member State engagement with countries like Senegal has limited the EU’s 
movement on the migration front. Indeed, delegation staff have indicated that dialogue with 
the Senegalese government has at times been difficult largely because progress is not 
possible without indication and approval from the Council. This inability to act 
autonomously, combined with the constraints in resources, has led to individual Member 
States adopting a much more pro-active role in liaising with the government on migration.
At the same time, Member States’ bilateral efforts have also moved EU-wide 
dialogue with Senegal to consider a broader agenda, which converges more closely with the 
Senegalese preferences on migration. Although Spanish and French efforts surpass the 
EU’s capabilities in migration, the comprehensive agreements “pave the way for a future 
EU-wide migration agreement” (Ibid. : 2), with the mobility partnership agreement likely to 
assume similar shape and scope as the bilateral agreements, once the negotiations move
31 In 2007, Spain granted 2,700 work permits, namely for work in the fishing and agricultural industries in 
exchange for Senegalese cooperation in fighting illegal migration. The Spanish government is also funding a 
special training programme to be implemented in Senegal in 2008.
32 Unsatisfied by the lack of movement in the political dialogue which the Commission was expected to 
undertake under Article 13, Member States have also instigated further coordination mechanisms at the 
country level in order to move this dialogue forward. At present, this coordination initiative is still at a purely 
informal level and is led mainly by Member States, with limited Commission participation (Interview EC 
delegation, Dakar: June 2008 (EC 17)).
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forward again. The intense bilateral cooperation on migration in Senegal therefore sets an 
important precedent for further cooperation efforts in the country. By providing an 
alternative and more comprehensive means for the government to engage with destination 
countries in the face of limited progress at the EU level, bilateral efforts contributed in re­
orientating EU-Senegal relations on migration to fit more closely with the government’s 
preferences. Bilateral cooperation has given the government further incentive to establish 
ownership over its migration phenomenon, and “affirmed the role of migration at the 
(Senegalese) political level” (Ibid: 55). To this extent, although Senegalese interests in 
formulating a migration agenda were largely a reaction to pressure from external actors, 
this has also provided a framework within which the Senegalese government has come to 
base its understandings, expectations, and consequently its own policy preferences for 
cooperation on migration not just bilaterally, but also with other actors such as the EU.
Therefore, Senegalese perceptions of the EU’s inability to fully engage with its 
preferences have led the government to develop a strategy of non-compliance vis-a-vis the 
EU, while more closely negotiating with individual Member States. All of this is not to say 
that either Senegal drove the Member States to break ranks with the Commission, nor that 
it was necessarily the only factor pushing the EU to shift its approach to migration 
management with the country. However, it does indicate the effectiveness of Senegal’s 
strategy of non-compliance in having its preferences considered more closely, and in 
getting what it wants out of the bilateral dialogue while significantly stalling EU-level 
dialogue. In this sense, Senegal was able to exercise leverage because it was able to place 
its interests and preferences on the EU’s migration agenda, has had its demands taken 
seriously by the EU, and has contributed to modifying the EU’s approach towards 
migration dialogue with the government. It was able to exert some control vis-a-vis the EU 
in migration dialogue because it has insisted on close involvement in the implementation of 
all migration-related actions, and has forgone cooperation when the EU is unable or 
unwilling to allow for government ownership.
The Senegalese case highlights two important points about the possibility of 
exercising leverage and control. Firstly, as already witnessed in the aid and trade fields, the 
presence of an alternative option is a fundamental factor in a country’s ability to possibly 
forego cooperation with the EU, or at least, in providing it with the confidence to negotiate 
according to its own preferences rather than those of its negotiating opponent. Secondly, 
and related to the first point, the degree to which a weaker government is perceived to be 
dependent on the EU to reach its policy preferences also determines its ability to exercise 
leverage and control. Being that migration cooperation is a new policy field in which the
239
EU is seeking cooperation with migrant-sending countries in Africa, African governments 
have not developed any financial or economic dependence on the EU in terms of migration 
management policies. In this sense, any funding opportunities or increased labour market 
access are considered merely supplementary, but not necessarily essential. This illustrates 
that within the context of migration policy, the terms of power asymmetry between the two 
parties are clearly very different than in the aid and trade fields, where alternatives are often 
limited and dependence on the EU is manifest.
2.2.2.1 Strategic factors
Another important factor which has favoured Senegalese leverage and control in 
migration management is its strategic importance as a migrant-sending country. At the very 
basic level, its geographic position as a major point of departure for both regular and 
irregular migrants has certainly placed Senegal amongst the more relevant sending- 
countries with which the EU is interested in collaborating on migration matters. Particularly 
Senegal’s contribution to a major influx of irregular and low skilled migrants in Europe has 
been one of the main reasons why the EU has continued to seek engagement with the 
government, and why it has often been willing to give concessions to the government’s 
demands for a more development-oriented framework on migration.33 Therefore, as argued 
in the previous chapter, because the EU’s and indeed also the Member States’ primary 
objective for engagement with migrant-sending countries has been to seek cooperation on 
migration control (through a framework of migration management), it should come as no 
surprise that Senegal has been prioritised as a partner country with which to seek 
engagement. This has also enhanced Senegal’s strategic position vis-a-vis the EU and 
consequently its ability to exercise leverage and control, because, in order to find 
agreement with the government, the EU must provide concessions in exchange for the 
government’s cooperation on migration matters. To a certain extent therefore, as posited in 
Hypothesis 2d, the EU’s willingness, urgency, or need in reaching agreement with the 
weaker party can be used as a source of bargaining strength for the weaker party, provided 
they are aware of these constraints. The Senegalese government has developed an 
awareness of its own strategic position within the framework of EU cooperation on 
migration. Indeed, it has interpreted increased interest from Europe as an opportunity from 
which it can potentially benefit in terms of development and influence at the EU-Africa and 
regional levels. For example, one government interviewee claimed that Senegal was well
33 Interview EC, Brussels: April 2008 (EC 14).
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aware of its strategic importance in the migration debate, and planned on using this in order 
to attain its preferences:
We Senegalese, we are good negotiators. We know what we want, and we negotiate 
hard to get it. But we also understand the importance of diplomacy and cooperation 
in order to get what we want. In migration negotiations with the EU, we know now 
that it is the EU that wants our cooperation, and not the other way around. This 
means that we need to build a partnership together, but that we are also using out 
new strategic position to get some increased benefits from our cooperation with the 
EU.34
Thus the importance of the migration issue in Senegal’s relations with Europe has allowed 
the government to use migration as a negotiation ‘instrument,’ by soliciting closer 
cooperation in exchange for shifting policies closer to its own national interests (IRIN 
2006).35
Furthermore, Senegal has also enhanced its strategic position by taking on an active 
role in leading migration dialogue at the regional level, mainly through the auspices of the 
ECOWAS. Senegal is said to have been the main regional actor in pushing the ECOWAS 
to set up a committee on migration at the regional level, and it has furthermore been the 
main country to lead the committee’s work and progress on finding common positions on 
migration matters facing the West African region. In March 2007, the government hosted 
an experts meeting on establishing a Common Approach to migration in the ECOWAS 
region, leading to a draft proposal for a joint strategy. In July 2008, it hosted and 
participated actively in an another Experts Meeting on Migration and Development, aiming 
to establish a common position for the region to present at the second EU-Africa 
Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development held in Paris later that year. At the 
meeting, Senegal’s foreign minister solicited Africa to develop its own African migration 
pact in response to the EU’s Pact, which he envisioned eventually forming into one Euro- 
African pact on migration which would consider the concerns and interests of both the 
continents in cooperating on migration matters. In so doing, other regional actors have 
noted that Senegal has taken an important leadership position both in the region and in 
Africa in general in developing a regional and pan-African response to European pressures 
to engage the continents more closely on migration issues.37 According to both Senegalese 
and Commission interviewees, its position at the regional level is another important factor 
in accounting for its ability to have external actors consider its preferences. As in trade 
negotiations, observers note that Senegal has become, “a voice to be reckoned with when it
34 Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S5).
35 Interview IOM, Dakar: June 2008 (12).
36 Ibid. (12); Interview Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G6); ); Interview Senegalese 
government, Dakar: June 2008 (S5).
37 Ib id  (12); Ibid. (G6; G9); Interview IOM, Accra: September 2008 (13).
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comes to migration matters in the continent.”38 Importantly therefore, as in the other two 
policy fields, Senegal’s pro-activeness in the region and its strategic position have assisted 
in the exercise of leverage and control.
In sum, Senegal’s pro-activeness, and even its success in shifting the migration 
agenda closer to its concerns, is intrinsically linked to how it perceives both its own 
position in EU-Senegal relations, as well as how it perceives the EU’s position as opposed 
to its own. To this extent, Senegal perceives its position within the migration debate as 
strategic, while at the same time, the EU is perceived as being constrained in the extent to 
which it can fully engage with the government, thus the government has opted to engage 
more closely with other interested actors. Although the EU is considered to be a crucial 
international actor in the country’s development efforts, as regards the ongoing migration 
debate in Senegal, the EU has been perceived as limited or constrained in its capacity to 
fully engage with the government. The constraints faced by the EU have been coupled with 
a rather unique level of engagement in the Senegalese migration phenomenon from 
interested EU Member States. Faced with this state of affairs, the Senegalese government 
opted to engage with these bilateral efforts while undermining and bypassing EU 
engagement unless successful agreement could be reached. Through this bilateral 
engagement, the Senegalese migration agenda was strengthened and the government 
adopted an awareness or perception of the country’s strategic position within the European 
migration debate. This perception has led to the government asserting increased ownership 
over its migration agenda in relation to other actors, namely the EU by adopting a strategy 
of non-compliance in order to attain its preferences. Although ongoing cooperation is more 
closely aligned with the government’s agenda, exemplified by the comprehensive joint 
framework for migration management between the EU and Senegal in the process of being 
established, movement has not been possible unless the government has indicated its 
willingness to negotiate and move dialogue forward.
38 Ibid. (12); Ibid. (13); Interview Senegalese government, Dakar: June 2008 (S5); Interview EC, Brussels: 
April 2008 (EC6);
3 Ghana
The Ghanaian government considers migration a positive phenomenon, which, if managed 
effectively, can contribute to development. Areas of priority for the government can be 
summarised as follows: Firstly, the importance of migrant remittances has dominated the 
political discourse on migration. Remittances are the largest source of foreign exchange, 
and have become a significant part of sustaining the Ghanaian economy.40 As Ghana has 
become highly dependent on this source of income, the facilitation of remittance transfers 
is seen as requiring due consideration in relation to Ghana’s development strategy (Anno- 
Kumi 2008; Higazi 2005; Owuso-Ankomah 2006,2006a; Baah-Wiredu 2007; Mazzucato 
et a l 2008). Secondly, in response to improved economic conditions, Ghana is currently 
experiencing significant return migration (Adepoju 2009: 21). The government aims to 
further encourage the return of highly skilled migrants, as the potential for ‘brain-gain’ in 
Ghana is vast, with migrants bringing with them new knowledge, technologies, and 
experiences (Quartey 2006: 15; Owusu-Ankomah 2006a; Arthur 2008; Black et al 2003; 
Sabates-Wheeler etal. 2007: 8; Anarfi etal. 2003:28-30). Thirdly, the departure of skilled 
labour, especially in the health and education sectors, has adversely affected Ghana. 
Mitigating the brain drain through circular and temporary migration schemes is another 
priority area (CEC-GoG 2006: 9; Oppong 2004: 91-92; Owusu-Ankomah 2006; Black et 
al. 2003; Sabates-Wheeler et al 2007: 8; Kuukua Awotwi 2007: 5). The government does 
not, however, have a clear policy on migration (CEC-Ghana 2006: 13; Anno-Kumi 2008; 
Anarfi et a l 2003: 32).41 In this sense, the government is aiming to develop a holistic 
approach to migration management by engaging all major partners both at the international 
and the domestic levels, including the government, private sector, civil society and trade 
unions, as well as focusing on increased research and data collection in order to better 
understand Ghana’s migration phenomenon and its consequences and benefits on the 
country’s development.42 The extent to which Ghana and the EU have engaged in dialogue 
and policy-making on migration is further explored in the following two sections.
39 Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G6; G9).
40 According to the Bank o f Ghana, in 2003 remittances represented between 10-15% o f Ghana’s GDP, 
compared to 5% for ODA, and 1.2% for FDI (Addison 2004).
41 At present, the Ghanaian government is in the process o f  integrating migration issues into the national 
development programme, the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) (GoG 2005; Mensa-Bonsu 
2007).
42 Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G6; G9).
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3.1 The EU -  Ghana migration dialogue and policy actions
The EU sent its first mission to Ghana in 2007 to initiate dialogue on the basis of 
Article 13. Initial dialogue between the Ghanaian government and the EU aimed to 
establish cooperation in migration control, with a view to encouraging the government to 
negotiate and sign a readmission agreement (GNA 2007).43 Although the opening of the 
dialogue was considered inimical to the country’s interests, an overall willingness and 
openness to engage in dialogue prevailed on both sides. Furthermore, the EU was generally 
perceived as well prepared and sincere in its efforts to develop a joint strategy on migration 
management.44 Although the EU initially focused the dialogue on migration control, a shift 
towards a more comprehensive approach occurred almost immediately.45 This was 
reflected, for example, in the June 2007 Ghana-EU joint statement following the conclusion 
of the first round of discussions between the government and the EU delegation,46 noting 
both sides’ commitment to developing a partnership in joint migration management by 
adopting a holistic approach and recognising that dialogue should become more systematic 
and regular in order to develop a more concrete and coherent framework for joint migration 
management (EU-GoG 2007). According to government officials, the EU shifted to a more 
comprehensive approach because of the realisation that in order for migrant-sending 
countries such as Ghana to become interested in migration management, the focus needed 
to be on adopting a wide-ranging approach that took account of development aspects.47 
Accordingly, an understanding is seen as existing on the part of both the Ghanaian and the 
EU sides that migration management will be mutually beneficial to both sides when 
managed effectively and coherently.
As in Senegal, the EU has used financial assistance from the EDF and the Aeneas 
programme to implement actions in migration management. Thus, migration was integrated 
into the country’s CSP for the 10th EDF (2007-2010), where Ghana was allocated €2 
million under the title ‘Migration, Diaspora, and Security’, which has prioritised funding 
for migration and development and government capacity-building in migration
43 Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G6; G9).
44 Ibid. (G9). As in Senegal, there was some initial confusion as to which government ministry or body would 
be responsible for coordinating the dialogue, and more importantly, possible implementation of migration- 
related projects and/or programmes. Indeed, the first EU mission to Ghana consisted o f separate meetings 
with officials from several ministries.
45 Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G6; G9); Interview EC Delegation, 
Accra/London: October 2008 (EC20).
46 Comprised o f the EU troika and representatives from interested EU Member States.
47 Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G6; G9).
48 Ibid. (G6; G9); Interview IOM, Accra: September 2008 (13); Interview EC Delegation, Accra/London: 
October 2008 (EC20).
244
management.49 The CSP also included a Ghana Migration Profile laying out the main 
determinants and effects of the country’s migration phenomenon, as well as soliciting a 
need for improved data collection and research in the area (CEC-GoG 2007: Annex V; 
CEC-GoG 2006). In 2006, the Aeneas programme funded six projects in Ghana providing 
specific and complementary financial and technical assistance to support more effective 
management of migration flows. Four of these projects are the same as those implemented 
in Senegal (see above),50 while two projects are exclusive to Ghana.51
Despite these actions however, ongoing migration dialogue and even policy actions 
have been limited between Ghana and the EU. The Netherlands, the UK, and Germany 
have pushed for further dialogue on migration with the government on the basis of 
Cotonou’s Article 8, namely political dialogue, rather than Article 13, which instead 
focuses exclusively on migration. At present therefore, no dialogue exists specific to 
migration, but rather only within the context of political dialogue between the EU and 
Ghana, the ECOWAS, and Africa in general. The EU has thus preferred to keep migration 
issues at a relatively low profile in Ghana. Most of the discussions between the delegation 
and the government have concerned mainly the identification of funding opportunities and 
project formulation, and even this has often been delegated to external agencies, such as the 
IOM or UNDP, charged with project implementation. Furthermore, although the 
government sees the EU as an important partner in terms of funding, especially in the field 
of data collection (CEC-GoG 2006),53 in comparison to the other development-related 
policy areas in which the EU is active in the country, funding for migration has been rather 
modest. Funding for migration management in the CSP is significantly less than what other 
migrant-sending ACP countries (namely Cape Verde, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal) 
received, and constitutes less than 0.5% of Ghana’s entire allocation. Moreover, financing
tfifor migration under the 10 EDF has yet to be implemented, with a feasibility study under 
way in 2008 and an actual financing decision expected only in 2010.
49 As an objective, the funding aims to “ensure that migration and human and financial resources o f the 
diaspora contribute effectively to national development, minimising the costs of the ‘brain drain’ (particularly 
in the health sector) while maximising diaspora contributions. Increase the capacity o f  police and migration 
agencies for law enforcement while enhancing their accountability and respect for human rights.”
50 The four projects are: “Reinforcing and sustaining dialogue and management o f irregular and transit 
migration in the Maghreb and originating in West Africa”; “Law enforcement capacity building project for 
West Africa in preventing and combating the smuggling o f migrants”; “Migration profiles in selected 
countries in West Africa”; “Facilitating a coherent migration management approach by promoting legal 
migration and preventing further irregular migration”.
51 These are: “Countering document fraud” and “Leveraging remittances to promote migrant 
entrepreneurship”.
52 Interview EC Delegation, Accra/London: October 2008 (EC20)
53 Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G6; G9).
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EU actions in Ghana in the migration field have therefore been far less intense than 
in Senegal. While initial dialogue was somewhat tense, this quickly shifted to a more wide- 
ranging approach. However, this approach has yet to develop into the EU or the 
government taking actions towards a concrete or comprehensive framework for joint 
migration management. At present, few policy actions have followed or complemented the 
limited dialogue that has taken place. In order to better understand just why such a limited 
framework for cooperation has come to characterise EU-Ghana relations in the field of 
migration, it is crucial to examine the strategies that both the government and the EU have 
adopted in formulating a framework for migration management. The extent of and the 
reasons for this limited framework are further explored in the following section.
3.2 Explaining the limited EU-Ghana migration framework
The Ghanaian government recognises that regardless of the increased dialogue, 
projects, and funding available, as well as increased engagement from Europe, it has not yet 
fully established ‘ownership’ in managing its migration phenomenon. It has not yet taken 
full advantage of the increased interest demonstrated by external actors as well as the 
opportunities that migration offers for development, and considers that it must now take up 
the EU’s initiative and implement it into national policy (Anno-Kumi 2008).54 Unlike the 
Senegalese case, the development of a joint migration framework between Ghana and the 
EU is not characterised by an increased pro-activeness on the part of the Ghanaian 
government to align preferences or establish increased ownership over its migration 
phenomenon. Rather the process has largely been driven by pressure and pro-activeness 
from external actors, with the government adopting a cooperative and compromising 
approach to migration relations, as opposed to the non-compliant approach adopted by 
Senegal.
It is argued that the Ghanaian government has not exercised leverage in migration 
relations with EU because it has not perceived the EU as the principal partner with which to 
conduct dialogue and formulate policy initiatives on migration cooperation with destination 
countries. Cooperation in migration matters is seen as being driven mainly by external 
sources, namely increased interest from the EU (but not leadership at the national level), 
some limited involvement from interested EU Member States, and positive and active 
engagement from agencies such as the IOM and the UNDP. The extent of involvement of 
these three external sources alongside the limited pro-activeness from the Ghanaian
54 Ibid. (G6; G9).
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government in shaping and driving the migration agenda partly explains why the scope for 
cooperation on migration between the EU and Ghana has remained narrow. The 
government has not adopted a leadership role in shaping EU-Ghana migration relations 
because the overall role of the EU (including Member States) in Ghana has been limited 
and narrow. This has led to closer engagement with external international agencies, which 
have come to play a more instrumental role in shaping the national policy environment. 
Another factor which can explain the lack of leverage and control on the part of the 
government is found in Ghana’s less than strategic position as a migrant-sending country to 
Europe. The argument is further developed below.
3.2.1 Perceptions o f the EU
In some respects, Ghana has perceived the EU similarly to Senegal, in terms of its 
capabilities in engaging with migration countries on closer cooperation in migration 
matters. Firstly, the government has recognised that the EU has a limited mandate to drive 
the migration debate in Ghana, leading it being pro-active and well-prepared in terms of 
high-level dialogue and agenda-setting, but much less so in terms of practical and applied 
actions in the field or at the national level. Government officials noted that the EU’s efforts 
at the national level have been very limited, and that most interactions on migration had 
been conducted under the auspices of external international agencies such as the IOM and 
the UNDP. In this sense, the EU is seen as constrained in its ability to engage with the 
government because it lacks both the mandate and resources necessary to adopt a 
leadership role in migration matters.55 Secondly, the government has perceived a lack of 
coherence between Member State efforts and those of the EU as a whole. Member States 
were seen as advancing their own bilateral interests, with limited coordination mechanisms 
in place to ensure that the delegation or even the Commission is aware of Member States’ 
actions and initiatives being implemented in Ghana.56 At the same time, differently from 
Senegal, the EU was also perceived as fundamental in having sensitised the government, as 
well as other African countries, in taking migration seriously and creating awareness on the 
benefits that could arise from integrating migration issues into the national development 
strategies. As such, the EU is seen as a crucial actor in having created awareness at the 
African level, and in promoting the idea that migration can positively contribute to
cn
development when managed correctly and effectively.
55 Ibid. (G6; G9).
56 Ibid. (G6).
57 Ibid. (G9).
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The way in which Ghana has perceived the EU’s capabilities in migration is 
important in understanding the government’s approach to cooperation on migration 
management with the EU. On the one hand, the EU has been perceived as a leader in terms 
of its ability to sensitise African governments and to place migration on the African and 
national development agendas. Unlike Senegal, the government has not sought to bypass or 
surpass the EU’s engagement in order to establish increased ownership; rather, it has 
chosen to engage with the EU’s initiatives and follow its lead. Indeed, as one government 
official claimed, “It is really thanks to the EU that Ghana is now starting to take its 
migration phenomenon seriously, and is starting to integrate migration into our national
• • • SRdevelopment agenda. The EU and Europe have been the main drivers of this.” On the 
other hand, the government also recognises that the EU is constrained by a rather narrow 
mandate for conducting dialogue on migration matters. The issues in which the government 
is fundamentally interested, such as increased labour migration opportunities or the creation 
of efficient temporary and circular migration schemes, essentially go beyond the EU’s 
competences. At the practical level, therefore, the EU’s role in implementing concrete 
initiatives and creating a working relationship with relevant national stakeholders has been 
rather limited and constrained to either providing limited funding opportunities, or 
supporting Member State initiatives (CEC-GoG 2006).59
In sum, the Ghanaian government perceives the EU as capable and influential in the 
migration debate, which has led the government to opt for a strategy that is more 
consensual with the EU’s leadership role in sensitising African governments to place 
migration issues on their national agendas. Similar to Ghana’s strategy in aid and trade 
therefore, the government has allowed external actors to drive policy processes and has not 
made significant attempts to take a more pro-active approach towards establishing 
ownership over migration policies vis-a-vis the EU or in putting forward its preferences in 
the limited migration dialogue that does exists between the EU and Ghana. Why has Ghana 
adopted a consensual approach to migration management with the EU? And why has it not 
made attempts to exercise leverage or asserted ownership over migration matters?
3.2.2 Ghana’s constraints on leverage and control
The EU is not considered to have spearheaded the formulation of a national position 
or policy on migration. In this sense the EU’s practical role in Ghana has been limited and 
narrow, and this has led to the government identifying other actors as more relevant in
58 Ibid. (G9).
59 Ibid. (G6; G9); Interview IOM, Accra: September 2008 (13).
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terms of meeting its preferences. EU Member States have a larger scope for more intense 
engagement at the national level, since as demonstrated in the Senegalese case, migration 
management at the bilateral level can offer significantly more incentives for cooperation 
(labour schemes, financial and technical assistance, etc.) than at the EU level. Member 
State involvement in Ghana has been mostly positive, and has concentrated on migration 
and development by furthering links with the Ghanaian diaspora or developing legal labour 
migration schemes. The Netherlands actively participated in the IOM’s MIDA Ghana 
Health project, which aimed at the development of the Ghanaian health sector by 
promoting skill transfers through temporary return assignments for the Ghanaian diaspora, 
while also organising internships in the Netherlands for Ghanaian nationals (IOM 2007). 
The Aeneas project on “leveraging remittances and promoting migrant entrepreneurship” 
also concentrated exclusively on diaspora engagement with Ghanaians residing in the 
Netherlands. The United Kingdom has taken steps to facilitate remittance transfers by 
developing a remittance partnership with Ghana, as well as supporting the UNDP in 
drafting a national framework on migration (Dfid 2007).60 The Italian government has co­
sponsored IOM-coordinated projects focusing on migration and development (see Markwei 
2008; Gallina 2007).61 Other Member States have instead been intent on negotiating 
readmission agreements with the government, this group includes Spain, and to a lesser
ft*)extent Malta and the UK, or have focused more explicitly on illegal migration issues, 
such as Denmark, which is funding an IOM-coordinated programme on “Capacity-Building 
and Awareness-Raising to Combat Trafficking in Persons and Irregular Migration” (IOM 
2008a).
The Ghanaian government has largely welcomed this engagement from Member 
States, seeing the combination of EU and bilateral interest as providing a good source of 
funding for migration-related projects and contributing towards the formulation of a
• ATnational policy framework. At the same time, their engagement has also been rather 
limited, lacking in comprehensiveness, coordination, and intensity. Engagement has taken 
the form of a project-based approach, rather than overarching political agreements for 
cooperation. Projects usually focus on the short-term and on limited aspects of migration, 
rather than linking the different levels of Ghanaian migration, such as legal and illegal 
migration or ethical recruitment and labour migration policies. Coordination amongst
60 Interview Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G9).
61 Interview EC Delegation, Accra/London: October 2008 (EC20); Interview IOM, Accra: September 2008 
(13).
62 To date no agreements between Ghana and an EU member state have been concluded.
63 Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G6; G9); Interview IOM, Accra: September 
2008 (13).
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different Member States and the EC is also limited, with the government recognising that 
each actor operates according to their own agenda, with coherence sometimes 
undermined.64 To this extent, the different needs and priorities of Member States have led 
to a variety of initiatives being forwarded, but little concerted policy action. Lastly, the 
intensity of bilateral engagement, as experienced in the Senegalese case, has also been 
lacking in Ghana, with most engagement occurring under the auspices of the Aeneas 
programme, or through the IOM or UNDP. This lack of intense effort to develop a 
comprehensive framework for bilateral migration management has also constrained the 
possibility of Ghana asserting increased ownership or at least pro-actively engaging outside 
of the narrow framework for bilateral cooperation. Certainly if the Senegalese case serves 
as any indication, intense Member State involvement can offer an alternative means to 
establish more ownership over migration policy vis-a-vis the EU, by creating an important 
precedent for future cooperation, providing the country with the means to adopt non- 
compliant behaviour in order to gain increased concessions, and in increasing awareness of 
a country’s strategic position in the migration debate.
While EU and bilateral efforts have contributed to the formulation of a national 
migration agenda, neither has taken a leadership role in Ghana. Rather this has been 
attributed to external international agencies that have been particularly active at the 
practical level in implementing migration-related and capacity-building projects in 
cooperation with the government. The IOM, and to a lesser extent, the UNDP, have worked 
in close cooperation with the government in the formulation of policies and implementation 
of projects.65 Indeed, both at the bilateral and EU levels, almost all migration-related 
projects have been coordinated and implemented by the IOM. The delegation of project 
implementation has strengthened the IOM’s role in Ghana’s migration debate, as it has 
worked closely with relevant national and international stakeholders on the ground, rather 
than merely at the level of high-level dialogue, agenda-setting, or project formulation, as is 
the case for the EU and many Member States. At the same time, delegating competences to 
the IOM has also contributed to the image of the EU as limited in its involvement in direct 
cooperation with the government, with the IOM instead seen as spearheading progress at 
the national level. Further to this, the IOM is also currently active in its own programme on 
“Integrating Migration into Ghana's Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy,” the GPRS 
laying out the government’s development strategies and agenda for implementation
64 Ibid. (G6); Ib id  (13).
65 Ibid. (G6); Ib id  (13).
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(Mensa-Bonsu 2007). The agency is therefore directly interacting with the government in 
formulating a strategy on migration and building this into the national political agenda.
Although not as active as the IOM, the UNDP has also been considered 
instrumental in the formulation of a national strategy on migration. At the request of the 
government, it is currently formulating a national programme that focuses on effective 
migration management, migration return, and remittances. Furthermore, in a joint effort 
between the government and the UNDP, in September 2007 a Regional Consultation on 
Migration, Remittances and Development in Africa was launched aiming to bring together 
relevant stakeholders in order to formulate, “key recommendations for governments, the 
private sector, development agencies and other stakeholders in both the sending and the 
receiving countries, to facilitate efficient use of remittances to promote equitable growth 
and improve the quality of life of the poor people through achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals” (UNDP-GoG-UN 2007: 8).
Because the EU is not a major actor in migration in Ghana, identifying leverage or 
control is not as straightforward. Indeed, although Ghana has not exercised leverage or 
control vis-a-vis the EU, it may indeed be doing so vis-a-vis other relevant actors in the 
country. In this sense, it is important to note that other actors such as the IOM, have mainly 
identified the government as mostly passive in formulating a national migration framework, 
but that this is now changing to a more pro-active approach.66 Indeed, direct interaction 
with the government in terms of project implementation and the agencies’ direct 
involvement in the formulation of a national strategy on migration have led to a recent 
increase in the government’s engagement and pro-activeness in shaping its own national 
agenda. For example, the government’s request to the UNDP to assist in formulating a 
national strategy on migration and development, was seen as an indication of increased 
interest shown on the part of the government to integrate migration in its development 
strategy. According to interviewees, although the national migration agenda was pushed 
and driven by external actors, recently there has been increased engagement from the 
government. This increased willingness to engage on migration has been attributed to 
firstly, increased IOM and UNDP initiatives and pressure for the government to develop a 
national migration policy, and secondly, to the increased funding available which has given 
the government an incentive to participate and motivated the development of national 
initiatives. Furthermore, observers have noted an increased willingness of outside actors to
66 Ibid. (13).
67 Ib id  (13).
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implement concrete measures on migration and development, thus aligning more closely
/JO
with the government’s interests.
3.2.2.1 Strategic factors
Another important factor to consider in the lack of leverage and control on the part 
of the Ghanaian government in migration matters is its strategic position (or lack of one) as 
a migration country in West Africa. Arguably, the EU could consider Ghana a strategic 
partner in the migration debate considering that the country is a major exporter of mostly 
highly and medium skilled human capital (see Table 7.2). Yet, the EU’s and the Member 
States’ main interests in engaging with migrant-sending countries lie in establishing 
migration management frameworks for the purposes of migration control of mostly 
irregular and/or low skilled migrants. In this sense, Ghana, much unlike Senegal, is neither 
geographically nor demographically (in terms of migrant skill levels) placed as a strategic 
country. Certainly, migration is an important phenomenon in Ghana, but it is one which 
tends to affect Ghana more adversely (in terms of brain drain) rather than the EU (in terms 
of irregular or low skilled migrants).69 In the Ghanaian case therefore, the strategic factors 
that favoured the exercise of leverage and control in the Senegalese case were not present. 
This not only led to much less intense engagement on the part of the EU, but it also 
contributed to a lack of the Ghanaian government perceiving itself in a strategic position 
which could favour leverage and control vis-a-vis the EU.
In Ghana, both EU and Member State engagement at the national level has been 
limited in terms of establishing a comprehensive and overarching framework for 
cooperation on migration, with efforts characterised as uncoordinated, narrow, and lacking 
in intensity. Arguably, without a broad bilateral agreement providing a model for possible 
future cooperation at the EU-wide level, the Ghanaian government has not had the 
opportunity to either bypass or surpass cooperation at the EU level (were this in their 
interests), nor does it have the previous experience of negotiating and formulating a 
framework for joint migration management. The limited roles attributed to the EU and
68 Ibid. (13); Interviews Ghanaian government, Accra: September 2008 (G6; G9); Interview EC Delegation, 
Accra/London: October 2008 (EC20).
69 Related to this, it should also be mentioned, that interestingly, the EU has not closely engaged with either 
Senegal or Ghana specifically in preventing human trafficking. This too is indicative o f the EU’s interests in 
migration management with sending countries in Africa, and their strategic positioning vis-i-vis the EU in 
migration matters. Again, the lack of engagement on an issue which essentially concerns the protection o f  
human rights, as opposed to a much more intense focus on preventing irregular migration in general shows 
where the EU’s strategic concerns lie. As such, the EU does not seem to differentiate voluntary from forced 
migration, but as an overall objective is focused on stemming irregular migration.
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individual Member States have given way to other international agencies playing a much 
more instrumental role in formulating a national migration policy and incentivising the 
government to adopt more ownership over its migration phenomenon. The practical work 
of the IOM, and to a lesser extent, the UNDP, mostly in terms of project implementation 
and coordination, have required close cooperation with the government, and have 
consequentially led to the perception that these agencies currently lead national migration 
management efforts. In the Ghanaian case therefore, leverage was not exercised, namely 
because the government did not actually identify the EU as the lead actor which could meet 
its policy preferences and because engagement from the EU and the Member States was not 
intense enough to establish these as the central actors with whom to engage with in the first 
place.
4 Comparisons and Conclusions
The two case studies have illustrated the extent to which some migrant-sending countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa can extend their influence in relations with the EU under the auspices 
of migration management with the EU. From the two case studies, three important 
conclusions can be drawn about firstly, the countries strategies in relation to the EU, 
secondly, on trends in the EU’s migration policy towards Africa, and thirdly, on a country’s 
ability to exercise leverage and control vis-a-vis the EU.
First, it has become even more clear that the countries’ strategies and approaches 
adopted vis-a-vis the EU are quite similar in all three areas examined in this thesis. Senegal 
has been more effective in exercising leverage and control vis-a-vis the EU, while Ghana 
continues to demonstrate a rather mixed record with regards to its capability and 
willingness to exercise leverage and exert ownership vis-a-vis the EU. In Senegal, a rather 
non-compliant approach and often critical perceptions of the EU, combined with the 
confidence that it can promote its interests in relations with the EU, have allowed it to 
translate negotiating strategies into considerable negotiating weight, despite power 
asymmetry. In this chapter, it was demonstrated that in the formulation of a framework for 
migration management with the EU, Senegal has maintained its position by preventing any 
movement or agreement on migration issues unless the government is expected to 
mutually-benefit from this. In Ghana, policy processes and outcomes tend to much more 
externally-driven, rather than government-owned. As in the other two fields, in migration 
too Ghana has adopted a more consensual approach towards the EU, due in part because of 
its strong awareness of differences in power, but also because often the EU is not 
necessarily identified as the lead actor with which to exercise leverage and control.
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Second, the case studies have shown the extent of the EU’s constraints or 
limitations in terms of the four main themes highlighted in Chapter 1, namely capacity, 
policy coherence, coordination, and interests and how these affect countries’ perceptions of 
the EU. In terms of capacity, the case studies bring to the forefront that the EU is limited in 
its capacity to engage fully with governments of migrant-sending countries in Africa. This 
is so because, firstly, policy implementation is delegated to external agencies largely 
because of their expertise in managing migration in different domestic contexts. These 
capacity constraints in turn have an effect on the type of relationship that the EU is trying to 
establish in the country. In Senegal, IOM coordination and implementation of EU-funded 
projects is perceived as restricting country ownership, while in Ghana these external 
agencies have adopted a leadership role, and the EU is seen as a secondary actor in shaping 
the national migration debate. With regards to policy coherence, the case studies have 
clearly shown that the EU has started to move towards increased coherence between 
migration and development policies, as demonstrated by the evolution of dialogue and 
policy initiatives from concentrating on control mechanisms to considering integration of 
migration policies into countries’ development programmes. At the same time, migration 
and development, and even migration and labour policies, are linked only insofar as this 
creates incentive mechanisms meant to induce countries to comply with joint cooperation 
in tackling irregular migration to the EU. Although the EU’s approach towards migration 
matters in Africa has indeed become more comprehensive, the field continues to be 
embedded in a security-oriented approach in that the purpose is still migration control, 
rather than reaching development goals through joint cooperation and policy coherence. 
This last observation was also clearly shown in the extent to which the EU has engaged 
much more intensely with Senegal as opposed to Ghana, largely because the former is 
much more closely aligned with the EU’s strategic interests in migration management as 
opposed to the latter.
As regards coordination, the chapter showed the extent to which the multi-level 
structure of the EU can pose a constraint on effective coordination amongst the different 
actors interested and active in the EU’s emerging migration policy towards Africa. 
Although decision-making and policy implementation should ideally be coordinated firstly 
amongst the different levels of the Commission, namely between the delegations and 
headquarters in Brussels, and secondly between the Commission and EU Member States, 
both the Senegalese and the Ghanaian case indicate that coordination and coherence is 
often lacking, and more importantly, these gaps have consequences for the effectiveness of 
the EU’s policy objectives projected abroad. The EU is often perceived as incapable of
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engaging with migrant-sending countries at the level espoused in the rhetoric on migration 
cooperation. At the level of the delegations, both Senegalese and EU observers noted 
problems in communicating decision-making processes between Brussels and the 
delegation. Accordingly, such delays in policy decisions and implementation have 
contributed significantly to the Senegalese strategy of closer engagement at the bilateral 
level, as Member State engagement has been seen as more closely aligned with Senegalese 
preferences and demands. Further to this, the extent of Member State efforts in the different 
countries also highlights these coordination gaps in the EU’s migration policy. The 
Senegalese case demonstrates how intense Member State involvement provided an 
alternative means to establish more ownership over migration vis-a-vis the EU, by allowing 
the government to bypass Commission efforts while creating an important precedent for 
future cooperation at the EU level. The lack of intense Member State involvement in Ghana 
shows how Member State involvement affects the EU’s policy effectiveness, in that a lack 
of coordinated and intense engagement has weakened the EU’s overall position in shaping 
the national policy framework on migration.
Third, the case studies have also demonstrated the extent to which a country’s 
perceptions of the EU’s capabilities and its constraints are important in shaping its position 
and strategies in the migration debate. In Senegal, the EU has been perceived as lacking in 
coherence and having a rather weak capacity to engage fully with the government in the 
migration agenda. This is seen as constraining the extent to which it can act as a positive 
force in shaping the migration agenda and negotiating with the government. For Ghana the 
EU is seen in a more positive light, having played a crucial role in sensitising African 
governments to insert migration into national, regional, and continental debates and to 
integrate this into domestic development policies, but at the same time, having limited 
interaction with the government at the level of domestic policy making and 
implementation. Both countries’ perceptions of the EU have in turn shaped their position in 
the migration debate. Senegal adopted a pro-active and strategic position in cooperating 
with other actors for closer collaboration, while Ghana adopted an accommodating 
approach in which it has willingly engaged in high-level dialogue with the EU, while the 
formulation of a national policy has been carried out alongside intermediary and external 
agencies specialised in migration matters. As such, the case studies largely confirm 
Hypotheses 2a-d, as outlined in Chapter 1: On the one hand, when the EU is perceived as 
incapable, inconsistent, incoherent, or constrained by its wider interests, weaker actors are 
more less likely to cooperate, and more likely to devise strategies towards the exercise of 
leverage and control. On the other hand, where the EU is perceived as capable and
255
coherent, and its wider interests do not constrain it to seek out intense cooperation with a 
weaker actor, than the country will be more likely to adopt a consensual or compliant 
approach.
The perception that the government holds of itself vis-a-vis the EU also contributes 
to the strategy that it chooses to adopt in relations with the EU. Indeed, the case of Senegal 
demonstrates that some African countries have been able to exploit this renewed strategic 
position vis-a-vis the EU showing just how this changing relationship has impacted the 
power dynamics between the two country blocs. As Senegal has come to perceive its 
position within the migration debate as strategic, it has not only strongly asserted 
ownership over its migration policy, but it shifted the migration dialogue to more closely 
consider the country’s concerns and interests. Due to its different geographic and 
demographic position, Ghana has not been considered strategic as a major migrant-sending 
country to Europe, assuming a more passive approach in the migration debate, even if this 
is starting to shift towards increased pro-activeness. Thus while in Ghana pro-activeness 
was a result of an increasingly closer alignment of agendas between the EU, and other 
actors, and the government, the opposite is true in Senegal, where pro-activeness on the 
part of the government and other actors instead resulted in the EU having to more closely 
align its strategy with the government’s.
Finally, the chapter illustrated how some African countries have been successful in 
putting forward their preferences and exercising leverage and control vis-a-vis the EU. 
Importantly, the chapter shows that in order to provide a more complete account of the 
power relationship between the EU and migrant-sending countries in Africa the limitations 
and constraints of both parties need to be taken into consideration. In considering the EU’s 
constraints and limitations in migration relations with African countries, it becomes evident 
that the increased awareness of some countries of these constraints has changed the 
dynamics of the traditional power relationship. In this sense, the chapter further confirms 
previous findings in the other two case studies on aid and trade, that success in exercising 
leverage is to a large extent dependent on a country’s perception of the EU as being able to 
transform its structural power into bargaining power, and effectively transform its rhetoric 
into policy actions, and secondly how this then translates into an effective strategy to get its 
preferences across despite the evident constraints it faces as a weaker country. Firstly, in 
terms of leverage, once again the opportunity for countries to exploit alternative options is a 
fundamental factor in a country’s ability to forego cooperation with the EU and promote its 
own policy preferences when these do not converge with the EU’s. Secondly, other 
contextual factors are important to consider in understanding the conditions under which
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countries are able to exercise leverage vis-a-vis the EU. In a policy area like migration, 
where the EU has more interest in seeking cooperation with African countries and the 
countries only have supplemental interests in cooperating with the EU, contextual factors, 
as outlined in Table 1.3 in Chapter 1, such as institutional capacity and economic and 
financial dependence do not play such a crucial role. Rather strategic factors, such as the 
country’s importance in the migration debate, are an important element in the exercise of 
leverage in new policy areas where power asymmetry between the EU and African 
countries is not as manifest. Indeed within the context of migration policy, the terms of 
power asymmetry between the two parties are clearly very different than in the aid and 
trade fields, where alternatives are often limited and dependence on the EU is often 
manifest. In sum, the chapter serves to confirm once again, that power relations between 
the EU and Africa are very much context-bound and dependent on the relation between the 
two parties.
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C onclusion
African countries’ scope for influence and 
the EU as an international actor
This thesis has argued that despite the fact that power asymmetry is an overarching 
characteristic of relations between the EU and Africa, relational and contextual factors can 
explain why some African countries have been successful in exercising leverage and 
control vis-a-vis the EU. Building upon previous literature on EU-Africa relations, it was 
argued that as a foreign policy actor the EU faces institutional and political constraints that 
lead to gaps between policy rhetoric and practise and between expectations and actual 
capabilities. This affects the EU’s position vis-a-vis third parties and creates a disjunction 
between the EU’s structural power and its actual bargaining power. Structurally weaker 
countries are able to achieve their preferences and goals successfully vis-a-vis the EU, 
firstly, because of their perceptions of the EU’s constraints and capacities, and secondly, 
because certain institutional, economic, political and strategic factors create conditions for 
weaker country leverage and control.
This conclusion will outline the main findings that came out of the case and 
thematic studies examining power asymmetry in EU-Africa relations. It briefly summarises 
the conceptual framework forming the basis of the thesis. It then demonstrates how this 
framework has actually played out in relations between the EU and Africa, by summarising 
the results of the case and thematic studies. It proceeds to outline some of the shortcomings 
of the framework. Lastly, the conclusion considers the implications of the findings on 
broader considerations of classifying the EU as a certain kind of international actor in the 
world and offers some potential avenues for future research.
1 Main findings of the thesis
The thesis challenged the notion that power asymmetry between the EU and African 
countries determines that the outcome of these interactions will necessarily favour the EU, 
or the EU will necessarily be influential in shaping other countries preferences, because of 
the significant structural power it possesses. It adopted a holistic approach to examining 
EU-Africa relations, by examining firstly the constraints faced by both EU and African 
actors in engaging with one another, and secondly African perspectives of the EU’s 
capabilities and how these have shaped their approach to the EU. In so doing, it engages
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with calls to fill a large gap in the current literature on the EU’s foreign policy role, by 
conducting more empirically-oriented research on the EU’s interactions with third 
countries. It thus aimed to advance a discussion on other actors’ perceptions of the EU, how 
the EU’s foreign policy actions affect other countries’ positions, and ultimately, what the 
EU’s foreign policy actions vis-a-vis others imply about the EU’s role in the world and its 
international identity.
The conceptual framework used to examine why certain countries have been 
successful in exercising leverage and control vis-a-vis a structurally stronger EU, adopted 
four different conceptualisations of power from the International Relations literature and 
placed these in the context of EU-Africa relations. Firstly, drawing on Baldwin’s, 
Habeeb’s, and Keohane and Nye’s conceptualisation of power, it was posited that power is 
both relational and contextual. The way in which the two parties exercise power vis-a-vis 
one another, and not merely the type of power they possess, and the context or issue-area in 
which the exercise of power takes place, matter greatly in explaining instances in which 
weaker actors can exercise leverage and control. This allows for significant variations in 
the exercise of leverage and control, in that it depends and varies according to the context 
and the relationship between the actors considered. Secondly, following contributions by 
Zartman and Rubin and in an attempt to move away from EU-centric discussions on the 
EU’s power, power was conceptualised as intrinsically linked to how an actor perceives its 
own power as opposed to that of others, as well as how it perceives the other actor’s power 
as opposed to its own. Power was thus considered to be influenced and shaped by actors’ 
perceptions of themselves, of others, and vis-a-vis one another. Thirdly, power was equated 
with Bachrach and Baratz’s understanding of power as agenda-setting. This allowed for 
analyses that do not focus merely on outcomes, but also on the process of relations between 
weak and strong actors, and importantly, the extent to which actors can shape wider 
preferences and policy processes vis-a-vis one another. Lastly, following constructivist 
assertions made by Lukes, among others, power was also considered to operate according 
to broader structural limitations in place which can either constrain or assist in the exercise 
of leverage and control, but which the actors concerned do not necessarily have any control 
over. In this sense, both the agent and the structure affect and shape the process and 
outcome of power relations. Based upon these four understandings, power was 
characterized as operating through an interactive, dynamic, and inter-subjective process in 
which several contextual factors create the conditions under which on actor can exercise 
leverage and control vis-a-vis another.
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In accounting for the contextual or issue-area aspects of power, the thesis focused 
on three different fields in which the EU and Africa have been or are seeking cooperation, 
namely aid, trade, and migration. The fields were chosen for their historical or 
contemporary importance in EU-Africa relations and because the context of these three 
thematic areas offers insights into how different issue-areas and contextual environments 
influence strategies and approaches. In addition, the three issue-areas illustrate that power 
asymmetry can differ from one issue-area to the next, and is therefore not a determinant for 
policy processes and outcomes between weak and strong actors. In accounting for the 
relational aspects of power, the EU’s relations with Africa were analysed through a 
comparative country case study of Senegal and Ghana. The countries were chosen based on 
a most similar methodology. As ‘weaker’ countries, Senegal and Ghana are similar in terms 
of their history with the EU, face similar structural constraints in negotiating with the EU, 
and are seemingly comparable with regards to their political and strategic position, yet they 
have demonstrated differing degrees of success in exercising leverage and control in 
relations with the EU. The thesis sought to answer why two countries which on the surface 
seem quite similar have adopted such differing strategies towards the EU that led to 
differing degrees of success in fulfilling their preferences. While the EU’s aid, trade, and 
migration policies towards the countries are nearly identical, as are the countries’ national 
agendas and interests in relation to the EU, they hold different perceptions of both their 
own and the EU’s strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, there are important differences 
in certain contextual factors influencing the countries’ strategies vis-a-vis the EU. As a 
result of differences in their perceptions and how contextual factors have influenced their 
ability to convert their strategies into a successful approach vis-a-vis the EU, variations in 
their ability to exercise leverage and maintain ownership can be explained.
Asymmetry in structural power is clearly an overarching characteristic in EU-Africa 
relations. In the field of development aid, this asymmetry is particularly pronounced. The 
EU holds significant financial strength over Africa and holds ultimate decision-making 
power as to whether or not to allocate its financial resources. Aid relations are thus based 
on a power asymmetry between the donor and the recipient. In the trade field, a similar 
asymmetry exists. The sheer size of the EU’s market and its share of world trade make it an 
important actor in international trade fora and a crucial trading partner. Furthermore, the 
extent of the EU’s experience in conducting trade negotiations and the delegation of 
competences to a central actor, namely the Commission, further accentuate the EU’s power 
in trade. In the migration field, this power asymmetry is apparent in the EU’s 
implementation of restrictive measures to prevent and control migration flows, and through
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its use of coercive measures to induce sending-countries to cooperate in prevention and 
control, despite the significant pull factors the EU offers potential migrants.
Senegal’s and Ghana’s structural power, on the other hand, is severely limited in 
comparison. In all three fields examined, an overriding characteristic is the constraints the 
countries face at the institutional levels. They lack financial resources and technical 
capacity to formulate effective strategies, negotiate positions, and implement policies and 
programmes. In both aid and trade relations, their financial and economic dependence on 
EU aid and market access constrains their ability to bargain with the EU. Senegal and 
Ghana are both highly aid dependent and the EU (EC plus the Member States) is the most 
important donor in both countries. The European Commission’s development programme 
alone constitutes an important source of revenue for the countries, and has been recognised 
as a crucial contributor towards achieving development goals. The countries are therefore 
not in a position to refuse or circumvent aid, making cooperation essential. Similarly, in the 
area of trade, both Senegal and Ghana hold a marginal share in world trade exporting only a 
narrow range of primary commodities, their industrial sector is largely underdeveloped, and 
the EU constitutes their largest export and import partner. As in aid therefore, cooperation 
with the EU in trade matters is essential for the countries’ economic growth prospects. The 
migration field presents a slightly different scenario, however, in that financial or economic 
dependence on the EU is less pronounced than in the other two fields. In fact, as a more 
recent policy field in which the EU and Africa are cooperating, migration does not operate 
along the same power dynamics as the aid and trade fields, because here the EU has 
pronounced interests in seeking the collaboration of migrant-sending countries.
Although the EU-Africa relationship is characterised by asymmetry in structural 
power, consideration of the context in which relations take place has established that both 
parties face constraints in effectively cooperating with one another. Therefore, it is 
important to recognise that the EU also faces constraints and that these limit the extent to 
which it can engage with African countries. These constraints were found to exist at four 
levels. Firstly, at the administrative or institutional level several issues were raised (see 
Hypothesis 2a). A very concrete constraint is found in the limited resources, both financial 
and human, the EU is able and prepared to employ in its relations with Africa. In the aid, 
trade, and migration fields different financial constraints and concerns impacted the EU’s 
engagement with Africa in important ways. In the aid field, the failure of Member States to 
commit to increased funding for the EDF impacts negatively on the EU’s credibility as a 
capable and coherent development actor because of the inability of the Commission to 
follow through on initial promised allocations. In trade, the lack of a sufficient financial
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instrument to address supply-side constraints and adjustment costs incurred by 
implementing free trade agreements caused significant deadlock in EPA negotiations with 
the ACP. In migration, the modest funding dedicated to migration in comparison to other 
policy areas and limited coordination amongst the different financial instruments available 
for migration-related programmes, has weakened the EU’s position as a relevant migration- 
actor in Africa. In addition, the aid and migration thematic studies illustrated the crucial 
role the EU’s delegations have in negotiating with the governments and carrying out tasks 
on the ground. At the same time, decentralisation has not been coupled adequately with the 
necessary resources, training, skills, expertise, and decision-making autonomy from 
Brussels required for the delegations to perform their roles as prescribed and as expected by 
the governments of the countries where they reside. Furthermore, in all three of the policy 
areas, both delegation and Commission staff were seen as lacking the knowledge of local 
conditions, which affected their engagement with national governments.
Secondly, the EU is constrained by the conflicting relationship between the 
Commission and the Member States or Council in executing its policies in Africa (see 
Hypothesis 2b). While Member State policies and practises towards Africa are supposed to 
be coordinated amongst themselves as well as with the Commission’s efforts, in reality this 
harmonisation is sometimes lacking. Overlap, duplication and conflicting actions 
undermine the EU’s total effort in Africa. While in all three fields, the Commission has 
been delegated the task of negotiating with African governments, albeit with differing 
degrees of intensity, its capacity to perform this task is constrained by several factors. In the 
negotiation and administration of aid, the Commission has come under intense pressure by 
the Member States to improve effectiveness and accountability of aid, yet this has led to an 
excessive complexity and bureaucracy, reducing the impact of aid and burdening recipient 
government. In trade negotiations, the Commission is on the one hand constrained to the 
negotiating mandate it is given by the Council, and therefore its inability to concede to the 
demands of the negotiating opponent reduces the scope for negotiation between the two 
parties. On the other hand, when divergences emerge between the Council or Member 
States and the Commission’s position, as witnessed in the EPA negotiations, this weakens 
the image of the EU as a unitary actor in trade matters. In migration, the way in which the 
Member States constrain the Commission’s efforts was clear. Indeed, Member States have 
preferred to conduct negotiations on migration agreements at the bilateral level, 
significantly undermining the Commission’s efforts in Senegal and Ghana.
A third constraint was found at the level of coherence amongst the different policies 
concerning EU-Africa relations (see Hypothesis 2c). Within the Commission, coordination
262
is expected to occur between the different directorate generals responsible for 
Development, Trade, External Relations, and Justice, Freedom, and Security, etc., yet 
internal coordination and coherence was often lacking. Policy divergence between the 
different areas of competence posed a constraint on the EU’s capacity to formulate a 
coherent approach towards its relations with African countries, which in turn affected its 
ability to employ an effective and credible policy in Africa. In the aid field, the lack of 
clarity about the roles and responsibilities of DG Relex, DG Development and Europe Aid 
created a split between aid programming and implementation, between policy formulation 
towards ACP and non-ACP countries, and between development and the EU’s wider 
external relations. In trade, the leadership role of DG Trade in negotiating trade agreements 
led development concerns to be sidelined in the EPA negotiations, which in turn led to 
accusations of incoherence between development-friendly EU rhetoric and the EU 
negotiators’ actual approach to the negotiations. Policy incoherence was also a major 
concern in the migration field, where the leadership position of the security branch 
constrained the EU’s capacity to engage fully with migrant-sending countries, because the 
EU’s objectives and policies are geared towards migration control and prevention rather 
than migration and development, as preferred by their African counterparts. The scattering 
of Africa-related policies amongst different DGs and the resulting policy incoherence 
contributes to the notion that the EU’s approach is plagued with coordination and 
consistency gaps in its external policies.
Fourthly, the EU was often found to be constrained by its wider interests in 
establishing itself as a relevant and influential foreign policy actor (see Hypothesis 2d). 
Paradoxically, the EU’s use of its relations, actions, and policies vis-a-vis weaker countries 
to achieve wider political and strategic objectives can sometimes hamper the reaching of 
those wider objectives because of the consequences of having to find agreement on issues 
that are particularly important to the EU. While this constraint was not as prevalent in the 
aid field, certainly in the trade and migration fields it was clear that the EU’s need to find 
agreement or to solicit cooperation from weaker countries has at times negatively affected 
its bargaining strength. In the EPA negotiations, the need to conclude the negotiations, 
especially considering the controversy and criticisms that came to surround EU’s 
negotiating positions, have evidenced the political constraints the EU continues to face as a 
trade negotiator. In migration, the need for the EU to engage in migration management with 
migrant-sending countries in order to reach the broader goal of effective migration control 
has constrained it to moving its migration agenda beyond a mere security focus, which 
proved largely ineffective in engaging governments of migration countries to cooperate. In
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sum, constraints faced by the EU have led to a gap between policy rhetoric and practise, 
and between expectations and actual capabilities. Furthermore, the institutional and 
political constraints faced by the EU create a disjunction between the EU’s structural power 
and its actual bargaining power or ability to influence and achieve its preferred outcome.
1.1 Perceptions
Some African countries are able to achieve their preferences successfully because of 
the way in which they perceive the EU and their awareness of the EU’s constraints. The 
perceptions that Senegal and Ghana held of the EU’s strengths and weaknesses influenced 
their choices, positions, and strategies vis-a-vis the EU, and ultimately contributed to their 
ability or inability to exercise leverage and ownership. In general, Senegal saw the EU as 
an essential partner, particularly in aid and to some extent in trade as well, and cooperation 
with the EU was considered necessary for the country to reach its goals of development and 
economic growth. Yet Senegal also perceives the EU as constrained in its ability to engage 
fully with the government. In this regard, the Commission’s procedures and administration 
are considered overly bureaucratic and complicated; the EU’s approach and policies are 
uncoordinated amongst the different institutions and actors comprising the EU; the EU’s 
external policies are applied in an incoherent and inconsistent manner; the EU is seen as 
lacking sufficient expertise, with the Commission and especially the delegation lacking 
adequate decisionrmaking and implementation autonomy in its relations with the 
government; and the EU is often perceived as constrained by its wider political and 
strategic interests. On the one hand, this is seen as adding an additional burden to the 
government’s already limited and strained capacity. On the other hand, the government has 
often circumvented the EU by negotiating more closely with other external actors, 
attempted to re-orientate the EU’s approach towards one that more closely fit its own 
preferences, adopted a non-compliant or hard-lined approach to negotiations, or insisted on 
its ownership over strategies according to the government’s priorities.
In many respects, the EU is viewed similarly in Ghana: certainly cooperation is 
considered crucial, yet the Commission’s procedures are also considered to burden the 
government, as in the case of aid; the EU’s actions are not always congruent with its 
rhetoric, as in the case of trade; and the EU is not always identified as the lead partner due 
to its limited mandate, as in the case of migration. At the same time however, Ghana also 
viewed the EU as a leader in terms of high-level agenda-setting and often the government’s 
strategies, where these existed, were largely congruent with those of the EU, thus avoiding 
major divergences between the EU and Ghana. Furthermore, few or even no opportunities
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were identified in which the government could exercise leverage or control vis-a-vis a 
much stronger and more experienced EU. Instead, the government adopted a consensual or 
compromising approach towards the EU, which was seen as necessary to maintain cordial 
relations and reap the maximum benefits from this relationship in the face of its inability to 
refuse or bypass cooperation.
Further to the countries’ perceptions of the EU’s strengths and weaknesses, another 
important difference between Ghana and Senegal was found in the way in which they 
perceive their own power as opposed to the EU’s. Although aware that structural power 
asymmetry constrains its room for manoeuvre, Senegal also holds a strong conviction of 
maintaining ownership or control over national strategies and defending these in relations 
with external , actors. This conviction has given the government the confidence to take 
initiatives in orientating policies towards its preferences and in identifying those actors that 
can most closely address its needs. Therefore, although the government is aware of the 
extent to which it needs to cooperate with the EU, especially in the aid and trade fields, it 
has also been unwilling to accept policy processes and outcomes to be entirely driven by 
external actors, especially where these do not fit with the preferences of the government. 
Thus Senegal’s strategy towards the EU has been to maximise control or leverage within 
the limits of structural power asymmetry (i.e. it does not have the choice to forego 
cooperation altogether). Ghana, on the other hand, does not perceive itself to be in a 
position in which it could strategically manoeuvre around EU constraints or gain increased 
control of policy processes and outcomes. Indeed, in Ghana there was a much stronger 
acknowledgement of the structural power asymmetry that permeates relations with the EU, 
and unlike Senegal, the government often considered the opportunities for exercising 
leverage limited or absent. Faced with a sense of constraint in exercising leverage and 
aware of its dependence on the EU, the Ghanaian government has been more inclined to 
opt for a consensual approach rather than confrontation. Thus Ghana’s strategy towards the 
EU has been to maximise the benefits from relations with the EU through compromise 
because of structural power asymmetry. Although this strategy has generally allowed for a 
rather ‘positive’ relationship between Ghana and the EU, in opting for such an approach, 
the government has also allowed policy processes and outcomes to be mostly externally- 
driven, rather than government-controlled. While this does not imply that Senegal’s 
relationship was more or less successful than Ghana’s, or that confrontation is a more 
desirable option than compromise, it simply suggests that perceptions, both those of the EU 
and of the country’s own strengths and weaknesses, influence the countries’ strategies in
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relation to the EU, which in turn partially explains the ability or inability to exercise 
leverage vis-a-vis the EU despite structural power asymmetry.
Contrary to the expectations of realist and neo-realist understandings of power, and 
to the conceptualisations of EU-Africa relations as mainly determined by power 
asymmetry, the case studies confirm that power is a relational concept, and highlight the 
extent to which understandings of power and asymmetry need to account for the inter- 
subjective nature of relations between weak and strong actors. Findings from the case 
studies also point to the importance of the perceptions actors hold of one another to explain 
why one actor can produce ‘intended effects’ despite an objective reality that clearly 
denotes a situation of power asymmetry. Yet perceptions alone cannot entirely explain 
weaker actor leverage. Although perceptions shape the actors’ approach and strategy vis-a- 
vis one another, they do not necessarily determine success in exercising leverage. Indeed, 
there are certain contextual factors which each country faces in its relations with the EU 
that have helped to determine firstly how the countries perceive the EU and secondly how 
the strategies adopted translated into successfully reaching preferences in policy processes 
and outcomes. This is precisely why the context and the issue-areas in which power 
relations take place were particularly relevant to consider in determining countries’ ability 
to exercise leverage.
Through detailed empirical work on the countries’ perceptions, approaches, and 
strategies towards the EU, it was demonstrated that Senegal has been more successful in 
exercising leverage and control vis-a-vis the EU than Ghana. In aid relations Senegal was 
able to maintain ownership and control over its national development framework and 
managed to gain increases in the type of aid it prefers due, in part, to its hard-line 
negotiating position. Although Ghana’s relations with the EC as a donor are cordial, this 
has not necessarily been congruent with the exercise of leverage or control. Different from 
Senegal, Ghana did not maintain control of its national development framework, and 
mainly relied on donor initiatives to allow for increases in the type of aid it preferred and 
develop donor coordination mechanisms. In the trade field, Senegal was able to influence 
the regional negotiating mandate by placing development issues at the centre of the 
region’s demands vis-a-vis the EU, and mobilised considerable opposition against the trade 
agreements the EU was trying to negotiate with the region, contributing to a shift in the 
EU’s strategy. Ghana instead focused its attentions more towards the national level, and 
took a rather passive approach to influencing the regional agenda or voicing its concerns 
towards the EU. The country eventually initialled the agreement that was opposed by most 
of the region and some important players at the national level. Finally, in the migration
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field, Senegal exercised leverage and control by using the extensive engagement on 
migration matters at the bilateral level to reposition the debate at the EU level, while at the 
same time adopting a non-compliant approach to the EU’s initial engagement on migration 
matters. In doing so, it managed to shift the EU to more closely address its own preferences 
in cooperating on migration matters. Ghana, on the other hand, in not identifying the EU as 
the main actor with which to reach its preferences on migration matters, preferred to 
collaborate with other international actors; in failing to develop a government-owned 
approach to migration, it allowed external actors to drive the migration debate at the 
national level. Senegal was more successful because it had the confidence to transform its 
strategies into ‘negotiating capital’ and employ this in an effective manner in its relations 
with the EU. This confidence derived largely from its ideological orientation towards 
country ownership of its development process and in relations to outside actors, and this 
was strengthened by numerous contextual factors which created favourable conditions for 
the exercise of leverage. Ghana, on the other hand, did not have this confidence largely due 
to a perceived lack of alternative sources and an embedded dependence on relations with 
external actors in which maximising the benefits of these relations rather than control over 
these relations is the country’s priority. Thus in remaining with the understanding of power 
espoused in this thesis, the exercise of leverage is dependent both on the agent and the 
structure.
After considering the strategies adopted by each country in each of the three policy 
fields, the country chapters proceeded to examine the historical, institutional, economic, 
political and ideological, and strategic contextual conditions in both countries which have 
shaped the countries’ perceptions and strategies vis-a-vis the EU. These factors can explain 
the variations between Senegal and Ghana’s exercise of leverage. While in Senegal these 
contextual factors have translated into an effective strategy to be employed in the exercise 
of leverage and maintaining control vis-a-vis the EU, in Ghana these same contextual 
factors have instead translated into a less effective strategy for leverage and control. 
Importantly however, although the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of leverage and control 
can be attributed to the country’s capacities and willingness to do so, at the same time the 
extent to which the EU has or has not been identified as the main partner in a given fields, 
is also crucial to the countries’ approaches to the EU. In performing this detailed exercise, 
it is now possible to draw some relevant conclusions regarding these intervening factors.
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1.2 Factors favouring and constraining leverage and control
1.2.1 Historical
Although this factor was not examined specifically in the country chapters, as 
outlined in the conceptual framework, a country’s historical ties to the EU and certain EU 
Member States was considered to be an overarching factor which contributed to influencing 
countries’ perceptions of the EU and consequentially the strategies they develop to 
negotiate with the EU. Thus Senegal’s historical ties to France have implications on the 
way it has chosen to deal with the EU. On the one hand, Senegal has based its expectations 
and interactions with the EU on its previous experiences in dealing with France. As the 
views it holds of France’s interventions are often congruent with the views it holds of the 
EU’s efforts in the country, its sometimes conflictual strategies and the strong sense of 
ownership it exerts in relations with external partners have been partially shaped by the 
views it holds of its primary historical partner: namely that it is considered important and 
essential, but at the same time Senegal aims for increased political and economic 
independence from France, by seeking out alternative partners and by asserting ownership 
over national processes and preferences. Indeed, throughout the chapters it became clear 
that this view and approach is increasingly similar to the one Senegal projects towards the 
EU. In Ghana, the historical ties to its former colonial power, the UK, are not nearly as 
strong as Senegal’s ties to France. In fact, it has been mostly other actors such as the World 
Bank, the IMF, and the US that have influenced and shaped Ghana’s understanding and 
perceptions of other foreign policy actors. In this regard, the EU, the UK, and other 
Member States are merely considered one amongst the many international actors present in 
Ghana. This has consequently also influenced the strategies it adopts towards the EU, 
which have been mostly in line with the overall approach the country has towards external 
actors. In this sense, the Ghanaian government has preferred to negotiate most closely with 
those external actors it has identified as better able to meet its needs and preferences, and in 
doing so it has adopted a consensual approach in order to receive the maximum benefits 
from its relations with external actors.
1.2.2 Institutional
Structurally weaker actors are severely constrained in the exercise of leverage due to 
the unfavourable institutional conditions they face, however there are several intervening 
conditions in the country’s institutional environment that assist or hinder the exercise of 
leverage beyond mere capacity constraints. In all three fields, it was evident that one of the
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main weaknesses Senegal and Ghana faced in their relations with the EU was the lack or 
limited capacity of their institutional and administrative structures to cope with not only the 
EU’s stringent procedures, but also to implement EU policies and programmes, and acquire 
negotiating expertise and capabilities. In Ghana in particular, institutional weaknesses were 
seen as the main factor explaining the country’s inability to effectively reach its preferences 
and maintain control over its policies and programmes. At the same time, many of the 
constraints faced by Ghana were similarly present in the Senegalese institutional context, 
and still the government often managed to get its preferences across. This is because even if 
it is not always successful in following through on strategies in the implementation phase, 
Senegal possesses a good capacity for strategy formulation without much external 
intervention. This derives mainly from its previous policy experience, institutional 
structures permitting for the formulation of a consolidated view between the government 
and stakeholders, and the technical expertise, albeit limited, that is available. Because 
strategies were largely formulated on the government’s initiative and without much 
external interference, this assisted in providing Senegal with the confidence to promote its 
preferences in relations with external actors such as the EU. Conversely in Ghana, although 
the government is capable of strategy formulation, this was mainly said to involve a large 
degree of interference and influence by external actors, which diminished the government 
ownership and even confidence in promoting its own initiatives and preferences. Because 
strategies are produced with a view of pleasing external partners in order to reap the 
maximum benefits from its external relations, many of Ghana’s strategies are externally- 
driven with the government taking initiative only after items have already been placed on 
the agenda.
1.2.3 Economic
A country’s economic situation, namely its trade and aid dependence on the EU, 
strongly determines the extent to which it is able or confident enough to exercise leverage 
vis-a-vis a structurally stronger actor. The more a country is considered to be dependent on 
the EU for its exports or on aid for meeting its developmental needs, the less likely it is 
willing to forego cooperation with the EU and risk confrontation in the pursuit of leverage. 
Access to alternative resources and alternative trading and aid partners encouraged 
governments to exercise leverage vis-a-vis its more traditional partners such as the EU. 
This was particularly evident in the aid and trade fields, where Senegal’s interactions with 
non-traditional donors and trading partners have provided the government with an 
increased willingness to criticise traditional partners such as the EU and increased
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confidence to risk forgoing cooperation in favour of other options which more closely 
converge with its short-term interests. In Ghana, the more cautious approach adopted by the 
government towards alternative partners, in combination with the embedded aid 
dependence at the institutional level, did not permit the government to adopt a more critical 
or confrontational approach vis-a-vis the EU. Certainly, Ghana’s access to newfound 
economic resources, namely the recent discovery of offshore oil, will prove particularly 
relevant in assessing whether the government’s approach to donors becomes more assertive 
as a consequence. Even in the migration field economic factors played a role: the more 
economically beneficial or the more development potential out-migration was seen as 
bringing, the less inclined the government was to cooperate with the EU in migration 
control and the more the agenda shifted towards migration and development.
1.2.4 Political/Ideological
Several political factors influence the exercise of leverage. Firstly, a high degree of 
domestic political legitimacy of the government and a strong electoral mandate favour 
leverage in that it confers upon the government a strong negotiating mandate and a strong 
conviction that policies should be defended and promoted in external relations. This was 
particularly evident in Senegal, where wide electoral support of Wade and his government 
and a relatively weak opposition gave the government the legitimacy and the security to 
formulate government-owned strategies that it aimed to defend in aid, trade, and migration 
negotiations with the EU. In Ghana, highly competitive party politics and the resulting 
pressure to deliver visible short-term results to ensure electoral success discouraged the 
pursuit of policies that do not converge with the interest of the government’s external 
partners. Therefore, in addition to aid and trade dependence, political dependence and the 
embeddedness of this dependence in the government’s relations with external actors such 
as the EU heavily influences the extent to which a country is able or willing to exercise 
leverage. This last point highlights another political factor that influences leverage, namely 
the political utility of defending government positions or complying with external actors’ 
strategies. In this sense, a country’s position vis-a-vis the EU and the intensity with which 
policy goals are pursued in its relations with the EU also depends on a strategic political 
choice to converge or diverge with the EU’s position. This was made most evident in the 
case of the EPA negotiations, in which criticising the EU’s approach to the negotiations in 
Senegal helped the government to divert attention from other pressing domestic concerns, 
whereas in Ghana, short-term interests and the political expediency to secure market access
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with its most important trade partner led to limited consultations at all level of government 
and a rather rushed decision to enter into an interim trade agreement with the EU.
1.2.5 Strategic
A country’s leadership, especially in the regional context, assists its ability to 
exercise leverage more effectively vis-a-vis the EU. The more its regional leadership role 
and a country’s position in the region aligns with the EU’s interests in the region, the more 
room for manoeuvre the country has in reaching its preferences. The importance of regional 
leadership was evident in all three thematic areas. In aid, it was argued that it was in part 
due to Senegal’s increasingly important geo-strategic position in the region and on the 
African continent, in which Senegal’s efforts and commitments have matched the EU’s 
increasing strategic interests in focusing on security. In Ghana, though regional 
commitments are extensive and commendable, donor interests lie mainly in the country’s 
policy efforts in terms of economic and political stability, rather than its role in security and 
political leadership geared towards a wider regional agenda. In trade, it was Senegal’s role 
and experience in the UEMOA that had afforded it with increased influence in determining 
the regional agenda, as opposed to Ghana’s sense of isolation within the region regarding 
both its economic position as a non-LDC and strategic position as a non-UEMOA member 
country. The regional leadership role of Senegal in placing migration issues on the 
ECOWAS political agenda has increased the government’s strategic importance in 
migration cooperation, as opposed to Ghana’s very limited involvement in the area, further 
illustrating the importance of regional leadership in exercising leverage. The migration 
field also points to another relatively clear-cut strategic condition which has influenced 
leverage: Senegal’s geographic position as a major country of migrant origin and transit 
especially for irregular and low-skilled migration as opposed to Ghana’s less threatening 
geographic position and contribution to mostly semi- and high-skilled migrant flows has 
made the EU’s interest in engaging with Senegal much more intense than with Ghana, 
especially in terms of cooperation on migration control, which in turn has contributed to 
shaping the governments’ reactions and strategies towards the EU’s approach.
In sum, in adopting an empirical approach to analysing power asymmetry between 
the EU and African countries, the thesis demonstrated that although asymmetry does indeed 
constrain weaker actors in identifying their preferences and limits the resources these actors 
can draw upon in meeting their preferences vis-a-vis stronger actors, it does not determine 
that the process and outcome of these relations necessarily favour the stronger actor. 
Indeed, in demonstrating that some African countries have been able to achieve
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successfully their preference vis-a-vis the EU despite power asymmetry, the thesis has 
demonstrated the importance of firstly identifying both parties’ strengths and weaknesses in 
conducting relations with one another, and secondly in establishing the conditions under 
which African countries are able to fulfil their goals in relations with the EU. Although 
there are some limitations to the framework adopted, as briefly outlined below, at the same 
time, the thesis makes a contribution in moving beyond the literature which merely 
characterises the EU as a certain kind of power or international actor, by instead 
considering specifically how its relations with the outside world affect current 
understandings of the EU’s power.
2 Limitations of the framework
The present framework does not allow in-depth consideration of how other external and 
internal contextual factors have influenced the countries’ positions vis-a-vis the EU. 
Indeed, in focusing mainly on the power relationship between the EU and Africa, some 
other important actors that have undoubtedly contributed to the changing context of EU- 
Africa relations remained mostly obscured. The presence and influence of other major 
players on the African continent, such as the US and the World Bank, merit due 
consideration, as does the extent of influence deriving from internal African players and 
processes such as the African Union and NEPAD. Furthermore, as the thesis was written at 
a very dynamic time period for the African continent, no solid conclusions could be drawn 
with regards to effects of Africa’s changing economic conditions and the impact of non- 
traditional partners on Africa, such as China. Thirdly, it is also recognised that the historical 
ties to the Member States and the post-colonial relationships between some Member States 
and the two case studies was not considered in any systematic manner. While it is true that 
Senegal’s ties to France and Ghana’s ties to Britain have influenced the way in which the 
countries perceive the EU, it is also the case that both the countries and these Member 
States have begun distancing themselves from one another considerably, while the post­
colonial relationship is not nearly as central to Europe’s relations to Africa as it once was.
In placing the focus of this research explicitly on the current state of EU-Africa 
affairs and in focusing exclusively on contemporary processes that illustrate the changing 
context of EU-Africa relations, the historical aspect of these relations could not be explored 
in much detail. The focus on contemporary processes is nevertheless valid, because one of 
the central aims of the thesis was to explore how the current state of EU-Africa relations, 
which have continuously been characterised by power asymmetry and marginalisation, are 
instead influenced and affected by numerous processes and complexities which continue to
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shape the evolving nature of EU-Africa relations. Furthermore, in focusing on a relatively 
short time frame of relations between the parties, the thesis attempts to capture more 
closely the extent to which some of the more dramatic shifts afforded by the Cotonou 
Agreement, the ending of trade preferences, and new issue-areas for cooperation have 
influenced relations between the parties.
3 Implications of the findings: the EU as an international actor
It is incorrect to assume the EU has power just because it is the EU, and that Africa has no 
power just because it is Africa. In adopting a holistic approach to the EU’s relations with 
Senegal and Ghana, the focus of the research shifts away from an EU-centric approach and 
instead examines the countries’ perceptions of the EU and certain contextual factors 
shaping their strategies towards the EU, it has become clear that power asymmetry does not 
determine the outcome of the EU’s relations with weaker actors. A holistic approach allows 
for explanations as to why and how some developing countries have been successful in 
reaching their preferences regardless of a situation in which the structural levels of power 
do not necessarily favour the weak. The research has shown that there is much more to the 
EU’s relations with Africa than meets the eye. Although it by no means negates that power 
asymmetry exists, it also argues that in taking into closer consideration the context in which 
relations between the EU and Africa operate, this asymmetry can be seen as decidedly less 
deterministic. The thesis has thus aimed to make a contribution to the growing body of 
literature that challenges the common notion of the inability of developing countries to 
formulate strategies and negotiate successfully with stronger actors. In doing so, it has 
aimed to put EU-Africa relations into a new perspective. In looking at power asymmetry in 
the context of these relations, the thesis challenges previous understandings of Africa as 
being an increasingly marginalised political entity on the EU’s foreign policy agenda. 
Current understandings about EU-Africa relations have consistently referred to the extent to 
which power asymmetry has dominated these relations, and how Africa, as a marginal actor 
in world affairs, has been unable to challenge this asymmetry significantly while the EU 
has generally projected its own preferences and policies onto African governments. In 
pointing at evidence from the changing context of EU-Africa relations, it becomes clear 
that although power asymmetry continues to be a defining characteristic in these relations, 
it is by no means a determining characteristic.
The thesis neither aims to propose a model upon which African countries can base 
their relations with the EU henceforth, nor to prescribe a set of guidelines to follow in order 
to ‘get what you want’ from the EU. It merely serves as recognition that EU-Africa
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relations are complex and very much context-bound, and relying merely on assumptions 
that power asymmetry determines how the actors will interact with one another presents a 
rather one-sided view of this relationship. It is mainly for this reason that a more holistic 
approach to analysing these relations was chosen, in terms of considering both EU and 
African perspectives and perceptions of one another and the extent to which these African 
countries are indeed capable or limited in formulating and achieving their preferences vis- 
a-vis the EU. While relevant conclusions can certainly be drawn from adopting a more 
holistic approach to examining the EU’s relations with third countries in general, a 
prescriptive set of guidelines on how or how not to exercise leverage would only serve to 
undermine the complexity and intricacy of interactions between the two continents.
What it does aim to do however, is to challenge and adjust current understandings 
of both the EU’s and Africa’s power and influence in international affairs. In furthering 
current understandings of the EU’s capabilities as a foreign policy actor, and the extent to 
which its policies and actions vis-a-vis Africa can contribute or harm its wider efforts in 
becoming a relevant, coherent, unique, and even powerful foreign policy actor, it is 
possible to move beyond the debate about what kind of power or leader the EU is or is 
aiming to be. In this sense, notions of the EU as ‘soft power,’ as posited by Nye (2004), a 
‘normative power,’ as posited by Manners (2002), or a ‘civilian power’ as posited by 
Duchene (1973), cannot be considered complete without taking account of other actors’ 
perceptions of the EU. Instead, the focus is shifted towards the effectiveness and coherency 
of the EU’s actions abroad, which provides evidence upon which classifying the EU as a 
certain kind of power or actor can actually be based. In addition to this, any debate on what 
the EU’s power actually is capable of or the effectiveness of the EU’s actions abroad 
cannot be considered complete without taking into consideration the perceptions and 
understandings of that power by those same actors the EU’s external policies and actions 
are designed for and projected upon. In order to fully understand the extent of the EU’s 
‘actomess’, as posited by Bretherton and Vogler (2006) amongst others, it is not enough to 
try to situate the EU’s identity as a foreign policy actor, or to identify how congruent the 
EU’s goals are with its capabilities, or whether it is implementing policies coherently and 
effectively. There is therefore a need to move beyond EU-centric analyses of the EU’s 
foreign policy actions and its actomess, which as a basis for classifying the EU as a certain 
kind of power, have focused only on the EU’s actions abroad, but fail to consider how 
others perceive the EU. In considering other actors’ views, a more complete picture 
emerges of the impact and effectiveness of the EU and the implications this may have for 
EU’s role in the world (Lucarelli 2009; Elgstrom 2007). Regardless of what kind of identity
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or role the EU is trying to establish, success in establishing itself as such depends on 
whether other external actors see it as such. If the EU’s sense of power or its own self- 
image is not congruent with other actor’s images of the EU, then classifications of the EU 
as a certain kind of power diminish the usefulness of this as an analytical tool and prove 
largely irrelevant in a real-world context.
In considering African views of the EU, what kind of power does the EU really 
exert according to others? And what does this say about the EU as an international actor? 
More than fifteen years onwards from Hill’s (1993) conceptualisation of the gap that 
existed between the EU’s capabilities, in terms of resources, instruments, cohesiveness and 
consistency, (i.e. the means) and expectations, especially in terms of both the EU’s own 
internal desires and goals and other actors’ hopes and demands of the EU (i.e. the ends), the 
gap has certainly not ‘closed’. Indeed, the gap between capabilities and expectations at the 
internal level seems certainly to have widened. The EU’s actions and policies in Africa 
remain rather incoherent and limited in their effectiveness and impact, yet the EU is 
continuously expanding the scope of its policies and actions on the continent without 
having adequately addressed these original gaps between means and ends, or without 
providing increased capabilities to take on effectively its expanding role. Yet in terms of 
other actors’ expectations of the EU, and especially concerning Africa, this gap may 
actually be narrowing, not necessarily due to higher capabilities, but rather due to lowering 
expectations. That is to say, while the means to effectively engage with Africa have 
remained either the same or are even less, the expectations by African governments of the 
EU are increasingly becoming lower too. This is both cyclical and structural in nature. On 
the one hand, the lowering of expectations is a result of years of somewhat ineffective 
engagement or approaches that are seen as increasingly interest-based rather than based on 
wider values or norms. In looking at other actors’ perceptions of the EU’s power and 
influence, it is clear that although the EU is considered an important actor in Africa and 
governments certainly have numerous interests in cooperating with the EU, expectations of 
the EU have been lowered by its inability to meet these interests or to project a coherent 
policy. Lowered expectations are fuelled by a distinct understanding on the African side 
that despite the EU’s significant structural power, or despite the potential power it 
possesses, most of the EU’s actual efforts are largely interest-based, tend to lack coherency, 
or the mandate to carry out actions is often too restrictive to fully engage with African 
countries as anticipated. In the eyes of others therefore, or at least, in the eyes of the EU’s 
African partners, the EU is seen as possessing tremendous potential for being a powerful
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and relevant actor on the world stage, but either due to a general incapability or 
unwillingness, this potential has not been fully achieved.
On the other hand, the lowering of expectations is structural in nature too, in that 
contextual factors have contributed to narrowing the gap on the expectations side. It is 
increasingly evident that the context in which EU-Africa relations take place is rapidly 
changing, and indeed is now facing a critical turning point. The sudden interest of other 
non-traditional actors in Africa, such as China and India, is bringing with it alternative 
sources of funding, increased investment, rapid infrastructure and energy-sector 
development, and new markets for African exports. These new entities are also affecting 
the way in which African governments now deal with their more traditional partners, often 
giving governments increased bargaining power and confidence to control their own 
agendas without excessive intervention or undermining of country ownership. The onset of 
alternative investment and interest in the continent has consequentially also spurred 
renewed interests and activeness from Africa’s traditional partners, such as the EU. Perhaps 
due to concern that it might lose its preferential relations with Africa or perhaps due to the 
increased opportunities and challenges Africa provides, the EU has significantly stepped up 
its efforts to engage with the continent on a variety of issues that now span well beyond the 
traditional aid and trade frameworks. In this thesis only limited consideration could be 
given to this new intervening factor in EU-Africa relations because of its novelty and 
dynamism making inquiry difficult and inconclusive. However, future research on EU- 
Africa relations will certainly have to consider this new factor ever more closely, as no 
current inquiry on Africa can be considered complete without reflecting on the changes 
ensuing on the continent and how this affects its position and its expectations vis-a-vis one 
of its longest-standing partners.
If the full potential of the EU’s power has not been perceived as having been 
achieved in its relations with other actors, what does this say about the EU’s international 
‘actomess’ or the EU’s international identity? If other actors’ perceptions and expectations 
of the EU have been lowered or altered due to the EU’s inability to effectively engage with 
outsiders, it suggests first of all that much work still needs to be done on measuring the 
effectiveness and impact of the EU’s policies abroad and how its actions are seen by others 
before the EU can correctly be classified as any certain kind of power. If anything, based 
on outsiders’ perceptions, the EU can perhaps be prematurely classified as a ‘conflicted 
power’ or a ‘potential power’. In any case, any considerations of the EU’s power or its 
international identity will certainly have to take better account of the view of those actors 
with which the EU conducts its foreign relations, as it is namely these actors which can
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affirm or negate the true significance of the EU’s ‘actomess’. If the EU has not been able to 
meet other actors’ expectations, it is damaging to the employment of its foreign policy 
objectives as well as to the desire to become a relevant power in the world. Other actors’ 
perceptions of the EU thus put into question such classifications of the EU as a ‘normative 
power’, in terms of the role the EU has seemingly adopted in advancing international norms 
and values such as democracy, human rights, peace, and stability. Indeed, there is a strong 
temptation to imply that strategic interests and even power politics have driven the EU’s 
approach towards Africa much more than the pursuit of core normative values and goals. 
While at least in rhetoric the EU’s foreign policy goals towards Africa certainly take on a 
heavily normative approach, the means by which these goals are pursued and the ends or 
impact of this approach illustrates the extent to which strategic policy concerns mostly 
override normative concerns. Certainly this is how many of its actions have been perceived 
by African governments, in explaining the persistent inconsistencies between rhetoric and 
action, and incoherence between essentially overlapping policies. Furthermore, this also 
suggests that the EU’s policies, actions, and even interests in Africa have been mostly 
reactive, in that they seem to be mainly in response to changing contextual and structural 
conditions and to a lesser degree, in response to external demands, even by African 
governments which have traditionally been considered much weaker than the EU. After a 
period of clear marginalisation on the EU foreign policy agenda, Africa has once again 
started re-acquiring a more prominent position, largely driven by increasing security 
concerns, the desire to secure natural resources in less volatile regions, the growing 
presence of other external actors, and perhaps even due to what some have considered a 
resurgence of assertive third worldism or pan-Africanism (Whitfield 2008a: 368-378; 
Kotsopoulos 2007) that have in some way put Africa back on the agenda. Therefore, it is in 
looking at what the EU actually does abroad, and how effective these actions are 
considered by others, that a more balanced debate can unfold on the EU as a foreign policy 
actor.
4 Future research
While considering other actors’ perceptions and understandings of the EU is a crucial 
element to furthering understandings of the EU as a foreign policy actor, the research 
agenda should also move beyond looking at other actors’ perceptions, and examine how 
these “actually have an influence on the EU’s chance to achieve its goals” (Elgstrom 2007: 
964). The EU’s policies abroad influence other actors’ perceptions of the EU, these 
perceptions inform actors’ strategies towards the EU, and in an environment where power
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is both relational and contextual, these strategies in turn affect the EU’s capacity to reach 
its own preferences. The EU’s foreign policy does not operate in a vacuum, and it is in the 
interactions it has with other actors that its foreign policy identity can actually take shape 
and that the research agenda can make more empirically-informed assertions about the 
EU’s role in the world. This will certainly require many more studies focusing on how 
other actors have formulated their approaches and the extent of their effectiveness in 
forwarding their own strategies onto the EU. In this sense, country case studies and 
comparative studies will prove particularly useful in moving along both the debate on the 
EU’s international identity and the effectiveness of its foreign policy. It is most certainly 
necessary to expand the current research agenda beyond this thesis’ focus on West Africa, 
by exploring the research question in relation to other parts of the continent, the ACP, or 
indeed other developing countries. Extending the research agenda beyond the West African 
region is crucial in understanding the changing power dynamics amongst the EU and Africa 
as a continent as well as in an era of growing regionalism. An extended focus will also have 
to allow therefore, for observation of how the significant acceleration in regionalisation 
processes now taking place in Africa have potentially affected the power dynamics with the 
EU. Although on the one hand regionalisation essentially fragments the continent, it also 
generates a need for understanding how these groupings have managed new challenges in 
negotiating their preferences and demands with the EU. In order for these preliminary 
observations to become more analytically useful, additional case studies in other African or 
even ACP regions would allow for broader scope from which to make improved 
generalisations regarding the power dynamics in EU-Africa relations.
Negotiation theorist William Zartman has rightly noted that if relations between the 
weak and the strong were “only a power play, they could be dismissed as not only 
unimportant but even uninteresting, given the asymmetrical context” (1987: 290). EU- 
Africa relations provide both an important and an interesting perspective on power relations 
between the weak and strong. Not only have African governments demonstrated a capacity 
to formulate relevant strategies vis-a-vis their European partners, they have also been able 
to influence processes and outcomes beyond just negotiating at the margins. It has become 
clear that studying the EU’s relations with Africa has a relevant role to play in shaping our 
understandings of the EU’s international identity, and this needs to be considered both in 
terms of the academic debate on the issue and in terms of the EU’s actual conduct as a 
foreign policy actor. As Africa’s own international role is set to increase in importance and 
relevance in the near future, it has become all the more crucial to reconsider common 
notions of power in an asymmetrical context.
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Appendix I
A rticle 13 o f  the C otonou A greem ent
ARTICLE 13 
Migration
1. The issue of migration shall be the subject of in-depth dialogue in the framework of the 
ACP-EU Partnership.
The Parties reaffirm their existing obligations and commitments in international law to 
ensure respect for human rights and to eliminate all forms of discrimination based 
particularly on origin, sex, race, language and religion.
2. The Parties agree to consider that a partnership implies, with relation to migration, fair 
treatment of third country nationals who reside legally on their territories, integration policy 
aiming at granting them rights and obligations comparable to those of their citizens, 
enhancing non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural life and developing 
measures against racism and xenophobia.
3. The treatment accorded by each Member State to workers of ACP countries legally 
employed in its territory, shall be free from any discrimination based on nationality, as 
regards working conditions, remuneration and dismissal, relative to its own nationals. 
Further in this regard, each ACP State shall accord comparable non-discriminatory 
treatment to workers who are nationals of a Member State.
4. The Parties consider that strategies aiming at reducing poverty, improving living and 
working conditions, creating employment and developing training contribute in the long 
term to normalising migratory flows.
The Parties will take account, in the framework of development strategies and national and 
regional programming, of structural constraints associated with migratory flows with the 
purpose of supporting the economic and social development of the regions from which 
migrants originate and of reducing poverty.
The Community shall support, through national and regional Cooperation programmes, the 
training of ACP nationals in their country of origin, in another ACP country or in a 
Member State of the European Union. As regards training in a Member State, the Parties 
shall ensure that such action is geared towards the vocational integration of ACP nationals 
in their countries of origin. The Parties shall develop cooperation programmes to facilitate 
the access of students from ACP States to education, in particular through the use of new 
communication technologies.
5.(a) In the framework of the political dialogue the Council of Ministers shall examine 
issues arising from illegal immigration with a view to establishing, where appropriate, the 
means for a prevention policy.
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(b) In this context the Parties agree in particular to ensure that the rights and dignity of 
individuals are respected in any procedure initiated to return illegal immigrants to their 
countries of origin. In this connection the authorities concerned shall extend to them the 
administrative facilities necessary for their return.
(c) The Parties further agree that:
(i) each Member State of the European Union shall accept the return of and readmission of 
any of its nationals who are illegally present on the territory of an ACP State, at that State’s 
request and without further formalities; each of the ACP States shall accept the return of 
and readmission of any of its nationals who are illegally present on the territory of a 
Member State of the European Union, at that Member State’s request and without further 
formalities.
The Member States and the ACP States will provide their nationals with appropriate 
identity documents for such purposes. In respect of the Member States of the European 
Union, the obligations in this paragraph apply only in respect of those persons who are to 
be considered their nationals for the Community purposes in accordance with Declaration 
No 2 to the Treaty establishing the European Community. In respect of ACP States, the 
obligations in this paragraph apply only in respect of those persons who are considered as 
their nationals in accordance with their respective legal system.
(ii) at the request of a Party, negotiations shall be initiated with ACP States aiming at 
concluding in good faith and with due regard for the relevant rules of international law, 
bilateral agreements governing specific obligations for the readmission and return of their 
nationals. These agreements shall also cover, if deemed necessary by any of the Parties, 
arrangements for the readmission of third country nationals and stateless persons. Such 
agreements will lay down the details about the categories of persons covered by these 
arrangements as well as the modalities of their readmission and return. Adequate assistance 
to implement these agreements will be provided to the ACP States.
(iii) for the purposes of this point (c), the term “Parties” shall refer to the Community, any 
of its Member States and any ACP State.
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